Harper & Peterson, P.L.L.C. v. John W. Seckinger ( 2017 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A16-1251
Harper & Peterson, P.L.L.C.,
Respondent,
vs.
John W. Seckinger,
Appellant.
Filed February 21, 2017
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge
Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CV-16-1201
William D. Harper, Jason L. DePauw, Harper & Peterson, P.L.L.C., Woodbury, Minnesota
(for respondent)
John W. Seckinger, Winter Haven, Florida (pro se appellant)
Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant, pro se, challenges the district court’s order granting respondent’s motion
for declaratory judgment, arguing that (1) his procedural due-process rights were violated;
(2) the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider respondent’s declaratory-judgment
motion; and (3) respondent’s failure to disclose his answer and other documents, which
demonstrated genuine issues of material fact, resulted in a miscarriage of justice. We
affirm.
FACTS
Appellant John Seckinger retained respondent Harper & Peterson, P.L.L.C., to
represent him as legal counsel after he sustained injuries in a motorcycle crash in 2005. A
retainer agreement formalized their attorney-client relationship. The retainer agreement
states, in part, “Client agrees to pay all costs of investigation, preparation and trial of case,
and authorize [Harper & Peterson] to deduct their fee and such costs from the proceeds
recovered.”
In 2008, Harper & Peterson commenced a personal-injury lawsuit on behalf of
Seckinger. The costs associated with investigation, expert fees, and pretrial preparation of
Seckinger’s case totaled $79,203.99. Seckinger paid Harper & Peterson $30,000 toward
the costs of the litigation, and Harper & Peterson advanced an additional $49,203.99 of its
own funds to cover the litigation costs. Four years later, the parties to the lawsuit entered
into a confidential settlement agreement.
After his personal-injury lawsuit settled, Seckinger asked Harper & Peterson to
reimburse him for the $30,000 that he had paid in litigation costs. Harper & Peterson
asserted that Seckinger is not entitled to reimbursement of the $30,000, which it kept in its
client trust account as disputed fees, and Harper & Peterson initiated an action against
Seckinger, requesting the district court to declare that it is entitled to the disputed fees.
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Harper & Peterson served a complaint on Seckinger on August 24, 2015, and filed
the case in district court on March 21, 2016. On March 28, 2016, Harper & Peterson moved
the district court for a declaratory judgment in its favor as to the disputed fees. The notice
of motion and motion were also served on Seckinger. Seckinger timely served his answer
to the complaint on Harper & Peterson but filed no documents with the district court, did
not secure legal representation in Minnesota, and did not appear before the district court at
the hearing on Harper & Peterson’s motion for declaratory judgment. The district court
granted Harper & Peterson’s motion. This appeal follows.
DECISION
I.
Seckinger asserts violations of his due-process rights. We review due-process
challenges de novo. Thole v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 831 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Minn. App.
2013), review denied (Minn. July 16, 2013).
“Due process requires that deprivation of property be preceded by notice and an
opportunity to be heard.” Comm’r of Nat. Res. v. Nicollet Cty. Pub. Water/Wetlands
Hearings Unit, 633 N.W.2d 25, 29 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Nov. 13,
2001). The degree of notice “varies with the circumstances and conditions of each case.”
Id. (quotation omitted). Generally, in civil cases, a copy of the summons and complaint
and every written motion shall be served upon the opposing parties. Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.02,
5.01, 6.04. “The purpose of the summons is to give the defendants notice that a proceeding
has been instituted against them . . . .” Peterson v. W. Davis & Sons, 216 Minn. 60, 64, 11
N.W.2d 800, 803 (1943).
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Here, Harper & Peterson served its summons and complaint on Seckinger in August
2015. While Seckinger timely served his answer on Harper & Peterson, he did not file his
answer in district court. After the case was filed in district court, Harper & Peterson served
Seckinger with its notice of motion and motion for declaratory judgment. Seckinger,
through his brother,1 attempted to file two responses to the declaratory-judgment motion.
But the district court returned these documents because his brother failed to include the
proper filing fee and did not provide the district court with a certificate of his representation
of Seckinger. Neither Seckinger nor someone on his behalf appeared at the hearing before
the district court. Because Seckinger had notice of the proceedings and had an opportunity
but did not appear in district court, we conclude that his procedural due-process rights were
not violated with respect to notice of the proceedings.
Seckinger asserts that the lack of “plain, unambiguous notice” from the district court
and Harper & Peterson of the district court’s filing requirements violated his due-process
rights. We disagree.
We have “repeatedly emphasized that pro se litigants are generally held to the same
standard as attorneys and must comply with court rules.” Black v. Rimmer, 700 N.W.2d
521, 527 (Minn. App. 2005), review dismissed (Minn. Sept. 28, 2005). “Unfamiliarity with
procedural rules is not good cause to excuse untimely action.” Heinsch v. Lot 27, Block 1
For’s Beach, § 21, Twp. 69, Range 21 (Unorganized Twp.), 399 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Minn.
1
Seckinger’s brother is a professor of law at an academic institution in another state. He
is not licensed to practice law in the State of Minnesota.
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App. 1987). The applicable laws that govern the requirements for filing documents in
district court are all published by statute or rule.
“All documents after the complaint required to be served upon a party . . . shall be
filed with the court within a reasonable time after service . . . .” Minn. R. Civ. P. 5.04(b)
(emphasis added). And any party responding to a motion “shall pay any required motion
filing fee,” serve a memorandum of law and any supplementary affidavits and exhibits on
the opposing party, and “file the documents with the court administrator at least 9 days
prior to the hearing.” Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 115.03(b) (emphasis added). The district court
may reject a document for filing if it is “tendered without a required filing fee.” Minn. R.
Civ. P. 5.04(c). In civil cases, all filing fees must be paid in advance, and the district court
shall not proceed on a case “until the full amount of the same is paid.” Minn. Stat.
§ 357.021, subd. 3 (2016). The fee for filing an answer in district court is $310, and the
fee for filing a motion or response to a motion is $100. Minn. Stat. § 357.021, subd. 2(1),
(4) (2016).
Because published laws and rules provide a pro se litigant with adequate notice of
the district court’s filing requirements, we conclude that Seckinger had adequate notice of
the proceedings and the district court’s filing requirements; his due-process rights were
therefore not violated.
II.
Seckinger argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion for
declaratory judgment because it was prematurely filed and because he did not file his
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answer with the district court. “Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law,
subject to de novo review.” Rupp v. Mayasich, 561 N.W.2d 555, 558 (Minn. App. 1997).
District courts do not have jurisdiction to rule on a motion for declaratory judgment
until the minimum time allowable by law has passed. Tri-State Ins. Co. of Minn. v. Bontjes,
488 N.W.2d 845, 847 (Minn. App. 1992). Any party seeking “a declaratory judgment may,
at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the service of the summons, . . . move with
or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party’s favor.” Minn. R.
Civ. P. 56.01. Here, Harper & Peterson served Seckinger with its complaint on August 24,
2015, and it moved the district court for an order seeking declaratory judgment on March
28, 2016. Because Harper & Peterson brought a declaratory-judgment motion before the
district court more than seven months after the service of the summons, we conclude that
the motion was not premature.
Seckinger asserts that, because he did not file his answer in district court, Harper &
Peterson’s motion for declaratory judgment should have been treated as a default-judgment
motion. But default judgment is not appropriate unless the party against whom a judgment
is sought “fails to plead or otherwise defend a claim within the time allowed by the law.”
Doe v. Legacy Broad. of Minn., Inc., 504 N.W.2d 527, 528 (Minn. App. 1993); see also
Minn. R. Civ. P. 55.01. A defendant properly pleads by serving his answer within the
prescribed time limits. Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.01. Here, because Seckinger timely served his
answer, we conclude that the district court properly considered the declaratory-judgment
motion.
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III.
Seckinger argues that Harper & Peterson’s failure to disclose to the district court his
answer and responses to the declaratory-judgment motion, which were not filed, resulted
in a miscarriage of justice because those documents demonstrated genuine issues of
material fact that would have precluded declaratory judgment. But we are bound to the
district court record and may not base our decision “on matters outside the record on
appeal.” Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (Minn. 1988). The record on appeal
includes only documents that were filed in district court. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01.
Here, Seckinger’s answer and other documents are not part of the record on appeal because
they were not filed in district court. We, therefore, cannot review them.
Seckinger maintains that Harper & Peterson cannot satisfy its burden to demonstrate
that there are no disputes of material fact because he clearly disputed the facts. Based on
a thorough review of the record, we disagree. “On appeal from summary judgment, we
must review the record to determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact and
whether the district court erred in its application of the law.” Dahlin v. Kroening, 796
N.W.2d 503, 504 (Minn. 2011). “The construction and effect of an unambiguous contract
present questions of law . . . .” Dorsey & Whitney, LLP v. Grossman, 749 N.W.2d 409,
417-18 (Minn. App. 2008). A contract is ambiguous if “it is reasonably susceptible of
more than one interpretation.” Denelsbeck v. Wells Fargo & Co., 666 N.W.2d 339, 346
(Minn. 2003).
The district court record demonstrates that Seckinger’s claim stems from his
interpretation of the retainer agreement. In one of his initial e-mails to Harper & Peterson
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regarding the disputed $30,000, Seckinger stated that his “sole purpose in this is to
communicate [his] interpretation of [their] Retainer Agreement that [they] entered into
back in October 2005.” The retainer agreement states that Seckinger “agrees to pay all
costs of investigation, preparation and trial of case, and authorize[s] [Harper & Peterson]
to deduct their fee and such costs from the proceeds recovered.” Because this language is
not susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, we conclude that the retainer
agreement is unambiguous. Because the interpretation of the retainer agreement is a
question of law and there are no other genuine issues of material fact, declaratory judgment
was proper.
Affirmed.
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