State of Minnesota v. Jebah Doe ( 2023 )

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-0070
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Jebah Doe,
Appellant.
Filed December 26, 2023
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-25721
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Peter H. Dahlquist, Special
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge. ∗
∗
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence discovered in his vehicle during a traffic stop because law enforcement
unlawfully expanded the scope of the stop. Because each incremental intrusion by law
enforcement was reasonable, we affirm.
FACTS
This case arises from appellant Jebah Doe’s challenge to the district court’s pretrial
order denying his motion to suppress evidence of a firearm discovered in a vehicle that he
was driving. At the suppression hearing, the district court received testimony from the
sergeant who conducted the traffic stop and also received the sergeant’s squad-car video
from the stop. A summary of the evidence at the suppression hearing follows.
On November 26, 2020, the sergeant heard dispatch relay that a vehicle with no
license plates and front-end damage had struck a concrete median. The sergeant located a
vehicle matching the description provided by dispatch and began to follow the vehicle.
The sergeant’s squad-car video depicts the vehicle weaving within the traffic lane and
crossing the fog line. The sergeant initiated a traffic stop on the highway immediately
before an offramp exit. The driver stopped the vehicle partially on the shoulder of the
highway and partially within the traffic lane. After the driver initially stopped the vehicle,
the driver began reversing the vehicle on the highway shoulder, prompting the sergeant to
yell, “Stop!”
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The sergeant approached the front passenger-side door and immediately tried to
open that door. When the door did not open, the sergeant knocked on the window, and the
sergeant was then able to open the car door. After opening the door, the sergeant leaned
into the vehicle and asked the driver if everything was okay. The driver responded that
everything was okay. The sergeant asked if the driver had been involved in an accident.
The driver replied that he had not been involved in an accident. The sergeant stated to the
driver that he stopped the vehicle after receiving driving complaints and then asked the
driver for his license. The driver responded that he did not have a license with him but
identified himself as Doe, providing his full name and date of birth. The sergeant closed
the door, returned to his squad car, ran Doe’s name through law-enforcement databases,
and learned Doe did not have a valid driver’s license.
Because Doe did not have a valid driver’s license and because the vehicle was
parked on the highway in a manner posing a traffic hazard, the sergeant ordered that Doe’s
vehicle be towed. The sergeant returned to Doe’s vehicle, this time approaching the front
driver-side door, tapped on the window, and opened the door. Immediately upon opening
the door, the sergeant saw a firearm between Doe’s legs on the floor of the vehicle and
instructed Doe not to move. The sergeant leaned into the vehicle to secure Doe’s arms and
another officer on the scene removed the gun from inside the vehicle. Doe was arrested
and the vehicle was impounded. Police conducted an inventory search of the vehicle.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Doe with possession of a firearm by an
ineligible person pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2020), and receiving stolen
property pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.53, subd. 1 (2020). Doe moved to suppress the
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firearm evidence seized from his vehicle, arguing that the segreant had illegally entered
and searched that vehicle. The district court denied his motion. Doe then moved for
reconsideration of his motion to suppress, arguing generally that the sergeant violated
Doe’s Fourth Amendment rights when he opened the vehicle doors. The district court
denied the motion to reconsider. Doe waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded with a
stipulated-evidence trial under the procedures described in Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01,
subd. 4. The district court found Doe guilty of possession of a firearm by an ineligible
person and of receiving stolen property, entered judgment of conviction for both counts,
and sentenced him to 60 months’ imprisonment for possession of a firearm by an ineligible
person.
Doe appeals.
DECISION
Doe argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because
the sergeant unlawfully expanded the scope of the traffic stop by opening the passenger-
side and driver-side doors to the vehicle. Because the sergeant’s actions were reasonable
incremental intrusions following a lawful traffic stop, and the evidence would otherwise
have been inevitably discovered, we disagree.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect an individual’s right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10.
Warrantless seizures are unreasonable, and thus unconstitutional, unless a recognized
exception to the warrant requirement applies. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
474-75 (1971) (“The most basic constitutional rule in this area is that searches conducted
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outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established
and well delineated exceptions.” (quotation omitted)); State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145,
149 (Minn. 2009). One exception to the warrant requirement permits reasonable
investigatory seizures, including traffic stops. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 363
(Minn. 2004). But an officer’s actions during the traffic stop must be “reasonably related
to and justified by the circumstances that gave rise to the stop in the first place” and “may
become invalid if [the stop] becomes ‘intolerable’ in its ‘intensity or scope.’” Id. at 364(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1968)). Thus, “each incremental intrusion
during a traffic stop [must] be tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original
legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as
defined in Terry.” Id. at 365. In assessing reasonableness, “the court should ask whether
with the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search, would a person
of reasonable caution believe that the action taken was appropriate.” State v. Othoudt, 482
N.W.2d 218, 223 (Minn. 1992). “The test for appropriateness, in turn, is based on a
balancing of the government’s need to search or seize ‘and the individual’s right to personal
security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.’” Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 365
(quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)). When evaluating a
district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s factual
findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d
496, 502 (Minn. 2008).
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Against this backdrop, we address the two incremental intrusions by the sergeant
following the lawful traffic stop.
Passenger-Side Door
Doe first argues that the district court erred in determining that the sergeant acted
reasonably in opening the passenger-side door because the sergeant’s investigation could
have been accomplished without such an intrusion and that the sergeant’s actions in
opening the passenger-side door were without reasonable, articulable suspicion. These
arguments are unavailing.
The record supports the district court’s conclusion that the sergeant’s act of opening
the passenger-side door at the beginning of the encounter with Doe was “tied to and
justified by reasonableness.” Our review of the record confirms that each of the sergeant’s
actions during this encounter was for the legitimate purpose of identifying Doe and
ensuring his welfare. The sergeant testified that he wanted to identify the driver and “make
sure that the driver was okay” based on information he received from dispatch reporting
that the driver hit a center median. Based on this and other evidence in the record, the
district court specifically determined that, following a lawful traffic stop, the sergeant
reasonably approached the vehicle “given the unknown state of the driver, reports that were
provided to the Sergeant prior to initiating the traffic stop, and the conduct the Sergeant
observed.” This is consistent with the district court’s finding that the sergeant stopped the
vehicle to “determine whether [Doe] was okay as he did not know whether the driver was
impaired or required additional aid.”
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Any incremental intrusion associated with the opening of the passenger-side door
was therefore reasonably tied to the original purpose of the lawful traffic stop and
appropriate under the circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d 888, 891
(Minn. 1978) (holding an officer opening a vehicle door was reasonable where the vehicle
was covered in snow and the officer could not see the passenger); State v. Lopez, 698
N.W.2d 18, 24 (Minn. App. 2005) (holding an officer opening a vehicle door was
reasonable when responding to a call that someone was asleep or unconscious in a parking
lot); see also State v. Perry, No. A08-0083, 2009 WL 233937, at *1, *3-4 (Minn. App. Feb.
3, 2009) (holding an officer opening a vehicle door was reasonable when the officer
responded to a call that a car was weaving, observed the parked car for ten minutes, and
then found the driver asleep). 1
Doe nonetheless argues that the sergeant’s actions were an unreasonable expansion
of the traffic stop, citing our nonprecedential opinion State v. Stevenson, No. A21-1142,
2022 WL 3152587, at *1, *5-6 (Minn. App. Aug. 8, 2022) (holding law enforcement
opening a vehicle door was unreasonable where law enforcement stopped a vehicle for
having no front license plate and expired tabs in a parking lot and the reason for opening
the door was general officer safety). But the facts available to the sergeant when he stopped
Doe differ from those in Stevenson in two notable ways. First, the sergeant conducted the
traffic stop and opened the vehicle door because of concern for Doe’s wellbeing and not
an equipment violation, which was the reason for the stop in Stevenson. 2022 WL 3152587,
1
We cite nonprecedential opinions for their persuasive authority. Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
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at *6. Second, the sergeant’s expansion of the stop was reasonably connected to the reason
for the traffic stop. In Stevenson, the reasons for the traffic stop were not connected to the
reason for the expansion—officer safety. Id. at *5-6.
With the facts available to the sergeant at the time he opened the passenger-side
door, a person of reasonable caution would believe that the action taken was appropriate.
See Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 365. Therefore, the sergeant acted lawfully in opening the
passenger-side door.
Driver-Side Door
Doe also argues that the district court erred in concluding that the sergeant’s actions
in opening the driver-side vehicle door were reasonable because the sergeant had “no need
to search or seize Doe’s vehicle.” We disagree.
The record supports the district court’s determination that the sergeant acted
reasonably in opening the driver-side door. Because Doe was an unlicensed driver and not
lawfully permitted to operate a vehicle, the sergeant planned to have Doe exit the vehicle
so the sergeant could drive Doe up the road. “[A] police officer may order a driver out of
a lawfully stopped vehicle without an articulated reason.” Id. at 367 (citing Pennsylvania
v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977)); see also Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d at 890 (recognizing
that a law-enforcement officer opening a door to order an occupant out of a vehicle is not
distinguishable from requesting that occupant exit the vehicle and the occupant opening
the door themselves). The sergeant had reasonable justification for this incremental
intrusion because he had probable cause to believe that Doe was driving without a license.
See Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 365 (holding that independent probable cause justifies an
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incremental intrusion during a traffic stop). The fact that the sergeant could have chosen
to allow Doe to exit the vehicle in an alternate manner does not negate the reasonableness
of the manner chosen by the sergeant under these circumstances. We therefore discern no
error by the district court in its suppression order.
Inevitable Discovery
Even if the district court erred in its determination that the incremental intrusions
into the vehicle were reasonable, we agree with the district court’s denial of the suppression
motion because law enforcement would have inevitably discovered the firearm through an
inventory search of the vehicle after its impoundment. Doe argues that the evidence would
not have been inevitably discovered because the choice to impound the vehicle was not
reasonable.
The exclusionary rule bars evidence “obtained either during or as a direct result of
an unlawful invasion.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963). But the
inevitable-discovery doctrine is an exception to this rule and applies if the state can show
that the fruits of a challenged search inevitably would have been discovered through lawful
means. State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 104-05 (Minn. 1999).
Inventory searches are an exception to the warrant requirement and are reasonable
“because of their administrative and caretaking functions” which “serve to protect an
owner[’]s property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost,
stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from danger.” Gauster, 752 N.W.2d
at 502 (quotation omitted). Because impoundment “gives rise to the need for and
justification of the inventory search, the threshold inquiry when determining the
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reasonableness of an inventory search is whether the impoundment of the vehicle was
proper.” Id. (quotation omitted). For impoundment to be proper, it must be “conducted
pursuant to standardized criteria” and “the State must have an interest in impoundment that
outweighs the individual’s Fourth Amendment right[s].” Id. at 502-03; State v. Rohde, 852
N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).
The sergeant properly impounded the vehicle driven by Doe. The state’s interest in
impounding a vehicle may outweigh individual rights if the vehicle is “impeding traffic or
threatening public safety and convenience.” Rohde, 852 N.W.2d at 265 (quotation
omitted). The record shows that Doe stopped the vehicle partially in a lane of traffic on a
busy highway and that Doe was unable to lawfully move the vehicle himself because he
did not have a license. The sergeant reasonably concluded that the vehicle posed a traffic
hazard and needed to be removed. Although Doe asserts that the vehicle could have been
removed from the highway without impoundment, the fact that law enforcement could have
used alternate means to remove the vehicle does not negate the conclusion that the state’s
interest in impoundment outweighed Doe’s Fourth Amendment rights or otherwise
undermine the propriety of the sergeant’s choice given the circumstances. The record
supports the district court’s determination that impoundment of the vehicle was proper, and
law enforcement would have inevitably discovered the firearm in the resulting inventory
search of Doe’s vehicle.
Affirmed.
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