State of Minnesota v. Elroy James Thomas ( 2017 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-2016
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Elroy James Thomas,
Appellant.
Filed January 9, 2017
Affirmed
Peterson, Judge
Polk County District Court
File No. 60-CR-15-193
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhler, Charles R. Curtis, Assistant County
Attorneys, Crookston, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PETERSON, Judge
In this appeal challenging the denial of appellant’s presentence motion to withdraw
his guilty plea, appellant argues that the district court erred by considering his motion under
the manifest-injustice standard, rather than the fair-and-just standard. We affirm.
FACTS
After accusing his girlfriend of hiding his beer, appellant Elroy James Thomas
grabbed her arm and forcibly removed her from their apartment. The deputy sheriff who
responded to the report of this incident arrested Thomas on an outstanding warrant that was
issued after Thomas failed to appear at a hearing on a misdemeanor charge for a previous
assault. The state charged Thomas with felony-level domestic assault for the new incident
involving his girlfriend.
After the misdemeanor charge for the previous assault was filed, the state learned
that Thomas had prior convictions that allowed the previous assault to be charged as a
felony. When Thomas made his first appearance on the domestic-assault charge for
assaulting his girlfriend, the state moved to dismiss the misdemeanor charge for the
previous assault. The district court dismissed the misdemeanor charge, and the previous
assault was later charged as a felony.
The parties reached a plea agreement. In exchange for Thomas’s guilty plea to the
domestic-assault charge, the state agreed to a 23-month sentence, which was at the bottom
of the presumptive sentencing range, and to allow Thomas to argue for a dispositional
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departure at sentencing. The state also agreed to dismiss the felony charge for the previous
assault. The district court accepted Thomas’s guilty plea.
Three days after entering his guilty plea, Thomas wrote the district court a letter
asking to withdraw the plea. Thomas claimed that he had not been taking his prescribed
anxiety medication when he entered the plea, which caused him to make irrational and
impulsive decisions and made the plea involuntary and unknowing, and that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel. A few days later, Thomas formally moved to withdraw
his plea. Thomas later withdrew this motion.
Almost four months later, Thomas again moved to withdraw his guilty plea.
Although Thomas was represented by a public defender, he submitted the motion to
withdraw his guilty plea pro se.1 The motion stated that it was made “in accordance to the
Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 15.05, based on an invalid guilty plea,” and
it addressed new “evidence of manifest injustice” based on prohibited procedures
committed by the prosecutor.
Thomas argued that, by dismissing the misdemeanor charge for the previous assault
during his first appearance on the domestic-assault charge and later filing a felony charge
for the previous assault, the prosecutor violated the law-of-the-case doctrine and Thomas’s
right against double jeopardy. Thomas contended that because the state was barred from
filing the felony charge after dismissing the misdemeanor charge, his guilty plea in
1
The district court granted Thomas’s request to discharge his attorney, and Thomas
represented himself with respect to his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The motion
was presented to the district court on written submissions.
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exchange for the dismissal of the felony charge was invalid. The district court determined
that filing the felony charge did not violate Thomas’s right against double jeopardy because
jeopardy did not attach upon the dismissal of the misdemeanor charge and that the law-of-
the-case doctrine was not violated because no rule of law was decided in the misdemeanor
case that later governed when the offense was charged as a felony.
Thomas also argued that because one of his previous assault convictions did not
contain “relationship evidence,” he could have accurately pleaded guilty to only gross-
misdemeanor domestic assault, not felony domestic assault. The district court determined
that this argument was
without merit, as the definition of “qualified domestic
violence-related offense” under Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 16
includes fifth-degree assault and “similar laws of other states.”
[Thomas] had two previous qualified domestic violence-
related offense convictions within the past ten years, and
therefore the requirements of the Felony Domestic Assault
charge were satisfied.
The district court denied Thomas’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court
concluded that Thomas did not show a manifest injustice that required the court to allow
him to withdraw his plea. Thomas was sentenced, and he now challenges the denial of his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
DECISION
Thomas argues that, because he moved to withdraw his guilty plea before he was
sentenced, the district court erred by judging the motion under the manifest-injustice
standard, rather than under the fair-and-just standard. A reviewing court will reverse the
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district court’s determination of whether to permit withdrawal of a guilty plea only if the
district court abused its discretion. Barragan v. State, 583 N.W.2d 571, 572 (Minn. 1998).
Under the rules of criminal procedure, there are two standards for judging a motion
to withdraw a guilty plea; one applies only to a motion brought before sentencing, and the
other applies to a motion brought at any time. The district court, in its discretion, “may
allow the defendant to withdraw a plea at any time before sentence if it is fair and just to
do so.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2 (emphasis added). “At any time the court must
allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea upon a timely motion and proof to the
satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn.
R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1 (emphasis added). The fair-and-just standard is discretionary
and less demanding than the manifest-injustice standard. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90,
97 (Minn. 2010); State v. Lopez, 794 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Minn. App. 2011).
“[A] defendant who can show manifest injustice is entitled as a matter of right to
withdraw his plea of guilty.” Hirt v. State, 298 Minn. 553, 557, 214 N.W.2d 778, 782
(1974). “Manifest injustice occurs if a guilty plea is invalid.” Barnslater v. State, 805
N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn. App. 2011). “To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be
accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. It is the defendant’s
burden to show the invalidity of a plea. Id. at 94.
Thomas had a right to withdraw his guilty plea at any time, either before or after
sentencing, if he could prove that withdrawal was necessary to correct a manifest injustice.
See State v. Abdisalan, 661 N.W.2d 691, 693 (Minn. App. 2003) review denied (Minn.
Aug. 19, 2003) (defendant may premise motion to withdraw guilty plea on manifest
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injustice either before or after sentencing). In his motion, Thomas stated that the motion
was “based on an invalid guilty plea” and that the motion “addresses new evidence of
manifest injustice” based on prohibited procedures committed by the prosecutor. The
district court’s determination that Thomas did not prove a manifest injustice addressed the
claim that Thomas made. Because the district court could not have judged Thomas’s claim
that there was a manifest injustice without considering the manifest-injustice standard, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by applying the manifest-injustice standard to
Thomas’s motion.
Furthermore, even if the district court had considered Thomas’s motion to withdraw
under the more lenient fair-and-just standard, the result would have been the same.
The fair and just standard requires district courts to give due
consideration to two factors: (1) the reasons a defendant
advances to support withdrawal and (2) prejudice granting the
motion would cause the State given reliance on the plea. A
defendant bears the burden of advancing reasons to support
withdrawal. The State bears the burden of showing prejudice
caused by withdrawal.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97 (citations and quotations omitted). The district court concluded
that the reasons Thomas advanced to support withdrawal were without merit: recharging
the previous misdemeanor assault as a felony violated neither the Double Jeopardy Clause
nor the law-of-the-case doctrine, and Thomas’s prior convictions qualified to enhance the
charge from a misdemeanor to a felony-level charge. Because Thomas’s reasons for
withdrawal were without merit, they were not sufficient to allow Thomas to withdraw his
guilty plea under either the manifest-injustice or the fair-and-just standard.
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Thomas does not contend on appeal that the district court’s conclusion regarding
any of his three reasons for withdrawal was erroneous, he simply argues that the district
court might have granted his motion if it had considered the motion under the fair-and-just
standard. Thomas argues that, because he brought his motion before he was sentenced, all
he needed to show was that it would have been fair and just to allow him to withdraw his
plea. He contends that, in attempting to meet this burden, he relied on his attorney’s
ineffective assistance and the fact that he was not taking his anxiety medication, and, while
these problems might not have created a manifest injustice, they might have made it fair
and just to allow him to withdraw his plea.
But Thomas did not rely on his attorney’s ineffective assistance and the fact that he
was not provided with his anxiety medicine to meet his burden of proof on his second
motion to withdraw his guilty plea; in a letter to the district court, he asserted those facts
as the reasons for his first motion to withdraw his guilty plea. His first motion cited Minn.
R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2, and sought to withdraw his plea because it was fair and just to
do so. But Thomas withdrew that motion, and the district court did not rule on it.
What Thomas is really requesting is an opportunity to have the district court now
consider the motion that he withdrew, and he asks that this court remand this case so that
the district court can evaluate his motion under the fair-and-just standard.2 We will not
2
Thomas contends that a remand is the remedy that this court provided in Anderson v.
State, 746 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. App. 2008). Anderson, however, was different from this
case. In Anderson, defense counsel advised appellant “to defer moving to withdraw her
guilty plea until after sentencing, without advising her how the differing standards of proof
might affect the decision,” which prejudiced appellant. Id. at 911. This court remanded
“to allow Anderson to move the district court to withdraw her guilty plea for consideration
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remand to allow Thomas to assert in support of his second motion the reasons that he
asserted in support of his first motion but failed to raise when his second motion was before
the district court.
Affirmed.
under the more lenient, pre-sentencing, fair-and-just standard.” Id. at 911-12. Unlike the
appellant in Anderson, Thomas was not prevented from making his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea before sentencing; he made the motion before sentencing. But he failed to
present issues to the district court when he had the opportunity to present them.
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