Julie Strowbridge, Relator v. Maid in America, Inc., Department of Employment and Economic Development ( 2014 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-0161
Julie Strowbridge,
Relator,
vs.
Maid in America, Inc.,
Respondent,
Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.
Filed December 8, 2014
Affirmed in part and reversed in part
Chutich, Judge
Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 31426846-6
Julie Strowbridge, Brainerd, Minnesota (pro se relator)
Maid in America, Inc., Brainerd, Minnesota (respondent employer)
Lee B. Nelson, Department of Employment and Economic Development, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent Department)
Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Chutich, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CHUTICH, Judge
Relator Julie Strowbridge challenges the unemployment-law judge’s
determination that she was ineligible for unemployment benefits and that she had to
repay $997 of benefits she had already received. Because Strowbridge was unavailable
for suitable employment from July 7 to August 4, 2013, we affirm the denial of benefits
for that period of time. Because Strowbridge was available for and actively seeking
suitable employment beginning on August 5, 2013, we reverse the denial of benefits after
that date.
FACTS
Strowbridge worked as a maid with a cleaning service company for over 17 years.
While working for the company on July 4, 2013, Strowbridge injured her back and the
company fired her. Because of her injury, Strowbridge was unable to sit or stand for 3
weeks to a month following the incident. During this time, Strowbridge received
unemployment benefits.
On July 24, 2013, the Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development (department) sent Strowbridge a notice, stating that she was ineligible for
benefits retroactive to July 7 because she was physically unable to work. Strowbridge
appealed the department’s determination. On August 5, while her appeal was pending,
Strowbridge’s doctor released her to work a sedentary position with the following
limitations: no standing, no squatting or bending, no lifting more than ten pounds,
walking less than one hour, sitting less than thirty minutes with the ability to change
2
positions, and driving less than three hours. These restrictions were lifted on
September 3, and five days later Strowbridge began working a part-time position at
Bethany Good Samaritan.
In November 2013, an unemployment-law judge held an evidentiary hearing to
consider Strowbridge’s appeal. In the hearing, Strowbridge testified that she began to
search for a job after her doctor cleared her to work with limitations on August 5.
Because she did not have Internet at home, Strowbridge said that she spent 6 to 12 hours
per week driving around in her car and walking into businesses to speak with potential
employers. Strowbridge also testified that she visited a Minnesota Workforce Center.
Strowbridge estimated that she applied to three or four jobs per week, but in her hearing
with the unemployment-law judge, she could only recall the names of five businesses to
which she had applied.
Based on Strowbridge’s testimony, the unemployment-law judge determined that:
(1) from July 7 to August 4, 2013, Strowbridge was unavailable for suitable employment;
(2) from August 5 until conditions change, Strowbridge was available for suitable
employment; (3) from July 7 until conditions change, Strowbridge was not actively
seeking suitable employment; and (4) from July 7 until conditions change, Strowbridge
was ineligible for employment benefits and must reimburse the department $997 for an
overpayment of benefits. The unemployment-law judge determined that Strowbridge
was not actively seeking suitable employment because her search did not “reflect the
reasonable, diligent efforts an individual in similar circumstances would make if
genuinely interested in obtaining suitable employment.”
3
After Strowbridge’s request for reconsideration was denied, this appeal by writ of
certiorari followed.
DECISION
We review de novo an unemployment-law judge’s determination that an applicant
is ineligible for benefits. Stassen v. Lone Mountain Truck Leasing, LLC, 814 N.W.2d 25,
30 (Minn. App. 2012). This court may affirm the unemployment-law judge’s decision,
remand it for further proceedings, or reverse or modify the decision if the substantial
rights of the relator have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusion, or
decision are “(1) in violation of constitutional provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory
authority or jurisdiction of the department; (3) made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) affected by other error of law; (5) unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the
entire record as submitted; or (6) arbitrary or capricious.” 2014 Minn. Laws, ch. 271, art.
1, § 1, at 1028-29 (to be codified at Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2014)). An
unemployment-law judge’s findings of fact are viewed in the light most favorable to the
decision, and we defer to the unemployment-law judge’s credibility determinations.
McNeilly v. Dep’t of Emp’t & Econ. Dev., 778 N.W.2d 707, 710 (Minn. App. 2010).
The purpose of the Minnesota Unemployment Insurance Program is to provide
“workers who are unemployed through no fault of their own a temporary partial wage
replacement to assist the unemployed worker to become reemployed.” Minn. Stat.
§ 268.03, subd. 1 (2012). The Minnesota Unemployment Insurance Law “is remedial in
nature and must be applied in favor of awarding benefits.” Minn. Stat. § 268.031, subd. 2
(2012).
4
To qualify for unemployment benefits, an applicant must be available for suitable
employment and be actively seeking suitable employment. Minn. Stat. § 268.085, subd.
1(4), (5) (2012). An applicant who is “ready, willing, and able to accept suitable
employment” is considered available for suitable employment. Id., subd. 15(a) (2012).
An applicant who is making “those reasonable, diligent efforts an individual in similar
circumstances would make if genuinely interested in obtaining suitable employment” is
actively seeking suitable employment. Id., subd. 16(a) (2012).
Benefits Eligibility from July 7 to August 4
The unemployment-law judge found that from July 7 to August 4, Strowbridge
was unavailable for suitable employment and therefore not entitled to unemployment
benefits. We agree.
In her hearing with the unemployment-law judge, Strowbridge testified that
immediately following her injury, “[she] could not stand. [She] couldn’t sit. There was
nothing [she] could do.” And when Strowbridge was asked how long this period of
incapacity lasted, she replied, “three weeks to a month.” Strowbridge also admitted that
she did not look for a job until after her doctor released her to work on August 5. Based
on Strowbridge’s testimony, the unemployment-law judge found that Strowbridge was
unavailable for suitable employment because she was not “ready, willing, and able to
accept suitable employment” as required by Minnesota Statutes section 268.085,
subdivision 15(a).
5
Because substantial evidence in the record shows that Strowbridge was not
available for suitable employment from July 7 to August 4, we affirm the unemployment-
law judge’s determination that Strowbridge was ineligible for benefits during that period.
Benefits Eligibility from August 5 Onward
The unemployment-law judge also found that Strowbridge was not eligible for
benefits from July 7 to November 8, 2013, because even though she was available to
work after August 5, she was not actively seeking employment during that period of time.
Strowbridge contends, and we agree, that she was actively seeking employment from
August 5 to the date of the hearing.
In determining that Strowbridge was not actively seeking employment, the
unemployment-law judge implicitly indicated that Strowbridge’s testimony regarding her
employment search was not credible:
Strowbridge testified that she has applied for three or four
jobs each week since the date of her injury; however,
Strowbridge could only name five employers with which she
had applied. Three of the positions for which Strowbridge
applied would require Strowbridge to perform work outside
of her restrictions.
Credibility determinations are within the exclusive province of the unemployment-
law judge, and we will not disturb those findings on appeal. Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc.,
721 N.W.2d 340, 345 (Minn. App. 2006). But when an unemployment-law judge makes
a credibility determination regarding a witness whose credibility “has a significant effect
on the outcome of a decision,” the unemployment-law judge is required to “set out the
6
reason for crediting or discrediting that testimony.” 2014 Minn. Laws, ch. 251, art. 2,
§§ 15, at 862; 24(b), at 870 (to be codified at Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(a) (2014)).
Here, Strowbridge’s testimony had a significant effect on the outcome of her case
because she was the only witness to testify. The unemployment-law judge may have
implicitly found that Strowbridge’s testimony was not credible when the judge stated,
“Strowbridge could only name five employers with which she had applied.” But when a
witness’s credibility has a significant effect on the outcome of a case, the statute requires
an unemployment-law judge to explicitly set out the reasons for crediting or discrediting
the witness’s testimony. See id. Accordingly, we review the record to determine if
substantial evidence supports the unemployment-law judge’s decision that Strowbridge
was not actively seeking suitable employment after August 5.
An applicant actively seeking employment is required to put forth the reasonable
and diligent efforts as someone in their similar circumstance would do. Minn. Stat.
§ 268.085, subd. 16(a). Whether an applicant is actively seeking suitable employment is
a factual determination. See McNeilly, 778 N.W.2d at 711–12. Evidence in the record
must substantially support the unemployment-law judge’s factual determination. 2014
Minn. Laws ch. 271, art. 1, § 1 (to be codified at Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)(5)).
No bright-line rule exists to clarify what “actively seeking suitable employment”
requires, and most Minnesota caselaw focuses on what does not meet the requirement.
See Monson v. Minn. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 262 N.W.2d 171, 172 (Minn. 1978) (holding
that a person who applied to two or three jobs over a two-month period was not actively
seeking suitable employment); McNeilly, 778 N.W.2d at 712 (holding that asking around
7
for work and not applying for any positions does not satisfy the “actively seeking suitable
employment” requirement); James v. Comm’r of Econ. Sec., 354 N.W.2d 840, 841-42,
844 (Minn. App. 1984), review denied (Minn. Dec. 20, 1984) (holding that a person who
made four job contacts in three weeks, all over the telephone, and visited a job-service
office twice was not actively seeking suitable employment).
In contrast, a person who made multiple telephone calls and in-person networking
contacts with five prospective employers, formally interviewed with one employer, and
attempted to become self-employed over an 11-week period was considered to be
actively seeking employment. Decker v. City Pages, Inc., 540 N.W.2d 544, 549-50
(Minn. App. 1995), superseded by rule on other grounds as recognized by Mueller v.
Comm’r of Econ. Sec., 633 N.W.2d 91, 93 (Minn. App. 2001).
Here, the record shows that Strowbridge suffered a debilitating back injury that
left her incapacitated for close to a month. When she finished physical therapy and her
doctor cleared her to work, she visited a Minnesota Workforce Center, applied to at least
3 to 4 jobs per week, and spent 6 to 12 hours per week driving around in her car and
soliciting employers in person.
And while Strowbridge did not search for a job online, she did not have Internet access at
home. Moreover, applying in-person may well have been beneficial for the type of work
that Strowbridge sought. See James, 354 N.W.2d at 842 (“With respect to the type of
work that the claimant was seeking, the Department has long maintained that the most
effective way to obtain gainful employment is by in-person job contacts, and not by
telephone contacts.”).
8
Based on Strowbridge’s job-search efforts, the unemployment-law judge’s
determination that Strowbridge was not actively seeking suitable employment is
unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. See 2014 Minn. Laws ch. 271, art. 1,
§ 1 (to be codified at Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)(5)) (allowing this court to reverse
an unemployment-law judge’s decision when it is unsupported by substantial evidence in
the record).
In sum, because Strowbridge was unavailable for suitable employment from July 7
to August 4, we affirm the unemployment-law judge’s determination that Strowbridge
was ineligible for unemployment benefits during that time period. Because substantial
evidence does not support the unemployment-law judge’s finding that Strowbridge was
not actively seeking suitable employment from August 5 onward, we reverse the
determination that Strowbridge was not entitled to unemployment benefits after August 5.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
9