In the Matter of the Welfare of: D.N.W., Child. ( 2017 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0910
In the Matter of the Welfare of: D.N.W., Child
Filed February 6, 2017
Affirmed
Peterson, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-16-487
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Susan J. Andrews, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant D.N.W.)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jean E. Burdorf, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent State of Minnesota)
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PETERSON, Judge
In this juvenile-delinquency appeal, appellant challenges the district court’s
determination that he assaulted “a family or household member.” We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant D.N.W. and the victim, M.T.G., met through social media in December
2015. After meeting in person, they dated for about two weeks. M.T.G. did not recall how
many times she visited D.N.W.’s house, but she estimated that it was four or five times.
Although the relationship was brief, on numerous occasions, D.N.W. asked M.T.G. to
move to Florida with him. According to M.T.G., the couple argued “constantly,” with the
disputes sometimes becoming physical, so M.T.G. decided to end the relationship. D.N.W.
was upset about M.T.G.’s decision, and M.T.G. testified that he would not let her leave
him.
A couple of days before Christmas, D.N.W. contacted M.T.G. and asked her to
come and stay with him at his house for the week. On Christmas Day, M.T.G. met D.N.W.
at a shopping mall, and they left together in D.N.W.’s car. They got into an argument when
M.T.G. tried to make it clear to D.N.W. that she did not want to be in a relationship with
him. M.T.G. decided that she wanted to go home, but D.N.W. ignored her repeated
requests to bring her home and, instead, drove to his house. D.N.W. yelled at M.T.G. and
would not let her get out of the car.
Eventually, M.T.G. got out of the car and began running away, but D.N.W. caught
up with her. D.N.W. claimed that the sweatshirt that M.T.G. was wearing was his, and he
ripped the sweatshirt off M.T.G. He also ripped off M.T.G.’s earrings and pulled off her
necklace. D.N.W. repeatedly pushed, shoved, and punched M.T.G., and he kicked garbage
cans at her. M.T.G. had her cell phone in her hand and was trying to call someone to come
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and get her when D.N.W. grabbed the phone out of her hand, broke it in half, and threw it
across the street. M.T.G. used a bystander’s phone to call 911.
D.N.W. was charged with misdemeanor criminal damage to property and
misdemeanor domestic assault. The case was tried to the district court, and the district
court found that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that D.N.W. committed both
offenses. See Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 13.09 (stating that “[w]ithin seven (7) days of the
conclusion of the trial, the court shall make a general finding that the allegations in the
charging document have or have not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt” and “[w]ithin
fifteen (15) days of the conclusion of the trial, the court shall in addition specifically find
the essential facts that support a general finding that the allegations in the charging
document have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt”). The district court stayed
adjudication of delinquency on both counts and placed appellant on probation. This appeal
followed.
DECISION
“On appeal from a determination that each of the elements of a delinquency petition
have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, an appellate court is limited to ascertaining
whether, given the facts and legitimate inferences, a fact-finder could reasonably make that
determination. This court must assume that the fact-finder believed the state’s witnesses
and disbelieved any contrary evidence.” In re Welfare of T.N.Y., 632 N.W.2d 765, 768
(Minn. App. 2001) (quotation and citation omitted); see also In re Welfare of M.E.M., 674
N.W.2d 208, 215 (Minn. App. 2004) (stating that the same standard of review applies to
court trials and jury trials).
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Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo. State v.
Mauer, 741 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. 2007). “It is the exclusive province of the legislature
to define by statute what acts shall constitute a crime . . . .” State v. Forsman, 260 N.W.2d
160, 164 (Minn. 1977). “[W]e will not add to [a] statute what the legislature has
intentionally or inadvertently omitted.” State v. Adickes, 741 N.W.2d 904, 906 (Minn.
App. 2007).
The domestic-assault statute provides that a person who “intentionally inflicts or
attempts to inflict bodily harm” against “a family or household member” commits an
assault. Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(2) (2014). The statutory definition of “family or
household members” includes “persons involved in a significant romantic or sexual
relationship.” Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(b)(7) (2014). The definition statute also
provides:
In determining whether persons are or have been involved in a
significant romantic or sexual relationship . . ., the court shall
consider the length of time of the relationship; type of
relationship; frequency of interaction between the parties; and,
if the relationship has terminated, length of time since the
termination.
Id. The district court’s findings of fact specifically address the length of time of the
relationship, the type of relationship, and the length of time between the termination of the
relationship and the assault.
Regarding the length of time of the relationship, the district court found that D.N.W.
and M.T.G. “had a brief romantic relationship.” Although the relationship was brief, the
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court noted that D.N.W. wanted to spend time with M.T.G. on Christmas and had
mentioned her moving to Florida with him.
In addressing the type of relationship, the district court cited M.T.G.’s statement to
police that D.N.W. was “her ex-boyfriend” and her trial testimony that D.N.W. followed
her when she tried to walk away “after telling him she no longer wanted to date him.” The
district court specifically found that M.T.G.’s testimony was credible and consistent with
her earlier statement to police.
Regarding the length of time since termination, the district court found that D.N.W.
“became upset when M.T.G. said she did not want to date him anymore.” Although M.T.G.
had tried to end the relationship earlier, she testified that D.N.W. would not let her leave
the relationship, and her testimony about what occurred on Christmas Day was that the
assault occurred immediately after termination of the relationship.
Addressing the length-of-time and type-of-relationship factors, D.N.W. argues that
the evidence is insufficient to prove that he and M.T.G. were involved in a significant
relationship because, when the assault occurred, he and M.T.G. had been dating for only
about two weeks; during that time, they frequently argued about whether they should be a
couple; and both he and M.T.G. were teenagers. But the domestic-assault statute contains
no age or time limit and, although D.N.W. and M.T.G. may have argued frequently, the
evidence supports the district court’s findings on the statutory factors, and the district
court’s findings on those factors support its determination that D.N.W. and M.T.G. were
“involved in a significant romantic . . . relationship.”
Affirmed.
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