In the Matter of the Welfare of: A. J. L., Child. ( 2014 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-0731
In the Matter of the Welfare of: A. J. L., Child.
Filed December 8, 2014
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge
Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-JV-13-532
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Susan Andrews, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant A.J.L.)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Dana D. Erickson, Assistant County
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Schellhas, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his request for a stay of
delinquency adjudication. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota filed a juvenile delinquency petition, alleging that
appellant A.J.L. committed two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under
Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a) (sexual penetration with another person under 13 years
of age with whom A.J.L. has a significant relationship), (g) (sexual penetration with
another person under 13 years of age and more than 36 months younger than A.J.L.)
(2012). The alleged victim was age four at the time of the alleged offense. Following a
court trial, the district court found A.J.L. guilty of both counts. Stearns County Human
Services filed a predisposition report, which recommended that A.J.L. “be adjudicated
delinquent and placed on probation for a period of time, not to exceed his 19th birthday.”
At his disposition hearing, A.J.L. requested that the district court “consider setting
disposition out” so that A.J.L. could undergo a psychosexual evaluation, permitting
A.J.L. to argue for a stay of adjudication. The court denied the request, adjudicated A.J.L.
delinquent, placed him on probation, and, among other things, ordered him to undergo a
psychosexual evaluation and complete predatory-offender registration.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
When facts in a petition are admitted or proven, a district court “shall either . . .
adjudicate the child delinquent . . . or . . . continue the case without adjudicating the child
delinquent.” Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “When it is in the best interests of
the child and the protection of the public to do so, the court may continue the case
without adjudicating the child.” Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 4(A) (emphasis
added). “[A] court shall adjudicate a child delinquent or continue the case without
adjudication ‘at the same time and in the same court order as the disposition.’” In re
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Welfare of J.R.Z., 648 N.W.2d 241, 244 (Minn. App. 2002) (quoting rule 15.05,
subdivision 1), review denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2002).
“A district court has broad discretion in determining whether to continue an
adjudication in a delinquency proceeding.” Id. (quotation omitted). A district court is “not
require[d] . . . to explain why an adjudication of delinquency is the least restrictive
alternative.” Id. at 245. Nothing in Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 7, “requires
particularized findings on the court’s decision to impose or withhold adjudication of
delinquency.” J.R.Z., 648 N.W.2d at 246. “Most importantly, imposing an adjudication
within the limits prescribed by the legislature is not an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 245(quotation omitted). “[A] finding on the least restrictive means for restoring a juvenile to
law-abiding conduct . . . [is] required in determining a disposition, but not when deciding
whether to adjudicate or stay adjudication.” Id. at 246 (quotation omitted).
A.J.L. argues that delinquency adjudication is unnecessary to restore him to law-
abiding conduct. He argues that he is an appropriate candidate for a stay of adjudication
because he is a first-time offender and the district court lacked a psychosexual evaluation
from which to determine that his rehabilitation would take longer than 180 days.1 He also
asserts:
In the year it took the parties to resolve [his] juvenile
court charges, he had remained law-abiding. [He] had
changed and vastly improved his living situation by residing
mostly with his father, who provided structure, supervision,
rules, and consequences. [He] had maintained good
1
Under Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 7 (2012), and Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05,
subd. 4(B), a district court may continue a case for up to 90 days, followed by an
extension of up to 90 days.
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relationships with his parents and teachers and had made
friends who were positive influences. Finally, [he] had
demonstrated academic promise.
But A.J.L. “confuses the standard for staying adjudication with the standard for ordering
a particular disposition.” J.R.Z., 648 N.W.2d at 245–46. Even assuming that all of
A.J.L.’s assertions are true and that A.J.L. therefore is a good candidate for a stay of
adjudication, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
adjudicating A.J.L. delinquent. See Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 4(A) (“When it
is in the best interests of the child and the protection of the public to do so, the court may
continue the case without adjudicating the child.” (emphasis added)); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.198, subd. 7.
A.J.L. argues that adjudication is not in his best interest and actually “undermines
the goal of rehabilitation.” He contends that with the label of “predatory offender,” a
“very real concern” exists “that he will be seen and treated as a pariah as he enters
adulthood.” But “the plain language of the registration statute compels [A.J.L.]’s . . . sex-
offender registration.” J.R.Z., N.W.2d at 248. “This may . . . be a harsh result. But harsh
or not, the decision concerning the reach of the statute rests with the legislature.” Id.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its broad discretion when it
refused to stay A.J.L.’s adjudication for first-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Affirmed.
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