In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Jeremiah Jerome Johnson ( 2023 )


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  •                    This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
    Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
    STATE OF MINNESOTA
    IN COURT OF APPEALS
    A23-1198
    In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:
    Jeremiah Jerome Johnson.
    Filed December 18, 2023
    Affirmed
    Bjorkman, Judge
    Commitment Appeal Panel
    MacKenzie Guptil, Pine City, Minnesota (for appellant Jeremiah Johnson)
    Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Leaf McGregor, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
    Minnesota (for respondent Commissioner of Human Services)
    Benjamin T. Lindstrom, Cass County Attorney, Nicole Cayko, Assistant County Attorney,
    Walker, Minnesota (for respondent Cass County)
    Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Ede,
    Judge.
    NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
    BJORKMAN, Judge
    Appellant challenges the decision of a commitment appeal panel (CAP) dismissing
    his petition seeking provisional or full discharge from his commitment as a sexually
    dangerous person (SDP). He argues that due-process considerations warrant discharge and
    the panel erred by weighing the evidence rather than viewing it in the light most favorable
    to his petition. We affirm.
    FACTS
    Appellant Jeremiah Jerome Johnson has a history of forceful sexual assaults, other
    nonconsensual sexual contact, and exhibitionism.        In 2009, he was indeterminately
    committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) as an SDP. In May 2020,
    Johnson petitioned for a transfer to community preparation services, provisional discharge,
    or discharge. The special review board recommended denying the petition. Johnson
    petitioned the CAP for rehearing and reconsideration, and the CAP appointed Dr. Paul
    Reitman to examine Johnson. Dr. Reitman did not support Johnson’s petition, opining that
    Johnson “is an untreated sex offender with psychopathy that puts him at high risk for
    criminal recidivism and sexual recidivism.” After Dr. Reitman filed his report, the CAP
    conducted a hearing.
    During the hearing, Johnson submitted several exhibits in support of his petition:
    quarterly treatment progress reports from September 2022, December 2022, and March
    2023; a November 2018 annual treatment progress report; a May 2020 mental-health
    assessment; the special review board’s April 2021 treatment report; the standard
    provisional discharge plan conditions; and Dr. Reitman’s report, submitted jointly with
    respondent Commissioner of Human Services (the commissioner). Johnson also called
    Dr. Reitman as a witness. The commissioner submitted exhibits opposing transfer.
    At the close of Johnson’s evidence, the commissioner moved to dismiss the petition
    under Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(b); respondent Cass County joined the motion. The CAP
    granted the motion, based solely on the evidence Johnson submitted. It denied Johnson’s
    transfer request, explaining that a preponderance of the evidence does not support transfer.
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    And it dismissed his requests for discharge or provisional discharge, explaining that
    Johnson failed to establish a prima facie case for either type of relief.
    Johnson appeals the dismissal of his discharge and provisional-discharge requests.
    DECISION
    A person committed as an SDP may be provisionally discharged if a CAP
    determines that they are “capable of making an acceptable adjustment to open society,” as
    demonstrated by evidence that (1) they no longer need treatment and supervision in their
    current treatment setting, and (2) a provisional discharge plan will reasonably protect the
    public and enable the person to adjust to the community. Minn. Stat. § 253D.30, subd. 1
    (2022). A committed person may be fully discharged if a CAP determines that they are
    (1) “capable of making an acceptable adjustment to open society,” (2) “no longer
    dangerous to the public,” and (3) “no longer in need of treatment and supervision.” Minn.
    Stat. § 253D.31 (2022).
    When petitioning for discharge or provisional discharge, the committed person
    “bears the burden of going forward with the evidence, which means presenting a prima
    facie case with competent evidence to show that the person is entitled to the requested
    relief.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.28, subd. 2(d) (2022). To do so, the person must produce
    evidence that, “if proven,” would satisfy the criteria for discharge or provisional discharge.
    Larson v. Jesson, 
    847 N.W.2d 531
    , 534 (Minn. App. 2014) (quoting Coker v. Jesson, 
    831 N.W.2d 483
    , 486 (Minn. 2013)). At this stage, the CAP must view the evidence in the
    light most favorable to the committed person. Coker, 831 N.W.2d at 491. Failure to
    establish a prima facie case may warrant dismissal of the petition under Minn. R. Civ. P.
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    41.02(b). We review dismissal of a petition under rule 41.02 de novo. Larson, 
    847 N.W.2d at 534
    .
    Johnson first argues that he has a due-process right to discharge. He cites caselaw
    requiring discharge if the original reason for commitment no longer exists, Call v. Gomez,
    
    535 N.W.2d 312
    , 319 (Minn. 1995), and identifying inability to control behavior as a
    constitutional prerequisite to ongoing civil commitment, In re Civ. Commitment of
    Opiacha, 
    943 N.W.2d 220
    , 229 (Minn. App. 2020) (citing Kansas v. Crane, 
    534 U.S. 407
    ,
    413 (2002)). The CAP did not expressly address due process in its decision. But we
    discern no error in this omission because the CAP addressed the statutory criteria, and the
    current versions of the discharge and provisional-discharge statutes comport with the due-
    process considerations outlined in Call. See In re Commitment of Fugelseth, 
    907 N.W.2d 248
    , 253 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2018). And even if ability to
    control behavior alone justifies discharge, regardless of the statutory criteria, Johnson still
    must establish a prima facie case by producing evidence that, if proven, would establish
    that he has such control. Opiacha, 943 N.W.2d at 229. He has not done so. Indeed, he
    does not even claim to have such evidence, asserting only that his evidence shows that his
    current sexual misbehavior is limited to exhibitionism, not assault.           But Johnson’s
    continued exhibitionism in a controlled setting after receiving consequences for that
    conduct, together with the other behavioral problems noted throughout the evidence that
    Johnson produced, points unavoidably to an inability to control behavior.
    Johnson also contends that the CAP erred by weighing the evidence rather than
    viewing it in the light most favorable to him, citing two examples. First, Johnson argues
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    that the CAP improperly weighed evidence by finding that Dr. Reitman’s familiarity with
    Johnson from the initial commitment case enabled the doctor “to provide an unbiased
    opinion on [Johnson’s] current petition.” Johnson is correct that weighing credibility is
    improper when determining whether a petitioner presented a prima facie case for discharge.
    Coker, 831 N.W.2d at 490-91. But because Johnson submitted Dr. Reitman’s report in
    support of his petition and called Dr. Reitman as a witness, the CAP’s acceptance of
    Dr. Reitman’s testimony as unbiased is consistent with the mandate to view the evidence
    in the light most favorable to Johnson.
    Second, he points to the CAP’s finding that includes paraphilia among his diagnoses
    even though “some of his quarterly reports don’t reflect an ongoing paraphilia at all.” This
    argument is unavailing. Johnson’s 2020 mental-health assessment and the special review
    board’s 2021 treatment report expressly state a diagnosis of paraphilic disorder. The other
    treatment reports Johnson submitted do not state a paraphilia diagnosis but include among
    his diagnoses “Encounter for Mental Health Services for Perpetrator of Nonparental Child
    Sexual Abuse,” and they note that Johnson continues to engage in inappropriate sexual
    behaviors toward female staff and violate their boundaries. And Dr. Reitman testified to a
    diagnosis of “sexual abuse,” explaining that he means Johnson “likes to rape and
    overpower women” and is “interested in humiliation and degradation,” and that this is, “in
    a sense,” a paraphilia diagnosis. The CAP’s finding that Johnson has a diagnosis of
    paraphilia does not reflect weighing of the evidence. It accurately describes this evidence.
    Moreover, any error in the CAP’s findings as to Dr. Reitman’s lack of bias and
    Johnson’s diagnoses does not warrant reversal because our careful review of the record
    5
    confirms that the evidence Johnson submitted, even when viewed in his favor, does not
    establish a prima facie case for provisional or full discharge. In particular, a committed
    person is not entitled to provisional discharge unless “there is no longer a need for treatment
    and supervision in [their] current treatment setting,” Minn. Stat. § 253D.30, subd. 1(b)(1),
    and not entitled to full discharge unless they no longer need treatment and supervision at
    all, Minn. Stat. § 253D.31. None of the evidence Johnson presented to the CAP satisfies
    the discharge criteria. Rather, it shows Johnson is an untreated sex offender who continues
    to require inpatient treatment in the secure environment of MSOP.
    Johnson’s evidence uniformly shows that he has antisocial personality disorder and
    a history of behavior consistent with a sexual disorder. His refusal to engage with treatment
    precludes diagnostic certainty, but a sexual-disorder diagnosis is not required for continued
    commitment. See Opiacha, 943 N.W.2d at 228 (stating that due process does not require
    any particular mental condition as a prerequisite to ongoing civil commitment). The
    evidence also uniformly shows that Johnson persistently exhibits behavioral problems,
    including exhibitionist and other sexually aggressive behaviors. He denies or minimizes
    his sexual-offending history, and he remains in the first phase of a three-phase treatment
    program; this means he has not reached the treatment stage where most sex-
    offender-specific treatment occurs. And none of the professionals who have examined
    Johnson support any form of discharge.
    In sum, Johnson failed to present a prima facie case for provisional or full discharge
    because he did not produce evidence that, if proven, would demonstrate that he no longer
    6
    requires treatment at MSOP. Accordingly, the CAP did not err by dismissing his petition
    seeking that relief.
    Affirmed.
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Document Info

Docket Number: a231198

Filed Date: 12/18/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/18/2023