Pearlean Conrod v. Ned Holder ( 2000 )


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  •                            IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
    NO. 2001-CA-00565-SCT
    PEARLEAN CONROD
    v.
    SHERIFF NED HOLDER AND DEPUTY SHERIFF STEVIE LITTLE
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                                10/4/2000
    TRIAL JUDGE:                                     HON. ASHLEY HINES
    COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:                       SUNFLOWER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                          BILL WALLER, SR.
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:                         RICHARD M. DYE
    TOMMIE SULLIVAN CARDIN
    NATURE OF THE CASE:                              CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY
    DISPOSITION:                                     AFFIRMED - 08/15/2002
    MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
    MANDATE ISSUED:                                  9/19/2002
    BEFORE SMITH, P.J., COBB AND CARLSON, JJ.
    SMITH, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
    ¶1. Pearlean Conrod, acting as legal representative of the heirs-at-law of her son Tyrone Conrod, appeals
    to this Court from an adverse ruling of the Circuit Court of Sunflower County which granted Sheriff Ned
    Holder and Deputy Sheriff Stevie Little, summary judgment. Conrod petitioned for reconsideration of the
    trial court's grant of summary judgment, which was denied. Conrod now appeals to this Court.
    ¶2. Finding no error by the trial court in dismissing the case against Holder and granting summary judgment
    in favor of Deputy Sheriff Little, we affirm the trial court.
    FACTS
    ¶3. At 8:00 a..m. on July 30, 1997, the Sunflower County Sheriff's Department and members of various
    other narcotics task forces executed a search warrant at the residence of Tyrone Conrod in Moorhead,
    Sunflower County, Mississippi. The officers found Conrod inside and arrested him. Apparently, sometime
    prior to his arrest, Conrod ingested a large amount of cocaine.
    ¶4. Following his arrest Conrod was transported to a second location in Moorhead, where another
    individual was taken into custody. Conrod and the other man were then taken to the Sunflower County Jail
    in Indianola. Prior to arriving at the jail and immediately following his arrival, Conrod made repeated
    requests to be taken to a hospital. The sheriff's deputies instead proceeded to book Conrod, and to place
    him in the Persons Under the Influence cell, or "drunk tank." During the booking process, a deputy removed
    traces of white powder from around Conrod's mouth and preserved it for testing. When they placed him in
    the drunk tank, the sheriff's deputies also placed an inmate trusty in the cell with him to watch him. Conrod
    once again renewed his request to be taken to the hospital. After half an hour in the cell Conrod became
    unconscious. The trusty tried to revive him, and, failing to do so, carried him to the front of the jail. The
    deputies at the station called Deputy Stevie Little to the jail to transport Conrod to the hospital. Conrod
    died at the hospital later that day. Sheriff Holder was not at the jail at the time this incident occurred, and
    Deputy Little's only contact with Conrod was him transporting him from the jail to the hospital.
    ¶5. Pearlean Conrod, originally brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
    Mississippi on November 25, 1997, against Sheriff Holder, Sunflower County, and the Sunflower County
    Board of Supervisors, and the individual members of the Sunflower County Board of Supervisors. Stevie
    Little was not a defendant in the original action. The district court dismissed the federal claims brought in
    that suit and refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims on September 9, 1999.
    On November 30, 1999, Conrod refiled the case in the Circuit Court of Sunflower County against Holder
    and Little. Holder and Little filed a notice of removal of the case to the federal courts, but Conrod stipulated
    that it was not seeking relief under federal law. Therefore, on the basis of Conrod's stipulation, the federal
    court found that no federal question presented itself and remanded the case back to the Circuit Court of
    Sunflower County.
    ¶6. On August 15, 2000, Holder and Little filed a motion to dismiss, or, alternatively, for summary
    judgment. After a hearing on the motion, the circuit court dismissed the claims against Little because they
    were time barred by the applicable statute of limitations in Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-13(3). The trial court
    found Holder to be immune under the provisions of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act and dismissed the suit
    against him. Conrod's motion to reconsider was denied, and, on April 2, 2001, Conrod appealed the
    granting of the motion for summary judgment.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶7. Rule 56(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure allows for summary judgment in cases where
    there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
    matter of law." M.R.C.P. 56(c). This Court conducts a de novo review to determine if the trial court
    properly granted a motion for summary judgment. Daniels v. GNB, Inc., 
    629 So. 2d 595
    , 599 (Miss.
    1993). The realm of "statutory interpretation is a matter of law which this court reviews de novo." Wallace
    v. Town of Raleigh, 
    815 So. 2d 1203
    , 1206 (Miss. 2002) (citing Donald v. Amoco Prod. Co., 
    735 So. 2d 161
    , 165 (Miss. 1999)). In conducting a de novo review, the evidence must be viewed in a light
    most favorable to the nonmoving party, but, if the evidence shows that the moving party is entitled to a
    judgment as a matter of law, then "summary judgment should forthwith be entered in his favor." GNB, 
    Inc., 629 So. 2d at 599
    .
    DISCUSSION
    ¶8. While Conrod lists seven issues for appeal in her brief, none of them address the fatal flaw in the
    complaint filed in this case. The Mississippi Tort Claims Act ("MTCA") controls all suits for negligence
    brought against the State or any political subdivision thereof. Miss. Code Ann. § § 11-46-1 et seq. (Supp.
    2001). The MTCA defines "political subdivision" as "any body politic or body corporate other than the
    state responsible for governmental activities only in geographic areas smaller than that of the state, including
    but not limited to any county, municipality, school district. . . ." Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-1(i). The MTCA
    defines an 'employee' as "any officer, employee or servant of the State of Mississippi or a political
    subdivision of the state, including elected or appointed officials and persons acting on behalf of the state or
    a political subdivision in any official capacity, temporarily or permanently, in the service of the state or a
    political subdivision whether with or without compensation." Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-1(f) (emphasis
    added). The MTCA states that
    the remedy provided by this chapter against a governmental entity or its employee is exclusive of any
    other civil action or civil proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the governmental
    entity or its employee; . . . any claim made or suit filed against a governmental entity or its employee to
    recover damages for any injury for which immunity has been waived under this chapter shall be
    brought only under the provisions of this chapter, notwithstanding the provisions of any other law to
    the contrary.
    Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-7(1). The statute further states that "an employee may be joined in an action
    against a governmental entity in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for
    which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee shall be held personally liable for acts or
    omissions occurring within the course and scope of the employee's duties." Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-7(2)
    (2001)(emphasis added).
    ¶9. This Court has recognized that "any tort claim filed against a governmental entity or its employee shall be
    brought only under the MTCA." Duncan v. Chamblee, 
    757 So. 2d 946
    , 949 (Miss. 1999). In a case
    where a school district was eliminated because the plaintiff failed to serve the government with notice within
    the required 120 days, this Court noted that "this Court has been consistent in rejecting the viability of
    claims against public employees where their political subdivision employer has been eliminated as a
    defendant." Cotton v. Paschall, 
    782 So. 2d 1215
    , 1218 (Miss. 2001). In a case interpreting Miss. Code
    Ann. §11-46-7, handed down this year, the Mississippi Court of Appeals noted that "the Tort Claims Act
    requires that a governmental entity against which a money judgment is sought must be named as a
    defendant." Mallery v. Taylor, 
    805 So. 2d 613
    , 622 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). That case further observes
    that "unless the action is brought solely against an employee acting outside of the scope of his employment,
    the government entity must be named and sued as the party in interest under the Tort Claims Act." 
    Id. ¶10. The complaint
    in this case only named Sheriff Ned Holder and Deputy Stevie Little as defendants. The
    plaintiffs did not name Sunflower County as a defendant. Further, the complaint alleges, not that Sheriff
    Holder acted outside the course of his duties, but that he was negligent in the conduct of his duties by not
    having properly trained personnel. The trial court was correct in granting summary judgment in this case
    because Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-7(2) requires a political subdivision be sued when seeking damages for
    negligence. The plaintiffs in this case failed to do so; and therefore, the granting of summary judgment was
    correct.
    ¶11. Another grounds for upholding the grant of summary judgment is that Deputy Little was not named as
    a defendant in this case until well after the statute of limitations had run. Section 11-46-11(3) of the MTCA
    maintains that "all actions brought under the provisions of this chapter shall be commenced within one (1)
    year next after the date of the tortious, wrongful or otherwise actionable conduct on which the liability phase
    of the action is based." Miss. Code Ann. §11-46-11(3).
    ¶12. In this case, Deputy Stevie Little was not named in the action filed in federal district court within the
    statute of limitations. Further, no notice of an action was given to Stevie Little until a full two years after the
    alleged conduct. Therefore, the action in this case was not only barred by the plaintiffs failing to meet the
    requirements of naming a governmental entity as a defendant; as to Stevie Little, the action was barred by
    the statute of limitations.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶13. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in this case because the plaintiffs failed to name a
    governmental entity in their complaint against Sheriff Holder and Deputy Little, as required by the
    Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Also, any action against Deputy Little was time barred by the applicable
    statute of limitations under the MTCA. Therefore, the grant of summary judgment by the trial court is
    affirmed.
    ¶14. AFFIRMED.
    PITTMAN, C.J., McRAE, P.J., COBB, DIAZ, EASLEY, CARLSON AND GRAVES, JJ.,
    CONCUR. WALLER, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2001-CA-00565-SCT

Filed Date: 10/4/2000

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014