State of Minnesota v. Andrew Leonard Caruthers ( 2017 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-0587
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Andrew Leonard Caruthers,
Appellant.
Filed January 17, 2017
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-15-11140
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Francis J. Rondoni, Mark J. Schneider, Golden Valley City Attorneys, Chestnut &
Cambronne, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn J. Lockwood, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of fifth-degree assault, arguing that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. We affirm.
FACTS
In April 2015, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Andrew Leonard
Caruthers with fifth-degree assault and disorderly conduct. The complaint alleged that
Caruthers confronted his son’s hockey coach between periods at a hockey game and yelled
at the coach, saying, “[L]et’s go outside.” Caruthers agreed to a bench trial, and the district
court found him guilty of both charges. Caruthers appeals.
DECISION
Caruthers contends that his “fifth-degree assault conviction must be reversed
because the evidence was insufficient to prove that [he] possessed the required intent to
cause fear of immediate bodily harm or death.” He argues that “[t]he state failed to prove
that when [he] asked [J.H.] whether he wanted to go outside, he intended to cause [J.H.]
fear of immediate bodily harm or death.”
When considering a sufficiency challenge, this court carefully analyzes the record
to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to permit the fact-finder to reach its
verdict. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). We “view the evidence in a
light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the [fact-finder] believed the state’s
witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence.” State v. Brocks, 587 N.W.2d 37, 42 (Minn.
1998). This court will not disturb the fact-finder’s verdict, if the fact-finder, acting with
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due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was proved guilty of the
offense charged. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004). We apply
the same standard of review to sufficiency challenges stemming from court trials and jury
trials. Davis v. State, 595 N.W.2d 520, 525 (Minn. 1999).
Whoever “commits an act with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily
harm or death” is guilty of misdemeanor fifth-degree assault. Minn. Stat. § 609.224, subd.
1(1) (2014). Because intent is a state of mind, it is “generally proved circumstantially—
by drawing inferences from the defendant’s words and actions in light of the totality of the
circumstances.” State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997). A fact-finder “may
infer that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his actions and a
defendant’s statements as to his intentions are not binding on the [fact-finder] if his acts
demonstrated a contrary intent.” Id.The state relied on circumstantial evidence to prove Caruthers’s intent. An appellate
court applies a heightened circumstantial-evidence standard when the state proves a
disputed element of a criminal offense by circumstantial evidence. State v. Al-Naseer, 788
N.W.2d 469, 473-74 (Minn. 2010). When reviewing the sufficiency of circumstantial
evidence to sustain a conviction, an appellate court first “identif[ies] the circumstances
proved, giving deference to the [fact-finder]’s acceptance of the proof of these
circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances
proved by the State.” State v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227, 241-42 (Minn. 2010) (quotation
omitted). Second, this court “independently examine[s] the reasonableness of all
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inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved, including inferences
consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt” and determines “whether the circumstances
proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that
of guilt.” Id. at 242 (quotations omitted).
In this case, the trial evidence established the following circumstances. In January
2015, J.H.’s son and Caruthers’s son were members of a youth hockey team. The ages of
players on the team ranged from 13 to 15. J.H. was a member of the hockey team’s
coaching staff. Caruthers had been “verbally abusive” to the team’s coaching staff,
including J.H., during some of their games, standing over the bench, yelling at coaches,
using profanity, and causing disruptions. Caruthers previously told J.H.’s wife that he was
going to “kick [J.H.’s] a--” and told other parents that he was going to have his son “kick
[J.H.’s] son’s a-- on the ice.” Caruthers also had a history of trying to fight other coaches.
The hockey team played a game in Golden Valley on January 31. Caruthers
attended the game. Caruthers’s son received a two-minute penalty during the second
period of the game. After Caruthers’s son received the penalty, coaches on the bench
witnessed Caruthers giving his son a “high sign of two and ten” and then two thumbs up,
which the coaching staff understood to mean that Caruthers was encouraging his son to
commit a two-and-ten penalty.1 When Caruthers’s son returned to the game, he
immediately and dangerously hit another player and committed a two-and-ten penalty.
1
A two-and-ten penalty is imposed when a player commits a two-minute and ten-minute
penalty in a single play. The offending player serves the ten-minute penalty and a
teammate serves the two-minute penalty. Ten-minute penalties are awarded for “a
dangerous type hit from behind” or head contact that appears to be intentional.
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Pursuant to a team rule, the team’s coaching staff took Caruthers’s son out of the game
after the second penalty.
The second period ended, and the players and coaches left for the locker room while
the ice was being resurfaced. Caruthers walked at a fast pace down from the stands and
was waiting in the players’ tunnel for the coaches when they arrived. Caruthers yelled at
the coaches stating, “How can you sit your best player?” and “You guys are a bunch of p-
ssies.” The coaches and the players entered the locker room, where they continued to hear
Caruthers yelling outside of the closed locker-room door. Because Caruthers’s conduct
was disrupting the locker room to the point that the players were not listening to the
coaches, J.H. left the locker room to try to diffuse the situation. As Caruthers stood
approximately ten feet away from J.H., Caruthers motioned with his hands and yelled,
“Let’s go outside.” J.H. told Caruthers that he was going to call Caruthers’s parole officer.
J.H. picked up his phone and called 911. Caruthers responded that he was not on parole
and left the building. The police responded to the scene, but Caruthers had already left by
the time they arrived.
At trial, Caruthers initially testified that he told J.H. to “come out and talk about it,
meaning come out of the locker room.” When asked by the prosecutor whether he said,
“[L]et’s go outside,” Caruthers testified that he did not believe he used the word “outside.”
He further testified that if he “said ‘outside’ that meant outside of the locker room, not
necessarily outside” and that “it was definitely for nothing other than to talk to [J.H.].”
Caruthers explained that he wanted to talk to J.H. outside of the presence of the players.
Despite this testimony, the district court found that Caruthers acted “with intent to cause
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fear in another of immediate bodily harm.” This finding indicates that the district court
rejected Caruthers’s testimony that he merely intended to communicate a request to talk to
J.H. outside of the players’ presence.
The totality of the circumstances proved supports the district court’s inference
regarding Caruthers’s intent. Caruthers quickly walked down from the stands after the
second period and confronted the coaches in the players’ tunnel. He yelled at J.H. and the
coaching staff. He used profanity. He eventually yelled, “Let’s go outside” at J.H., while
making hand gestures. These actions do not reasonably suggest that Caruthers merely
wanted to talk with J.H. outside of the presence of the players.
Caruthers asserts that the circumstances proved support the reasonable inference
that he did not specifically intend to cause J.H. to fear immediate bodily harm or death
when he asked him to go outside. Caruthers argues that “[e]ven if the trial court rejected
[his] testimony, there is still a reasonable inference that [he] did not intend to cause [J.H.]
[f]ear of immediate bodily harm.”
“Assessing the credibility of a witness and the weight to be given a witness’s
testimony is exclusively the province of the [fact-finder].” State v. Mems, 708 N.W.2d
526, 531 (Minn. 2006). In sufficiency cases, an appellate court construes the record most
favorably to the state, especially where resolution depends on conflicting testimony
because “weighing the credibility of witnesses is the exclusive function of the [fact-
finder].” State v. Pieschke, 295 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 1980). “[T]he [fact-finder] is
free to question a defendant’s credibility, and has no obligation to believe a defendant’s
story.” State v. Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d 916, 923 (Minn. 1995). This court will not consider
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a witness’s credibility on appeal. State v. Garrett, 479 N.W.2d 745, 747 (Minn. App.
1992), review denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 1992). Acceptance of Caruthers’s hypothesis of
innocence—that he merely intended to communicate a desire to talk to J.H. outside—
would require us to ignore the district court’s rejection of Caruthers’s testimony regarding
his intent, which we will not do.
Caruthers further argues that “[n]ot only was [his] request to [J.H.] to go outside
ambiguous on its own, two witnesses other than [Caruthers] testified that it could mean
‘let’s talk’ rather than a desire to cause fear of immediate harm.” Caruthers’s reliance on
witness testimony that is favorable to his theory is unavailing because we construe the
record in the light most favorable to the state.
Caruthers also argues that even if he “intended the invitation to go outside as an
invitation to fight, that does not make him guilty of assault” because “[a]ny harm [J.H.]
could have feared by [Caruthers’s] invitation was not immediate.” Caruthers argues that
“[J.H.] would have first had to accept Caruthers’s invitation and then go outside before he
would have been subject to possible harm. By definition that is not immediate, it is
delayed.” We are not persuaded. Once again, the evidence established that Caruthers
previously threatened to “kick [J.H.’s] a--” and that he was yelling and making hand
gestures within approximately ten feet of J.H. when he yelled, “Let’s go outside.”
Caruthers’s behavior did not reasonably suggest that no harm would come to J.H. so long
as he remained in the building.
In sum, Caruthers’s proffered alternative hypothesis that he did not intend to cause
J.H. to fear immediate bodily harm is not reasonable. The circumstances proved are
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consistent with the district court’s finding that Caruthers was guilty of misdemeanor fifth-
degree assault and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt. Because the
district court could reasonably conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the state proved
Caruthers guilty of fifth-degree assault, we do not disturb the guilty verdict.
Affirmed.
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