Citifinancial Mortgage Company v. Rosie Washington ( 2005 )


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  •                     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
    NO. 2005-IA-00311-SCT
    CITIFINANCIAL MORTGAGE COMPANY, INC.
    v.
    ROSIE WASHINGTON AND CATHERLEAN
    CRAFT
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                          02/10/2005
    TRIAL JUDGE:                               HON. ROBERT G. EVANS
    COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:                 JASPER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:                   LAURA L. GIBBES
    H. MITCHELL COWAN
    ROBERT D. GHOLSON
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:                   CHRISTOPHER E. FITZGERALD
    W. LEWIS GARRISON, JR.
    NATURE OF THE CASE:                        CIVIL - OTHER
    DISPOSITION:                               REVERSED AND REMANDED - 10/25/2007
    MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
    MANDATE ISSUED:
    EN BANC.
    SMITH, CHIEF JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
    ¶1.    CitiFinancial appeals to this Court from the Circuit Court of Jasper County’s denial
    in part of CitiFinancial’s motion for summary judgment. This case concerns a loan Rosie
    Washington and Catherlean Craft obtained from Ford Consumer Finance, a predecessor in
    interest to CitiFinancial. The issues presented are whether the evidence demonstrated the
    existence of each essential element of the causes of action brought, thus creating a genuine
    issue of material fact, and whether the claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2.    Plaintiffs obtained a loan from Ford Consumer Finance, which was sold to The
    Associates First Capital which became Associates Home Equity Services, and Associates
    was bought by CitiGroup and became CitiFinancial. On November 29, 1995, Catherlean
    Craft and her mother Rosie Washington signed an agreement for a loan of $31,480 from Ford
    Consumer Finance. Plaintiffs filed a complaint on November 19, 2001, alleging that
    CitiFinancial represented to them that 180 monthly payments of $400.57 would satisfy the
    debt when, in fact, after 179 such monthly payments, Plaintiffs would still owe $28,878.20.1
    Plaintiffs raised claims of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, economic
    duress, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, constructive fraud, rescission
    and cancellation, and violation of the Mississippi Unfair or Deceptive Acts and Practices Act,
    Mississippi Code Annotated Section 75-24-3, et seq. (Rev. 2000). Defendants answered and
    raised as defenses, inter alia, that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim and that Plaintiffs’ claims
    are barred by the statute of limitations and the doctrine of release.
    ¶3.    On December 13, 2004, CitiFinancial filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting
    that Plaintiffs’claims were barred by the statute of limitations; that Plaintiffs previously
    signed a settlement agreement releasing CitiFinancial; and that Plaintiffs raised no genuine
    issue of material fact as to the causes of action brought. Plaintiffs responded, and attached
    excerpts of the deposition of Rhonda Hare, the mortgage representative who allegedly made
    misrepresentations; the deposition of Scott McIlhaney, who at the time of the execution of
    1
    Specifically, Plaintiffs obtained the loan through a mortgage on Washington’s home and
    allege that Rhonda Hare of Hare Mortgage, Inc., who Plaintiffs claim served as an agent or
    employee of CitiFinancial, misrepresented the terms of their loan payment obligation.
    2
    the loan was an employee of Ford Consumer Finance, which later became CitiFinancial; the
    deposition of Rosie Washington, one of the plaintiffs and a signatory to the loan agreement;
    Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Answers to Defendants’ Interrogatories, describing the expected
    opinions of Gene Marsh, an expert on predatory lending; the deposition of Marsh; and the
    deposition of Catherlean Craft, the other plaintiff and signatory to the loan agreement.
    ¶4.    On February 14, 2005, the trial court granted in part and denied in part CitiFinancial’s
    Motion for Summary Judgment. The court denied summary judgment on the issues of breach
    of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional
    distress, fraud, statute of limitations, and release of claims. Upon this denial, CitiFinancial
    filed a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal and a Motion for Emergency Stay of Case pending
    the resolution of this interlocutory appeal, both of which this Court granted.
    ¶5.    This Court need only discuss the statute of limitations application to Plaintiff’s claim,
    since that issue is dispositive. We conclude that Plaintiffs are barred according to the statute
    of limitations, and denial of summary judgment was error by the trial judge. Accordingly, we
    reverse and render.
    DISCUSSION
    I.     Whether the Trial Court Erred in its Determination that Plaintiffs’
    Claims Are Not Barred by the Statute of Limitations.
    ¶6.    The claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is subject to a one-year
    statute of limitations under Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-35 (Rev. 2003).
    Southern v. Miss. State Hosp., 
    853 So. 2d 1212
    , 1214 (Miss. 2003). The intentional act
    which Plaintiffs claim forms the basis of this action involves the alleged misrepresentations
    3
    or omissions occurring on or before November 29, 1995, and Plaintiffs filed their claim on
    November 19, 2001. Clearly, the statute of limitations had run as to this claim when Plaintiffs
    brought suit almost six years after the act giving rise to the claim.
    ¶7.      The remainder of the claims are governed by Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-
    1- 49 (Rev. 2003). Rankin v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 
    912 So. 2d 725
    , (Miss. 2005) (breach of
    a fiduciary duty, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent
    misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligence are subject to a three-year
    statute of limitations pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49). In a contractual claim, a cause
    of action accrues on the date of actual injury, the date the facts occurred which enable the
    Plaintiffs to bring a cause of action. Oaks v. Sellers, 
    953 So. 2d 1077
    , at *10-11 (Miss.
    2007).
    ¶8.      The dispute centers around whether a claim arose at the time of the execution of the
    loan, as CitiFinancial asserts, or at the time Plaintiffs were first counseled on the fact that
    better terms existed. The statute of limitations for the claims in this case began to run when
    the plaintiffs had notice of the terms of the contract, which was at the time of the execution
    of the loan agreement, when the Plaintiff received the terms of the contract. 
    Id. at 11 (discussing
    Andrus v. Ellis, 
    887 So. 2d 175
    (Miss. 2004)). Having signed and received a
    copy of the loan, which contained all the payment terms, Plaintiffs were on notice of the
    terms complained of as of November 29, 1995. This Court held in Sellers that having
    knowledge, regardless of whether that knowledge was actual or constructive, of the terms of
    the agreement begins the statute of limitations. Sellers, 
    953 So. 2d 1077
    , at *18. The
    4
    plaintiffs filed suit on November 19, 2001, more than three years after they learned of the
    terms about which they now complain.
    ¶9.    Giving Plaintiffs all benefit of the doubt, in November 1995, the terms of the contract
    upon which they base their claim included a balloon payment of $28,878.20. That contract
    also stated that those were the only terms provided to them. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ right to sue
    began on November 29, 1995, and the statute of limitations began to run on that date also.
    Plaintiffs filed their claim six years later in November 2001, well outside the three-year
    statute of limitations under Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-49. Accordingly, this
    Court finds that the trial court erred by denying CitiFinancial’s motion for summary
    judgment. The statute of limitations bar warrants a grant of summary judgment on all claims
    raised in this case. See 
    Bennett, 921 So. 2d at 1272
    (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 323, 
    106 S. Ct. 2548
    , 2552, 
    91 L. Ed. 2d 265
    , 273 (1986)).
    CONCLUSION
    ¶10.   Plaintiffs were barred from filing suit six years after the events occurred which gave
    rise to their claims. Accordingly, the trial court erred by denying CitiFinancial’s motion for
    summary judgment, and this Court reverses that judgment and remands this case to the
    Circuit Court of Jasper County for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.
    ¶11.   REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    WALLER, P.J., CARLSON, DICKINSON, RANDOLPH AND LAMAR, JJ.,
    CONCUR. DIAZ, P.J., EASLEY AND GRAVES, JJ., DISSENT WITHOUT
    SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
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