Jeremy Cage v. State of Mississippi , 2014 Miss. LEXIS 536 ( 2014 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2013-KA-00813-SCT
JEREMY CAGE a/k/a “JAY” a/k/a JEREMY
LAMAR CAGE
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/22/2013
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JANNIE M. LEWIS
TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: AKILLE MALONE-OLIVER
SCOTT ROGILLIO
TINA HERRIN
LATRICE WESTBROOKS
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HOLMES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: CHOKWE ANTAR LUMUMBA
CHOKWE LUMUMBA
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: SCOTT STUART
JOHN R. HENRY, JR.
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: AKILLIE MALONE OLIVER
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 10/30/2014
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE WALLER, C.J., CHANDLER AND KING, JJ.
WALLER, CHIEF JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Jeremy Cage appeals his conviction in the Holmes County Circuit Court for statutory
rape, arguing that the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence and in denying his
motion for a new trial. Cage also claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm Cage’s conviction and sentence.
FACTS
¶2. At around 9:30 p.m. on August 26, 2010, thirteen-year-old A.S.1,2 walked outside her
house in Mileston, Mississippi, to feed her dogs. While she was feeding the dogs, a man
grabbed her from behind and dragged her into a field adjacent to her house. The man pushed
her to the ground, pulled her pants down, and began having sexual intercourse with her. A.S.
could not identify the man at first because her eyes had not yet adjusted to the dark, but she
was eventually able to identify him as her cousin Jeremy “Jay” Cage. She also recognized
Cage by his voice. Shortly thereafter, A.S.’s brother walked outside and called for her, and
Cage ran away. A.S. went back to her house and told her brother that she had been raped,
but asked him not to tell anyone.
¶3. The next day at school, A.S. told her friend K.J. that she did not feel well. K.J. told
Tamika Clark Garnett, one of A.S.’s teachers, that she thought something was wrong with
A.S. When questioned by Garnett, A.S. revealed that she had been raped. Garnett sent A.S.
to talk to Shinar Riley, the school’s guidance counselor. Riley called A.S.’s mother, Angel
Bowman Spann, who picked A.S. up from school and took her to the police station in
Lexington. A.S. told the police that she was feeding the dogs outside her house when Cage
grabbed her from behind, dragged her into a field near the house, and raped her. A.S. then
went to the hospital, where doctors performed a rape-kit examination on her.
1
We refer to the minor victim and other minor witnesses by their initials to protect
their identities.
2
A.S.’s birth date is September 20, 1996.
2
¶4. The Holmes County Sheriff’s Department obtained an arrest warrant for Jeremy Cage
and an order to retrieve a DNA sample from him upon his arrest. Cage’s mother Melissa
Cage York brought him to the police station on August 31, 2010. Cage was twenty-one years
old at the time of his arrest.3 Melissa told Captain Sam Chambers with the Holmes County
Sheriff’s Department that she had last seen Cage on her front porch at around 8:00 p.m. on
the night in question.
¶5. Upon his arrest, the police performed a buccal swab on Cage and sent the swab to the
Mississippi Crime Lab in Jackson for testing. The Crime Lab compared DNA from Cage’s
buccal swabs and DNA from a blood sample taken from A.S. to the DNA retrieved from the
vaginal swab in A.S.’s rape kit. The DNA testing indicated that Cage could not be excluded
as a contributor to the mixture of DNA retrieved from the vaginal swab, and the results of
the test excluded more than ninety-nine percent of the population. There was no indication
of any other contributing DNA, other than that of A.S. herself.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶6. On April 29, 2011, a Holmes County grand jury indicted Cage with one count of
statutory rape in violation of Section 97-3-65(1)(b) 4 of the Mississippi Code. Cage’s trial
commenced on February 11, 2013. Cage was represented at trial by Attorney Latrice
3
Cage’s birth date is March 31, 1989.
4
“(1) The crime of statutory rape is committed when: . . . (b) A person of any age has
sexual intercourse with a child who: (i) Is under the age of fourteen (14) years; (ii) Is twenty-
four (24) or more months younger than the person; and (iii) Is not the person’s spouse.”
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-65(1)(b) (Rev. 2014).
3
Westbrooks. On February 12, 2013, Angel, A.S.’s mother, appeared in court with attorney
Imhotep Alkebu-lan and filed an affidavit stating the following:
My daughter wishes and it is in my daughter’s best interest that the charges
pending in cause No. 11-0029, in the Circuit Court of Holmes County,
Mississippi, styled State of Mississippi vs. Jeremy Cage, be dismissed . . . . Me
and my family have forgiven Jeremy. We do not want to see him go to prison
for the rest of his life . . . . If we are called to testify in this matter we will so
testify.
Alkebu-lan informed the court that he was representing Angel’s interests because she felt
pressured by the prosecutors. In response, the prosecutors stated that this was the first time
they had been informed of Angel’s unwillingness to participate in the case. The prosecutor
also stated that Melissa, Cage’s mother, had visited Angel at her house the night before trial
began, implying that it was the defense who had put pressure on Angel. The trial court called
Angel to the witness stand and questioned her about these events. Angel testified that
Melissa had contacted Alkebu-lan for her, and that she had spoken to him about the case, but
she did not hire him. Angel stated that the prosecution of Cage had been hard on her family,
as they were related, and she seemed to be under the impression that she had the authority
to have the charges against Cage dismissed. The trial court explained to Angel and the
attorneys that Cage’s prosecution rested in the State’s discretion. After considering Angel’s
testimony, the trial court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent A.S.’s interests during
the prosecution. The trial court also allowed the prosecution and the defense to speak with
Angel to determine if she had altered her testimony since speaking with Alkebu-lan.
¶7. At trial, during the defense’s cross-examination of Angel, Cage’s attorney attempted
to question her about the affidavit, asking her whether she had requested that the charges
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against Cage be dropped. The State objected to the relevance of this question, and the
defense attorney attempted to withdraw the question. After hearing arguments from the
parties, the trial court sustained the State’s objection, finding that the affidavit was not
relevant to the issues in the case. The affidavit was never offered into evidence.
¶8. Cage attempted to present an alibi defense at trial. Melissa testified that Cage was
sitting on the front porch of her house 5 smoking marijuana with Henry McClaurin at 9:00
p.m. on August 26, 2010, about thirty minutes before the time A.S. alleged she was raped.
Melissa was inside her house watching “General Hospital” at the time. Sometime around
10:00 p.m., Melissa went to bed, and she did not see Cage again for the rest of the night.
Melissa testified that she heard a car start up and assumed Cage and McClaurin had left the
house, although she could not state when this occurred. On cross-examination it was
revealed that, in her statement to Captain Chambers, Melissa had stated that she had last seen
Cage closer to 8:00 p.m on the night in question. Melissa stated that Captain Chambers must
have written the time down wrong.
¶9. Cage also called K.J. to testify. The prosecutors informed the judge that they had not
expected K.J. to testify and did not know what the substance of her testimony would be. The
trial court allowed the State and the defense to interview K.J. before she testified. The State
then informed the trial court that K.J. was going to testify regarding A.S.’s prior sexual
relationships. The State objected to this potential testimony under Mississippi Rule of
Evidence 412, also known as the rape-shield law. To limit the possibility of prejudicial
inadmissible evidence being revealed to the jury, the court allowed K.J. to proffer her
5
Melissa and Cage lived on the same road as A.S. and her family.
5
testimony outside the presence of the jury. K.J. stated that, two days before reporting the
rape, A.S. had told her that she thought she might be pregnant. K.J. relayed this information
to Riley. Then, a week later, A.S. told K.J. she had lied about the rape because she did not
want to tell her mother that she might be pregnant. K.J. stated that she did not believe A.S.
when she said she had been raped because she knew A.S. to be a liar and “full of drama.”
The trial court prohibited K.J. from testifying regarding specific instances of A.S.’s prior
sexual behavior. The court did allow her to testify about A.S.’s statements to her about the
rape, but restricted her from calling A.S. a liar without specific supporting evidence.
¶10. After the conclusion of the defense’s case-in-chief, the State recalled Riley and
Captain Chambers as rebuttal witnesses. Riley testified that she had never had a conversation
with K.J. about the possibility of A.S. being pregnant. She stated that she would have been
required to tell A.S.’s mother if such a report had been made. Captain Chambers testified
that Melissa had told him that she had last seen Cage at around “eight or eight something”
on the night in question and had never mentioned 9:00 p.m. as a possible time frame. An
audio recording of Melissa’s statement to Captain Chambers was played for the jury, and it
corroborated Captain Chambers’s testimony.
¶11. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict finding Cage guilty of
statutory rape. At the sentencing hearing, Cage gave a statement in which he admitted to the
rape and asked the judge for leniency in sentencing. The trial court sentenced Cage to twenty
years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Cage subsequently filed
a motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV), or alternatively, a New Trial,
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which the trial court denied. Cage, now represented by Attorney Chokwe Antar Lumumba,
appeals to this Court, raising the followings issues:
I. Whether the trial court improperly limited the defense’s cross-
examination of Angel Spann.
II. Whether the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of K.J.
III. Whether Cage received ineffective assistance of counsel.
IV. Whether the trial court erred in denying Cage’s motion for a
new trial based on newly discovered juror misconduct.
DISCUSSION
I. Whether the trial court improperly limited the defense’s cross-
examination of Angel Spann.
¶12. The trial court prohibited Cage from asking Angel about her sworn affidavit in which
she expressed a desire to have the charges against Cage dropped, finding that Angel’s wishes
were not relevant to the issue of Cage’s guilt and had no effect on the State’s ability to
proceed with the prosecution. On appeal, Cage claims that the trial court’s exclusion of this
testimony prohibited the jury from accurately considering Angel’s possible interest, bias, or
prejudice in the outcome of the case.
¶13. “Limitations placed on cross-examination are reviewed for abuse of discretion.”
Jefferson v. State, 818 So. 2d 1099, 1109 (Miss. 2002). “As long as the trial court remains
within the boundaries of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, its decision to admit or exclude
evidence will be accorded a high degree of deference.” Hickman v. State, 73 So. 3d 1156,
1160 (Miss. 2011) (citing Johnston v. State, 567 So. 2d 237, 238 (Miss. 1990)). An abuse
7
of discretion will be found only where the defendant shows clear prejudice resulting from
undue restraint on the defense. Davis v. State, 684 So. 2d 643, 652 (Miss. 1996).
¶14. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 611(b) “allows wide-open cross-examination so long
as the matter probed is relevant.” Johnston v. State, 618 So. 2d 90, 93 (Miss. 1993); Miss.
R. Evid. 611(b). However, the trial court has the authority to control the mode of
interrogating witnesses so as to “(1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the
ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses
from harassment or undue embarrassment.” Miss. R. Evid. 611(a). Proper subjects of cross-
examination may include a witness’s possible “bias, prejudice, or interest . . . for or against
any party to the case[.]” Miss. R. Evid. 616. See also Meeks v. State, 604 So. 2d 748, 755
(Miss. 1992) (citations omitted). The general rule of admissibility of evidence under Rule
616 is subject to the trial court’s discretionary finding that the evidence is relevant to the
specific facts of the case. Tillis v. State, 661 So. 2d 1139, 1142 (Miss. 1995). Relevant
evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence.” Miss. R. Evid. 401.
¶15. We find that the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of Angel’s affidavit, as
the statements in the affidavit have no relevance to the determination of the issues in the
instant case. First, the statements in Angel’s affidavit had no tendency to make any of the
facts constituting the offense charged more or less probable. See Miss. R. Evid. 401. If the
State had probable cause to believe that Cage had committed statutory rape by having sexual
intercourse with A.S., the decision of whether to prosecute Cage rested entirely in the State’s
8
discretion. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S. Ct. 663, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604
(1978). The fact that Angel’s family had forgiven Cage and wanted the charges against him
dropped does not make Cage’s guilt in the instant case more or less probable.
¶16. In addition, Angel’s affidavit was not relevant to show her bias, prejudice, or interest
in the case. “Rule 616 must be interpreted as it relates to other rules of evidence, particularly
M.R.E. 104, 401 and 402.” Tillis v. State, 661 So. 2d 1139, 1142 (Miss. 1995). Thus, before
evidence of bias, prejudice, or interest can be admitted under Rule 616, “[i]t must have the
tendency, in the case being tried, to make the facts to which the witness testified less
probable than it would be without the evidence of bias.” Id. The statements in Angel’s
affidavit have no tendency to make the facts to which she testified at trial less probable, as
her affidavit does not support Cage’s argument that she had an interest in the outcome of the
case. Cage argues that Angel cooperated with the prosecutors only because she feared her
children would be taken from her, but he offers no evidence to support this allegation. There
is no evidence that Angel or A.S. ever attempted to retract their initial statements to the
police. The statements in Angel’s affidavit do not contradict her trial testimony or the
testimony of any of the other witnesses; on the contrary, Angel’s statement that she had
forgiven Cage implies that she still believed he was the perpetrator of the rape at the time of
trial. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the
defense’s cross-examination of Angel. This argument is without merit.
II. Whether the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of K.J.
¶17. The trial court allowed K.J. to testify regarding A.S.’s statements that she had lied
about the rape because she thought she was pregnant. However, the trial court prohibited
9
K.J. from testifying regarding specific instances of A.S.’s past sexual behavior. On appeal,
Cage argues that the trial court erred in excluding this testimony because it would have called
into question A.S.’s credibility as a witness. Cage also argues that K.J.’s testimony would
have provided evidence of an alternate source of the DNA retrieved from A.S.’s rape kit.
Again, the exclusion of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Williams v. State,
54 So. 3d 212, 213 (Miss. 2011).
¶18. The trial court excluded K.J.’s testimony pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Evidence
412. “[Rule] 412 is designed to prevent the introduction of irrelevant evidence of the
victim’s past sexual behavior to confuse and inflame the jury into trying the victim rather
than the defendant.” Hughes v. State, 735 So. 2d 238, 273 (Miss. 1999). Rule 412 provides
that, in a sexual-offense case, the past sexual behavior of the alleged victim generally is not
admissible. See Miss. R. Evid. 412(a), (b). However, evidence of the victim’s past sexual
behavior, other than opinion or reputation evidence, may be admissible if “offered by the
accused upon the issue of whether the accused was or was not, with respect to the alleged
victim, the source of the semen, pregnancy, disease, or injury[.]” Miss. R. Evid.
412(b)(2)(A). The party intending to offer evidence of specific instances of the victim’s past
sexual behavior under Rule 412(b) “shall make a written motion to offer such evidence no
later than fifteen days” prior to the trial date. Miss. R. Evid. 412(c)(1) (emphasis added).
This motion must be accompanied by a written offer of proof. Miss. R. Evid. 412(c)(2). The
trial court has the discretion to allow such motion to be made at a later date, including during
trial, if it concludes “either that the evidence is newly discovered and could not have been
10
obtained earlier through the exercise of due diligence or that the issue to which such evidence
relates has newly arisen in the case.” Miss. R. Evid. 412(c)(1).
¶19. Cage complains that K.J.’s proffered testimony was admissible under Rule
412(b)(2)(A) as evidence of an alternate source of the DNA retrieved from A.S.’s rape kit.
But Cage failed to file a motion and accompanying offer of proof concerning this evidence
within the time limit specified in Rule 412(c). And it does not appear that this evidence was
newly discovered and could not have been obtained earlier through the exercise of due
diligence. See Miss. R. Evid. 412(c)(1). Because Cage failed to timely comply with the
requirements of Rule 412(c), the trial court did not err in prohibiting K.J. from testifying
about A.S.’s past sexual behavior. See Aguilar v. State, 955 So. 2d 386, 393 (Miss. Ct. App.
2006); Levy v. State, 724 So. 2d 405, 409 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). This issue is without merit.
III. Whether Cage received ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶20. Cage argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial
attorney failed to secure a serologist or DNA analyst to serve as an expert witness for the
defense, even though the trial court had granted Cage’s motion for application of funds to
hire such an expert. Cage claims that this failure irreparably damaged his defense.
¶21. When assessing an ineffective-assistance claim, this Court applies the two-pronged
standard set by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). The first prong of the Strickland test requires the
appellant to show that counsel’s performance was deficient. Id. at 686. There is a “strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.” Id. at 689. Under the second prong, even if counsel’s conduct is deemed to be
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“professionally unreasonable,” the jury’s verdict must stand “if the error had no effect on the
judgment.” Id. at 691. Accordingly, the defendant must show that there is a “reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.” Id. at 694.
¶22. “Generally, ineffective assistance claims are more appropriately brought during post-
conviction proceedings.” Bateman v. State, 125 So. 3d 616, 633 (Miss. 2013) (citing Archer
v. State, 986 So. 2d 951, 955 (Miss. 2008)). “This is because during direct appeals the Court
is limited to the trial court record in its review of the claim, and there may be instances in
which insufficient evidence exists within the record to address the claim adequately.”
Archer, 986 So. 2d at 951. However, such a claim may be raised on direct appeal “if such
issues are based on facts fully apparent from the record.” Miss. R. App. P. 22(b).
¶23. We find that the record on appeal does not contain sufficient evidence for this Court
to address Cage’s ineffective-assistance claim. At trial, the State’s expert witness testified
that the DNA information collected from A.S.’s rape kit could not exclude Cage as a
contributor. She also stated that the results of the DNA testing in this case would exclude
more than ninety-nine percent of the population. The record does not reveal whether an
independent DNA analyst would agree with or dispute the Crime Lab analysts’ findings.
Moreover, it is unclear whether Cage’s trial counsel actually failed to procure the services
of an expert witness after the trial court authorized funding for one, or whether she consulted
an expert and chose not to call the expert at trial. The appropriate procedure in this case is
to deny Cage’s ineffective-assistance claim without prejudice, preserving his right to raise
the issue through a petition for post-conviction relief. See Archer, 986 So. 2d at 955.
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IV. Whether the trial court erred in denying Cage’s motion for a new
trial, based on newly discovered juror misconduct.
¶24. After the jury returned its verdict, Cage filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict (JNOV), or in the alternative, a new trial. In his motion, Cage argued that he was
entitled to a new trial due to jury misconduct during the deliberation of Cage’s guilt or
innocence. Cage claimed that he had obtained newly discovered evidence indicating that one
of the jurors who had served on his case had not answered a question truthfully during voir
dire. On appeal, Cage argues that the interests of justice demand that he be granted a new
trial based on this newly discovered evidence.
¶25. In support of his argument, Cage presents this Court with the affidavit of his aunt,
Shella M. Head. This affidavit is not a part of the record from the trial court, but was
attached to Cage’s record excerpts on appeal. Cage filed a motion with this Court seeking
to amend the record to include Head’s affidavit. This Court dismissed Cage’s motion,
instructing him to seek relief from the trial court, but it appears that Cage failed to take any
further action.
¶26. We find that Cage has failed to meet his obligation to provide a complete record of this
issue on appeal. Accordingly, this issue is not properly before the Court. The appellant has
a duty to justify his assignments of error with all the information necessary to establish an
understanding of the matters relied upon for reversal. Pauley v. State, 113 So. 3d 557, 564
(Miss. 2013). In addition, this Court’s consideration of issues on appeal “will be confined
strictly to the record, both in terms of facts occurring prior to trial and to facts occurring since
trial. This rule holds true regardless of the nature of the facts sought to be placed before this
13
Court[.]” Phillips v. State, 421 So. 2d 476, 478 (Miss. 1982). Cage failed to include in the
record on appeal the transcript of the hearing on his post-trial motions and the trial court’s
order denying his post-trial motions. Furthermore, Head’s affidavit is not a part of the record,
as it was never presented to the trial court. Thus, this Court is unable to determine whether
the trial court had an opportunity to review the jury-misconduct issue Cage now raises before
this Court. Because Cage did not fulfill his duty to provide a complete record for this Court’s
review, we decline to address the merits of his argument.
CONCLUSION
¶27. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Cage’s conviction and sentence.
¶28. CONVICTION OF STATUTORY RAPE AND SENTENCE OF TWENTY (20)
YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, AFFIRMED. APPELLANT SHALL PAY $500 ATTORNEY FEES
AND $376 COURT FEES.
DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., LAMAR, KITCHENS, CHANDLER,
PIERCE, KING AND COLEMAN, JJ., CONCUR.
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