In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: P. L. G., Parent. ( 2016 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0362
In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
P. L. G., Parent.
Filed August 29, 2016
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge *
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-15-4288
Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Public Defender, Peter W. Gorman, Assistant Public
Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant P.L.G.)
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michelle A. Hatcher, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County Human Services and
Public Health Department)
Alex Brusilovsky, Eden Prairie, Minnesota (for guardian ad litem Jesse Mongrue)
Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.
*
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
KLAPHAKE, Judge
Appellant-mother P.L.G. challenges the termination of her parental rights to her
children, B.C.D.G. and T.L.T. 1 The district court terminated parental rights on four
statutory grounds: failure to comply with parental duties; palpable unfitness; failure of
reasonable county efforts to correct the conditions leading to out-of-home placement; and
children remaining neglected and in foster care. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subds. 1(b)(2),
(4), (5), (8) (2014). Appellant challenges the district court’s decision on all of the statutory
grounds, and argues that termination was not in the children’s best interests, and the district
court erred in admitting five hearsay exhibits as evidence. We affirm.
DECISION
A district court’s decision to terminate parental rights must be supported by one of
the statutory grounds listed in Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b). Whether to terminate
parental rights is “discretionary with the district court.” In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L.,
853 N.W.2d 127, 136 (Minn. 2014). We will affirm a district court’s termination if at least
one statutory basis is proven by clear and convincing evidence and termination is in the
children’s best interests. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 899-902
(Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
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P.L.G. transferred legal custody of a third child, M.W., to his father prior to trial; M.W.
was removed from the termination petition.
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I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in terminating P.L.G.’s parental
rights because she is palpably unfit to parent.
P.L.G. challenges the district court’s finding that she is palpably unfit to parent.
She maintains that, at the time of the termination hearing, she was able to ensure that her
children attended school on time and she had learned to manage their asthma. She also
disputes the district court’s reference to her mental health as grounds for termination as it
was not initially alleged by the county in its petition requesting that the children be
adjudicated in need of protection or services (CHIPS).
A district court may terminate parental rights to a child if the court finds that the
parent
is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship because of
a consistent pattern of specific conduct before the child or of specific
conditions directly relating to the parent and child relationship either of
which are determined by the court to be of a duration or nature that renders
the parent unable, for the reasonably foreseeable future, to care appropriately
for the ongoing, physical, mental, or emotional needs of the child.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4). The county “must prove a consistent pattern of
specific conduct or specific conditions existing at the time of the hearing that appears will
continue for a prolonged, indefinite period and that are permanently detrimental to the
welfare of the child.” In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 661 (Minn. 2008)
(quotation omitted). In a termination-of-parental-rights case, the district court relies “to a
great extent upon the projected permanency of the parent’s inability to care for his or her
child.” In re Welfare of Solomon, 291 N.W.2d 364, 368 (Minn. 1980) (citation omitted).
The district court concluded that P.L.G. was palpably unfit to parent because her
diagnoses of depression, anxiety, and narcissistic personality disorder with strong
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compulsive and histrionic features significantly impairs her ability to function and to
perform life skills. The district court found that P.L.G. feels overwhelmed and anxious,
and is unable to sleep or get out of bed. Her mental-health issues render her unable to
ensure that the children receive proper and timely medical treatment and that they regularly
attend school. It found that P.L.G.’s steadfast denial of her mental-health issues “directly
affects her ability to parent in the present and for the foreseeable future.”
Here, clear and convincing evidence supports the district court’s findings. A
diagnosis of mental illness alone does not “permit termination of parental rights.” In re
Welfare of Kidd, 261 N.W.2d 833, 835 (Minn. 1978). But a termination can be affirmed
when a parent’s mental illness is detrimental to the children. See id. at 836.
P.L.G.’s case plan required her to comply with recommendations arising from her
court-ordered psychological and parenting assessment, which included undergoing a
psychiatric examination and regularly seeing a therapist to address her mental-health
issues. Several county-referred providers testified that P.L.G.’s mental-health issues,
coupled with her low-intellectual functioning, negatively affected her ability to parent. The
children’s court-appointed guardian ad litem (GAL) testified that P.L.G.’s untreated
mental-health issues prevented her from having any insight into her lack of parenting skills
and she is therefore incapable of managing the children’s medical issues or ensuring that
they regularly attend school. Over a fifteen-month period, P.L.G. received intensive, one-
on-one parenting training and education, but failed to demonstrate significant progress.
Several county-referred service providers described P.L.G.’s general intransigence toward
receiving advice, including assistance from a mental-health specialist. She repeatedly
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exhibited confusion as to when to show up for appointments, including court-ordered visits
with her children. The county protection worker testified that P.L.G.’s depression and
anxiety significantly impaired her ability to perform routine, day-to-day tasks, provide a
suitable home for the children with adequate food and furniture, or recognize and address
the children’s medical issues. P.L.G. also presented no evidence that she ever received
mental-health therapy or a psychiatric evaluation.
At trial, P.L.G. categorically denied suffering from any mental-health issues. The
district court found P.L.G.’s statements not credible, and we defer to the court’s credibility
determinations. Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. App. 2000). The
district court’s conclusion that P.L.G.’s conduct will persist for a prolonged, indefinite
period, and that it is permanently detrimental to the welfare of the children, is supported
by clear and convincing evidence. See T.R., 750 N.W.2d at 661.
Because we conclude that termination on the grounds of palpable unfitness to parent
was supported by the record, we do not address P.L.G.’s arguments as to the district court’s
termination on other statutory grounds. See In re Welfare of Children of R.W., 678 N.W.2d
49, 55 (Minn. 2004) (“Termination of parental rights will be affirmed as long as at least
one statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence and
termination is in the child's best interests.”).
II. Termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children.
A district court must not only identify a statutory basis for termination, but must
also determine whether termination is in the child’s best interests. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 7 (2014). When analyzing the child’s best interests, “the court must balance three
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factors: (1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s
interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interests of the
child.” In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992). “Competing interests
include such things as a stable environment, health considerations and the child’s
preferences.” Id. “Where the interests of parent and child conflict, the interests of the child
are paramount.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7.
The district court concluded that it was in the best interests of the children that
P.L.G.’s parental rights be terminated because she would be unable to care for them in the
reasonably foreseeable future due to her unaddressed mental-health and parenting issues.
It found P.L.G.’s intransigence, “whether willful or as a result of her cognitive or mental
abilities,” to be “an absolute roadblock to her progress as a parent.” The district court based
its best-interests determination on the children’s need for permanency, concluding that the
children’s out-of-home placement provided steady, dependable care.
On this record, the district court did not clearly err in finding that termination of
P.L.G.’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. The evidence demonstrates
that P.L.G. loves her children, and that they love her. But the children’s GAL and many
county-referred service providers testified that P.L.G.’s mental-health issues significantly
impaired her parenting abilities.
At the time of trial, the children had been in their current foster home for over a year
and were thriving. “[T]he best interests of a child are not served by delay that precludes
the establishment of parental bonds with the child by either the natural parent or adoptive
parents within the foreseeable future.” In re Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Minn.
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1996). B.C.D.G. was regularly attending school and T.L.T.’s growth and development
were on target. Neither children had experienced any medical issues in foster care.
P.L.G. argues that the district court failed to consider transferring legal custody to
D.P., B.C.D.G.’s paternal grandmother, instead of terminating her parental rights.
“Termination of parental rights and adoption, or guardianship to the commissioner of
human services through a consent to adopt, are preferred permanency options for a child
who cannot return home.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.513(a) (2014). “If the court finds that
termination of parental rights and guardianship to the commissioner is not in the child’s
best interests, the court may transfer permanent legal and physical custody of the child to
a relative when that order is in the child’s best interests.” Id.
We are concerned by the district court’s failure to address P.L.G.’s proposal to shift
legal custody to D.P., and the lack of findings preclude us from engaging in any meaningful
appellate review on this issue. But we are unable to assign error because the statute does
not require the district court to make findings regarding transfers of legal custody in its
determination of the children’s best interests. See id.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged
exhibits.
Evidentiary rulings are discretionary with the district court, and we will reverse only
if the ruling was an abuse of discretion and it prejudiced the objecting party. In re Welfare
of Children of J.B., 698 N.W.2d 160, 172 (Minn. App. 2005), review dismissed (Minn.
May 3, 2005).
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P.L.G. challenges the admissibility of five exhibits, arguing that the county failed
to establish a sufficient foundation for admission under the business-records exception to
the hearsay rule. Under Minn. R. Evid. 803(6), a party seeking to have a document
admitted as a business record must present testimony establishing that
the records were (1) made by a person with personal knowledge of the
matters recorded and a business duty to report accurately or from information
transmitted by a person with such knowledge, (2) made at or near the time of
the recorded event, (3) kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity, and (4) made as part of the regular practice of that business activity.
In re Welfare of Child of Simon, 662 N.W.2d 155, 160 (Minn. App. 2003). While Rule
803(6) does not require the records custodian to testify, it does require the witness laying
foundation “to be familiar with how the business in question compiles its documents.” Id.The disputed exhibits consist of medical records of P.L.G.’s two sons, M.W. and T.L.T.; a
diagnostic and functional assessment of P.L.G. completed by an Adult Rehabilitative
Mental Health Service (ARMHS) employee; and monthly progress notes by an ARMHS
parenting educator concerning her contact with P.L.G.
We conclude that the county generally failed to establish that the exhibits satisfied
Rule 803(6). See Simon, 662 N.W.2d at 160 (concluding that a social worker was unable
to provide foundation for a therapist’s notes and that his testimony did not satisfy the
foundational requirements of Rule 803(6)). We note, however, that the assistant director
of ARMHS provided sufficient foundation for Exhibit 51, the monthly progress notes
prepared by an ARMHS parenting educator. See id. at 160-61.
P.L.G. argues that she was prejudiced by the district court’s admission of these
objected-to documents because she was deprived of the opportunity to cross examine the
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authors of the exhibits, and because the exhibits contained double hearsay. We recognize
county attorneys are increasingly relying on written hearsay materials in child-protection
cases due to the “mushrooming body of judicial activity” in this area of law, but we caution
the county against sidestepping its legal obligation to comply with the rules of evidence.
See In re Welfare of D.J.N., 568 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Minn. App. 1997).
Nevertheless, we conclude that P.L.G. was not prejudiced because substantial
independent and undisputedly admissible evidence supported the district court’s findings.
P.L.G. also does not assert that the records are inaccurate or unreliable. See Simon, 662
N.W.2d at 160 (noting that business records are “presumed to be reliable”). And because
this was a bench trial, any prejudice stemming from erroneously admitted evidence would
be minimal. State v. Burrell, 772 N.W.2d 459, 467 (Minn. 2009) (recognizing the
diminished risk of unfair prejudice in a bench trial).
Affirmed.
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