Mississippi Care Center of Greenville, LLC v. Nancy Hinyub ( 2005 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2005-CA-01239-SCT
MISSISSIPPI CARE CENTER OF GREENVILLE,
LLC, OXFORD MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC.,
MICHAEL OVERSTREET AND TESSA COOPER
v.
NANCY HINYUB, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE
OF DON WYSE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/21/2005
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. RICHARD A. SMITH
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: HEATHER MARIE ABY
MARJORIE SELBY BUSCHING
STEVEN MARK WANN
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: F. M. TURNER, III
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - WRONGFUL DEATH
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED - 01/03/2008
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE SMITH, C.J., CARLSON AND RANDOLPH, JJ.
CARLSON, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. In this wrongful-death suit, Mississippi Care Center of Greenville, LLC; Oxford
Management Company, Inc.; Michael Overstreet; and Tessa Cooper appeal to this Court after
the trial court refused to compel arbitration. Finding no error, we affirm the Washington
County Circuit Court’s order denying the defendants’ motion to stay proceedings and compel
arbitration.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT
¶2. In January of 1997, Don Wyse was admitted to Mississippi Care Center of Greenville
f/k/a MS Extended Care of Greenville (MCCG) under an admission agreement which did not
contain an arbitration provision. This admission agreement was signed by Don Wyse and
Wyse’s daughter, Nancy Wyse (Hinyub),1 who asserted that she was signing on behalf of her
father pursuant to a durable power of attorney.2 On January 31, 2004, Don Wyse was
discharged from MCCG and was transferred to Delta Regional Medical Center for treatment.
On February 13, 2004, at approximately 6:30 p.m., Wyse was re-admitted to MCCG, and
Hinyub, on behalf of her father, entered into a second admission agreement with MCCG.
This second admission agreement contained an arbitration provision. Wyse died at noon the
next day.
¶3. On August 24, 2004, Nancy Hinyub, individually and as personal representative of
the estate of Don Wyse, deceased, filed an action in the Circuit Court of Washington County
against MCCG; Oxford Management Company, Inc.; Health Care Consultants, Inc.;
Mississippi Extended Care of Greenville, Inc.; Michael H. Overstreet; Tessi Cooper;
Unidentified Entities 1 through 10 and John Does 1 through 10 (as to MCCG) alleging, inter
alia, negligence, malpractice, malice and/or gross negligence, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty,
1
Nancy Wyse has since married and her legal name is now Nancy Hinyub.
2
The official record before this Court is devoid of a durable power of attorney
executed by Don Wyse in favor of Nancy Hinyub. This fact will be discussed in more detail,
infra.
2
and wrongful death. On August 30, 2004, Hinyub filed an amended complaint to substitute
John Does 1-2 with Nino A. Bologna, M.D. and Phillip Doolittle, M.D., two of Wyse’s
treating physicians. On December 16, 2004, MCCG, Overstreet and Cooper filed a Motion
to Stay Proceedings and Compel Arbitration based on the arbitration provision contained
within the Admissions Agreement of February 13, 2004. On December 22, 2004, Oxford
Management Company, Inc., filed its Motion for Joinder in the Defendants’ Motion to Stay
Proceedings and Compel Arbitration. Hinyub filed her opposition to the defendants’ motion
to compel arbitration on April 21, 2005. After reviewing the motions submitted by the
parties, on June 3, 2005, the Circuit Court of Washington County, Judge Richard A. Smith,
presiding, entered its Order Denying the Defendants’ Motion to Stay Proceedings and
Compel Arbitration. From this order, certain defendants 3 appeal to this Court on the sole
issue of whether the trial court erred in failing to enforce an arbitration provision contained
3
There is no Rule 54(b) certification from the trial judge in this case. See Miss. R. Civ.
P. 54(b). In the original Complaint, there were seven named defendants as well as
Unidentified Entities 1 through 10 and John Does 1 through 10. In the later filed Amended
Complaint, Dr. Nino A. Bologna and Dr. Phillip Doolittle were added as named defendants.
The defendants who filed the motion to compel arbitration were MCCG, Michael H.
Overstreet, and Tessi Cooper; however, by separate motion, Oxford Management Company,
Inc., joined this motion to compel arbitration. Separate motions to dismiss were filed by Dr.
Bologna and Dr. Doolittle; however, the record reveals that the trial court ruled only on Dr.
Bologna’s motion to dismiss by way of an order denying the motion to dismiss. Thus, the
defendants who are not parties to this appeal are Health Care Consultants, Inc., Health
Services of Mississippi, Inc., Mississippi Extended Care of Greenville, Inc., Dr. Nino A.
Bologna, and Dr. Phillip Doolittle. Since the sole issue on appeal is whether certain
defendants are entitled to the enforcement of an arbitration provision, and since today’s
appeal is being resolved by way of a remand to the trial court for a final disposition on the
merits as to all defendants, the lack of a Rule 54(b) certification is of no moment.
3
within a nursing home admission agreement entered into between the nursing home and the
resident’s daughter (Nancy Hinyub), operating under a power of attorney and as her father’s
responsible party. Finding that the trial court properly denied the defendants’ motion to
compel arbitration, we affirm.
DISCUSSION
WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION.
¶4. On appeal, we apply a de novo standard of review to a trial court’s decision to grant
or deny a motion to compel arbitration. Equifirst Corp. v. Jackson, 920 So. 2d 458, 461
(Miss. 2006); Doleac v. Real Estate Professionals, LLC, 911 So. 2d 496, 501 (Miss. 2005);
East Ford, Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709, 713 (Miss. 2002). The Federal Arbitration Act,
9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq., applies to all written agreements to arbitrate contained in any contract
“evidencing a transaction involving commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 2.
¶5. Courts have long recognized the existence of “a liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements.” Equifirst Corp., 920 So. 2d 461 (citing Terminix Int’l, Inc., Ltd.
P’ship v. Rice, 904 So. 2d 1051, 1054-55 (Miss. 2004) (quoting Russell v. Performance
Toyota, Inc., 826 So. 2d 719, 722 (Miss. 2002))). As such, “[a]rbitration is firmly embedded
in both our federal and state laws.” Equifirst Corp., 920 So. 2d at 461 (citing Pass Termite
& Pest Control, Inc. v. Walker, 904 So. 2d 1030, 1032-33 (Miss. 2004) (citing Russell, 826
So. 2d 719 (Miss. 2002); East Ford, 826 So. 2d 709 (Miss. 2002); IP Timberlands
Operating Co. v. Denmiss Corp., 726 So. 2d 96 (Miss. 1998))).
4
¶6. Therefore, arbitration is required “unless the agreement to arbitrate is not part of a
contract evidencing interstate commerce or is revocable ‘upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’” McKenzie Check Advance of Miss. v.
Hardy, 866 So. 2d 446, 450 (Miss. 2004); 9 U.S.C. § 2. That being said, “[a]rbitration is a
matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which
he has not agreed so to submit.” Equifirst Corp., 920 So. 2d at 461 (citing Pre-Paid Legal
Services, Inc. v. Battle, 873 So. 2d 79, 83 (Miss. 2004) (quoting AT&T Technologies, Inc.
v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648 106 S. Ct. 1415, 1418, 89 L.
Ed. 2d. 648 (1986))).
¶7. The defendants argue on appeal that they should be allowed to arbitrate the claims
asserted by Nancy Hinyub, individually and as personal representative of the estate of Don
Wyse. In support of their argument, the defendants contend Hinyub had authority to bind
her father, Don Wyse, in health care matters, including the agreement to arbitrate. The
defendants thus assert that, based on Hinyub’s authority to bind her father to the arbitration
provision, Hinyub gave the mutual assent of her father and herself to the arbitration provision
when she signed directly below the arbitration provision, which provided in relevant part:
The parties understand and agree that by entering this Arbitration
Agreement they are giving up and waiving their constitutional right to
have any claim decided in a court of law before a judge and jury.
The Resident and/or Responsible Party understand that (1) he/she has the right
to seek legal counsel concerning this agreement, (2) the execution of this
Arbitration (sic) is not a precondition to the furnishing of services to the
Resident by the Facility; and (3) this Arbitration Agreement may be rescinded
by written notice to the Facility from the Resident within 30 days of signature.
5
If not rescinded within 30 days, this Arbitration Agreement shall remain in
effect for all care and services subsequently rendered at the Facility, even if
such care and services are rendered following the Resident’s discharge and
readmission to the Facility.
¶8. Hinyub argues on the other hand that no arbitration agreement existed between Don
Wyse and MCCG because the claims asserted in the complaint are not covered by the
arbitration agreement; Hinyub did not have authority to bind her father to an arbitration
agreement, either pursuant to a durable power of attorney for health care or as a health care
surrogate under the Uniform Health-Care Surrogate Statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-211
(Rev. 2005); and the arbitration agreement was substantively unconscionable.
¶9. This Court unquestionably has recognized the well-accepted standard for determining
the validity and enforceablility of an arbitration clause. Specifically,
In determining the validity of a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal
Arbitration Act, courts generally conduct a two-pronged inquiry. The first
prong has two considerations: (1) whether there is a valid arbitration
agreement and (2) whether the parties’ dispute is within the scope of the
arbitration agreement.
...
Under the second prong, the United States Supreme Court has stated the
question is “whether legal constraints external to the parties’ agreement
foreclosed arbitration of those claims.”
Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc. v. Battle, 873 So. 2d 79, 82-83 (Miss. 2004) (citing East Ford,
Inc., 826 So. 2d at 713). See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 626, 105 S. Ct. 3346, 87 L. Ed. 2d 444 (1985). Based on the above standard,
MCCG states “[i]n this case sub judice, a valid written agreement to arbitrate exists between
Don Wyse and Mississippi Care Center of Greenville.” However, nowhere in the motion did
6
MCCG assert that a valid arbitration agreement existed because Hinyub had a durable power
of attorney or any authority to act on behalf of Wyse to sign the admission agreement.
¶10. Thus, this Court must first determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the
dispute. Rogers-Dabbs Chevrolet-Hummer v. Blakeney, 950 So. 2d 170, 173 (Miss. 2007).
To determine whether the parties in this case agreed to arbitrate the dispute, we consider the
already-noted, two-prong test of whether there is a valid arbitration agreement, and whether
the parties’ dispute is within the scope of the arbitration agreement. Id. (citing East Ford,
826 So. 2d at 713). In determining whether Wyse and Hinyub agreed to arbitration, we
simply apply contract law. See Terminix Int’l, Inc., Ltd. P’ship v. Rice, 904 So. 2d 1051,
1055 (Miss. 2004); see also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944,
115 S. Ct. 1920, 1924, 131 L. Ed. 2d 985 (1995). That being said, it is important to note that,
while Wyse did not himself sign the arbitration agreement, Hinyub’s signature may have
bound Wyse if Hinyub had the authority to sign the document.
¶11. In Washington Mutual Finance Group, LLC v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260, 266 (5 th Cir.
2004), a plaintiff insisted she could not be bound by the arbitration provision contained
within a contract signed solely by her husband. However, the court found that she was bound
by the arbitration provision and stated:
It does not follow . . . that under the [Federal Arbitration] Act an obligation to
arbitrate attaches only to one who has personally signed the written arbitration
provision. [We have made] clear that a nonsignatory party may be bound to an
arbitration agreement if so dictated by the ordinary principles of contract and
agency.
7
(quoting Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2 nd Cir. 1995)).
See also Terminix, 904 So. 2d at 1058 (wife bound by arbitration clause in contract signed
by her husband, although she did not sign the contract). So this Court must determine
whether Hinyub had authority to sign the nursing home’s admission agreement and
arbitration agreement on behalf of Wyse.
¶12. MCCG argues that Wyse executed a power of attorney in favor of Hinyub on June 1,
1996, and that this power of attorney empowered Hinyub with full authority to act on his
behalf with regard to health-care decisions. “Generally speaking, our law regards as valid
and enforceable as a power of attorney any written instrument signed by the principal and
‘expressing plainly the authority conferred.’” Kountouris v. Varvaris, 476 So. 2d 599, 603
(Miss. 1985) (quoting Miss. Code Ann. § 87-3-7 (Rev. 1999)). However, the durable power
of attorney to which the parties refer is not a part of the official record before this Court. The
defendants concede this fact in their brief when they state that “[s]aid power of attorney was
submitted to the [trial court] as part of the April 26, 2005 hearing. However it does not
appear in the record.” It was not until the end of the hearing that the parties and the trial
court focused on the power of attorney. The transcript of the April 26, 2005, hearing (in
which the official court reporter certified that no exhibits were offered and received into
evidence) reveals the following:
BY [DEFENDANTS’ ATTORNEY]: One thing that was not brought out, and
may I approach, Your Honor?
BY THE COURT: Yes.
8
BY [DEFENDANTS’ ATTORNEY]: In order to clear up whether or not she
can bind –
BY [PLAINTIFFS’ ATTORNEY]: What are you looking at?
BY [DEFENDANTS’ ATTORNEY]: The power of attorney. Do you have a
copy?
BY [PLAINTIFFS’ ATTORNEY]: I haven’t seen it.
BY [DEFENDANTS’ ATTORNEY]: Ms. Hinyub executed a power of
attorney for healthcare the year before her dad went into the facility, and I
know I’ve got another one.
BY [PLAINTIFFS’ ATTORNEY]: That’s okay. You can give him [the trial
judge] this one. I’ve read it.
BY [DEFENDANTS’ ATTORNEY]: In their brief, they repeatedly pointed
out unless there was a power of attorney, she has no authority as an agent to
bind Mr. Wyse, or any of the estate, or wrongful death beneficiaries, where
clearly she had the authority since 1996 to do so, and, in fact, she did admit
him as his agent for power of attorney for healthcare decisions.
¶13. This power of attorney was not offered into evidence as an exhibit, nor was it
designated as part of the record for this appeal. Instead, there are only references to its
existence in the briefs, and Hinyub attached an unauthenticated copy of the durable power
of attorney in her brief.4 “This Court is limited to consideration of the facts in the record,
while reliance on facts only disclosed in the briefs is prohibited.” Greater Canton Ford
Mercury, Inc. v. Clark, 948 So. 2d 417, 423 (Miss. 2007) (citing Atlantic Horse Ins. Co. v.
Nero, 108 Miss. 321, 329, 66 So. 780 (1914)). Without a durable power of attorney
4
It is interesting to note that it was the plaintiff-appellee, Nancy Hinyub, who attached
an unauthenticated copy in her brief, and not the defendants-appellants, who would have
been the ones who would want us to look at the power of attorney.
9
contained within the record, this Court is constrained as a matter of law to find that Nancy
Hinyub did not have authority to bind her father, Don Wyse, according to such power of
attorney, by causing the claims to be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration
agreement within the second admissions agreement executed by Hinyub within hours of her
father’s death.
¶14. We now look at MCCG’s second assertion that Hinyub had authority to bind Wyse
as Wyse’s health care surrogate under the Uniform Health Care Surrogate Statute, Miss.
Code Ann. § 41-41-211 (Rev. 2005). This statute states in pertinent part:
(1) A surrogate may make a health-care decision for a patient who is an adult
or emancipated minor if the patient has been determined by the primary
physician to lack capacity and no agent or guardian has been appointed or the
agent or guardian is not reasonably available.
(2) An adult or emancipated minor may designate any individual to act as
surrogate by personally informing the supervising health-care provider. In
absence of a designation, or if the designee is not reasonably available, any
member of the following classes of the patient’s family who is reasonably
available, in descending order of priority, may act as surrogate:
(a) The spouse, unless legally separated;
(b) An adult child;
(c) A parent; or
(d) An adult brother or sister.
(6) A surrogate shall make a health-care decision in accordance with the
patient’s individual instructions, if any, and other wishes to the extent known
to the surrogate. Otherwise, the surrogate shall make the decision in
accordance with the surrogate’s determination of the patient’s best interest. In
determining the patient’s best interest, the surrogate shall consider the patient’s
personal values to the extent known to the surrogate.
10
¶15. Again, the record is devoid of information to properly determine if Hinyub could act
as Wyse’s health care surrogate. According to the statute, Wyse’s primary physician would
first have to determine that Don Wyse lacked capacity to make his own health care decisions.
“Capacity” is defined in Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-203 (d) as “an individual’s ability to
understand the significant benefits, risks, and alternatives to proposed health care and to
make and communicate a health care decision.” No such evidence is contained in the record
before us. Neither party presents a declaration by Wyse’s primary physician stating that
Wyse was incapable of managing his affairs prior to Hinyub’s signing the admissions
agreement with the arbitration agreement.
¶16. Additionally, under the Act, the authority of a health-care surrogate is limited to
making “health-care decisions.” According to Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-203 (h):
“Health care decision” means a decision made by an individual or the
individual’s agent, guardian, or surrogate, regarding the individual’s health
care, including:
(i) Selection and discharge of health-care providers and
institutions;
(ii) Approval or disapproval of diagnostic tests, surgical
procedures, programs of medication, and orders not to
resuscitate; and
(iii) Directions to provide, withhold or withdraw artificial
nutrition and hydration and all other forms of health care.”
Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-211 (Rev. 2005).
While in both Covenant Health Rehab of Picayune v. Brown, 949 So. 2d 732 (Miss. 2007)
and Vicksburg Partners, L.P. v. Stephens, 911 So. 2d 507 (Miss. 2005), this Court found
that execution of the arbitration provision as part of the admissions agreement was part of
11
the “health-care decision,” the arbitration provision was an essential part of the consideration
for the receipt of “health care” in those instances. On the other hand, in today’s case, Hinyub
was not required to sign the arbitration provision to admit Don Wyse to the Mississippi Care
Center of Greenville. In fact, the admissions agreement clearly stated:
The Resident and/or Responsible Party understand[s] that (1) he/she has the
right to seek legal counsel concerning this agreement, (2) the execution of this
Arbitration is not a precondition to the furnishing of services to the Resident
by the Facility; and (3) this Arbitration Agreement may be rescinded by
written notice to the Facility from the Resident within 30 days of signature.
If not rescinded within 30 days, this Arbitration Agreement shall remain in
effect for all care and services subsequently rendered at the Facility, even if
such care and services are rendered following the Resident’s discharge and
readmission to the Facility.
¶17. Since signing the arbitration provision was not a part of the consideration necessary
for Wyse’s admission to MCCG and not necessarily in the best interest of Wyse as required
by the Act, Hinyub did not have the authority as Wyse’s health care surrogate to enter into
the arbitration provision contained within the admissions agreement.
¶18. Because Hinyub lacked authority to enter into the arbitration provision within the
admission agreement, the arbitration agreement is invalid. Therefore, Hinyub is not required
to arbitrate her claims against MCCG. The first prong of the two-prong test outlined in East
Ford has not been met. 826 So. 2d at 713. Thus, it is unnecessary for this Court to address
the remaining issues raised on appeal.
12
CONCLUSION
¶19. For the reasons stated, the Washington County Circuit Court’s order denying the
defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is affirmed and this case is remanded to the Circuit
Court of Washington County for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶20. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
SMITH, C.J., WALLER, P.J., EASLEY, DICKINSON, RANDOLPH AND
LAMAR, JJ., CONCUR. DIAZ, P.J., AND GRAVES, J., CONCUR IN RESULT
ONLY.
13