Elizabeth L. Strickland v. Amy Alyece Broome , 2015 Miss. LEXIS 604 ( 2015 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2014-IA-00933-SCT
ELIZABETH L. STRICKLAND, INDIVIDUALLY,
AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE ELIZABETH LANCE
BROOME REVOCABLE TRUST, STEPHEN LUKE
BROOME AND JESSE ALAN BROOME
v.
ESTATE OF STEVE ALAN BROOME AND AMY
ALYECE BROOME, EXECUTRIX
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 6/20/2014
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DEBORAH J. GAMBRELL
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LAMAR COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: S. ROBERT HAMMOND, JR.
NICHOLAS KANE THOMPSON
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: JONATHAN MICHAEL FARRIS
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
COLEMAN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Following Steve Broome’s death, his ex-wife Elizabeth Strickland and his
children, Stephen Luke Broome and Jesse Alan Broome, filed claims against Steve’s
estate for child support arrears, other unpaid support obligations, and for life insurance
proceeds. The chancellor dismissed all of the claims, holding that the claims were not
valid because they were not reduced to a judgment before Steve’s death and that the
claims were barred by res judicata. We hold that the chancellor erred in dismissing the
claims, since Elizabeth, Stephen, and Jesse presented sufficient evidence to satisfy
Mississippi Code Section 91-7-149. Therefore, we reverse the chancellor’s judgment and
remand for proceedings consistent with the instant opinion.
Factual Background and Procedural History
¶2. Steve Broome and Elizabeth Strickland married in 1986. They had two childrenB
Luke, born in 1988, and Jesse, born in 1990. Steve and Elizabeth divorced in 2002. They
entered into a Child Custody and Support and Property Settlement Agreement (the
agreement). According to the agreement, Steve and Elizabeth had joint legal custody of
the children, and they had joint physical custody of Luke, with Luke spending every other
week with each parent. Elizabeth had physical custody of Jesse, and Steve had visitation.
¶3. Pursuant to the agreement, Steve was ordered to pay $637 per month in child
support. Elizabeth was to maintain health insurance for the children, and Steve was to
reimburse her for half of the premium and any medical expenses not covered by
insurance. They were supposed to purchase an MPACT college savings plan, with each
party paying half. The agreement provided the following about life insurance: “Each
party shall maintain the same amount of life insurance and keep the beneficiary the
same.” Finally, the agreement included a waiver provision, waiving and relinquishing
any and all rights to inherit from the other and agreeing to “make no claim of any kind
whatsoever against the estate of the other in the event of their death.”
¶4. Soon after the divorce, Jesse tried living with each parent every other week as
Luke was doing. In June 2003, Steve filed a petition for modification of the divorce
judgment. Based on Jesse’s living arrangements, Steve sought to have joint physical
custody of Jesse and to have his child support obligation terminated. Elizabeth responded
with a petition for contempt, alleging that Steve was behind on child support and that he
no longer had a life insurance policy naming Elizabeth as the beneficiary. The matter
never went to trial. In March 2004, Steve and Elizabeth signed an agreed order
acknowledging a material change in circumstances. A few months later, Luke signed a
custody election in favor of Steve.1 The modification and contempt proceeding remained
dormant until 2006, when the court entered a Rule 41 order of dismissal for lack of
prosecution. Neither party opposed the dismissal nor moved to have it set aside. At that
time, Luke was 18 and Jesse was 15.
¶5. Jesse continued to live with each parent every other week. Steve’s estate
maintains that each parent provided for him when he was at their house and that they split
major expenses equally. Jesse enrolled at Pearl River Community College (PRCC) in
2012, and Steve paid half of the cost, but Jesse did not finish the first semester.
¶6. According to Steve’s estate, Luke began abusing drugs and alcohol when he was in
high school, and he had to repeat the twelfth grade. Steve’s estate writes that Luke did
not like Elizabeth’s live-in boyfriend, so he lived with Steve full time. After high school,
Steve sent Luke to rehabilitation and paid for his treatment. Upon Luke’s return to
Steve’s house, Steve told Luke that he had to stay sober and either work full time or go to
school full time. Luke did neither, and Steve asked him to leave in December 2007. In
2010, Luke enrolled at the University of Southern Mississippi, at age 21. The estate
maintains that Steve paid for half of Luke’s tuition. Luke failed to stay enrolled. In 2011,
1
Elizabeth now claims that Steve coerced Luke into signing the custody and that Luke
never went to live with Steve full time.
Luke enrolled at Pearl River Community College. Again, Steve paid for half of Luke’s
tuition and gave him $300 a month for rent. Luke graduated from Pearl River in 2013, at
age 24.
¶7. Steve was diagnosed with cancer in 2010, and he passed away in August 2013,
leaving the entirety of his estate to Amy Broome, his current wife, in his will. Amy was
the executrix of the will. The will was admitted to probate, and the notice to creditors was
published. Elizabeth filed claim against the Broome Estate for $400,000 plus interest,
which she claimed was the amount of the life insurance policy Steve was supposed to
have, with her as the named beneficiary. She filed a second claim, joined by their adult
sons, claiming $161,602 for back child support, half of the boys’ health insurance
premiums, and half of college tuition for Luke to attend Louisiana State University and
Jesse to attend Mississippi State University. Luke was 25 and Jesse was 23 at that time.
The Estate objected to the claims.
¶8. Elizabeth propounded discovery to the Estate and sought to take Amy’s deposition,
individually and as executrix. When the Estate did not respond, Elizabeth filed a motion
to compel discovery and a motion to compel Amy’s deposition. The Estate filed a motion
to quash discovery, which also called into question the validity of Elizabeth’s claims.
Elizabeth then filed a Motion to Determine the Technical Adequacy of the Claims. After
a hearing, the chancellor denied all of Elizabeth’s motions. The chancellor held that the
claims against the Estate were not valid because they should have been reduced to a
judgment in the divorce action prior to Steve’s death. Elizabeth filed a motion to
reconsider, which the chancellor denied. In addition to holding that Elizabeth was not
entitled to relief because her claims had not been reduced to a judgment, the chancellor
held that the claims were barred by res judicata because they could have been raised in
the 2003 contempt proceeding. The chancellor dismissed the probate claims. Elizabeth
petitioned for and was granted the instant interlocutory appeal.
Standard of Review
¶9. Although neither party filed a motion to dismiss, the chancellor dismissed
Elizabeth’s probate claims after she filed a Motion to Determine the Technical Adequacy
of the Claims. A “chancellor’s finding that the claims did not meet the requirements
under the law is a question of law.” In re Estate of Lingle, 822 So. 2d 320, 322 (¶10)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2002). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id. (citing Matter of
Estate of Mason, 616 So. 2d 322, 327 (Miss. 1993)).
Discussion
¶10. Elizabeth raises two primary issues on appeal. The first is that the chancellor erred
in dismissing the probate claims, as the claims more than complied with Section 91-7-
149, were not barred by res judicata, and were within all applicable statutes of
limitations. The second issue involves the chancellor’s denial of Elizabeth’s motions to
compel discovery.
I. Compliance with Section 91-7-149
¶11. Mississippi Code Section 91-7-149 provides the procedure for probating claims
against an estate. It provides, in pertinent part,
Any person desiring to probate his claim shall present to the clerk the
written evidence thereof, if any, or if the claim be a judgment or decree, a
duly certified copy thereof, or if there be no written evidence thereof, an
itemized account or a statement of the claim in writing, signed by the
creditor, and make affidavit, to be attached thereto, to the following effect,
viz.: That the claim is just, correct, and owing from the deceased; that it is
not usurious; that neither the affiant nor any other person has received
payment in whole or in part thereof, except such as is credited thereon, if
any; and that security has not been received therefor except as stated, if any.
Miss. Code Ann. § 91-7-149 (Rev. 2013). Therefore, “[a] probated claim must
substantially comply with the provisions of Miss[issippi] Code [Section] 91-7-149.”
Central Optical Merchandising Co. v. Lowe’s Estate, 249 Miss. 61, 160 So. 2d 673, 678
(1964). “The written evidence or statement of claim must on its face show a prima facie
right to recover from the estate or that liability exists on the part of the estate.” In re
Estate of Lingle, 822 So. 2d at 322-23 (¶12) (citing Wilson v. Yandell, 174 Miss. 713,
722, 165 So. 430, 433 (1936)). To be adequate, a claim “shall give notice that a claim
exists against the estate, for payment of which the creditor looks to the estate, that the
statement shall be so clear and unambiguous as to distinguish the claim with reasonable
certainty from all other similar claims, and that it shall give such information concerning
the nature and amount of the demand as will enable the representative to act intelligently
in providing for its payment or in rejecting it.” Central Optical Merchandising Co., 160
So. 2d at 678.
¶12. Elizabeth filed two claims against the Estate. On her own, Elizabeth asserted that
a provision of the divorce decree entitled her to $400,000 in life insurance proceeds that
Steve was required to maintain with her as the beneficiary. Elizabeth, joined by Stephen
and Jesse, also filed a claim for $161,602.56, comprised of child-support arrearages,
Steve’s portion of Stephen’s and Jesse’s health insurance premiums that Steve had not
paid, and half of Stephen’s and Jesse’s college expenses. As proof of both claims,
Elizabeth submitted the Agreement as a contract; the final judgment of divorce; and an
itemized statement of the monies Steve owed, with affidavits from Elizabeth, Stephen,
and Jesse. After the hearing, Elizabeth submitted a significant amount of supplemental
information in an attempt to support her claims, including documents concerning the life
insurance policy, correspondence between Steve and Elizabeth about their sons and
related expenses, Elizabeth’s payroll documents showing health insurance deductions,
and a plethora of documents related to their sons’ college expenses.
¶13. Without hearing any testimony, which Elizabeth attempted to offer at the hearing,
the chancellor dismissed Elizabeth’s claims because the claims were not “valid.”
However, the Court has little to go on from the record on the basis of the chancellor’s
order. The hearing before the chancellor was brief, and the chancellor’s order contains
little explanation. In the chancellor’s initial order, the entirety of the analysis is as
follows:
The [c]ourt[,] after oral argument, supplemental information[,] and review
of the Cause No. 2001-0327-GN-W finds that the claims asserted are not
valid as it involves issues relating to past due support and other matters
that should have been reduced to a judgment in the prior divorce action.
(A petition for Contempt was filed in said action in 2003 and an Order of
Dismissal being entered on the 3rd day of May, 2006.)
The Motion to Compel Discovery and the Motion to Compel Deposition are
hereby denied. The [c]ourt further finds that the Claims of Elizabeth
Strickland and others stemming from the divorce action are not valid and all
relief pertaining thereto is hereby denied.
(Emphasis added.) The chancellor’s order denying Elizabeth’s motion to reconsider
contained an almost identical statement, but the order also included that the claims were
barred by res judicata.
¶14. The Court holds that the chancellor’s order is ambiguous, as it does not
specifically address whether the claims complied with Section 91-7-149, which was the
only issue before the chancellor at the time. Furthermore, in Raspilair v. Estate of
Raspilair, 583 So. 2d 970, 971-2 (Miss. 1991), the Court found that trial court erred in
dismissing Ruth Raspilair’s claim for life insurance proceeds and back alimony against
her ex-husband’s estate based on Ruth’s presentation of their divorce decree containing a
life insurance requirement. “We find that Ruth made and proved a valid claim against the
estate for $30,600, which the chancellor should have allowed, as authorized under
Miss[issippi] Code Ann[otated section] 91-7-165.” Therefore, Elizabeth’s presentation of
the divorce decree, the agreement, and other various documents was sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of Section 91-7-149.
¶15. To the extent the chancellor dismissed Elizabeth’s claims on the merits, such
action was improper, as the merits were not before the chancellor to decide. As the Court
explained in Central Optical, 249 Miss. at 72, 160 So. 2d at 678 (emphasis added):
Presentation of a claim against an estate is in many respects similar to the
filing of a suit against a defendant. The main purposes of pleading and
procedure are to obtain a clear definition of the issues between the parties
and to reveal all of the facts, in order to obtain a fair and equitable decision
of the controversy. Where a claimant against an estate presents in good
faith a claim which is in substantial compliance with the foregoing
requirements, it is not equitable to permit the deceased’s representative to
wait until the six months have expired, then to assert the itemized account is
not technically sufficient, and thereby to bar an otherwise legitimate debt of
the estate.
Had Elizabeth’s claims not been compliant with the statute, the more appropriate remedy
would have been to permit Elizabeth to correct any deficiency, if possible.
¶16. By way of comparison, Elizabeth’s motion to determine the technical adequacy of
her claims was akin to a Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12 motion, and the
chancellor’s order dismissing her claims converted the motion to a Mississippi Rule of
Civil Procedure 56 motion. “[S]ummary judgment practice under Rule 56 is inapplicable
in contests of probated claims because it is ‘inconsistent’ with the statutory procedure
which necessitates that a claimant enter court to introduce evidence in support of his
claim and permits a personal representative to rebut the claim.” Biloxi Reg’l Med. Ctr.,
Inc. v. Estate of Ross, 546 So. 2d 667, 671 (Miss. 1989) (citations omitted). While it is
true that Elizabeth did present various items in support of her claims, she was not
permitted to present testimony on the claims and, on several occasions orally and in
writing, asserted that she was not yet seeking an adjudication on the merits. Therefore,
Elizabeth has not had her day in court at which she could attempt to prove her claims.2
¶17. We reverse the chancellor’s judgment and remand the case to the chancery court
for proceedings consistent with the instant opinion.
II. Res Judicata
¶18. Additionally, the chancellor erred in finding that res judicata applied to the claims
of past-due child support obligations and the life insurance policy because of the prior
contempt action that had resulted in a Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(d)
dismissal. “For res judicata to apply, the defendant must show that the judgment
rendered in the previous action was a final judgment on the merits. A final judgment on
the merits is ‘a judgment based on the evidence rather than on the technical or procedural
grounds.’” Estate of White v. White, 152 So. 3d 314, 317 (&&9-10) (Miss. 2014). Thus,
the Rule 41(d) dismissal of the prior contempt actions is not a judgment on the merits for
the application of res judicata.
III. Discovery
2
Elizabeth still must prove her claims by clear and convincing evidence. See
Biloxi Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Estate of Ross, 546 So. 2d 667, 670 (Miss. 1989).
¶19. Elizabeth’s last claim is that the chancellor erred in denying her motions to compel
discovery. Elizabeth sought discovery to determine the whereabouts of the life-insurance
proceeds to which she believed she was entitled. Chancellors have considerable
discretion in matters relating to discovery; thus, “[t]he trial court’s grant or denial of a
motion to compel is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review on appeal.”
Elec. Data Sys. Corp. v. Miss. Div. of Medicaid, 853 So. 2d 1192, 1209 (&57) (Miss.
2003) (quoting Taylor Machine Works, Inc. v. Great American Surplus Lines Ins. Co.,
635 So. 2d 1357, 1363 (Miss. 1994)). “The trial court has considerable discretion in
matters relating to discovery and its order will not be disturbed unless there has been an
abuse of that discretion.” French v. Druetta, 399 So. 2d 1327, 1329 (Miss. 1981)
(quoting Clark v. Miss. Power Co., 372 So. 2d 1077, 1080 (Miss. 1979)).
¶20. It appears that the chancellor based her decision to deny the motion to compel
discovery on the fact that the chancellor also found the claims were invalid. However, as
we have explained above, the chancellor erroneously concluded that the claims were
invalid; therefore, any decision stemming from such conclusion may also be incorrect.
We reverse the chancellor’s judgment denying Elizabeth’s motion to compel discovery
and remand for the chancellor to reconsider the issue in light of our analysis.
Conclusion
¶21. We hold that Elizabeth’s and her sons’ claims against Steve’s estate sufficed to
meet the requirements found in Section 91-7-149, and the chancellor erred in dismissing
the claims as invalid and barred by res judicata. The merits of the claims were not before
the chancellor at the time, and on remand, Elizabeth and her sons still must prove their
claims by clear and convincing evidence subject to any defenses that the Estate may raise.
See Biloxi Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Estate of Ross, 546 So. 2d 667, 670 (Miss. 1989).
Additionally, we reverse the chancellor’s judgment denying Elizabeth’s motion to compel
discovery, and we remand the case for the chancellor to reconsider whether the motion to
compel discovery should or should not be granted.
¶22. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
DICKINSON, P.J., LAMAR, KITCHENS, PIERCE AND KING, JJ.,
CONCUR. WALLER, C.J., AND RANDOLPH, P.J., NOT PARTICIPATING.