Ralph Arnold Smith, Jr. v. Ricky Banks ( 2012 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2012-CA-01850-SCT
RALPH ARNOLD SMITH, JR.
v.
RICKY BANKS, SHERIFF OF LEFLORE
COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, AND THE STATE OF
MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/09/2012
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. L. BRELAND HILBURN
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LEFLORE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: WILLIAM CHARLES BELL
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES: OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY,
FOURTH DISTRICT
BY: TIMOTHY HUTSON JONES
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 01/30/2014
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: 02/12/2014; DENIED AND MODIFIED AT
¶14 AND ¶16 - 04/10/2014
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE WALLER, C.J., LAMAR AND KITCHENS, JJ.
WALLER, CHIEF JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Ralph Arnold Smith Jr. appeals from the Leflore County Circuit Court’s denial of his
habeas corpus petition. After reviewing Smith’s petition and the evidence proffered to the
trial court, we find that Smith is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
¶2. Smith was arrested on April 29, 2012, and charged with one count of capital murder
and two counts of conspiracy to commit murder. The State charged Smith with capital felony
murder for causing the death of Keaira Byrd. The State alleged that Smith had conspired
with Byrd to murder Lee Abraham, a Greenwood attorney. According to the State, the
underlying felony raising Byrd’s death to capital murder was Byrd’s own “burglary by
subterfuge” of Abraham’s office. Byrd and Derrick Lacy were attempting to enter
Abraham’s office under false pretenses to murder him when Byrd was killed by an
investigator with the Attorney General’s office. The State also charged Smith with one count
of conspiracy to commit murder for his alleged involvement in the murder-for-hire plot with
Byrd and Lacy, along with a second count of conspiracy to commit murder for entering into
an agreement with Cordarious Robinson to find someone to kill Abraham.
¶3. The record reflects that, during his initial appearance in justice court, Smith was
granted $100,000 bail on his conspiracy charge with Cordarious Robinson, but was denied
bail on the other conspiracy charge and the capital-murder charge. Smith then had a
preliminary hearing before the Leflore County Court on May 16, 2012. At the hearing, the
county court found that there was probable cause to bind Smith over to await the action of
the Grand Jury of Leflore County on all three charges. The court refused to grant bail on
Smith’s capital-murder charge, finding that the proof was evident and the presumption great
that Smith had committed a capital crime. The court also denied bail for Smith’s charge of
conspiracy with Byrd and Lacy, finding that Smith’s release would constitute a special
danger to Abraham and his family. The county court denied the State’s request to revoke the
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bail granted on Smith’s conspiracy charge with Robinson. The county court issued an oder
to this effect on May 21, 2013. Smith then filed a petition for bail with this Court, arguing
that the county court had erred in denying bail. A panel of this Court denied Smith’s petition
for bail. See Smith v. State, No. 2012-M-01054 (Miss. July 18, 2012).
¶4. On September 12, 2012, Smith filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Leflore
County Circuit Court, claiming that his detention without bail on his capital-murder charge
was illegal. For the purposes of this appeal, Smith claimed that he could not be held without
bail for capital murder because the State’s allegations against him did not state a valid charge
for capital murder. Smith argued that Byrd’s death was not committed “without authority
of law” by someone engaged in the underlying felony of burglary, as alleged by the State,
because Byrd was killed by a law-enforcement officer acting in self-defense. The trial court
entered an order directing the circuit clerk to issue a writ of habeas corpus for Smith to be
brought before the court for a hearing. The Leflore County Circuit Clerk then issued a writ
of habeas corpus on October 3, 2012.
¶5. Sometime between the filing of Smith’s petition and the habeas corpus hearing, a
Leflore County Grand Jury indicted Smith on all charges.1 Smith’s habeas corpus hearing
was held on October 9, 2012. At the beginning of the hearing, the trial court considered
arguments by the parties on the issues. Smith’s counsel argued, as he had done at the
preliminary hearing and in the petition for bail filed with this Court, that Smith could not be
held on the capital-murder charge because the State’s allegations did not give rise to a valid
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Smith’s indictments were not made a part of the record on appeal.
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charge of capital murder. The State responded that, regardless of Smith’s arguments
regarding the validity of his capital-murder charge, he was still being legally held without
bail on his conspiracy charge, which Smith had not challenged in his habeas corpus petition.
The State also pointed out that a grand jury already had indicted Smith on all charges brought
against him. After hearing from the parties, the trial court denied Smith’s petition, reasoning:
This is a civil proceeding and this proceeding is really kind of ancillary to the
criminal procedure taking place in the actual process of the indictment and
reaching up to the trial, itself. And I’m concerned that you’re asking the Court
through a civil proceeding to reach into the process that ordinarily belongs to
the trial of the case and make some decisions on those issues, and I’m just
reluctant to do that.
There are remedies available to the defendant through the trial procedures that
bring forward these issues that you – appropriately bring forward these issues
before the criminal trial court. It’s going to be the decision of the Court that
the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the relief sought in the petition will be
denied.
The trial court then allowed Smith’s counsel to proffer any evidence that he intended to
produce at the hearing. The majority of the evidence proffered by Smith focused on the
circumstances surrounding Byrd’s death and related evidentiary issues.
¶6. The trial court entered an order denying Smith’s habeas corpus petition. Smith
subsequently filed a motion to set aside, alter, or amend, the trial court’s order, arguing that
the order did not accurately reflect the course of events at the habeas corpus hearing. Smith
pointed out that the trial court’s order mentioned “pleadings filed before the Supreme Court
and the ruling by that Court,” but that no evidence to that effect had been introduced at the
hearing. Smith requested that the trial court amend its order to reflect that Smith’s petition
for habeas corpus was denied without a trial based on documents not provided to Smith or
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entered into evidence. Smith also filed a motion requesting the circuit court judge to recuse
himself from the case. The trial court denied both of these motions.
¶7. Smith now appeals to this Court, raising the following issues:
I. Whether the trial court erred in failing to allow evidence on
Smith’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.
II. Whether the trial court erred by basing its ruling on documents
provided by the State that were not entered into evidence.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶8. “The rule is that the judgment of the trial court which heard the habeas corpus
proceeding is presumptively correct, and, where the evidence is conflicting, the judge’s
finding of fact, if supported by the evidence, will not be disturbed on appeal.” Lee v.
Hudson, 165 Miss. 756, 144 So. 240 (1932). “[T]he judgment of a habeas corpus court will
not be disturbed, unless it is manifest to us that the trial court either tried the cause upon an
erroneous conception of the law, or that the judgment is erroneous upon the facts.” Parker
v. Tullos, 150 Miss. 680, 116 So. 531, 532 (1928).
DISCUSSION
I. Whether the trial court erred in failing to allow evidence on
Smith’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.
¶9. The writ of habeas corpus is a privilege guaranteed by our Constitution that cannot
be suspended, “unless when in the case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require
it, nor ever without the authority of the legislature.” Miss. Const. art. 3, § 21 (1890). “The
writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty . . . except in the cases expressly excepted.” Miss. Code
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Ann. § 11-43-1 (Rev. 2012). “The function of the habeas corpus court in Mississippi in
criminal cases is to release a prisoner who is being unlawfully held or to grant him a bail
bond which he can make.” Keller v. Romero, 303 So. 2d 481, 483 (Miss. 1974). However,
“[a] habeas corpus writ cannot be used as a collateral method to prevent a trial on an
indictment in this state[.]” Id.
¶10. Smith’s habeas corpus petition focused solely on the validity of his capital-murder
charge, which Smith believes fails as a matter of law, entitling him to be discharged, or
alternatively, to be granted bail on that charge. We must first note that the habeas corpus
court was without authority to discharge Smith for his capital-murder charge. After a
defendant in a criminal case has been indicted, as here, the habeas corpus court has no power
to discharge the defendant, but is limited to granting bail. Street v. State, 43 Miss. 1, 30
(1870). We therefore can view Smith’s habeas corpus petition only as a request for bail on
his capital-murder charge.
¶11. Mississippi’s Constitution grants all criminal defendants the right to bail prior to
conviction, with certain exceptions. Miss. Const. art. 3, § 29, cl. 1 (1890). Because Smith
is charged with capital murder, he is not entitled to bail pending trial if “the proof is evident
or the presumption great” concerning his guilt. Id. In addition, because Smith’s conspiracy
charges carry a maximum penalty of twenty years’ imprisonment, bail may be denied on
those charges where “the proof is evident or the presumption great” upon a determination by
the court that Smith’s release would constitute a “special danger to any other person or to the
community[.]” Miss. Const. art. 3, § 29, cl. 3 (1890).
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¶12. On appeal, Smith argues that the trial court erred in denying his habeas corpus petition
without allowing him to present evidence in support of his arguments. After reviewing our
court rules governing preconviction habeas corpus matters, we find that Smith was entitled
to present witnesses and other evidence for the purpose of proving that he was wrongly
denied bail. After the writ of habeas corpus is issued, the habeas corpus court must hold a
hearing on the matter, and “shall either discharge, or commit, or admit to bail, or remand the
movant . . . as the law and the evidence shall require.” URCCC 2.07(A)(9)(a) (emphasis
added). The parties are entitled to invoke the processes of civil discovery, to the extent that
the court grants leave to do so. URCCC 2.07(A)(8). Upon a hearing on the matter, “[t]he
order rendered by the court shall be conclusive until reversed and shall be a bar to another
writ of habeas corpus in the same cause[.]” URCCC 2.07(A)(9)(b). A fair interpretation of
these provisions demonstrates that a habeas corpus petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing once the writ of habeas corpus has been issued.
¶13. Because Smith was entitled to present evidence supporting his arguments, we
conclude that the trial court erred in ruling on Smith’s petition without allowing him to
present any evidence. However, after reviewing Smith’s habeas corpus petition, his
argument before the trial court, and the evidence proffered at the habeas corpus hearing, we
agree with the trial court that Smith is not entitled to habeas corpus relief.
¶14. First, Smith’s petition for habeas corpus failed to challenge the validity of his
detention for his conspiracy charge. Smith’s indictment created a prima facie case of the
legality of his detention on all charges. Russell v. Crumpton, 208 Miss. 43, 44 So. 2d 527,
529 (1950). Smith therefore had the burden of proving that he was wrongly denied bail on
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each of his charges. At the preliminary hearing, the county court found that Smith’s release
would constitute a special danger to Abraham, the target of Smith’s alleged conspiracy,
which foreclosed Smith’s eligibility for bail. See Miss. Const. art. 3, § 29, cl. 3 (1890). Smith
did not challenge this finding at the preliminary hearing in county court, in his petition for
bail before this Court, or in his habeas corpus petition in circuit court. Smith did challenge
the finding at his habeas corpus hearing but failed to proffer any evidence supporting his
position. Smith is being held lawfully without bail on a charge of conspiracy to commit
murder and therefore is not entitled to habeas corpus relief.
¶15. In addition, the majority of the evidence proffered by Smith was irrelevant to the
purposes of the habeas corpus hearing. For example, Smith’s assertion that local law
enforcement had no prior notice of the Attorney General’s investigation of Smith’s alleged
conspiracy has no bearing on whether Smith was being illegally detained without bail.
Smith’s evidentiary arguments regarding Byrd’s autopsy and the conditions of the crime
scene must be determined “by the trial court that has jurisdiction to try the charge against
[Smith], and not the habeas corpus court.” Keller, 303 So. 2d at 482. Due to Smith’s proffer
of largely irrelevant evidence, the trial court understandably found Smith’s arguments to be
an attempt to bypass his criminal proceeding to collaterally defeat his capital murder-charge
without a trial by jury.
¶16. Although the trial court erred in refusing to allow Smith to present evidence in support
of his petition for habeas corpus, we find that the evidence proffered by Smith would not
have entitled Smith to any relief that the court could have granted. In addition, Smith’s
failure to proffer any evidence supporting his challenge to the validity of his detention on his
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conspiracy charge forecloses his eligibility for release on bail. Therefore, we affirm the trial
court’s decision to deny Smith’s petition for habeas corpus.
II. Whether the trial court erred by basing its ruling on documents
provided by the State that were not entered into evidence.
¶17. Smith argues that the trial court’s denial of his habeas corpus petition was not based
on substantial evidence because it was founded in part on documents not entered into
evidence during the habeas corpus hearing. Our holding concerning Smith’s first claim of
error renders this issue moot, since a judgment on the merits, if rendered, would be of no
practical benefit to Smith and no detriment to the State. See Gartell v. Gartell, 936 So. 2d
915, 916 (Miss. 2006). Accordingly, we decline to address Smith’s arguments regarding this
issue.
CONCLUSION
¶18. Since Smith is not entitled to habeas corpus relief, we affirm the judgment of the
Leflore County Circuit Court.
¶19. AFFIRMED.
DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., LAMAR, KITCHENS, CHANDLER,
PIERCE AND KING, JJ., CONCUR. COLEMAN, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
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