Lee R. Lawrence v. Greenline Eqmpt ( 1992 )


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  •                          IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
    NO. 92-CA-01042-SCT
    LEE R. LAWRENCE AND PEGGY M. LAWRENCE
    v.
    GREENLINE EQUIPMENT, INC., SHERIFF DENNIS E. PRESCOTT, WEST ALABAMA
    BANK & TRUST
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                               09/18/92
    TRIAL JUDGE:                                    HON. JOHN M. MONTGOMERY
    COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:                      LOWNDES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS:                        CHARLES D. EASLEY JR.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES:                         J. GORDON FLOWERS
    NATURE OF THE CASE:                             CIVIL - OTHER
    DISPOSITION:                                    DISMISSED - 6/20/96
    MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
    MANDATE ISSUED:                                 7/11/96
    BEFORE SULLIVAN, P.J., McRAE AND ROBERTS, JJ.
    McRAE, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
    ¶1. This appeal arises from a replevin action in the Lowndes County Circuit Court, wherein the
    Lawrences sought possession of certain vehicles which had been confiscated by Lowndes County
    Sheriff, Dennis Prescott, and were stored at Greenline Equipment, Inc. In a January 6, 1992 decision,
    the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, Eastern Division, found
    that the vehicles, which had been abandoned from the bankruptcy estate, could not be exempted by
    amendment. Based on the Bankruptcy Court's decision, the circuit court found that the Lawrences
    were estopped from claiming the vehicles as exempt from seizure pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 85-
    3-1(a), and granted summary judgment in favor of the judgment creditor/intervenor, West Alabama
    Bank and Trust. Aggrieved by the decision, which enabled West Alabama Bank and Trust to attempt
    to partially collect a December 6, 1990 judgment of $55,773.74 against Lee Lawrence through a
    public sale of the vehicles, the Lawrences now assert that the trial court erred in granting summary
    judgment to defendants based on a ruling by the United States Bankruptcy Court.
    ¶2. Lawrence owned a used car dealership known as Lee Lawrence Motor Company in Columbus,
    Mississippi. Through a series of proceedings during which the bankruptcy court repeatedly noted that
    the Lawrences were less than candid with the court, the vehicles at issue were found to be part of Lee
    Lawrence's business inventory. On appeal, however, the Lawrences contended that, despite the ruling
    of the bankruptcy court, the vehicles should be exempt pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 85-3-1(a),
    which exempts from seizure or attachment "[t]angible personal property of any kind, not exceeding
    Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) in value, which shall be selected by the debtor . . ." In response
    to the Lawrences' three-page argument, West Alabama asserts that the circuit court properly ruled
    that allowing the Lawrences to claim the automobiles under the § 85-3-1(a) exemption would allow
    them to claim a double exemption and further, that res judicata and collateral, judicial and equitable
    estoppel all prevented them from relitigating the exemption status of the vehicles.
    ¶3. On December 22, 1995, we received a copy of the bankruptcy court's December 20, 1995
    Judgment Denying Discharge, denying the discharge of the Lawrence's debts. In as much as the
    Lawrences' bankruptcy petition has been denied, the issue of whether certain assets can be exempt
    from seizure based on their status with regard to the bankruptcy estate is now moot. Accordingly, we
    dismiss the appeal.
    ¶4. APPEAL DISMISSED.
    SULLIVAN, P.J., ROBERTS, SMITH AND MILLS, JJ., CONCUR. BANKS, J., CONCURS
    WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY LEE, C.J., AND PRATHER, P.J.
    AND PITTMAN, J.
    BANKS, JUSTICE, CONCURRING:
    ¶5. With deference, I cannot see how the failure to gain a discharge in bankruptcy makes this case
    moot. The Lawrences claim that the property in question is exempt from execution. The trial court
    granted summary judgment on the basis that the bankruptcy court had earlier considered the question
    of exemption and decreed, based on proceedings there, that the Lawrences should be judicially
    estopped from claiming such an exemption in any judicial proceedings.
    ¶6. The exemption from execution is a state statutory right incorporated into bankruptcy proceedings
    by operation of federal and state law. Miss. Code Ann. § 85-3-1 (1972); 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b); see
    Matter of Allen, 
    725 F.2d 290
    (5th Cir. 1984), reh. denied, 
    729 F.2d 1459
    (5th Cir. 1984). It is not,
    however, dependent upon the existence of bankruptcy proceedings. 
    Id. Any dissolution of
    the
    bankruptcy proceedings in this case should help rather than hinder the Lawrences' cause, given the
    fact that the order upon which the collateral estoppel found in the trial court is based is an order in
    the bankruptcy proceedings.
    ¶7. In my view, this case should be affirmed on the merits. While the bankruptcy order may have been
    over broad, there is a clear finding of judicial estoppel based on prior filings of the Lawrences
    concerning the nature and ownership of the property in question. Daughtrey v. Daughtrey, 
    474 So. 2d
    598, 602 (Miss. 1985); State Highway Commission v. Charmar, Inc., 
    569 So. 2d 1132
    , 1138
    (Miss. 1990). That finding should be given the collateral estoppel effect accorded it by the circuit
    court. 
    Id. ¶8. Dismissal of
    the appeal results in allowing the judgment below to stand. Accordingly, I concur in
    that result.
    LEE, C.J., AND PRATHER, P.J., AND PITTMAN, J., JOIN THIS OPINION.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 92-CA-01042-SCT

Filed Date: 9/18/1992

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014