Roy Lee Jackson v. State of Mississippi ( 1995 )


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  •                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 05/21/96
    OF THE
    STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
    NO. 95-KA-00235 COA
    ROY LEE JACKSON A/K/A RAY LEE JACKSON A/K/A "LI’L LEE" A/K/A LITTLE LEE
    APPELLANT
    v.
    STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
    APPELLEE
    THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION AND
    MAY NOT BE CITED, PURSUANT TO M.R.A.P. 35-B
    TRIAL JUDGE: HON. KENNETH L. THOMAS
    COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: COAHOMA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
    DARNELL FELTON
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
    OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: PAT FLYNN
    DISTRICT ATTORNEY: LAURENCE Y. MELLEN
    NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - BURGLARY
    TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: CONVICTED AND SENTENCED AS AN HABITUAL
    OFFENDER TO SERVE A TERM OF SEVEN (7) YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MDOC
    BEFORE THOMAS, P.J., BARBER, AND PAYNE, JJ.
    PER CURIAM:
    Roy Lee Jackson was convicted of burglary. He was sentenced as an habitual offender to serve a
    term of seven years in prison. On appeal, Jackson asserts that the evidence submitted was insufficient
    to support a guilty verdict. Finding Jackson’s argument without merit, we affirm.
    Jackson was indicted and convicted for burglarizing a bicycle shop in Clarksdale. Approximately
    twelve bikes were taken along with a small refrigerator and a motorized go-cart. Many of the stolen
    articles were found at Jackson’s home. The refrigerator was located at the house next door. The
    testimony at trial revealed that Jackson had requested that his next door neighbor keep the
    refrigerator for Jackson until a later date.
    Several individuals were involved in the burglary. Three of the accomplices testified at trial that
    Jackson, although he had been drinking that evening, participated in the burglary. Jackson claims that
    he drank so much on the evening of the burglary, he was too drunk to have been involved. He stated
    that he had passed out from drinking too much during the early evening hours of the night of the
    burglary and remained at home, asleep, until the morning after the burglary. Jackson also claims to
    have found the stolen merchandise the day after the burglary in the tall grass behind his house, and
    that is how he came to be in possession of it.
    On appeal, Jackson argues that because the witnesses’ testimony regarding certain details of the
    events of the evening of the burglary differed, their entire testimony was without credibility and
    thereby impeached. Jackson asserts that the only remaining evidence against him is the possession of
    the stolen items. That alone, he claims is insufficient to support a verdict against him.
    Jackson is, however, procedurally barred from asserting this error on appeal. Jackson moved for a
    directed verdict at the end of the prosecution’s case. That motion was denied by the trial court.
    Thereafter, Jackson proceeded to go forth with his case in chief and introduced evidence in his own
    behalf. Jackson did not renew his motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence nor did
    he request a peremptory instruction or JNOV. It is well settled that where a defending party,
    following the denying of a motion for a directed verdict, goes forward with evidence of his own, he
    waives the right to assert this ruling as error on appeal. Stever v. State, 
    503 So. 2d 227
    , 230 (Miss.
    1987).
    Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that there was no procedural bar, Jackson still cannot prevail on his
    theory. We do not find that minor discrepancies in the testimony of the State’s witnesses are
    sufficient to cast doubt upon their entire testimony. Thus, there is more than mere possession upon
    which to base a conviction. There is corroborated eyewitness testimony. Where, as here, the evidence
    for the State and Defendant are in conflict, a classic jury issue is created. We may reverse only where
    the evidence is such that reasonable and fair minded jurors could only find the defendant not guilty.
    Wetz v. State, 
    503 So. 2d 803
    , 808 (Miss. 1987). After reading the record, we find that the guilty
    verdict was supported by sufficient credible evidence. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in denying Jackson’s motion for a directed verdict. Accordingly, Jackson’s conviction is
    affirmed.
    THE JUDGMENT OF THE COAHOMA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF CONVICTION
    OF BURGLARY AND SENTENCE OF SEVEN (7) YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE
    MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AS AN HABITUAL OFFENDER IS
    AFFIRMED. COSTS ARE ASSESSED AGAINST COAHOMA COUNTY.
    FRAISER, C.J., BRIDGES AND THOMAS, P.JJ., BARBER, COLEMAN, DIAZ, KING,
    McMILLIN, PAYNE, AND SOUTHWICK, JJ., CONCUR.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 95-KA-00235-SCT

Filed Date: 2/24/1995

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014