Marvin Rerocukus Demond Carver v. State of Mississippi , 227 So. 3d 1090 ( 2017 )


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  •                     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
    NO. 2015-CT-00384-SCT
    MARVIN REROCKUS DEMOND CARVER a/k/a
    MARVIN REROCUKUS DEMOND CARVER a/k/a
    MARVIN CARVER a/k/a MARVIN REROCKUS
    CARVER a/k/a MARVIN R. CARVER a/k/a “FOOT”
    v.
    STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                         06/18/2013
    TRIAL JUDGE:                              HON. WILLIAM E. CHAPMAN, III
    COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:                MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:                  OFFICE OF THE STATE PUBLIC
    DEFENDER
    BY: HUNTER NOLAN AIKENS
    GEORGE T. HOLMES
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:                    OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
    BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD
    DISTRICT ATTORNEY:                        MICHAEL GUEST
    NATURE OF THE CASE:                       CRIMINAL - FELONY
    DISPOSITION:                              REVERSED AND RENDERED - 10/12/2017
    MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
    MANDATE ISSUED:
    EN BANC.
    KING, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
    ¶1.    Marvin Rerockus Demond Carver was the passenger in a vehicle not owned by him
    in which marijuana was found in the rear of the trunk. Although Nicholas Ingram, Carver’s
    half-brother who had been driving the vehicle, took full ownership of the contraband, Carver
    was convicted of possession of marijuana. Because the State presented insufficient evidence
    to support Carver’s conviction, we reverse and render judgment.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2.    In November 2011, Nicholas Ingram, Carver’s half-brother, planned to drive from
    Grenada to the coast to surprise his mother for Thanksgiving. Ingram’s and Carver’s
    grandmother had rented a car for Ingram to take on the trip. She then asked Carver to
    accompany Ingram so he would not be alone. The trip was described as last-minute, and
    Carver stated that he had decided to go the same day that Ingram had planned to leave. In a
    rush, Ingram picked up Carver on his way to the coast.
    ¶3.    Wade Zimmerman, a state trooper for the Mississippi Highway Patrol, pulled Ingram
    over for speeding in Madison County. Trooper Zimmerman testified that he first went to the
    passenger side of the vehicle, where Carver was sitting, to obtain identification. Trooper
    Zimmerman returned to his car and then proceeded to the driver’s side of the vehicle. At that
    time, Trooper Zimmerman testified that he noticed a strong odor of marijuana emanating
    from the vehicle. He noted that Ingram’s eyes were bloodshot. Trooper Zimmerman asked
    Ingram to step out of the vehicle for questioning. Ingram first denied smoking marijuana but
    later admitted he had been smoking after Trooper Zimmerman performed a field sobriety test.
    Trooper Zimmerman testified that Ingram then consented to a search of the vehicle.
    ¶4.    Under the driver’s seat, Trooper Zimmerman found a small hand gun. In the center
    console was a small bag containing less than a gram of marijuana. Trooper Zimmerman
    found two larger bags of marijuana in the right rear side of the trunk of the car, underneath
    2
    the flap where the spare tire is stored. One bag was wrapped in bubble wrap inside a manila
    envelope. The second bag was bubble-wrapped and in a white plastic bag. A digital scale
    also was in the trunk of the vehicle. Subsequently, Ingram and Carver were taken into
    custody. Ingram had in his possession more than eight hundred dollars in cash.
    ¶5.    Both Ingram and Carver waived their Miranda rights.1 Agent Candace Beth Edwards
    with the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics first interviewed Ingram. At that time, Ingram
    admitted purchasing the marijuana from a bar in Grenada and claimed sole ownership of it.
    Ingram stated that he had paid $300 for the marijuana. He also stated that he had purchased
    the gun for protection around three months prior after a family member had been killed.
    Ingram testified that he had purchased the marijuana to smoke with a couple of people for
    the holiday and that he had been smoking marijuana prior to getting in the car that day.
    Ingram said that Carver had not known about the marijuana in the car. Agent Edwards
    testified that Ingram had taken full responsibility for everything illegal that was found in the
    vehicle.
    ¶6.    Agent Edwards then interviewed Carver. She testified that Carver had stated that he
    had known about the marijuana in the vehicle and that he had agreed to smoke marijuana
    with Ingram for the holiday. Carver did not state that he had known specifically about the
    marijuana in the trunk. Agent Edwards testified that she had assumed that he knew about all
    of the marijuana in the vehicle because the amount in the center console was not enough for
    a marijuana cigarette.
    1
    Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 
    86 S. Ct. 1602
    , 
    16 L. Ed. 2d 694
    (1966).
    3
    ¶7.    In Carver’s written statement, he said that “the marijuana he had, I knew about
    because he said he had sum ‘weed’ for us to smoke for Thanksgiving. Me being the older
    “square,” as he calls me agreed to ‘puff’ for the special occasion. I didn’t know he had all that
    much marijuana until the police pulled it out the trunk!” (Emphasis added.) Carver testified
    about the conversation he had with Ingram, stating:
    CARVER: I was like what was we going to do for Thanksgiving. And that’s
    when he told me that, he mentioned, he said that he will smoke some
    marijuana with me for Thanksgiving.
    COUNSEL: So did you know where the marijuana you were going to smoke
    for Thanksgiving with Nicholas Ingram, did you know where that marijuana
    was?
    CARVER: Well, no, he didn’t tell me where it was or if he already had it or,
    you know, was he going to buy it or whatever. I didn’t know.
    COUNSEL: So it’s fair to say that you did not know that there was any
    marijuana in the car, but you did know, ’cause ya’ll had talked about it, that
    over the holiday, over Thanksgiving, you and your brother were going to
    smoke some marijuana?
    CARVER: Yes, that’s what he told me, that he will smoke some with me for
    Thanksgiving, as we had mentioned.
    ¶8.    Both Ingram and Carver were indicted for possession of thirty grams but less than one
    kilogram of marijuana with intent to distribute, while in possession of a firearm, and
    conspiracy to distribute. Ingram pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana, and Carver’s case
    went to trial. The jury acquitted Carver of conspiracy but convicted him of the lesser-
    included offense of possessing more than thirty but less than 250 grams of marijuana. The
    circuit court then sentenced Carver to serve six years in prison.
    ¶9.    The Court of Appeals affirmed Carver’s conviction, finding that the evidence was
    sufficient “to show that Carver was aware of the presence and character of the marijuana, had
    dominion and control over it, and intended to possess it.” Carver v. State, No.
    4
    2015-KA-00384-COA, 
    2016 WL 6471407
    , at *4 (Miss. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2016), reh’g denied
    (Apr. 25, 2017), cert. granted, 
    222 So. 3d 311
    (Miss. 2017). Judge Irving’s dissenting
    opinion instead argued that the evidence had been insufficient to bridge the gap between
    suspicion and proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Carver had exercised dominion and
    control over Ingram’s marijuana. 
    Id. at *11.
    ¶10.   Ingram appeals, arguing three issues. Because the first is dispositive, we decline to
    address the remaining two issues.
    ISSUE
    ¶11.   Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶12.   Because marijuana was not found in Carver’s actual, physical possession, this Court
    must determine if the evidence was sufficient to establish constructive possession. In
    constructive-possession cases, the State must prove that the defendant was both aware of the
    contraband and intentionally, although not physically, possessed it. Glidden v. State, 
    74 So. 3d
    342, 348–49 (Miss. 2011). We have established the following rule regarding constructive
    possession:
    [T]here must be sufficient facts to warrant a finding that defendant was aware
    of the presence and character of the particular substance and was intentionally
    and consciously in possession of it. It need not be actual physical possession.
    Constructive possession may be shown by establishing that the drug involved
    was subject to his dominion or control. Proximity is usually an essential
    element, but by itself is not adequate in the absence of other incriminating
    circumstances.
    5
    Hamm v. State, 
    735 So. 2d 1025
    , 1028 (Miss. 1999) (quoting Curry v. State, 
    249 So. 2d 414
    ,
    416 (Miss. 1971)). “[T]he State must prove dominion and control over the contraband and
    not simply the automobile in order to satisfy the Curry test.” Boches v. State, 
    506 So. 2d 254
    ,
    259 (Miss. 1987) (quoting Hudson v. State, 
    362 So. 2d 645
    , 647 (Miss. 1998)). When the
    defendant does not own the premises, the State must show additional incriminating
    circumstances connecting the defendant to the contraband. Fultz v. State, 
    573 So. 2d 689
    ,
    690 (Miss. 1990).
    ¶13.    As previously stated, proximity usually is an essential element of constructive
    possession. This Court has expressed skepticism concerning the issue of proximity when
    marijuana was found under the hood of a car not owned by the defendant. Hudson, 
    362 So. 2d
    at 647. There, this Court stated: “First, even the proximity is questionable since the
    marijuana was not inside the car, but secreted under the hood of the car.” 
    Id. In reversing
    the
    defendant’s conviction of possession, the Hudson Court additionally noted the differences
    in that case and in Curry, where marijuana had been found inside the defendant’s car in
    which he was a passenger and within his sight and reach. 
    Id. (citing Curry,
    249 So. 2d at
    414).
    ¶14.    Evidence of constructive possession also has been insufficient where contraband was
    found in a car not owned by the defendant but where the defendant had been driving and had
    been the sole person present in the car. In Fultz, the defendant had been driving his sister’s
    car when he was pulled over for driving erratically. Fultz v. State, 
    573 So. 2d 689
    , 689-90
    (Miss. 1990). More than seven ounces of marijuana were found in the trunk of the car. 
    Id. 6 at
    690. This Court reversed the defendant’s conviction and reasoned that, although the
    defendant had been the sole person in the car and had admitted to smoking marijuana, the
    State had failed to prove a connection between the defendant and the contraband. 
    Id. at 691.
    Similarly, in Ferrell, the defendant was the sole occupant of the car but was not the owner.
    Ferrell v. State, 
    649 So. 2d 831
    , 832 (Miss. 1995). Contraband was found concealed in a
    matchbox. 
    Id. at 834.
    This Court reversed the possession charge, stating that “the contraband
    was not positioned in such a way that its presence would be reasonably apparent to a person
    riding in the car.” 
    Id. at 835.
    ¶15.   Even proximity coupled with knowledge previously has presented insufficient
    evidence to establish constructive possession. In Martin, the defendant was found standing
    over two Tupperware containers of marijuana in a kitchen where more than eight ounces of
    marijuana were recovered. Martin v. State, 
    804 So. 2d 967
    , 970 (Miss. 2001). The defendant
    admitted that he had known that the others had been “messing with marijuana” but denied
    he had been involved. 
    Id. at 969.
    This Court reversed the defendant’s conviction, finding that
    the defendant’s “mere presence in the kitchen area where the marijuana was found, without
    more, is simply not enough.” 
    Id. And in
    Naylor v. State, a narcotics unit entered a bathroom
    and observed the defendant jumping into the bathtub while another individual attempted to
    flush cocaine down the toilet. Naylor v. State, 
    730 So. 2d 561
    , 563 (Miss. 1998). The
    defendant also had been in possession of more than seven hundred dollars in cash. 
    Id. at 566.
    However, this Court reversed and rendered the defendant’s conviction, finding that the
    7
    evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant had possessed the cocaine. 
    Id. at 566-
    67.
    ¶16.   This case, too, involves a situation in which we express skepticism of the proximity
    of Carver to the marijuana found in the trunk of a car not owned by him, in addition to
    Carver’s knowledge of the marijuana. However, the biggest obstacle in this case is the issue
    of dominion and control. This Court has held that “mere presence does not indicate
    participation in the purchase. Nor does it support an inference of dominion and control.”
    Berry v. State, 
    652 So. 2d 742
    , 748 (Miss. 1995). Dominion and control must be established
    by evidence more compelling than the momentary handling of the contraband. Momentary
    handling of the contraband is not enough to establish constructive possession. Berry v. State,
    
    652 So. 2d 745
    , 751 (Miss. 1995). There, the defendant placed drugs in the glove
    compartment of a vehicle at his friend’s direction. 
    Id. In finding
    that constructive possession
    had not been established, this Court stated that, “possession is defined . . . in terms of the
    exercise of dominion and control.” 
    Id. No evidence
    had been presented that the defendant
    had owned the drugs, had paid for them, or had controlled them in any way. 
    Id. ¶17. Evidence
    of dominion and control in this case is lacking. Ingram took full
    responsibility for everything illegal that had been found inside the vehicle. Moreover,
    Zimmerman testified that initially he had approached the passenger’s side of the car; yet it
    was not until he returned from his patrol car to the driver’s side of the vehicle that he noticed
    the strong odor of marijuana. Zimmerman also noticed that Ingram’s eyes had been
    bloodshot. After a field sobriety test, Ingram admitted that he had been smoking but denied
    8
    smoking in the car. Zimmerman then found the gun under Ingram’s seat and a small amount
    of marijuana in the center console. Ingram additionally had more than eight hundred dollars
    in cash in his pocket. The patrolman testified that he had found two larger bags of marijuana
    in the trunk of the vehicle, both wrapped in bubble wrap. Ingram and Carver each testified
    that Carver had no knowledge of the marijuana in the trunk. Moreover, Ingram testified that
    the marijuana had been under the flap for the spare tire, not in plain view. And although
    Ingram and Carver were half-brothers, this Court previously has held that “[i]t cannot be
    presumed that, simply because two people associate with one another, they are accomplices
    in a common crime.” Cunningham v. State, 
    583 So. 2d 960
    , 962 (Miss. 1991).
    ¶18.   The Court of Appeals found that Carver’s expression of his intention to smoke
    marijuana manifested constructive possession of an undivided interest in the amount of
    marijuana to be smoked. Carver v. State, No. 2015-KA-00384-COA, 
    2016 WL 6471407
    , at
    *4 (Miss. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2016), reh’g denied (Apr. 25, 2017), cert. granted, 
    222 So. 3d 311
    (Miss. 2017). We disagree. Testimony shows that the marijuana was found in the right
    rear of the trunk of the vehicle, under the flap for the spare tire. Carver denied knowledge
    of the marijuana in the trunk, and Ingram testified that Carver had not known of the
    marijuana in the trunk. Thus, proximity and knowledge of the contraband in this case present
    skepticism. Carver admitted that he had planned on smoking marijuana over the holiday.
    However, no evidence established that Carver had exercised dominion or control over the
    marijuana found in the trunk of the vehicle. Even had Carver had knowledge of the marijuana
    9
    secreted in the trunk, the State must have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Carver had
    constructively possessed the contraband. This it failed to do.
    ¶19.   In addition, the appeals court stated that “[t]here was no evidence at trial that
    suggested that Carver did not exercise dominion and control over Ingram’s rental car and the
    marijuana in it.” 
    Id. As the
    dissent noted, “it was the State’s burden to prove that Carver
    exercised dominion or control over the marijuana; it was not Carver’s burden to prove a
    negative or his innocence.” 
    Id. at *11.
    The evidence in this case falls short of the sufficiency
    required to establish a conviction of constructive possession. Accordingly, we reverse and
    render Carver’s conviction and sentence.
    ¶20.   REVERSED AND RENDERED.
    RANDOLPH AND KITCHENS, P.JJ., COLEMAN, MAXWELL, BEAM AND
    CHAMBERLIN, JJ., CONCUR. WALLER, C.J., AND ISHEE, J., NOT
    PARTICIPATING.
    10