Robert Edward Dornbusch v. Commissioner of Public Safety , 860 N.W.2d 381 ( 2015 )


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  •                                STATE OF MINNESOTA
    IN COURT OF APPEALS
    A14-1236
    Robert Edward Dornbusch, petitioner,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    Commissioner of Public Safety,
    Respondent.
    Filed March 2, 2015
    Affirmed
    Ross, Judge
    Hennepin County District Court
    File No. 27-CV-12-21256
    Robert Edward Dornbusch, Winona, Minnesota (pro se appellant)
    Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Jacob Fischmann, Assistant Attorney General, Rory C.
    Mattson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
    Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Kirk, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.
    SYLLABUS
    When a district court reviews the commissioner of public safety’s decision under
    the implied-consent statute to revoke the license of a driver whose chemical-test results
    indicated the presence of a Schedule II controlled substance, the district court may not
    rescind the revocation on the ground that the drug’s presence resulted from the driver’s
    lawful use of the drug under a physician’s prescription.
    OPINION
    ROSS, Judge
    A sample of Robert Dornbusch’s blood tested positive for amphetamine after
    police stopped him in Deephaven in July 2012 and field sobriety testing indicated that he
    was impaired. The public safety commissioner revoked Dornbusch’s driver’s license for
    90 days. Dornbusch contested the revocation in district court, arguing that the revocation
    cannot stand because the positive test resulted from his lawful use of a prescription drug.
    The district court made no fact findings on the assertion. It instead rejected the argument
    on the legal ground that the prescription-drug affirmative criminal defense does not apply
    in administrative license-revocation proceedings under the implied-consent statute.
    Dornbusch appeals. Because the district court was correct, we affirm.
    ISSUE
    After the commissioner of public safety revokes the license of a driver whose
    chemical-test results indicated the presence of a Schedule II controlled substance, may a
    district court on judicial review rescind the revocation on the ground that the positive
    indication resulted from the driver’s lawful use of the substance under a physician’s
    prescription?
    ANALYSIS
    The commissioner of public safety must revoke a driver’s license under the
    administrative provisions of the impaired-driving law if certain conditions exist, such as
    the presence of a Schedule II controlled substance in a driver suspected of driving while
    impaired:
    2
    Upon certification by the peace officer that there existed
    probable cause to believe the person had been driving . . . a
    motor vehicle in violation of section 169A.20 (driving while
    impaired) and that the person submitted to a test and the test
    results indicate . . . the presence of a controlled substance
    listed in Schedule I or II or its metabolite, . . . then the
    commissioner shall revoke the person’s license.
    Minn. Stat. § 169A.52, subd. 4(a) (2014). The amphetamine detected in Dornbusch’s
    blood after his arrest for suspected impaired driving is a Schedule II controlled substance.
    Minn. Stat. § 152.02, subd. 3(d)(1) (2014). Dornbusch’s license revocation was therefore
    mandatory.
    Dornbusch challenges the district court’s holding that the affirmative prescription-
    drug defense does not apply to the district court’s review of the revocation. The defense
    certainly could apply in a driving-while-impaired criminal proceeding in which liability
    is based solely on the presence of a controlled substance in the driver’s body:
    If proven by a preponderance of the evidence, it is an
    affirmative defense to a violation of section 169A.20
    subdivision 1, clause (7) (presence of Schedule I or II
    controlled substance), that the defendant used the controlled
    substance according to the terms of a prescription issued for
    the defendant in accordance with sections 152.11 and 152.12.
    Minn. Stat. § 169A.46, subd. 2 (2014). The question we must answer—whether the
    defense could also apply in a driving-while-impaired administrative proceeding—is a
    matter of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. See State v. Rohan, 
    834 N.W.2d 223
    , 226 (Minn. App. 2013), review denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2013).
    Although the statutory prescription-drug defense expressly applies in cases
    involving “a violation of section 169A.20, subdivision 1, clause (7),” the impaired-
    3
    driving chapter says nothing to suggest that it applies outside that criminal context. And
    the provision that governs judicial review of license revocations specifically identifies the
    “limited” issues to be resolved in a judicial-review proceeding: “The scope of the hearing
    is limited to the issues in clauses (1) to (10).” Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b) (2014).
    The issues in four of those clauses refer to test refusal, commercial vehicles, or motor
    vehicle accidents, and these involve circumstances plainly irrelevant to Dornbusch’s
    revocation. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b)(3), (4), (7), (9). The remaining six
    issues are these:
    (1) Did the peace officer have probable cause to believe the
    person was driving, operating, or in physical control of a
    motor vehicle . . . in violation of section 169A.20 (driving
    while impaired)?
    (2) Was the person lawfully placed under arrest for violation
    of section 169A.20?
    ....
    (5) If the screening test was administered, did the test indicate
    an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more?
    (6) At the time of the request for the test, did the peace officer
    inform the person of the person’s rights and the consequences
    of taking or refusing the test as required by section 169A.51,
    subdivision 2?
    ....
    (8) If a test was taken by a person driving, operating, or in
    physical control of a motor vehicle, did the test results
    indicate at the time of testing: (i) an alcohol concentration of
    0.08 or more; or (ii) the presence of a controlled substance
    listed in Schedule I or II or its metabolite, other than
    marijuana or tetrahydrocannabinols?
    4
    ....
    (10) Was the testing method used valid and reliable and were
    the test results accurately evaluated?
    
    Id. The prescription-drug
    defense does not appear in this list of “limited” issues. And the
    supreme court has recently emphasized that the list is exclusive. See Axelberg v. Comm’r
    of Pub. Safety, 
    848 N.W.2d 206
    , 208–09 (Minn. 2014) (prohibiting driver from raising
    necessity defense in revocation proceeding because the defense is not in the statute’s
    issues list). We therefore hold that a district court reviewing the commissioner of public
    safety’s decision to revoke the license of a driver whose chemical test results indicated
    the presence of a Schedule II controlled substance may not rescind the revocation on the
    ground that the positive indication resulted from the driver’s prescribed, lawful use of the
    substance.
    We understand the rationale behind the prescription-drug defense in criminal
    proceedings. That the impaired-driving statute expressly imposes no criminal liability on
    a person who is not under the influence of prescribed medicine but who drives after
    ingesting the medicine follows naturally from the fact that many Schedule II controlled
    substances have accepted medical uses. See Minn. Stat. § 152.02, subd. 7(2) (2014)
    (setting out “currently accepted medical use” as a criterion for classification in Schedule
    II). For example, Schedule II includes the stimulants amphetamine (Dexedrine, Adderall),
    methamphetamine (Desoxyn), and methylphenidate (Ritalin, Concerta), and it also
    includes the narcotics hydromorphone (Dilaudid), methadone (Dolophine), oxycodone
    (OxyContin, Percocet), fentanyl (Sublimaze, Duragesic), morphine, codeine, and
    5
    hydrocodone. 
    Id., subd. 3(b)(1)(ii)(B),
    (F), (G), (I), (J), (c)(10), (16), (d)(1), (2), (4); see
    U.S. Dep’t of Justice, D.E.A., Lists of Scheduling Actions, Controlled Substances,
    Regulated Chemicals (Feb. 2015), available at www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedules
    (identifying commercial names of controlled substances). The statute indicates that these
    drugs are listed in Schedule II primarily to address potential abuse and dependence,
    Minn. Stat. § 152.02, subd. 7(2), not to thwart their intended prescribed use by drivers.
    And we recognize that nothing in the implied-consent law suggests that the
    legislature intended that a driver, despite not necessarily being criminally liable for
    driving while properly using a prescribed drug, would nevertheless be administratively
    liable and lose his license with no judicial remedy to void the revocation. We therefore do
    not suppose that the legislature contemplated this result when it limited the scope of
    judicial review proceedings to the ten listed issues in section 169A.53, subdivision 3(b).
    But our holding is required by the admonition not to add words when construing a statute,
    even words that the legislature has apparently inadvertently omitted. Martinco v.
    Hastings, 
    265 Minn. 490
    , 497, 
    122 N.W.2d 631
    , 638 (1963) (“[C]ourts cannot supply that
    which the legislature purposely omits or inadvertently overlooks.”). For these reasons, we
    follow the statute’s plain language and the Axelberg court’s holding, and we affirm the
    district court’s decision.
    We add that we are aware of, but have no basis to apply, a very narrow exception
    to the plain-language rule. In an exceptional situation, applying a statute’s plain words
    might obviously and directly controvert, rather than follow, the legislature’s clear and
    manifest purpose. See, e.g., State v. Retzlaff, 
    807 N.W.2d 437
    , 440 (Minn. App. 2011)
    6
    (“[W]e are convinced that this is one of those rare circumstances in which we cannot both
    follow a statute’s plain language and avoid an absurd result that contradicts the statute’s
    obvious intent.”), aff’d mem., 
    842 N.W.2d 565
    (Minn. 2012); see also Mut. Serv. Cas.
    Ins. Co. v. League of Minn. Cities Ins. Trust, 
    659 N.W.2d 755
    , 761–62 (Minn. 2003)
    (summarizing decisions and clarifying that “the court could disregard the plain language
    of a statute only where the legislative purpose was clear and the plain meaning would
    utterly confound that purpose”). The rare exception does not apply here because,
    although the legislature has expressly prevented criminal impaired-driving liability
    arising from the mere presence of a prescription drug in a driver’s body due to lawful use,
    it has not expressly established its intent to extend this protection to prevent license
    revocation. It is not our prerogative to reconcile the gap between the criminal provisions
    and the administrative provisions in the impaired-driving law. “This public policy
    concern should be directed to the [l]egislature because we must read this state’s laws as
    they are, not as some argue they should be.” 
    Axelberg, 848 N.W.2d at 212
    .
    DECISION
    Because Dornbusch’s use of prescription drugs is not one of the limited issues that
    the district court may resolve in its judicial review of the commissioner’s license-
    revocation decision, the district court here correctly rejected Dornbusch’s attempt to
    invoke the criminal prescription-drug defense.
    Affirmed.
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Document Info

Docket Number: A14-1236

Citation Numbers: 860 N.W.2d 381

Filed Date: 3/2/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023