Mississippi High School Activities Association, Inc. v. Richard Rusty Trail ( 2015 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2013-IA-01728-SCT
MISSISSIPPI HIGH SCHOOL ACTIVITIES
ASSOCIATION, INC.
v.
R.T. A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH HIS
NATURAL FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND,
RICHARD R. TRAIL
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/09/2013
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. VICKI B. COBB
TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: STEVEN E. FARESE, SR.
JOHN JEFFREY TROTTER
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: DESOTO COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: BENJAMIN BLUE MORGAN
JAMES A. KEITH
JOHN JEFFREY TROTTER
J. KEITH TREADWAY
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: STEVEN E. FARESE, SR.
JOSEPH WHITTEN COOPER
NORMAN WILLIAM PAULI, JR.
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED - 05/08/2015
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC
DICKINSON, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. The only issue before us is whether a high school athlete has standing to challenge
adverse decisions concerning the student’s eligibility to participate in high school athletics.
We hold that he does.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. The DeSoto County School District (“School District”)—a public, taxpayer-funded
entity—entered into a contract with a private entity called the Mississippi High School
Activities Association (“MHSAA”).1 The terms of the contract allow MHSAA to decide
whether School District students are eligible to play high school sports. In making its
decisions, MHSAA applies its own rules and regulations, and neither the School District nor
its school board have input into the process.
¶3. In 2012, R.T. was a star quarterback for Wynne Public School in Wynne, Arkansas.
His parents—the Trails—decided that a change of school districts would be in R.T.’s best
interests, so in January 2013 they bought a house in Olive Branch and enrolled R.T. in Olive
Branch High School. Their daughter was to remain in Wynne until the school year ended.
MHSAA determined that R.T. was eligible to compete in spring sports and allowed R.T. to
play baseball. MHSAA conditioned R.T.’s continuing eligibility on the Trails’ daughter also
enrolling in the School District at the start of the 2013-2014 school year. But, because the
Trails’ daughter did not want to leave her friends behind in Arkansas, the family decided that
one parent would stay in Arkansas with their daughter, as they had done during the spring
semester, and the other parent would move to Mississippi and remain with R.T.
¶4. On the eve of the 2013 football season, MHSAA notified the school and R.T. that,
under its interpretation of its rules and regulations, R.T. was ineligible to play because it had
1
The contract between the school and MHSAA consists of an annual membership
form that the school is required to complete and return to MHSAA, pursuant to section 3.4.1
of the MHSAA Handbook, and the MHSAA Handbook, itself. See footnote 9 and
accompanying text below.
2
determined that his family had not made a bona fide move to the School District.2 Neither
the School District nor Olive Branch High School appealed through MHSAA’s internal
procedure, so the Trails immediately filed a petition for a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and preliminary injunction in the DeSoto County Chancery Court. The chancellor signed an
ex-parte order granting the TRO and revoking MHSAA’s adverse eligibility determination.
¶5. MHSAA then filed a motion to dismiss under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) arguing that the Trails lacked standing to challenge MHSAA’s eligibility
determinations and that the Trails’ action was premature. The Trails argued that R.T. had
standing as a third-party beneficiary to the contract between MHSAA and the School District.
The chancellor granted MHSAA’s motion to dismiss all claims against the MHSAA and the
DeSoto County School District and dissolved the original injunction, finding that the Trails
lacked standing because “[t]he Mississippi Supreme Court has held that participation in high
school athletics is not a legally enforceable right.” However, the chancellor granted the
Trails’ motion for a stay while the Trails appealed the chancery court’s order dissolving their
injunction and dismissing their case.
¶6. The Trails then filed a motion under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 59(c) to
amend the chancellor’s order, arguing that the chancery court was the “only bastion [of]
relief for the kids” who had been affected by adverse eligibility determinations, and that R.T.
had standing as a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the School District and
2
The MHSAA’s byzantine eligibility requirements are codified in Part II, Section 2
of the MHSAA’s handbook.
3
MHSAA. In the interim, MHSAA twice petitioned this Court for writs of prohibition and
mandamus and a petition for permission to file an interlocutory appeal.
¶7. After we directed the chancellor to rule on the Trails’ still-pending Rule 59(e) motion,
the chancellor granted the motion finding that the Trails had standing, because R.T. was a
direct beneficiary of the hardship provisions of the contract between MHSAA and the School
District. The chancellor converted the TRO into a preliminary injunction. MHSAA yet
again filed a petition for permission to file an interlocutory appeal in this Court, which we
granted in order to finally settle the issue.
ANALYSIS
¶8. This Court reviews questions of law, including questions of standing and the existence
of legally cognizable claims, de novo.3 Mississippi’s standing requirements—unlike the
standing requirements in federal court—are quite liberal.4 “Parties have standing to ‘sue or
intervene when they assert a colorable interest in the subject matter of the litigation or
experience an adverse effect from the conduct of the defendant, or as otherwise authorized
by law.’”5 But our liberal standing requirements are not without bounds:
[A]n individual’s legal interest or entitlement to assert a claim against a
defendant must be grounded in some legal right recognized by law, whether
3
See, e.g., Children’s Med. Grp., P.A. v. Phillips, 940 So. 2d 931, 933 (Miss. 2006)
(citing Webb v. DeSoto Cnty., 843 So. 2d 682, 684 (Miss. 2003)) (“[W]e review de novo
the denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.”).
4
Dunn v. Miss. Dep’t of Health, 708 So. 2d 67, 70 (Miss. 1998) (citing Fordice v.
Bryan, 651 So. 2d 998, 1003 (Miss. 1995)) (“Mississippi’s standing requirements are quite
liberal.”).
5
Dunn, 708 So. 2d at 70 (quoting Fordice, 651 So. 2d at 1003) (emphasis added).
4
by statute or by common law. Quite simply, the issue adjudicated in a standing
case is whether the particular plaintiff had a right to judicial enforcement of a
legal duty of the defendant or . . . whether a party plaintiff in an action for
legal relief can show in himself a present, existent actionable title or interest,
and demonstrate that this right was complete at the time of the institution of
the action.6
¶9. Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, “a beneficiary of a promise is an
intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate
to effectuate the intention of the parties and . . . the circumstances indicate that the promisee
intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.”7 In one of our older
cases we articulated a three-part test to determine when a third party qualifies as an intended
beneficiary:
(1) [w]hen the terms of the contract are expressly broad enough to include the
third party either by name as one of a specified class, and (2) the said party was
evidently within the intent of the terms so used, the said third party will be
within its benefits, if (3) the promissee had, in fact, a substantial and articulate
interest in the welfare of the said third party in respect to the subject of the
contract.8
¶10. In this case, the MHSAA Handbook—which forms part of the contract between
MHSAA and its member schools—declares that its purpose “is to promote the general
6
City of Picayune v. S. Reg’l Corp., 916 So. 2d 510, 526 (Miss. 2005) (citing State
v. Quitman Cnty., 807 So. 2d 401, 405 (Miss. 2001); Am. Book Co. v. Vandiver, 181 Miss.
518, 178 So. 598 (1938)).
7
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 (1981); see also Simmons Housing, Inc.
v. Shelton ex rel. Shelton, 36 So. 3d 1283, 1286 (Miss. 2010) (citing Burns v. Washington
Savings, 251 Miss. 789, 796, 171 So. 2d 322, 325 (1965)) (“Third-party-beneficiary status
arises from the terms of the contract.”).
8
Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669, 671 (1931) (citing
Smyth v. City of New York, 96 N.E. 409 (N.Y. 1911)).
5
welfare of member schools in their relations with each other.”9 This artfully drafted
statement of purpose carefully avoids any mention of student athletes. But MHSAA’s
bylaws governing student-athlete eligibility make clear that the “[e]ligibility rules shall apply
to all students participating in interscholastic athletic competition in all activities/athletics
at all levels of play, including middle school.”
¶11. Under our three-part Sideboard test, we first look at whether “the terms of the contract
are expressly broad enough to include the third party . . . by name.”10 This first requirement
is met because students are expressly mentioned by name in MHSAA’s eligibility rules.
¶12. Second, we determine whether the third-party “was evidently within the intent of the
terms so used.”11 If so, “the said third party will be within its benefits.”12 Clearly the student
athletes are within the intent of MHSAA’s eligibility rules and within the benefits of those
rules. After all, students who are ruled eligible are allowed to play sports, and those who are
ruled ineligible are not.
¶13. And finally, “the promisee [must have] had, in fact, a substantial and articulate interest
in the welfare of the said third party in respect to the subject of the contract.”13 We can only
hope that MHSAA had the welfare of the students in mind when it drafted its eligibility
9
Miss. High School Activities Ass’n v. Farris, 501 So. 2d 393, 396 (Miss. 1987)
(“The Court looks to the handbook to see if any rights spring to appellees, or if the alleged
broken conditions were placed in the handbook for the direct benefit of the appellees.”).
10
Sideboard, 133 So. at 671.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
6
requirements. It seems obvious that MHSAA’s entire system of eligibility rules creates a
substantial and articulate interest in the welfare of the student athletes.
¶14. So, under Mississippi’s law governing third-party beneficiaries, we find that student
athletes are intended beneficiaries of MHSAA’s eligibility requirements. Applying our rules
on intended third-party beneficiaries, it is clear that both MHSAA and its member schools
intended the students to have a right to compete in athletic competitions and that the parties
intended to give this benefit to high school students. The bylaws manifest an intent by both
parties to create rules benefitting both member schools and student athletes. And, under our
Sideboard three-part test, the specific procedures governing student athletes in the bylaws
mean that student athletes, like R.T., are the intended beneficiaries of the contract between
the MHSAA and its member schools.
¶15. Our previous decision in Mississippi High School Activities Association v. Farris is
readily distinguishable from this case. In Farris, MHSAA threatened to impose sanctions
and penalties on member schools allegedly for violating MHSAA’s rules.14 We addressed
only whether high school baseball players were the intended beneficiaries of MHSAA’s
handbook’s notice and hearing procedures that allowed the school to challenge the sanctions
and penalties.15 We held that the high school baseball players were merely incidental
beneficiaries to MHSAA’s notice and hearing provisions, which were intended only to
14
Farris, 501 So. 2d at 394-95.
15
Id. at 395.
7
benefit high schools facing sanctions.16 Here, unlike Farris, the issue directly affects the
student, and not merely the school.
¶16. MHSAA’s eligibility rules clearly benefit and apply to the student athletes. Indeed,
Section 2.2.2 of the eligibility bylaws states that “[i]t is a school’s responsibility to educate
student-athletes, parents, coaches, and other appropriate persons on MHSAA rules, including
eligibility rules that affect them.” (Emphasis added.) So the eligibility rules, by MHSAA’s
own language, affect student athletes.
¶17. MHSAA’s eligibility requirements touch on student age,17 medical history,18
behavior,19 drug and substance use,20 academic requirements,21 and residency requirements.22
16
Id.
17
Section 2.6 Age and Entry Requirements: “A student becomes ineligible for
interscholastic participation if he/she has reached his/her 19th birthday before August 1 of
that school year.”
18
Section 2.8 Medical History Evaluation and Examination: “Prior to tryouts or
practices in the season in which he/she participates, each student shall pass a medical
examination . . . .”
19
Section 2.35 Felony: “The MHSAA Executive Committee and Legislative Council
strongly recommend that any student indicted for a felony not be allowed to participate in
interscholastic sports/activities during the time of indictment and/or conviction.”
20
Section 2.9 Abuse and/or Misuse of Illegal Substances: “The MHSAA recommends
that each member school develop and implement a substance abuse/misuse policy, including
procedures for chemical testing of student-athletes.”
21
Section 2.10 Scholastic Requirements: “The MHSAA requires students
participating in MHSAA sanctioned competitions to make ‘satisfactory progress toward
graduation.’”
22
Section 2.27 Bona Fide Residence: “A student must attend school in the school
district in which his/her parents are bona fide residents.” Section 2.28 Bona Fide Change
of Residence State: “Determination of what constitutes a bona fide change of residence shall
8
These elaborate rules clearly are designed to benefit student athletes. Indeed, these rules
indicate that MHSAA has a “substantial and articulate interest in the welfare of the said third
party in respect to the subject of the contract.”23 While MHSAA proclaims that its purpose
is only to govern relations between its member schools, its rules regulating the eligibility of
student athletes indicate otherwise.
¶18. MHSAA’s intent to benefit individual student athletes also is manifested in MHSAA’s
policy of sanctioning member schools any time an individual student challenges MHSAA in
court and loses.24 Under its contract with member schools, MHSAA reserves the right to
sanction the member school for a student’s unsuccessful litigation. This rule, which is just
one part of MHSAA’s elaborate eligibility rules, undermines MHSAA’s claim that students
do not have standing to challenge its eligibility determinations in court. All of MHSAA’s
eligibility rules are intended to benefit the student athletes, and student athletes have standing
to challenge adverse eligibility determinations.
depend upon the facts of each case . . . .” And Section 2.29 Bona Fide Move Investigation
states: “The MHSAA shall conduct an investigation of a bona fide move if it appears a bona
fide change of residence has not been made.”
23
Sideboard, 133 So. at 671.
24
These are the same individual students who are denied any internal mechanism to
challenge the MHSAA’s adverse-eligibility determinations.
9
CONCLUSION
¶19. While it generally is true that high school students have no legally protected right to
participate in high school athletics,25 once a school decides to create a sports program and
establish eligibility rules, the school—or as in this case, MHSAA—has a duty to follow those
rules; and it may be held accountable when it does not do so. Without the students, there
would be no school, no principal, no school board, no MHSAA, and no athletic program, so
we find it fairly obvious that high school student-athletes are among the intended
beneficiaries of high school athletic programs, and the rules that govern them—whether
those rules are administered by the school, the school district, or a private entity with whom
the school contracts.
¶20. And where, as here, the school delegates its authority to control student eligibility
through a contract with a private entity, we hold that students directly affected by the contract
are third-party beneficiaries of that contract. For us to say otherwise would run contrary to
the very reason for extracurricular activities, which is to enrich the educational experience
of the students.26 Accordingly, we hold that R.T. does have standing to challenge MHSAA’s
25
See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Gillard, 352 So. 2d 1072, 1081 (Miss. 1977)
(quoting Scott v. Kilpatrick, 237 So. 2d 652, 655 (Ala. 1970)) (“Participation in high school
athletics is an extra-curricula activity subject to regulations as to eligibility. Engaging in
these activities is a privilege which may be claimed only in accordance with the standards
set up for participation.”).
26
S e e M i s s is s i p p i H i g h S ch o o l A c t i v i t i e s A s so c i a t i o n ,
http://www.misshsaa.com/about.aspx (last visited May 6, 2015):
The public and private schools that make up the MHSAA account for 94% of
the total school population and because of this our Association realizes the
tremendous responsibility we have to the people of Mississippi. The
10
eligibility decision that prevented him from playing high school sports. The decision of the
chancery court is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the Chancery Court of DeSoto
County for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶21. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
KITCHENS, CHANDLER, KING AND COLEMAN, JJ., CONCUR.
RANDOLPH, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY
WALLER, C.J., LAMAR AND PIERCE, JJ. PIERCE, J., DISSENTS WITH
SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH, P.J.,
AND LAMAR, J.
RANDOLPH, PRESIDING JUSTICE, DISSENTING:
¶22. Today’s holding is breathtaking in its reach. (Maj. Op. ¶ 1). As written, it grants
standing for high school athletes to challenge eligibility decisions, such as being declared
ineligible for a game or games because of missed curfews or being dismissed from the team
for smoking in the boys’ room. One does not have to be a jurist to appreciate that there must
be penalties, including loss of eligibility, if rules are broken.
¶23. Today’s analysis presupposes the existence of a contract, a critical point not developed
by the majority or in Mississippi High School Activities Association, Inc. v. Farris, 501 So.
Mississippi High School Activities Association and the activities it sponsors
are often called “the other half of education,” when, in fact, we are much more
than that. Surveys have shown that students who participate in extracurricular
activities stay in school and achieve to a higher degree academically than
those who do not participate. Surveys also show that these same students
develop high moral fiber and that their values are molded in such a way that
they are truly the good citizens that make this country great. Because of this
proven importance of activities to a student’s education, our Association
cannot be just “the other half.” Activities are instead an integral part of any
quality educational program.
(Emphasis added.)
11
2d 393 (Miss. 1987). The issue as presented in Farris was “were the minor appellees third
party beneficiaries to the contract between Hattiesburg High School and MHSAA.” Id. at
395. The Farris Court analyzed that issue, as presented, as if the handbook of the
Mississippi High School Activities Association (MHSAA) was a contract; however, the
Court never determined as a matter of law that the handbook was, in fact, a contract.27 Id. at
396. The majority, again reaching far beyond the scope of this case, fast-forwards to a
determination that a contract exists, without support for its conclusion.
¶24. Then, after citing Farris to buttress the contractual argument, the majority
disassociates itself from the holding in Farris. In Farris, the chancellor held that “[a]
contract existed between Hattiesburg High School and the MHSAA and the minor plaintiffs
had standing as third party beneficiaries to bring this suit.” Id. at 395. That issue is the exact
issue before this Court today – do student athletes and their parents have standing as third-
party beneficiaries to file suit? The majority lists numerous benefits that apply to the students
to support its finding that the students are third-party beneficiaries. (Maj. Op. ¶ 16-17). I,
just as the Farris court, recognize that students receive some benefit; however, those benefits
are incidental benefits, not direct benefits. Id. at 396.
¶25. If we honor stare decisis, the Farris holding controls this case. The Farris court held
that “the chancellor erred in finding the plaintiffs/appellees were third party beneficiaries .
. . .” Id. The Farris court further held that the student athletes and parents “had no property
27
The only person who declared that the handbook was a contract was the chancellor.
12
interests in playing interscholastic sports” and were in no position to implement third-party
standing. Id. at 398. I cannot ignore this precedent.
WALLER, C.J., LAMAR AND PIERCE, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.
PIERCE, JUSTICE, DISSENTING:
¶26. I dissent from the majority’s holding that R.T. has standing to challenge the eligibility
decision of the Mississippi High School Athletic Association (MHSAA) in this instance. At
the outset, the majority’s statement that the DeSoto County School District entered into a
contract with MHSAA to allow MHSAA to decide whether its students are eligible to play
high school sports is inaccurate. Apart from having no such signed instrument in the record
before us, this statement misleads the reader as to what the MHSAA actually constitutes.
MHSAA “is a private, voluntary nonprofit organization for public, private and parochial
secondary schools that choose to join and participate in the organization.” (Emphasis
added.) Each member school adopts the rules and interpretations contained in the MHSAA
handbook. The rules and interpretations are developed by member school representatives to
promote fairness in competition for the student athletes and to promote the general welfare
of member schools in their relations with each other. In no way have MHSAA and its
member schools conferred any “right(s)” upon students to compete or participate in athletic
competitions. As this Court recognized in National Collegiate Athletic Association. v.
Gillard, 352 So. 2d 1072 (Miss. 1977), Mississippi High School Activities Association, Inc.
v. Farris, 501 So. 2d 393 (Miss. 1987), and Mississippi High School Activities Association,
Inc. v. Coleman, 631 So. 2d 768, 774 (Miss. 1994), students have no “right” or entitlement
13
to participate in athletics as part of a public education. Rather, students are allowed the
privilege to participate in athletics. And this “privilege . . . may be claimed only in
accordance with the standards set up for participation.” NCAA v. Gillard, 352 So. 2d 1072,
1081 (Miss. 1977) (quoting Scott v. Kilpratick, 286 Ala. 129, 237 So. 2d 652 (1970)).
¶27. Here, the standards set up for participation are developed by the member schools
through member school representatives, which, I say again, form MHSAA. To this end,
MHSAA regulates the standards of eligibility for students who choose to or attempt to play
on athletic teams of its member schools.
¶28. One of the eligibility requirements instituted is that a student must attend school in the
school district in which the student’s parent(s) are bona-fide residents. The purpose of this
rule is to deter athletically motivated transfers and recruitment of students and promote fair
competition among the member schools, keeping in mind the educational principle that
participation in athletics is a privilege which should not take a dominant role over academics.
MHSAA v. Coleman, 631 So. 2d 768, 777-78 (Miss. 1994).28 If a school violates the rules
it adopted by allowing a student who has been declared ineligible to participate in any
28
In Coleman, we explained the following:
The stated purposes of the anti-recruitment regulation, to encourage and
promote fair competition among the schools and to deter odious recruitment
tactics, are legitimate. Requiring that a student attend a school located within
the school district in which that student resides, before the student may
participate in interscholastic athletic competitions, is rationally related to the
state’s legitimate purpose. A classification scheme based on bona fide
residence will clearly deter overzealous recruiting practices.
Coleman, 631 So. 2d at 777-78.
14
interscholastic contest, the school will be sanctioned by its fellow members through
MHSAA. To be sure, MHSAA also has a rule that, even if a school obtains a court order
enjoining the MHSAA from making an eligibility ruling, the school will be sanctioned in the
event such order is reversed or determined to be unjustified. This provision is necessary to
assure that MHSAA’s antirecruitment regulations will not be rendered pointless by
gamesmanship played in the courts, through use of injunctions and the like.
¶29. In reaching the conclusion that R.T. has standing to challenge MHSAA’s eligibility
decision in this instance, the majority fails to mention that the chancery court merely found
that the Trails “have the right to have the court, following a trial on the merits, determine
whether MHSAA wrongly decided to revoke R.T.’s eligibility and/or failed to properly
consider applying an undue hardship exception to the residency requirements under the
circumstances of this case.” I can only assume that, in affirming the chancery court’s
decision, the majority is presuming that will occur. But why would the Trails pursue the
matter to resolution? R.T. is now playing college football, and he actually left Olive Branch
after his junior season to return to his high school in Arkansas. Why would he now seek a
judicial determination as to whether MHSAA wrongly decided to revoke his eligibility? The
record does not indicate whether R.T. participated in Olive Branch’s football program after
the chancery court issued a preliminary injunction in this matter. Assuming he did, if the
Trails drop their suit against MHSAA, MHSAA’s ineligibility ruling still stands, and
pursuant to Section 4.6 of the MHSAA rule book, sanctions against Olive Branch will be
implemented. But if, on the other hand, the Olive Branch football program, taking the
15
“team” concept into consideration, did not allow R.T. to participate while this suit was
pending, then sanctions will not be forthcoming.
¶30. This illustrates quite plainly to me why the member schools did not intend for student
athletes to be third-party beneficiaries to the internal operation of affairs of MHSAA.
Though elementary, it must be pointed out that MHSAA has no capability whatsoever to
physically restrain a student athlete from participating in interscholastic activities. The only
enforcement power MHSAA has is the power to sanction for violations of its rules and
regulations, which, again, the member schools through rotating school representatives
institute. To expect a student athlete who a member school allows to participate in
interscholastic competition after being ruled ineligible to pursue a claim to a judicial
determination for the benefit of a member school is absurd.
¶31. In Scott, which this Court cited with approval in Gillard, the Alabama Supreme Court
stated:
If officials of a school desire to associate with other schools and prescribe
conditions of eligibility for students who are to become members of the
school’s athletic teams, and the member schools vest final enforcement of the
association’s rules in boards of control, then a court should not interfere in
such internal operation of the affairs of the association.
Scott, 237 So. 2d at 655 (citing Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, et al. v. Cox, et al.,
425 S.W.2d 597 (Tenn. 1968); Morrison v. Roberts, 183 Okla. 359, 82 P.2d 1023 (Okla.
1938); Robinson v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 45 Ill. App. 2d 277, 195 N.E.2d 38 (Ill. App. 1963);
State ex rel. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Judges of the Court of Common Pleas, 173
Ohio St. 239, 181 N.E.2d 261 (Ohio 1962); Sult v. Gilbert, 148 Fla. 31, 3 So. 2d 729 (Fla.
16
1941); State ex rel. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Lawrence Circuit Court, 240 Ind.
114, 162 N.E.2d 250 (Ind. 1959); Starkey v. Board of Education of Davis County School
District, 14 Utah 2d 227, 381 P.2d 718 (Utah 1963)). I agree with Scott.
¶32. Again, students have no protected property interest or right to participate in athletics
as part of a public education. Rather, participation in athletics is a privilege, and “[the]
privilege . . . may be claimed only in accordance with the standards set up for participation.”
Gillard, 352 So. 2d at 1081. MHSAA’s rules preclude student athletes and/or their parent(s)
from either challenging an adverse eligibility determination or instituting a hardship
determination. Unless it can be shown that the member schools, through MHSAA, have no
authority to institute such a policy, we are powerless to order MHSAA to facilitate otherwise.
Of course, rules cannot be instituted that contravene or infringe upon any constitutional or
statutory right of a student, as provided by either federal or state law, and the MHSAA rule
book safeguards that accordingly. No such question, however, is presented in this instance.
¶33. The majority’s opinion leaves questions which cannot be answered given the
reasoning used to reach its holding, And, most disturbing, by elevating the privilege of
participating in interscholastic athletics to a right, the majority creates the ability for a student
athlete to contest any adverse decision that affects the student’s playing status, whether it
involves team rule violations or coaching decisions.
WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH, P.J., AND LAMAR, J., JOIN THIS OPINION.
17