State of Minnesota v. Melvin Eugene Snoddy ( 2016 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1525
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Melvin Eugene Snoddy,
Appellant.
Filed November 21, 2016
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-14-13444
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda K. Jenny, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Mark D. Nyvold,
Special Assistant Public Defender, Fridley, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Johnson, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant challenges his second-degree criminal-sexual-conduct conviction under
Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (2012), arguing that the district court erred by denying
his motion to issue judicial subpoenas for the victim’s medical records. We affirm.
FACTS
In October 2013, seven-year-old L.J. attended a party at a relative’s house.
According to L.J., after the party, she was driven with her brothers to appellant Melvin
Snoddy’s house to spend the night. She changed clothes at Snoddy’s house and was
wearing only underwear and one of Snoddy’s t-shirts while watching television before
bed. Snoddy touched her vagina with his hand on top of her underwear. Because L.J.
felt uncomfortable, she asked to go to her room to sleep. Snoddy took L.J. into the
bedroom and asked if he could lay down by her, but L.J. refused. Although Snoddy later
denied any sexual conduct with L.J., he admitted hosting a family get-together in 2012 or
2013, after which L.J. and her brothers slept at his house.
L.J. testified that she told her mother about the incident but her mother did nothing
in response. Approximately two months after the incident, L.J. told her grandmother
about the sexual conduct. Her grandmother took L.J. to the doctor and to a forensic
interviewing service. L.J.’s grandmother also provided this information to the police,
who charged Snoddy with second-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Before trial, Snoddy moved for an in camera review of the documents in L.J.’s
family’s child-protection case, claiming that information involved the same incident of
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sexual abuse and would be relevant to his defense. The district court granted the motion.
After an in camera review of the child-protection records for L.J.’s family, the district
court provided Snoddy with a single page of the records that included the statement that
L.J. “has a mental health diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder.”
At a motion hearing four days before trial, Snoddy moved to subpoena L.J.’s
medical records from two facilities on the ground that false delusions and inability to
distinguish fantasy from reality are symptoms of schizoaffective disorder and, therefore,
based on L.J.’s “diagnosis,” the records might be relevant to L.J.’s credibility as a
witness. The district court denied Snoddy’s motion, articulating three reasons:
(1) Snoddy failed to make a sufficient showing that the evidence would be material and
favorable, (2) evidence of the diagnosis would not be relevant and would be unfairly
prejudicial, and (3) the motion was untimely and would result in a third continuance of
trial.
Snoddy also requested that the district court conduct a competency hearing of L.J.
because of her age and potential mental-health condition. The district court conducted
the hearing and found L.J. to be a competent witness. Snoddy’s theory of defense at trial
was that L.J. is a liar whose story was inconsistent. Snoddy’s counsel sought to impeach
L.J.’s credibility based on her alleged history of telling falsehoods, including asking L.J.
questions about the fact that her grandfather made her “hustle” to get money for him by
lying to people about selling cookie dough or needing money for a trip. The jury found
Snoddy guilty of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. This appeal follows.
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DECISION
Snoddy argues that the information in L.J.’s medical records was potentially
probative of L.J.’s credibility as a witness, and therefore his motion requesting judicial
subpoenas for those records should have been granted. We review a district court’s
decision to limit a defendant’s use of medical records to impeach a witness for abuse of
discretion. State v. Evans, 756 N.W.2d 854, 872 (Minn. 2008).
Medical records are generally protected from disclosure due to the physician-
patient privilege. See Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(d), (g) (2014). But “the medical
privilege ‘sometimes must give way to a defendant’s right to confront his accusers.’”
Evans, 756 N.W.2d at 872 (quoting State v. Kutchara, 350 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Minn.
1984)). Even if a defendant is granted access to confidential material, it is not direct
access—the evidence is first screened by the district court, which reviews the medical
records in camera to determine whether the privilege must give way. Id.; State v.
Hummel, 483 N.W.2d 68, 71 (Minn. 1992). “This approach ‘strikes a fairer balance
between the interest of the privilege holder in having his confidences kept and the interest
of the criminal defendant in obtaining all relevant evidence that might help in his
defense.’” Evans, 756 N.W.2d at 872 (quoting State v. Paradee, 403 N.W.2d 640, 642
(Minn. 1987)).
A defendant has no right to have a district court review confidential material
unless certain prerequisites are satisfied. Hummel, 483 N.W.2d at 72. Before a district
court will review records in camera, “a defendant must make some showing that a
confidential file contains information that would be material and favorable to his case.”
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Evans, 756 N.W.2d at 872-73 (citing Hummel, 483 N.W.2d at 72). “Evidence is material
only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable
probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” State v.
Wildenberg, 573 N.W.2d 692, 697 (Minn. 1998) (quoting United States v. Baglely, 473
U.S. 667, 682, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383 (1985)).
The supreme court’s analysis of this issue in Evans is instructive. Following his
conviction of first-degree murder of a peace officer, Evans appealed on multiple grounds,
including the claim that the district court erred by limiting his access to the medical
records of a witness to the murder who testified at trial. Evans, 756 N.W.2d at 862. The
witness saw the murder while driving home with his family at approximately 2:00 a.m.
on May 6. Id. at 861. Evans had learned by reviewing transcripts of police interviews of
the witness’s parents that the witness had agreed to go to the hospital on the night of May
5 following a family intervention. Id. at 871. The witness’s mother told the police that
the witness was schizophrenic although he had not been diagnosed as such. Id. Both
parents advised the police that while the witness sometimes had hallucinations, he “was
fine” the night of the shooting. Id. at 872.
Evans requested that the district court review all of the witness’s medical records
for information that might relate to the witness’s symptoms of schizophrenia, arguing that
the records were reasonably likely to contain information related to the witness’s
credibility. Id. at 871-72. The district court limited its review to the May 5 records and
subsequently ordered production of a one-page redacted copy of the May 5 records. Id.
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at 872. On review, the supreme court stated, “At most, Evans established that the records
from the May 5 visit might contain [information that would have been material and
favorable to Evans’s ability to cast doubt on the witness’s testimony],” but “Evans did
not make any showing that any medical records existed prior to or after the May 5 visit”
that would also contain relevant information. Id. at 873. As a result, the supreme court
concluded that “the district court properly balanced [the witness’s] right to privacy
against Evans’s right of confrontation and gave Evans access to that information
potentially probative of [the witness’s] credibility.” Id.
Here, Snoddy contends that he made the requisite showing that the evidence was
material and favorable by: (1) stating why he was seeking the information, (2) providing
a page of the child-protection record that referred to a diagnosis of schizoaffective
disorder, and (3) describing symptoms of the disorder at the motion hearing. Snoddy
conceded in argument:
[W]e’re not sure what all these records show, but what we’re
trying to determine is whether there was an actual diagnosis
of schizoaffective disorder . . . . [B]ut for us to evaluate
whether there is evidence there that could be useful to the
defense, we’d like to review those—those medical records.
The state contends that the district court properly determined that Snoddy failed to
make a plausible showing that the information was material and favorable to Snoddy’s
defense and that an isolated reference to a mental-health diagnosis in a non-medical
record should not have enabled Snoddy to have access to L.J.’s medical records. We
agree.
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The district court denied Snoddy’s motion for judicial subpoenas on the basis that
Snoddy failed to make a showing that L.J.’s records contained material and favorable
information that could be used at trial, noting that the “diagnosis” of schizoaffective
disorder was not a fact but rather an allegation by someone in the child-protection section
of the county attorney’s office.
Following careful consideration, the district court stated:
We’ve had many hearings on this case. The most recent was
a—a detailed in camera inspection of the records, which I
then did disclose. There is the references that you made to the
schizoaffective disorder. It’s not very clear at all. I know you
know that and that’s why you’re asking for more. It’s not
clear at all whether the victim had—actually suffers from this
disorder as a diagnosis, you know, and was on medication or
who knows what.
I also don’t know—and I’ve read your—your—your
request which defines schizoaffective disorder. I guess for
purposes of this hearing I can take your word for it. I mean,
we haven’t had a hearing on what that even means, but
your—your National Library of Medicine and National
Institutes of Health definition is where you get your delusions
and false beliefs and delusions, et cetera. I mean, again, like I
said, I guess for purposes of this hearing, I’ll take your word
for it. I don’t know if that’s true or not.
. . . [E]ven if this child has that diagnosis, it’s a
legitimate full-blown diagnosis, I wouldn’t let you put that
evidence in anyway because it would be probative—more
prejudicial than probative because it would only be relevant in
so far as this person is either a liar or not a liar because of a
diagnosis or for any other reason, right? So if you have
witnesses who want to get on the stand and say she’s a liar
and you can lay a proper foundation, you can do that under
Rule 608, under Rule 405.
....
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A diagnosis is irrelevant to that. Because either she
has a diagnosis or she doesn’t, and either her diagnosis leads
to her making stuff up or being a liar or it doesn’t. If it makes
it more likely that she lies about stuff, then we’ll know that—
then you’ll put that evidence in like you would any other
witness regardless of diagnosis.
Because Snoddy failed to make a sufficient showing for an in camera review of
L.J.’s medical records, we conclude that the district court properly exercised its discretion
by denying his motion for judicial subpoenas.
Affirmed.
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