Regina Darlene Garrett v. State of Mississippi ( 2004 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2004-KA-00775-SCT
REGINA DARLENE GARRETT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/12/2004
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ROBERT B. HELFRICH
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: PERRY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: THOMAS RICHARD MAYFIELD
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JOHN R. HENRY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY JOHN MARK WEATHERS
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 01/05/2006
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE SMITH, C.J., GRAVES AND DICKINSON, JJ.
DICKINSON, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Regina Darlene Garrett (Regina) appeals from her conviction and life imprisonment
sentence for the murder of her husband, Charles Joseph Garrett, Sr. She claims the trial court
erred in denying her motion for directed verdict of “not guilty” and in refusing two of her
requested jury instructions on circumstantial evidence. Finding no reversible error in the
record, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. On January 28, 2002, Perry County Deputy Sheriff Edward Bolton responded to a 911
call reporting a shooting at 188 Holliman Road. At the scene, Deputy Bolton observed Joey
Garrett, the son of Regina and Charles Garrett, “running around hollering and beating.” Deputy
Bolton further observed Charles lying in the doorway between the carport and the residence.
Regina told Deputy Bolton that while target shooting Charles sent her inside the house to get
a shotgun and bring it to him. She explained that as she was bringing the shotgun to him, she
tripped over the couch and fell, causing the gun to discharge and strike Charles.
¶3. Deputy Mitch Nobles who also responded to the location, took Joey Garrett aside and
attempted to calm him. Joey told Deputy Nobles that while riding a four-wheeler with his little
sister, he saw his father fall and his mother standing in the doorway with a shotgun.
¶4. When Chief Deputy Jimmy Dale Smith arrived at the scene, he found in the kitchen a
shotgun containing one spent round. Chief Deputy Smith interviewed Regina and, after
administering the Miranda warnings, obtained from her a 2 ½ page handwritten statement
describing the events surrounding the death of her husband. In her statement, Regina claimed
that her husband sent her for the gun, and as she was taking it to him, she tripped and fell,
causing the gun to accidently discharge, killing her husband. Chief Deputy Smith testified he
sent the shotgun he recovered from the kitchen to the state crime lab for a fingerprint
examination and a drop test. Starks Hathcock, a forensic scientist specializing in firearms
identification for the Mississippi Crime Lab, performed the drop test on the shotgun. Because
the shotgun failed to fire after numerous drops, Hathcock concluded that the shotgun could not
have discharged without the trigger being pulled.
¶5. The Perry County Sheriff’s Department requested Mississippi Crime Lab senior crime
scene analyst Grant Graham to inspect the scene of the shooting. During his investigation,
Graham noticed and recorded ricochet marks but was unable to project the trajectory of the
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objects which caused them. Additionally, forensic pathologist Dr. Steven Hayne performed
an autopsy on Charles’s body and concluded that the cause of death was massive blood loss
from major vessels secondary to a shotgun wound to the face. Dr. Hayne also concluded that
the muzzle of the weapon was 8 to 10 feet from the decedent’s face when it was fired, but
could not determine from his examination the respective position or body angles of the
shooter and deceased at the time the shot was fired. He did state, however, that there was
enough evidence for him to exclude accident in this case.
¶6. At trial, several witnesses testified concerning their relationship with Regina Garrett
as well as specific conversations in which she related her desire to kill her husband. Rita Smith
testified that during December 2000 through the spring of 2001, she and Regina had at least
two dozen conversations about having Regina’s husband killed. The conversations included
details of his possible death such as his having an “accident” doing target practice. ¶7.
Another friend of Regina’s, Penny Strickland, testified that Regina stated several times
that if Charles Garrett hit her again she would shoot him. Charles Graves testified that while
the two worked together, he and Regina had a sexual relationship which lasted about five
months. After discovering the affair, Charles Garrett called Graves on several occasions
prompting Graves to contact the police. Graves further testified that Regina never discussed
with him a plan to kill her husband.
¶8. Louis Young testified that he became acquainted with Regina when they worked
together at the Care Center in Laurel, Mississippi. He testified that Regina contacted him to
solicit his assistance in getting someone killed and offered to pay him $15,000 from insurance
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proceeds for his help in bringing about her husband’s death. Young arranged a meeting in a
Wal-Mart parking lot in Magee, Mississippi, between Regina and a friend of his, Lindsay
James, for the two to discuss the possibility of having Regina’s husband killed. Young further
testified that he never intended to locate someone to kill the deceased and really did not
believe Regina was serious about killing her husband. During the meeting, according to James,
however, Regina provided a small photo of her husband and told James she wanted her husband
killed and offered to pay money from the insurance proceeds in exchange for his death. James
testified that he did not receive any money from Regina and denied ever entering into any type
of negotiation for the killing of her husband.
¶9. A Perry County Grand Jury indicted Regina Garrett for the deliberate design murder of
her husband Charles Garrett, Sr. At the close of the State’s case, the trial court denied
Regina’s motion for directed verdict challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Regina
rested without putting on any proof, and Regina was convicted and sentenced to a term of life
imprisonment. The trial court judge denied Regina’s Motion for New Trial and for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict.
ANALYSIS
¶10. Regina Garrett presents two issues for this Court to review:
1. Since the defendant was the only eye witness to the homicide and her
version was reasonable and uncontradicted in any material particular by
credible witnesses, physical facts or facts of common knowledge, her
version should have been accepted as true and her motion for directed
verdict of “not guilty” should have been granted.
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2. The trial court erred in refusing defendant’s requested Instruction D-5 as
submitted and in refusing defendant’s requested Instruction D-6.
Motion for Directed Verdict
¶11. Regina Garrett asserts that because she was the only eyewitness to the homicide of
Charles Garrett, Sr., and because her version of the event was reasonable and uncontradicted,
the trial judge should have granted her motion for directed verdict of “not guilty.” Some
seventy-two years ago, this Court in Weathersby v. State, 165 Miss. 207, 147 So. 481, 482
(1933), held that where a defendant or defendant’s witnesses were the only eyewitnesses to
a homicide, their version, if reasonable, must be accepted as true, unless substantially
contradicted in material particulars by a credible witness or witnesses for the State, or by
physical facts or by the facts of common knowledge. Therefore, we must determine whether
Regina presented her version of events and, if so, whether her version of the homicide is
reasonable and whether the physical facts and testimony of the State’s credible witnesses
reveal any inconsistences which substantially contradict her version of the homicide.
¶12. Regina presented no evidence and called no witnesses following her motion for directed
verdict, that is to say, she rested without putting on any proof. Having put on no proof, she
therefore presented no version of the homicide. Her “version” of the homicide in her January
28, 2002, handwritten statement, and the tape-recorded statement of February 7, 2002, were
unsworn statements which were introduced into evidence by the State in its case-in-chief and
may not be considered Regina’s version of the homicide for purposes of obtaining a
Weathersby instruction.
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¶13. In Carter v. State, 221 Miss. 111, 72 So. 2d 231, 232 (1954), this Court held that even
though the State introduced statements made by Carter in its case, the Weathersby rule had no
application because Carter neither testified nor offered any witnesses at trial. Similarly,
Regina may not invoke the Weathersby rule because she did not establish her version of the
homicide through testimony at trial.
¶14. Regina argues that her version of the facts came into evidence through the statements
she made to police. However, this Court has never held that an unsworn statement to police
may be used for purposes of a Weathersby analysis. Thus, Regina’s first assignment of error
is without merit, and the trial court properly denied her motion for directed verdict.
Regina’s requested Jury Instructions D-5 and D-6
¶15. Regina’s second assignment of error is that the trial court erred in refusing her
requested Jury Instructions D-5 and D-6, as submitted. Both of these jury instructions, which
relate to circumstantial evidence, instruct the jury that the prosecution must prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of any reasonable hypothesis of innocence in
order to convict. Instruction D-5 as submitted by the Defendant required the jury to find the
defendant guilty to “the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis.” The State objected
to this language, contending that this was not a purely circumstantial evidence case. The trial
court agreed, and we find no error.
¶16. Instruction D-6, as submitted, instructed the jury regarding the “two theory”
circumstantial evidence case. The court refused this instruction, again noting that this was not
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a circumstantial evidence case. This Court has stated that “the so-called ‘two theory
instruction’ . . . should be granted only in a case based entirely upon circumstantial evidence.
State v. Rogers, 847 So. 2d 858, 863 (Miss. 2003), citing Kitchens v. State, 300 So. 2d 922,
926 (Miss. 1974) citing Coward v. State, 223 Miss. 538, 78 So. 2d 605 (1955).
¶17. A circumstantial evidence case is one where the State is “without a confession and
wholly without eyewitnesses to the gravamen of the offense charged,” Kniep v. State, 525
So. 2d 385, 392 (Miss. 1988). But where the accused has made an admission on an element
of the offense, it is no longer a circumstantial evidence case. Lynch v. State, 877 So. 2d 1254,
1256 (Miss. 2004); Conner v. State, 632 So. 2d 1239, 1256 (Miss. 1993); Mack v. State, 481
So. 2d 793, 795 (Miss. 1985). The defendant is not entitled to a circumstantial evidence
instruction where both circumstantial and direct evidence are admitted at trial. Gilleylen v.
State, 255 So. 2d 661, 663-64 (Miss. 1971).
¶18. In addition to direct scientific evidence such as fingerprints and DNA, direct evidence
has been held to include evidence such as eyewitness testimony, the defendant’s confession
to the offense charged, or the defendant’s admission to an important element thereof. Lynch,
877 So. 2d at 1265-66; Conner, 632 So. 2d at 1256; Mack, 481 So. 2d at 795.
¶19. Regina admitted three times to having shot her husband, causing his death. This qualifies
her as an eyewitness to the homicide. Also, several witnesses testified that, on numerous
occasions, Regina discussed her desire to kill her husband and the possibility of hiring
someone to kill him for money.
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¶20. Regina’s statements to the four people about her desire to kill her husband and her
requests for others to kill him constitute an admission of deliberate design which is an element
of the crime. This Court has held that a defendant’s statement to the police that he thought his
partner was going to carjack somebody was an admission against interest, and thus, the capital
murder case was not purely circumstantial even though the statement did not constitute a
confession. See Lynch, 877 So. 2d at 1254. See also Swinney v. State, 829 So. 2d 1225
(Miss. 2002) (confession to a shooting could be direct evidence to an underlying felony for
capital murder purposes where defendant admitted to pointing the gun at the victim and stated
the gun accidently fired). Our precedent consistently adheres to the rule that any direct
evidence presented at trial is sufficient to preclude a circumstantial evidence instruction.
¶21. Accordingly, the trial court judge was correct in striking the circumstantial evidence
language in Jury Instruction D-5 and in refusing to submit the circumstantial evidence
instruction D-6. Regina’s second assignment of error is also without merit.
CONCLUSION
¶22. For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶23. CONVICTION OF MURDER AND SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT IN
THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
AFFIRMED.
SMITH, C.J., WALLER AND COBB, P.JJ., EASLEY AND CARLSON, JJ.,
CONCUR. GRAVES AND RANDOLPH, JJ., CONCUR IN PART AND IN THE RESULT.
DIAZ, J. NOT PARTICIPATING.
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