State of Minnesota v. Abel Gonyamonquah Miamen ( 2016 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1896
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Abel Gonyamonquah Miamen,
Appellant.
Filed December 5, 2016
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge
Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-15-2073
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Samuel J. Clark, St. Paul City Attorney, Kyle A. Lundgren, Laura A. Pietan, Assistant City
Attorneys, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of violating a domestic abuse no contact order
on the grounds that (1) the district court erred by admitting relationship evidence and
(2) the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument. We affirm.
FACTS
This appeal arises out of appellant Abel Miamen’s conviction of violating a
domestic abuse no contact order (DANCO) against former girlfriend, N.P. On March 21,
2015, at 2:00 a.m., St. Paul police officers responded to a disturbance in a parking lot
behind a club and observed a group of people fighting. Appellant informed an officer that
he was with his girlfriend, N.P., and they were looking for a ride home. A routine records
search revealed that N.P. had an active DANCO against appellant. The officers arrested
appellant for violating the DANCO and arrested N.P. and several other individuals for
participating in the fight. The officers placed appellant into custody at the Ramsey County
Law Enforcement Center. While in custody, appellant called an unidentified female,
provided her with N.P.’s phone number, and instructed her to tell N.P. to have the DANCO
lifted.
The state charged appellant with violating a DANCO and the matter proceeded to a
jury trial. The state sought to introduce relationship evidence at trial, including
(1) appellant’s May 2013 domestic assault strangulation conviction and (2) the in-custody
phone calls during which appellant attempted to locate N.P. and directed “an unidentified
female to tell [N.P.] to cancel the [DANCO].” The defense objected to introduction of the
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evidence at trial. The district court admitted the evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 or,
in the alternative, under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b). The district court held that
appellant’s domestic abuse strangulation conviction was “relevant,” placed the relationship
“in context,” because it provided the basis for the DANCO and demonstrated “absence or
lack of mistake[] or accident.” The district court characterized the in-custody phone calls
as “clearly relationship evidence” under section 634.20, and ruled that the evidence was
also admissible under rule 404(b) to prove appellant’s “state of mind, intent, knowledge of
the no contact order, and lack of mistake or accident.” In both instances, the district court
determined that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the danger of unfair
prejudice.
The district court read a cautionary instruction before admitting the evidence:
Members of the jury, the State is about to introduce evidence
of occurrences on May 4th, 2013 . . . . This evidence is being
offered for the limited purpose of assisting you in determining
whether the defendant committed those acts with which the
defendant is charged in this complaint and for demonstrating
the nature and extent of the relationship between the defendant
and [N.P.]. This evidence is not to be used to prove the
character of the defendant or that defendant acted in
conformity with such character. The defendant is not being
tried for, may not be convicted of, any offense, other than the
charged offense. You are not to convict defendant on basis of
occurrences on May 4, 2013 . . . , to do so might result in unjust
double punishment.
The state called a Minneapolis police officer to provide testimony about appellant’s
domestic assault strangulation conviction. The officer testified that he responded to an
incident at appellant’s house in May 2013, when appellant punched N.P. in the face with
his closed right fist, pulled her into a shower and ran hot water over her, punched her in the
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head while she held their child, kicked her in the stomach, and placed both hands around
her neck and applied pressure until she began to lose consciousness.
The state also presented evidence that appellant had been convicted of an attempted
DANCO violation, based upon the in-custody phone calls following his March 2015 arrest.
The jury found appellant guilty of the offense. This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The district court did not err by admitting relationship evidence.
a. A DANCO violation qualifies as domestic conduct.
Minnesota Statutes section 634.20 (2014) governs the admissibility of evidence
related to a defendant’s prior incidents of domestic abuse. State v. Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d
752, 755 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Oct. 9, 2008). This evidence is
commonly referred to as “relationship evidence.” State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 549
(Minn. 2010). Relationship evidence is distinct from rule 404(b) bad-acts evidence
because it evinces “prior conduct between the accused and the alleged victim and may be
offered to illuminate the history of the relationship, that is, to put the crime charged in the
context of the relationship between the two.” State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 159 (Minn.
2004), superseded by statute 2002 Minn. Laws ch. 314, § 9, at 516 (codified at Minn. Stat.
§ 634.20 (2002)), as recognized in Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d at 755. A defendant is presumed
to be aware that his prior relationship with the victim, “particularly in so far as it involves
ill will or quarrels,” may be offered against him at trial. Id. at 159-60 (quotation omitted).
We review a district court’s decision to admit relationship evidence for an abuse of
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discretion. Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d at 755. Appellant bears the burden of establishing that
the district court abused its discretion and that he was prejudiced. Id.
Minnesota Statutes section 634.20 provides that:
Evidence of domestic conduct by the accused against
the victim of domestic conduct, or against other family or
household members, is admissible unless the probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence. “Domestic conduct”
includes, but is not limited to, evidence of domestic abuse,
violation of an order for protection under section 518B.01;
violation of a harassment restraining order under section
609.748; or violation of section 609.749 or 609.79, subdivision
1. “Domestic abuse” and “family or household members” have
the meanings given under section 518B.01, subdivision 2.
Minn. Stat. § 634.20.
Appellant argues that evidence of his past convictions was not admissible as
relationship evidence because a DANCO violation does not constitute “domestic conduct”
as that term is defined in Minn. Stat. § 634.20. The statute defines “domestic conduct” as
“evidence of domestic abuse, violation of an order for protection under section 518B.01;
violation of a harassment restraining order under section 609.748; or violation of section
609.749 or 609.79, subdivision 1.” Id. Appellant argues that the legislature included
DANCO violations in its definition of “qualified domestic violence-related offenses” in
Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(c), but elected not to characterize “qualified domestic
violence-related offenses” as “domestic conduct” in section 634.20. Therefore, appellant
argues that DANCO violations are excluded from the statutory definition of “domestic
abuse” under a plain reading of the statute.
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We are not persuaded. First, a DANCO violation is only issued by a court in a
criminal proceeding related to domestic conduct crimes. See Minn. Stat. § 629.75,
subd. 1(1) (2014). A DANCO may be issued in cases involving: (1) a domestic abuse
crime as defined in Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2; (2) harassment or stalking a family or
household member under Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2; (3) a violation of an order for
protection; or (4) a violation of a previous DANCO. See id. Because a DANCO violation
necessarily implicates domestic conduct, it would be absurd to exclude it from section
634.20’s scope. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2014) (articulating the presumption that the
legislature does not intend an absurd result). Moreover, appellant’s argument ignores the
statutory provision that “‘[d]omestic conduct’ includes, but is not limited to, evidence of
domestic abuse.” Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (emphasis added). Considering the statute as a
whole, we determine that a DANCO violation qualifies as domestic conduct under a plain
reading of section 634.20. See State v. Mayl, 836 N.W.2d 368, 370 (Minn. App. 2013)
(“We do not examine different provisions in isolation, but interpret them within their
broader statutory context.”), review denied (Minn. Nov. 12, 2013). We therefore conclude
that evidence of appellant’s DANCO violation conviction may properly be considered
“domestic conduct” within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 634.20.
b. The probative value of the relationship evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect.
Relationship evidence is admissible unless the probative value of that evidence is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Minn. Stat. § 634.20.
“When balancing the probative value against the potential prejudice, unfair prejudice is not
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merely damaging evidence, even severely damaging evidence; rather, unfair prejudice is
evidence that persuades by illegitimate means, giving one party an unfair advantage.”
Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d at 757 (quotations omitted).
The district court determined that the probative value of the evidence outweighed
the danger of unfair prejudice. The district court found that the domestic abuse
strangulation conviction was “relevant” and placed the relationship “in context,” and that
the DANCO violation arising out of the in-custody phone calls lent context to the parties’
relationship. In both instances, the district court found that the probative value of the
evidence outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice. The district court’s decision is
supported by our previous decisions. See, e.g., Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d at 756 (stating that
evidence “which places the event in context bolsters its probative value”); McCoy, 682
N.W.2d at 161 (recognizing that relationship evidence “assist[s] the jury by providing a
context with which it could better judge the credibility of the principals in the
relationship”); State v. Waukazo, 374 N.W.2d 563, 565 (Minn. App. 1985) (determining
that the district court acted within its discretion in admitting relationship evidence to
“illuminate” the relationship and place crime in the “proper context”), review denied
(Minn. Nov. 1, 1985). The relationship evidence provided context for appellant and N.P.’s
relationship, had significant probative value, and assisted the jury in assessing the
credibility of the witnesses. See Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d at 757 (noting that relationship
evidence has “significant probative value in assisting the jury to judge witness credibility”).
Further, the district court minimized any potential prejudice by providing a
cautionary instruction to the jury. A limiting instruction to the jury mitigates the potential
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for unfair prejudice, State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 392 (Minn. 1998), and we assume
that the jury follows the district court’s instructions. State v. Ferguson, 581 N.W.2d 824,
833 (Minn. 1998). Prior to trial, the parties agreed to a cautionary instruction and the
district court instructed the jury that the witness’s testimony was offered for the “limited
purpose” of assisting the jury in their deliberations “and for demonstrating the nature and
extent of the relationship between the defendant and [N.P.].” The district court cautioned
that the evidence could not be used to prove appellant’s character or that he acted in
conformity with that character. These cautionary instructions “lessened the probability of
undue weight being given by the jury to the evidence.” Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d at 757
(quotation omitted).
We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
appellant’s prior domestic abuse strangulation conviction and DANCO violation
conviction as relationship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20.1
II. The prosecutor’s unobjected-to statements during closing argument do
not constitute prosecutorial misconduct.
The standard of review “for claims of prosecutorial error depends on whether an
objection was raised at the time of the alleged error.” State v. Yang, 774 N.W.2d 539, 559
(Minn. 2009). Appellant did not raise an objection at trial and we therefore review under
a modified plain-error standard. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). This
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Appellant also challenges the district court’s decision to admit the evidence under
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b). Because we determine that the evidence was properly
admitted as relationship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20, we do not address this
alternative argument.
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standard requires appellant to establish that the prosecutor committed an error and that the
error was plain. Id. An error is plain if the prosecutor’s conduct “contravenes caselaw, a
rule, or a standard of conduct.” Id. If appellant demonstrates that a plain error occurred,
the burden shifts to the state to demonstrate that the error did not affect appellant’s
substantial rights. Id. “If the state fails to demonstrate that substantial rights were not
affected, ‘the appellate court then assesses whether it should address the error to ensure
fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.’” State v. Davis, 735 N.W.2d 674,
682 (Minn. 2007) (quoting State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998)).
Ultimately, we will reverse a conviction “only if the [prosecutorial] misconduct, when
considered in light of the whole trial, impaired [appellant’s] right to a fair trial.” State v.
Powers, 654 N.W.2d 667, 678 (Minn. 2003).
The prosecutor argued:
[The evidence] points to one fact and one fact only that
[appellant] on March 21, 2015, violated [the DANCO] and . . .
should be held accountable for that offense. . . . We don’t know
everything about the history of this relationship, the dynamics
of this relationship. I’d submit to you that [the district court
judge] who signed that no-contact order, knows more about
this relationship than you and I ever will. She saw it fit to try
to protect [N.P.], to try to keep these two people apart. And
you can see what happens when they get together. Bad things
happen. We don’t want that to happen.
Appellant asserts that the prosecutor’s statements that the district court judge
“knows more about this relationship than you and I ever will” and “saw it fit to try to protect
[N.P.], to try to keep these two people apart,” insinuated the existence of evidence not
admitted at trial and aroused the passions and biases of the jurors. While the prosecutor
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may “argue all reasonable inferences from evidence in the record,” the prosecutor may not
“intentionally . . . misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may
draw.” State v. Smith, 876 N.W.2d 310, 335 (Minn. 2016) (quotations omitted). Thus, a
prosecutor “may not seek a conviction at any price” and “must avoid inflaming the jury’s
passions and prejudices against the defendant.” State v. Porter, 526 N.W.2d 359, 362-63
(Minn. 1995). Here, the prosecutor’s statements either had factual support in the record or
were reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. The evidence supports the
prosecutor’s statements that the district court in the underlying domestic abuse case issued
a DANCO to protect N.P. The prosecutor’s comments were based on evidence produced
at trial and did not “impinge on juror independence” or otherwise inflame the passions of
the jury. Id. at 364.
Appellant argues that the prosecutor attempted to align the prosecution with the jury
by stating that “[w]e don’t want [bad things] to happen.” “[A] prosecutor is not a member
of the jury, so to use ‘we’ and ‘us’ is inappropriate and may be an effort to appeal to the
jury’s passions.” State v. Mayhorn, 720 N.W.2d 776, 790 (Minn. 2006). However, the use
of the word “we” could also “reasonably be interpreted . . . to refer to everybody who was
in court when the evidence was presented.” Nunn v. State, 753 N.W.2d 657, 663 (Minn.
2008). In the latter instance, the use of the word “we” does not constitute misconduct. Id.
When read in context, the prosecutor’s comment was not intended to place appellant and
the prosecutor in separate groups, but instead referred to the entire courtroom. See id.
(stating that prosecutor did not use “we” to place defendant in a separate group). The
prosecutor’s use of the word “we” does not constitute misconduct.
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Appellant challenges the prosecutor’s statement that appellant “should be held
accountable.” Appellant argues that the prosecutor’s reference to “accountability” diverted
the jury’s attention away from determining whether the state met its burden of proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. A prosecutor may “talk about accountability, in order to help
persuade the jury not to return a verdict based on sympathy for the defendant,” provided
the prosecutor does not emphasize accountability to the extent that it diverts the jury’s
attention away from its role of “deciding whether the state has met its burden of proving
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Montjoy, 366 N.W.2d 103, 109
(Minn. 1985). Here, the prosecutor’s reference to “accountability” was brief and did not
“cross[] the line of propriety.” Id. Further, the district court properly instructed the jury
on the state’s burden of proof. The district court advised the jury that “[t]he defendant is
presumed innocent of the charge made. This presumption remains with the defendant,
unless and until, the defendant has been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” The
prosecutor did not commit misconduct by referencing the word “accountability” in closing.
Because appellant has not met his burden of establishing that a plain error occurred,
we do not reach the issue of whether appellant’s substantial rights were affected. See
Montanaro v. State, 802 N.W.2d 726, 732 (Minn. 2011) (“[I]f we find that any one of the
requirements [under the plain-error test] is not satisfied, we need not address any of the
others.”).
Affirmed.
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