William M. Tisdale v. Wilchie Clay ( 1997 )


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  •                            IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
    NO. 97-CA-01076-SCT
    WILLIAM M. TISDALE
    v.
    WILCHIE CLAY, WILLIE A. COOK, CLOYD GARTH
    AND DEE RILEY, SERVING AS ALDERMEN OF
    THE CITY OF ABERDEEN IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL
    WARDS
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                                08/14/97
    TRIAL JUDGE:                                     HON. WILLIAM JOSEPH LUTZ
    COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:                       MONROE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:                         JAN P. PATTERSON
    CLAUDE A. CHAMBERLAIN
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES:                          DEWITT T. HICKS, JR.
    NATURE OF THE CASE:                              CIVIL - OTHER
    DISPOSITION:                                     AFFIRMED - 11/12/98
    MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:                      11/23/98
    MANDATE ISSUED:
    BEFORE PITTMAN, P.J., ROBERTS AND SMITH, JJ.
    PITTMAN, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    ¶1. The appellant, William M. Tisdale (hereinafter "Mayor"), along with Robert D. Patterson, City Attorney
    at the time, and Kelly Tucker, one of the five members of the Board of Aldermen, filed suit for declaratory
    judgment against the appellees, Wilchie Clay, Willie A. Cook, Cloyd Garth and Dee Riley, the other four
    members of the Board of Aldermen (hereinafter "Aldermen"). Robert D. Patterson withdrew from the case
    before trial and Alderman Kelly Tucker declined to join in the appeal.
    ¶2. In his complaint for declaratory judgment, Mayor cited a dispute between Mayor and Aldermen as to
    which had the power to appoint the persons to serve as city attorney, municipal judge, public defender, and
    the subordinate officers and department leaders of the City, and which had the authority to exercise direct
    supervisory control over the City employees and supervisors in each department, and which had the
    responsibility for the operations of the City. He asked the court to declare that Aberdeen's Special Charter,
    enacted in 1854, gives that authority to Mayor. Aldermen answered that Aldermen, not Mayor, have the
    prerogative and duty under the City Charter to appoint the city attorney, the city judge and public defender,
    as well as the other subordinate officers.
    ¶3. The three Chancellors of the First Judicial District recused themselves and this Court subsequently
    appointed Honorable Bill Lutz, Chancellor of the Eleventh Chancery Court District, to preside and conduct
    the proceedings in this case.
    ¶4. After being advised by counsel for Mayor and for Aldermen that there were no issues of fact to be
    determined by the Court, Chancellor Lutz requested simultaneous briefs from both sides on the issues of
    law, stipulation of facts, and a stipulation of what to include in the trial record. Counsel for both sides
    agreed that the entire court file, the stipulations to Chancellor Lutz, and the simultaneous briefs of Counsel
    would comprise the record.
    ¶5. On August 14, 1997, Chancellor Lutz filed his Opinion and Judgment in which he held that the City
    Council, which consists of Mayor and Aldermen, have the authority to appoint the city attorney, city judge,
    public defender and any other subordinate officer the Council determines is appropriate, and that the
    Council has the authority to establish the term of office for each officer. The Chancellor further held that the
    Mayor has the authority to appoint a replacement should a subordinate officer be unable to complete the
    term established for that subordinate office.
    ¶6. Aggrieved, Mayor filed this notice of appeal. Mayor raises four issues on appeal:
    I. WHETHER SECTION 21 OF THE SPECIAL CHARTER OF THE CITY OF
    ABERDEEN GRANTS TO THE MAYOR THE USUAL POWERS INHERENT IN THE
    EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT AS SET OUT IN ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 1
    AND 2 OF THE MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTION OF 1890.
    II. IF MISSISSIPPI STATUTORY LAW IN REGARD TO MUNICIPALITIES SHOULD
    BE APPLIED IN INTERPRETING THE CITY'S SPECIAL CHARTER, THE
    STATUTORY MAYOR-COUNCIL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IS APPLICABLE.
    III. UNDER THE SPECIAL CHARTER AND THE STATE MUNICIPAL STATUTES
    THE MAYOR HAS THE SOLE AUTHORITY TO DIRECT CITY OPERATIONS,
    INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO HIRE, FIRE AND DISCIPLINE CITY EMPLOYEES.
    IV. ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 1 AND 2 OF THE MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTION OF 1890
    APPLIES TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND OFFICIALS; THEREFORE, THE
    INTERPRETATION OF THE SPECIAL CHARTER OF THE CITY OF ABERDEEN
    SHOULD BE HARMONIZED WITH THE CONSTITUTION IF POSSIBLE. IF THIS IS
    NOT POSSIBLE, IT SHOULD BE HELD TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL INSOFAR AS
    THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE IS CONCERNED.
    ¶7. This Court will address each of these issues in turn. The standard of review in the present case is de
    novo. This Court in Stevenson v. Stevenson, 
    579 So. 2d 550
    , 553 (Miss. 1991) (quoting Planters Bank
    & Trust Co. v. Sklar, 
    555 So. 2d 1024
    , 1028 (Miss. 1990)), stated, "[w]hen the determination is one of
    law rather than fact, 'the familiar manifest error/substantial evidence rule does not prevent this Court from
    conducting a de novo review of the chancellor's finding.'"
    I. WHETHER SECTION 21 OF THE SPECIAL CHARTER OF THE CITY OF
    ABERDEEN GRANTS TO THE MAYOR THE USUAL POWERS INHERENT IN THE
    EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT AS SET OUT IN ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 1
    AND 2 OF THE MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTION OF 1890.
    ¶8. The Chancellor is correct in his finding that the special charter of the City of Aberdeen grants the Mayor
    myriad responsibilities. Section 21 of that Charter charges the Mayor with the responsibility to see that
    the laws and ordinances thereof are strictly enforced, to inspect the conduct of subordinate officers,
    and see that their duties are performed; he shall report, from time to time, to the council, all
    delinquencies on the part of such officers, and communicate such information, and recommend such
    measures, as he may deem beneficial to the health, security, and good order and government of the
    corporation; he shall also have power to fill all vacancies that may occur in the subordinate officers of
    said city. And the said mayor shall also have the power to take and certify . . . the proof and
    acknowledgment of deeds, and other instruments of writings . . . such proof or acknowledgment to be
    sufficient for the lawful registration of such deeds . . . . He shall, also, . . . be ex-officio a justice of the
    peace, and a notary public . . . and likewise to administer all oaths . . . .
    1854 Miss. Laws, 100, § 21.
    ¶9. The Chancellor correctly states that § 21 of the Special Charter of Aberdeen gives the Mayor the
    power to appoint subordinate officers only to fill a vacancy of an officer who was properly appointed by the
    city council but then fails to serve out his full term. Furthermore, the City of Aberdeen in April of 1958
    passed Council Resolution No. 246 which expressly provided that:
    The city council shall annually appoint the said city attorney or attorney at law for the municipality for
    a term to expire not later than the first Tuesday of May of each year, prescribe his duties, and fix his
    compensation as provided by law.
    ¶10. The Mayor argues that when the Charter states that he has "power to fill all vacancies that may occur
    in the subordinate offices of the City" that it implies the Mayor's power of appointment to any offices not
    specifically granted to the council. This is an incorrect reading of the City of Aberdeen Special Charter
    because the Charter specifically gives such power to the city council, not the Mayor. Section 8 of the
    Special Charter of Aberdeen grants the city council, "to be constituted by said mayor and selectmen," the
    power to appoint a city clerk, assistant Marshall for keeping order, tax assessor, tax collector, treasurer,
    city surveyor, "and appoint such other officers as it may deem necessary, for such terms of office, and with
    such regulations as it may, by ordinance, prescribe." 1854 Miss. Laws, 100, § 8.
    ¶11. This specifically gives the city council, not the Mayor acting alone, the power to appoint city personnel
    not specifically mentioned in the special charter. The Chancellor is correct in dismissing the Mayor's
    argument that under the separation of powers he should appoint all officers as the chief executive officer.
    This argument fails because the Aldermen do not appoint the subordinate officers, rather the city council
    composed of both the Mayor and the Aldermen appoint the subordinate officers. 1854 Miss. Laws, 100, §
    8.
    ¶12. This Court has recognized that local government has numerous positions and groups which consist of a
    mix of administrative and legislative characteristics. See Edwards v. Weeks, 
    633 So. 2d 1035
     (Miss. 1994)
    . As the Chancellor so aptly put it, "[t]he combination of the Mayor and Aldermen working together as one
    body is not new to this state."
    II. IF STATUTORY LAW OF MUNICIPALITIES IS CONSIDERED IN
    INTERPRETATION OF A SPECIAL CHARTER, THE STATUTORY MAYOR-
    COUNCIL FORM OF GOVERNMENT IS APPLICABLE.
    ¶13. The Mayor argues that Aberdeen's Special Charter most closely resembles a mayor-council form of
    government as defined in Miss. Code Ann. § 21-8-23 and § 21-8-27 (1990). However, this Court finds
    that this argument is irrelevant given the plain language of the Aberdeen Special Charter and therefore
    concludes that this argument is without merit.
    III. THE MAYOR HAS SOLE AUTHORITY TO DIRECT CITY OPERATIONS.
    ¶14. This issue becomes moot since this Court affirms the Chancellor's holding that the power of
    appointment of city officers under the City of Aberdeen's Special Charter is vested in the city council
    composed of the mayor and the aldermen. 1854 Miss. Laws, 100, § 8. The Chancellor is affirmed.
    IV. ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 1 AND 2 OF THE MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTION APPLIES
    TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT.
    ¶15. The Mayor asserts that under Article I, Sections 1 and 2 of the Mississippi Constitution, local
    governments operate subject to the separation of powers theory of government wherein the Mayor is the
    executive power and board of aldermen are the legislative power and, therefore, they cannot both exercise
    appointment powers because that would be a solely executive power vested entirely in the Mayor. For
    support of this proposition, the Mayor cites Jordan v. Smith, 
    669 So. 2d 752
    , 756 (Miss. 1996).
    ¶16. However, the aldermen correctly point out that Jordan does not support the Mayor's separation of
    powers argument. This Court in Jordan stated that "there is no natural law of the separation of powers, and
    the powers of local government are separate only insofar as the State Constitution makes them." Jordan v.
    Smith, 
    669 So. 2d 752
    , 756 (Miss. 1996). Justice Banks, writing for the Court, further stated, "[the]
    dissent does not cite nor has the writer found an instance in which the constitutional doctrine of separation
    of powers has ever been applied to municipal government. On the contrary, the code is replete with
    instances wherein governmental functions are merged at that level." Id. at 758 n. 4. Further support for the
    Aldermen's argument can be drawn from Edwards v. Weeks, 
    633 So. 2d 1035
     (Miss. 1994) which the
    Chancellor cited in his Final Order. In Edwards, this Court recognized that local governments have
    numerous positions which consist of administrative and legislative characteristics. Id.
    ¶17. In the final analysis, the Special Charter of Aberdeen clearly and sufficiently answers the question of
    who has authority to appoint the city officers not specifically named in the charter - the city council does.
    ¶18. AFFIRMED.
    PRATHER, C.J., SULLIVAN, P.J., BANKS, McRAE, ROBERTS, SMITH AND WALLER,
    JJ., CONCUR. MILLS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 97-CA-01076-SCT

Filed Date: 8/14/1997

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014