Antionette Dunn, Relator v. Caremate Home Health Care, Inc., Department of Employment and Economic Development ( 2014 )


Menu:
  •                         This opinion will be unpublished and
    may not be cited except as provided by
    Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
    STATE OF MINNESOTA
    IN COURT OF APPEALS
    A13-1997
    Antionette Dunn,
    Relator,
    vs.
    Caremate Home Health Care, Inc.,
    Respondent,
    Department of Employment and Economic Development,
    Respondent.
    Filed July 7, 2014
    Affirmed
    Klaphake, Judge*
    Department of Employment and Economic Development
    File No. 31399502-2
    Antionette Dunn, Brooklyn Park, Minnesota (pro se relator)
    Caremate Home Health Care, Inc., St. Paul, Minnesota (respondent)
    Lee B. Nelson, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development,
    St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)
    Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Stauber, Judge; and
    Klaphake, Judge.
    *
    Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
    Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    KLAPHAKE, Judge
    Relator Antionette Dunn challenges the unemployment law judge’s (ULJ)
    determination that she is ineligible to receive unemployment benefits, arguing that the
    record does not support the decision. We affirm.
    DECISION
    The ULJ issued a decision in this case concluding that “Dunn is ineligible to
    receive unemployment benefits” because she “has not been available for suitable
    employment.” Dunn argues that “the record does not reasonably support the decision of
    the [ULJ]” and that she “was available for suitable employment.” This court may reverse
    or modify a ULJ’s decision “if the substantial rights of the petitioner may have been
    prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusion, or decision” are, among other
    things, affected by an error of law or “unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the
    entire record as submitted.” 
    Minn. Stat. § 268.105
    , subd. 7(d)(4)-(5) (2012). Substantial
    evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
    support a conclusion.”     Minneapolis Van & Warehouse Co. v. St. Paul Terminal
    Warehouse Co., 
    288 Minn. 294
    , 299, 
    180 N.W.2d 175
    , 178 (1970) (quotation omitted).
    Under Minnesota Statutes section 268.085, subdivision 1, “[a]n applicant may be
    eligible to receive unemployment benefits for any week if . . . the applicant was available
    for suitable employment as defined in subdivision 15.” 
    Minn. Stat. § 268.085
    , subd. 1(4)
    (2012).
    2
    “Available for suitable employment” means an
    applicant is ready, willing, and able to accept suitable
    employment. The attachment to the work force must be
    genuine. An applicant may restrict availability to suitable
    employment, but there must be no other restrictions, either
    self-imposed or created by circumstances, temporary or
    permanent, that prevent accepting suitable employment.
    
    Id.
     subd. 15(a) (2012). “This court views the ULJ’s factual findings in the light most
    favorable to the decision.      This court also gives deference to the credibility
    determinations made by the ULJ. As a result, this court will not disturb the ULJ’s factual
    findings when the evidence substantially sustains them.” Peterson v. Nw. Airlines Inc.,
    
    753 N.W.2d 771
    , 774 (Minn. App. 2008) (citations omitted), review denied (Minn. Oct.
    1, 2008). But “[w]e review de novo a ULJ’s determination that an applicant is ineligible
    for unemployment benefits.”      Stassen v. Lone Mountain Truck Leasing, LLC, 
    814 N.W.2d 25
    , 30 (Minn. App. 2012).
    The ULJ found that Dunn declined an offer to work for 10 additional hours each
    week because she was spending time caring for her stepdaughter, who had been in an
    automobile accident. The ULJ also found that Dunn’s employer, respondent Caremate
    Home Health Care, Inc., left several messages again offering additional work, and that
    Dunn again declined and again explained that she could not accept the work because of
    the extra time she was spending caring for her stepdaughter. Dunn challenges these
    findings, arguing that (1) she was not caring for her stepdaughter beyond the 31.5 hours a
    week Caremate authorized and that the ULJ simply “presupposed that more care was
    being provided to [her stepdaughter]”; and (2) she turned down only one offer for
    3
    additional hours and “never heard from [Caremate]” regarding “other patients and hours”
    and did not receive any messages.
    Dunn’s arguments are not persuasive. The evidence presented at the hearing
    substantially supports the ULJ’s finding that Dunn told Caremate she could not take
    additional hours because she was caring for her stepdaughter. The Caremate staffing
    coordinator testified at the hearing that she “was told by Ms. Dunn . . . that she was
    spending more time with her [stepdaughter] because of this accident,” and that on March
    11, 2013, Dunn informed Caremate that she could not work with the new client because
    her stepdaughter “had had this accident” and Dunn “was spending more time with her.”
    The evidence presented at the hearing also supports the ULJ’s findings that
    Caremate left messages offering additional work on April 24, 25, and 29, and that Dunn
    again declined the work. The staffing coordinator testified that she left messages for
    Dunn offering work on April 24, 25, and 29. The staffing coordinator further testified
    that Dunn called on May 29 and said “she wasn’t avoiding the offer. She just couldn’t
    accept them because of the extra hours she was with [her stepdaughter].”
    Although Dunn testified that she was available for suitable work, the ULJ
    concluded that Dunn’s testimony was not “as plausible, believable, or credible” as
    Caremate’s witnesses on this point because Caremate’s witnesses “provided testimony
    that is corroborated by their written submissions and that is a more logical version of
    events than Dunn’s self-serving denial.” The ULJ further concluded that “[i]t is not
    believable or credible that Dunn would limit her assistance to her stepdaughter to only
    31.5 hours a week; rather, it is more likely true than not that Dunn has been helping her
    4
    stepdaughter more than that.” We defer to the ULJ’s credibility determination. See
    McNeilly v. Dep’t. of Emp’t & Econ. Dev., 
    778 N.W.2d 707
    , 710 (Minn. App. 2010).
    (“This court . . . gives deference to the credibility determinations made by the ULJ.”);
    Ywswf v. Teleplan Wireless Servs., Inc., 
    726 N.W.2d 525
    , 533 (Minn. App. 2007) (stating
    that this court will affirm if “[t]he ULJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence
    and provide the statutorily required reason for her credibility determination”).
    Dunn does not challenge whether the offered work constituted “suitable
    employment” within the meaning of the statute. And because Dunn repeatedly turned
    down Caremate’s offers to work more hours in order to provide care for her stepdaughter,
    it is clear that Dunn was not “ready, willing, and able to accept suitable employment.”
    See 
    Minn. Stat. § 268.085
    , subd. 15(a); Hansen v. Cont'l Can Co., 
    301 Minn. 185
    , 187,
    
    221 N.W.2d 670
    , 672 (1974) (“A claimant may not limit [his] availability because of
    personal or domestic reasons unrelated to [his] employment” (quotation omitted.)). The
    ULJ did not err in concluding that Dunn was not available for suitable employment.
    Affirmed.
    5