State of Minnesota v. Lisa Lorraine Peltier ( 2016 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1324
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Lisa Lorraine Peltier,
Appellant.
Filed April 25, 2016
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge
Polk County District Court
File No. 60-K4-98-001049
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhler, Assistant County Attorney,
Crookston, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and
Randall, Judge.

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s calculation of jail credit toward her
sentence, arguing that the district court erred by denying her custody credit against her
Minnesota sentence for time she spent incarcerated in North Dakota for a North Dakota
conviction of possession of methamphetamine and possession of a schedule IV controlled
substance. Because we see no error, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Lisa Lorraine Peltier pleaded guilty in Polk County, Minnesota, on
November 9, 1998, to one count of conspiracy to sell cocaine. Pursuant to a plea
agreement, on February 1, 1999, the district court sentenced appellant to 39 months in
prison, stayed, and placed her on 20 years of supervised probation. Appellant paid a fine
and was required to comply with the conditions of her probation: (1) serving 120 days in
jail; (2) obtaining a chemical-dependency assessment, following its recommendations, and
paying its costs; (3) being subject to random drug testing and searches; (4) performing 100
hours of community service; and (5) remaining law abiding.
Appellant violated the terms of her probation on July 6, 2011, and June 1, 2012.
She admitted both violations, and the district court reinstated her probation.
On February 18, 2014, another probation-violation report was issued that alleged
multiple violations, including felony drug charges in Grand Forks, North Dakota. A
warrant was issued for appellant’s arrest. On May 14, 2014, a North Dakota district court
found appellant guilty of possession of methamphetamine and possession of a schedule IV
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controlled substance (Clonazepam) and sentenced her to five years in prison, with three
years of the sentence suspended.
While in North Dakota, appellant sent letters to the Polk County district court
administrator’s office. One letter, dated May 1, 2014, stated that appellant was in North
Dakota facing a new charge and wished to be transferred to Polk County. Another letter,
dated May 16, 2014, stated that appellant had been sentenced in North Dakota and asked
Polk County to “come get [her].” On June 10, 2014, a Polk County court administrator
answered these two letters, saying “it is the discretion of the Prosecutor whether you should
be transported to Polk County to personally appear . . . or resolve them through
correspondence . . . .” A third letter, dated September 15, 2014, asked for an “[I]nterstate
Agreement on Detainers.” A court administrator replied that the county attorney had
discretion to decide whether appellant should be transported to Polk County.
When appellant returned to Minnesota on April 15, 2015, for a probation-violation
hearing, she admitted to the two violations of her probation in North Dakota. Her counsel
requested that appellant’s sentence not be executed and that either she be reinstated on
probation or her file be closed. The district court revoked appellant’s probation, executed
the balance of her previously stayed 39-month sentence, and refused to give her credit for
time served in North Dakota.
DECISION
Appellant argues that the district court erred in denying her credit for time she spent
incarcerated in North Dakota. A challenge to a district court’s award of jail credit is a
mixed question of law and fact. State v. Johnson, 744 N.W.2d 376, 379 (Minn. 2008).
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“[T]he [district] court must determine the circumstances of the custody the defendant seeks
credit for, and then apply the rules to those circumstances.” Id. at 379. Accordingly,
appellate courts review legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. Id.“[T]he defendant carries the burden of establishing that [s]he is entitled to jail
credit.” State v. Willis, 376 N.W.2d 427, 428 n.1 (Minn. 1985). However, the granting of
jail credit is not discretionary with the district court. State v. Hadgu, 681 N.W.2d 30, 32
(Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 2004). When sentencing a defendant,
a district court must state the number of days spent in custody in connection with the
offense being sentenced, and that number of days must be deducted from the sentence.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 4(B).
Calculating intra-jurisdictional jail credit differs from calculating inter-
jurisdictional jail credit. The general intra-jurisdictional rule is that a defendant may
receive custody credit for time served for another offense before being charged with the
instant offense, but that credit only covers the time after the date when the state has
completed its investigation “in a manner that does not suggest manipulation by the State,
and the State has probable cause and sufficient evidence to prosecute its case against the
defendant with a reasonable likelihood of actually convicting the defendant of the offense
for which [s]he is charged.” State v. Clarkin, 817 N.W.2d 678, 689 (Minn. 2012). The
general inter-jurisdictional rule is that a defendant is not entitled to credit for time spent in
a foreign jurisdiction’s custody unless that time was served solely in connection with a
Minnesota offense. Willis, 376 N.W.2d at 428.
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Because appellant seeks jail credit for time spent in custody in North Dakota, the
inter-jurisdictional rule applies. See id. Appellant’s incarceration in North Dakota was the
result of offenses committed in North Dakota and was completely separate from any
Minnesota offense. Under the inter-jurisdictional rule, appellant does not receive jail credit
for time spent in custody in North Dakota.
Appellant claims that a limited exception to the inter-jurisdictional jail-credit rule
exists and should apply to her case. Appellant relies on State v. Jennings, in which this
court held that the district court erred in denying defendant’s request for execution of his
stayed Minnesota sentence when he was incarcerated in California based on (1) a
defendant’s right to execute a prior probationary sentence; (2) the preference for concurrent
sentencing expressed in the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines; (3) a recognition that the
second sentencing court specifies whether the sentences run concurrently or consecutively;
and (4) California’s “preference for concurrent sentencing in the multi-state sentencing
context.” Jennings, 448 N.W.2d 374, 375 (Minn. App. 1989).
Under Jennings, appellant’s right to have her executed Minnesota sentence run
concurrent with her North Dakota sentence and obtain jail credit for time spent in custody
in North Dakota, depends on two factors. First, the second sentencing court, North Dakota,
must have a stated preference for concurrent sentencing in the multi-state context, and
second, appellant must have actually requested execution of her stayed sentence. Id.Appellant claims that North Dakota has expressed a preference for concurrent sentencing
in the multi-state context, relying on State v. Kunze, 350 N.W.2d 36 (N.D. 1984) (holding
that concurrent sentencing is preferable when one of the sentences is for a federal offense).
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Kunze does not address the multi-state context, and its reasoning is based on the comity
between federal and state courts. Kunze, 350 N.W.2d at 39. Appellant’s argument assumes
that, by including federal sentences, the Kunze holding extends to out-of-state sentences.
But in North Dakota, whether sentences run concurrently or consecutively depends on the
district court’s discretion in every case. State v. Clark, 801 N.W.2d 732, 735-36 (N.D.
2011) (citing State v. Johnson, 571 N.W.2d 372, 374 (N.D. 1997)). Because appellant does
not cite to any North Dakota authority stating a preference for concurrent sentencing in the
multi-state context, she does not satisfy the first Jennings requirement.
In this case, the record does not indicate that the North Dakota court was aware that
appellant was facing revocation of her Minnesota probation or that the North Dakota court
ordered appellant’s North Dakota sentence to run concurrent to her Minnesota sentence.
Because appellant has not satisfied the first Jennings requirement, we need not
consider whether she has satisfied the second Jennings requirement that she properly
requested execution of her sentence.
Affirmed.
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