Timothy Gene Pryer v. Thomas Gardner, III , 247 So. 3d 1245 ( 2018 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2017-CP-00723-SCT
TIMOTHY GENE PRYER
v.
THOMAS GARDNER, III
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/30/2017
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. T. K. MOFFETT
TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: TIMOTHY GENE PRYER (PRO SE)
JUSTIN L. MATHENY
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: ITAWAMBA COUNTY CHANCERY
COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: TIMOTHY GENE PRYER (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JUSTIN L. MATHENY
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 05/17/2018
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE KITCHENS, P.J., BEAM AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ.
KITCHENS, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. A prisoner, Timothy Gene Pryer, filed an action in chancery court against the
Itawamba County Sheriff’s Department and the Itawamba County Circuit Clerk. Pryer
claimed that the defendants wrongfully had denied him access to public records under the
Mississippi Public Records Act, entitling him to civil damages. See Miss. Code Ann. § 25-
61-15 (Rev. 2010). More than three years after filing the complaint, Pryer filed a motion for
leave to amend it to add a Public Records Act claim against Circuit Judge Thomas Gardner,
III. Pryer alleged that, in deeming his public records request a motion for post-conviction
relief, and then denying it, Judge Gardner had violated the Public Records Act, entitling
Pryer to civil damages. The Chancery Court of Itawamba County granted Judge Gardner’s
motion to dismiss, and Pryer appeals. Because Pryer’s claim against Judge Gardner is barred
by the doctrine of judicial immunity, we affirm the dismissal of his amended complaint.
FACTS
¶2. This cause of action arises from a request Pryer filed in the Circuit Court of Itawamba
County for “the Order givin[g] Carol Gates the Office of Judge de facto or pro tempore and
the order givin[g] Carol Gates authority to appoint indigent counsel for December 2, 2004
[hearing] and the names of the 40 plus souls and their addresses according to the record.”
Pryer v. State, 139 So. 3d 713, 713-14 (Miss. 2014). According to Pryer’s allegations in a
subsequent Motion to Show Cause, the circuit court entered an order on June 6, 2011, that
denied his request and construed it as a motion for post-conviction relief.1 Id. at 714. In his
show cause motion, Pryer alleged that, in the absence of the circuit judge, the Circuit Clerk
of Itawamba County, Carol Gates, presided over arraignments and appointed counsel for
some or all of the “forty (40) plus souls.” Id. Pryer filed a petition for mandamus in this
Court, requesting that we compel the circuit court to rule on his Motion to Show Cause. Id.We granted the petition; and, on February 1, 2012, the circuit court entered an order that
denied the motion. Pryer v. State, 139 So. 3d 719, 720 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013). Although the
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Although the order does not appear in the record, in a prior decision of this Court,
we quoted Pryer’s allegations concerning the order made in his “Motion to Show Cause,”
filed on June 20, 2011. Pryer, 139 So. 3d at 714.
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record now before the Court does not contain that order, the Court of Appeals quoted from
it as follows:
This cause comes before this [c]ourt on [Pryer’s] pro se [m]otion to [s]how
[c]ause. [Pryer] requests this [c]ourt to order the Itawamba County Circuit
Clerk to forward [Pryer] a free copy of the documents not contained within the
[c]ircuit [c]lerk’s file. This motion contains the exact same requests as the
previously filed motions. In addition, the [m]otion to [s]how [c]ause contains
completely unfounded and slanderous allegations against several court offices.
The [m]otion to [s]how [c]ause has no legal merit and shall be DENIED.
Id. at 721.
¶3. Pryer appealed from the order of February 1, 2012, and this Court assigned his appeal
to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed. Id. at 721. The Court of Appeals found that “we
have no reason to believe that any such documents do exist,” and deemed Pryer’s filings a
“fishing expedition.” Pryer, 139 So. 3d at 721. This Court granted Pryer’s petition for
certiorari. Pryer, 139 So. 3d at 713. On certiorari, Pryer complained that, because he had
filed a public records request, the circuit court had lacked jurisdiction to treat the request as
a motion for post-conviction relief. Id. at 714. This Court found that Pryer had filed a motion
to show cause in circuit court rather than following the statutory procedure set forth by the
Public Records Act, which provides for the institution of a suit in chancery court by “any
person denied the right granted by Section 25-61-5 to inspect or copy public records.” Id. at
715-16 (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 25-61-13(1)(a) (Rev. 2010)). We held that the circuit court
had jurisdiction to rule on Pryer’s motion and that nothing in the circuit court’s order
indicated that it had treated Pryer’s motion as one for post-conviction relief. Id. at 716.We
found that the Court of Appeals had been incorrect to assume that the circuit court had
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considered the motion as a motion for post-conviction relief; but we agreed with the Court
of Appeals’ finding that there was no reason to believe the documents Pryer sought actually
existed. Id. Therefore, we affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the
Circuit Court of Itawamba County’s denial of the public records request. Id. In our decision,
we did recognize that
If Pryer so desires, he may, pursuant to the statute, institute a suit in the
Chancery Court of Itawamba County. Nothing in the Court of Appeals
decision or in the order of the circuit court prevents his doing so, and this
Court’s ruling today does not impede Pryer’s statutory right to file such an
action, should he choose to do so.
Id.
¶4. During the pendency of his appellate litigation, on July 3, 2013, Pryer filed the instant
action in the Chancery Court of Itawamba County against the Itawamba County Sheriff’s
Department and the Itawamba County Circuit Clerk. He claimed that these entities were
liable for civil penalties for failing to respond to his public records requests made on May 18,
2011; July 5, 2011; August 2, 2012; and September 13, 2012, asking for copies of capiases
served on December 2, 2004. Pryer claimed that, because the defendants had ignored his
public records requests on four occasions, he was entitled to damages of $400, plus
reasonable expenses, pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 25-61-15, which provides:
Any person who shall deny to any person access to any public record which is
not exempt from the provisions of this chapter or who charges an unreasonable
fee for providing a public record may be liable civilly in his personal capacity
in a sum not to exceed One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) per violation, plus all
reasonable expenses incurred by such person bringing the proceeding.
Miss. Code Ann. § 25-61-15 (Supp. 2017).
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¶5. Despite his efforts at achieving proper service, Pryer never served the defendants with
his complaint. On June 23, 2014, he filed a motion to amend his complaint to add Judge
Gardner as a defendant. On October 13, 2016, the chancellor entered an order granting the
motion to amend, finding that no responsive pleading had been filed and that amendment
would not be prejudicial to adverse parties. Pryer filed his amended complaint on November
1, 2016. In the amended complaint, Pryer made the following allegations against Judge
Gardner:
Defendant Thomas J. Gardner is Circuit Court Judge in Itawamba County.
After receiving the request for Public Records addressed to Defendant Gates,
Gardner held the request to be a Post-Conviction Relief Petition, and den[ied]
those records to Pryer on June 3, 2011. On June 15, 2011 A.D. Pryer filed a
Motion to Show Cause in the Circuit Court asking why he was being denied
access to Public Records by the Circuit Court even after offering payment for
said records. On December 19, 2011 A.D., Pryer filed a Petition for Writ of
Mandamus with the Supreme Court of Mississippi to compel Defendant
Gardner to answer Pryer[’]s Motion to Show Cause. Defendant Gardner was
ordered to respond and on January 20, 2012 denied Pryer Public Records citing
“no free documents.” Defendant Gardner has denied Pryer access to Public
Records twice in violation of MCA §25-61-5.
He claimed that Judge Gardner’s two alleged violations of the Public Records Act entitled
him to an additional $200 in damages.
¶6. Pryer served Judge Gardner with process. On January 12, 2017, Judge Gardner moved
to dismiss Pryer’s claim against him under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on
the basis of judicial immunity or, alternatively, because the statute of limitations had expired.
On March 30, 2017, the chancellor granted Judge Gardner’s motion to dismiss. The
chancellor found that Pryer’s complaint was against a judge in his judicial capacity and that
judicial immunity shielded Judge Gardner from liability. The chancellor also held that the
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action against Judge Gardner was time barred because the amended complaint was filed
outside the limitations period. Finding no just reason for delay, the chancellor directed the
entry of a final judgment in favor of Judge Gardner pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b). The chancellor denied Pryer’s motion for reconsideration. Pryer has
appealed.2
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7. On review of the disposition of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, this
Court does not defer to the trial court’s ruling. Jourdan River Estates, LLC v. Favre, 212
So. 3d 800, 803 (Miss. 2015). Rather, the issue presents a question of law, which is reviewed
de novo. Id. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal sufficiency of the
complaint. Lagniappe Logistics, Inc. v. Buras, 199 So. 3d 675, 677 (Miss. 2016). The Court
limits its review to the face of the complaint, accepting all allegations therein as true. City
of Meridian v. $104,960.00 U.S. Currency, 231 So. 3d 972, 974 (Miss. 2017). A Rule
12(b)(6) motion should not be granted unless “it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the
plaintiff will be unable to prove any set of facts in support of the claim.” Id. (citing Rose v.
Tullos, 994 So. 2d 734, 737 (Miss. 2008)).
2
On December 11, 2017, the State filed a motion to strike six exhibits attached to
Pryer’s reply brief and his arguments associated with those exhibits on the ground that the
exhibits were not in the record. By order entered on February 2, 2018, the motion was passed
for consideration with the merits of the appeal. Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure
30(a) provides that “[a]ppeals shall be on the record as designated pursuant to Rule 10.”
M.R.A.P. 30(a). It is well established that this Court does not consider information outside
the record. We grant the State’s motion and strike the extra-record exhibits attached to
Pryer’s reply brief and the portions of Pryer’s reply brief that rely on those exhibits.
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DISCUSSION
THE CHANCELLOR PROPERLY DISMISSED PRYER’S AMENDED
COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE GARDNER BECAUSE IT WAS BARRED
BY THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL IMMUNITY.
¶8. The doctrine of judicial immunity long has been recognized in Mississippi. Newsome
v. Shoemake, 234 So. 3d 1215, 1223 (Miss. 2017). “[T]he best interests of the people and
public order require that judges be immune from civil liability.” Loyacano v. Ellis, 571 So.
2d 237, 238 (Miss. 1990). It is the sound public policy of this state that judges are
empowered to make decisions in the absence of fear that they will be held liable for their
actions. Id. A person who believes a judge has acted contrary to or in excess of his or her
authority may, however, file a complaint with the Mississippi Commission on Judicial
Performance. Newsome, 234 So. 3d at 1225.
¶9. In Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331(1978), the United States Supreme Court held that “judges of courts of superior or general
jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in
excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.” In
Loyacano, this Court recognized that, in the prior case of DeWitt v. Thompson, 192 Miss.
615, 7 So. 2d 529, 532 (1942), the Court seemingly left for another day the question of
whether judicial immunity applies to malicious or corrupt acts. But Loyacano ultimately held
that “[t]he doctrine of judicial immunity is fully recognized in Mississippi.” Loyacano, 571
So. 2d at 238. In Newsome, the Court held that, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s allegation that
a judge was corrupt in his handling of a conservatorship, the judge was immune from civil
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liability. Newsome, 234 So. 3d at 1225. So judicial immunity in Mississippi extends even to
acts of malice or corruption. The reason is that it is “a general principle of the highest
importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the
authority vested in him, [should] be free to act upon his own convictions, without
apprehension of personal consequences to himself.” Id. (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 355-56,
98 S. Ct. 1099). Further:
It is a judge’s duty to decide all cases within his jurisdiction that are brought
before him, including controversial cases that arouse the most intense feelings
in the litigants. His errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have
to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice
or corruption. Imposing such a burden on judges would contribute not to
principled and fearless decisionmaking but to intimidation.
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1967).
¶10. Judicial immunity does not extend to acts taken in the clear absence of jurisdiction.
Weill v. Bailey, 227 So. 3d 931, 936 (Miss. 2017). However, judicial acts in excess of
jurisdiction are subject to judicial immunity. Newsome, 234 So. 3d at 1223. In Newsome, the
Court provided the following explanation of this distinction:
In Bradley, the Court illustrated the distinction between lack of jurisdiction
and excess of jurisdiction with the following examples: if a probate judge, with
jurisdiction over only wills and estates, should try a criminal case, he would
be acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction and would not be immune from
liability for his action; on the other hand, if a judge of a criminal court should
convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in
excess of his jurisdiction and would be immune.
Newsome, 234 So. 3d at 1224 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 357 n.7, 98 S. Ct. 1099 (citing
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 352, 20 L. Ed. 646 (1871)). We have said that “[i]n order to
determine the existence of judicial immunity one must look to whether at the time [the judge]
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took the challenged action he had jurisdiction over the subject matter before him.” Loyacano,
571 So. 2d at 238 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 356, 98 S. Ct. 1099).
¶11. Pryer contends that Judge Gardner lacked jurisdiction to enter the 2011 and 2012
orders, so judicial immunity does not apply to his actions. The difficulty with Pryer’s
argument is that this Court explicitly has held that Judge Gardner had jurisdiction to enter the
orders. In Pryer’s earlier action challenging the denials of his requests for documents, he
argued that “the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a Public Records request as a
Post Conviction Relief petition.” Pryer, 139 So. 3d at 716. This Court held that, because the
2011 order was not in the record and nothing in the 2012 order showed Judge Gardner had
treated Pryer’s filings as a post-conviction relief matter, “the record provides no indication
that the circuit court treated Pryer’s Motion to Show Cause as a petition for post-conviction
relief.” Id. at 716. Recognizing the fact that the Mississippi Constitution vests jurisdiction
in the circuit courts “in all matters civil and criminal in this state not vested by this
Constitution in some other court,” the Court held that the circuit court had jurisdiction to rule
upon Pryer’s filings. Id. at 715, 716 (citing Miss. Const. Art. 6 § 156). Because it is beyond
question that Judge Gardner had jurisdiction to rule on Pryer’s filings, judicial immunity
insulates him from Pryer’s civil action.
¶12. Pryer also argues that the provision in Section 21-61-15 that “[a]ny person” may be
liable for denying another access to public records abrogates judicial immunity. He argues
that, because Section 21-61-15 says “any person,” and because a judge is a person, Section
21-61-15 includes a private right of action against a judge. This argument tasks the Court
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with determining whether Section 21-61-15 abrogates the common law doctrine of judicial
immunity. “The function of the Court is not to decide what a statute should provide, but to
determine what it does provide.” Lawson v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 75 So. 3d 1024, 1027
(Miss. 2011). When engaging in this function, the Court seeks to give effect to the intent of
the legislature. Id. The Court first examines the language of the statute; if the statutory
language is plain and unambiguous, the Court will apply the plain meaning of the statute and
refrain from applying principles of statutory construction. Id.
¶13. The State points out that the United States Supreme Court rejected an extremely
similar argument to Pryer’s in Pierson. There, the Supreme Court examined 42 U.S.C. §
1983, which creates a cause of action against “every person” who under color of law
deprives another person of his civil rights, to determine whether the statute abrogated judicial
immunity. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554, 87 S. Ct. 1213. The Supreme Court held that the
language of the statute itself contained no indication that Congress intended to abolish the
hallowed common law principle of judicial immunity to provide a cause of action against a
judge for a Section 1983 violation. Id. at 554-55, 87 S. Ct. 1213. Likewise, the language of
Section 25-61-15 contains no indication that, by its enactment, the Mississippi Legislature
intended to abrogate judicial immunity. Because there is no textual indication whatsoever
that the legislature intended to abrogate judicial immunity, we decline to read the “any
person” language in Section 25-61-15 as a limitation on judicial immunity. See Burns v.
Allen, 202 Miss. 240, 243, 31 So. 2d 125, 126 (1947) (if the legislature intended to abrogate
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a requirement of the common law, “it must be held to have retained so much thereof as is not
specifically dispensed with.”).
¶14. Finally, Pryer argues that this Court, in its opinion affirming the denial of his
documents requests, held that he was entitled to seek damages from Judge Gardner in
chancery court. This argument is without merit. While in the earlier case we mentioned that
Pryer could file a suit seeking the documents under Section 25-61-13(1)(a) in chancery court,
the Court in no way condoned, encouraged, or authorized Pryer to file an action against
Judge Gardner seeking civil damages under Section 25-61-15. Pryer, 139 So. 3d at 716.
¶15. Pryer and Judge Gardner both make arguments pertaining to the circuit court’s
finding, in the alternative, that the amended complaint against Judge Gardner was barred by
the statute of limitations. Because we affirm the dismissal of Pryer’s amended complaint on
the ground of judicial immunity, we decline to address the circuit court’s alternative finding
that the claim also was time barred.
CONCLUSION
¶16. Because Pryer’s claim against Judge Gardner is barred by the doctrine of judicial
immunity, we affirm the chancery court’s dismissal of the amended complaint for failure to
state a claim.
¶17. AFFIRMED.
WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH, P.J., KING, COLEMAN, MAXWELL, BEAM,
CHAMBERLIN AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR.
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