William Daniel Vaughn v. Connie Lynn Davis ( 2007 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2007-CT-02065-SCT
WILLIAM DANIEL VAUGHN
v.
CONNIE LYNN DAVIS, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS
MATERNAL GRANDMOTHER AND NEXT
FRIEND OF DANIELLE LYNN VAUGHN
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/01/2007
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DAN H. FAIRLY
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: RANKIN COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: WILLIAM P. FEATHERSTON, JR.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: SHARON PATTERSON THIBODEAUX
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 06/17/2010
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
RANDOLPH, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. William Daniel Vaughn (“Vaughn”) appealed from the judgment of the Rankin
County Chancery Court awarding physical custody of his daughter, Danielle Lynn Vaughn
(“Danielle”), to the child’s maternal grandmother, Connie Lynn Davis (“Connie”). The
Court of Appeals affirmed. Vaughn v. Davis, 2009 WL 1664622 (Miss. Ct. App. June 16,
2009). This Court granted certiorari. Vaughn v. Davis, 27 So. 3d 404 (Miss. 2010).
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. Except as otherwise noted, the Court of Appeals correctly and fully laid out the factual
and procedural background as follows:
Danielle was born in October 2000 out of wedlock. Danielle and her mother,
Theresa Davis (Theresa) lived with Connie, the maternal grandmother, since
Danielle's birth. Theresa died as the result of a car accident in March 2002,
when Danielle was approximately seventeen months old. Danielle's birth
certificate lists Vaughn as her father. Vaughn's paternity was further
established through a DNA test. Vaughn and Theresa never married. At the
time of Theresa's death, Theresa and Danielle lived with the grandmother,
Connie. Vaughn lived with two roommates in an apartment. He attended
school and worked full time. After Theresa's death, Vaughn and Connie
discussed the physical custody arrangements for Danielle. Vaughn and Connie
mutually agreed that Connie would keep Danielle until Vaughn had finished
school and gotten back on his feet. After their agreement, Vaughn failed to
visit Danielle regularly and paid only $100 of support for Danielle prior to
Connie's filing her petition for custody. He also failed to voluntarily seek
custody of his daughter when he got back on his feet.
Vaughn v. Davis, 2009 WL 1664622, at *1. The amount of Vaughn’s monetary support was
disputed.1 Although Vaughn was in school and living with roommates at one time, that
situation did not continue. He testified that in the years following Theresa’s death, he had
(1) attended school only one semester; (2) never received a degree; (3) lived by himself in
an apartment and then with a girlfriend; (4) worked full-time, earning $300-400 per week,
with the exception of three months of unemployment.
¶3. The Court of Appeals continued as follows:
At some point after Theresa's death, Connie tried to obtain medical insurance
for Danielle. The insurance company denied coverage because Connie was
not Danielle's legal guardian. On August 18, 2004, when Danielle was nearly
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Connie testified that he made a one-time contribution of $100 at the time of
Theresa’s funeral. Connie and her mother, who lived next door, kept a contemporaneous log
of Vaughn’s contribution and contacts. Vaughn testified that he gave cash and in-kind
contributions, such as clothes, food, and diapers, but could provide no proof.
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four years old, Connie filed a petition for custody and emergency temporary
relief. Vaughn and Connie signed an agreed temporary order dated August 20,
2004, granting Connie temporary custody of Danielle.
Id.
¶4. In her petition for custody, Connie listed several reasons why she should be granted
custody, including that Vaughn had “gone as long as four months without any contact
whatsoever with his minor child, either in person or via any other method of
communication.” Connie also asked that Vaughn be required to pay child support and to
maintain a life-insurance policy, with Danielle as the beneficiary. Connie did not request
termination of Vaughn’s parental rights. The “Agreed Order for Emergency Temporary
Custody and Other Relief” granted Connie the “temporary care, custody and control” of
Danielle, subject to Vaughn’s “temporary visitation rights” pending a final hearing, which
was set for February 16, 2005. Vaughn acknowledged paternity at that time. The order did
not address child support. Vaughn signed the agreed order on the advice of his then-attorney.
He testified that his understanding of the order was that “the judge has to hear the whole case
and then he’ll decide who Danielle lives with. So it was never my understanding or never
my intentions to give up my daughter.” However, he did understand he was “temporarily
giving [Connie] custody.” At the time the agreed order was signed, Vaughn was unemployed
and living with his girlfriend.
¶5. The custody hearing was continued several times, as a psychologist was appointed to
evaluate Danielle, and a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) was appointed for her. See id. While
awaiting the hearing, Vaughn was granted visitation, which he exercised inconsistently. The
court-appointed psychiatrist reported in 2006 that Vaughn was “inconsistent in his interaction
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with the child. This is evidenced by long periods in which he would not contact her and
periods in which she is not with him in which he does not call or write her. In addition, he
leaves her with others when he does have her.” In a later report, the psychiatrist reported that
Vaughn was “well intentioned,” but his lack of “follow through . . . has been evident.”
Vaughn first began to pay child support a few months after the agreed order. Several months
after testifying that he had already done so, he obtained health insurance for Danielle through
his policy at work.2 Vaughn obtained a life insurance policy, but named his new wife as the
sole beneficiary.
¶6. Regarding the three-year wait before the hearing, the Court of Appeals stated the
following:
Vaughn [regained] full-time employment, married Melissa Vaughn, bought a
home, and had a son with Melissa. The chancery court finally heard Connie's
petition for custody on August 1, 2007, and entered a final order granting
[physical] custody of Danielle to Connie. Danielle was nearly seven years old
at the time of the hearing.
Id. The chancellor granted Connie and Vaughn joint legal custody. Vaughn was allowed
liberal visitation and was required to pay child support and to maintain health insurance for
Danielle.
¶7. The Court of Appeals continued as follows:
On appeal, Vaughn argues that the chancellor erred in not giving him the
benefit of the natural-parent presumption, which arises in custody disputes
between natural parents and third parties. Grant v. Martin, 757 So. 2d 264,
265 (¶ 5) (Miss. 2000). Utilizing the standard adopted . . . in Grant, however,
2
Vaughn testified that this was a misunderstanding that was worked out with the help
of the GAL. Prior to being covered by Vaughn’s insurance, Danielle was on Medicaid.
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the chancellor reasoned that Vaughn relinquished the natural-parent
presumption . . . .
Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed the chancellor’s order granting physical custody of
Danielle to Connie, finding that (1) Vaughn had “relinquished the natural-parent presumption
when he agreed to allow Danielle to remain in Connie’s custody pending a hearing . . . .”;
and (2) the decision below was “further buttressed by Vaughn’s voluntary and extended
failure to seek custody . . . .” Id.
¶8. Allowing Grant to control on the facts as presented in the case sub judice would
create a disincentive for parents to allow children to remain temporarily in a safe and stable
environment while custody issues are decided. Pairing the Grant analysis with a finding that
Vaughn had relinquished custody through his inaction is likewise unavailing. The chancellor
made no such finding, but based his analysis solely on the application of Grant. The
chancellor found that Vaughn was neither mentally nor morally unfit to have custody of the
child, nor had he abandoned the child through his inaction. However, because Vaughn had
agreed to the temporary custody order, he had given up the natural presumption, thus
allowing the chancellor to complete an Albright analysis, which favored Connie. See
Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983). After finding that Connie stood
“in loco parentis . . . to the child,” the chancellor stated that “the affections of this child have
become so engaged to [Connie] that a severance of that relationship would result in
destroying the best interest of the child.”
ANALYSIS
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¶9. “A chancellor's findings of fact will not be disturbed unless manifestly wrong or
clearly erroneous. . . . A chancellor's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.” Lowrey v.
Lowrey, 25 So. 3d 274, 285 (Miss. 2009) (citations omitted). We analyze a single issue:
Whether the chancellor erred in denying Vaughn the benefit of a natural-parent presumption
based on his agreeing to the order for temporary custody.
¶10. “At the outset of this discussion, we reaffirm that the paramount and ultimate goal in
every child custody case must be the best interests of the child.” In re Dissolution of
Marriage of Leverock and Hamby, 23 So. 3d 424, 429 (Miss. 2009). The Leverock Court
stated further:
In Mississippi, it is presumed that it is in the best interest of a child to remain
with the natural parent as opposed to a third party. K.D.F. v. J.L.H., 933 So.
2d 971, 980 (Miss. 2006). This presumption is echoed in Mississippi Code
Section 93-13-1: “The father and mother are the joint natural guardians of their
minor children and are equally charged with their care, nurture, welfare and
education. . . . If either father or mother die or be incapable of acting, the
guardianship devolves upon the surviving parent.” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-13-1
(Rev. 2004). However, we also recognize that this presumption or preference
for a natural parent may be rebutted.
Id. at 429-30.
¶11. The chancellor believed he had only two options. He would have to find Vaughn
immoral or unfit as a parent, or that he had abandoned the child, and then do an Albright
analysis to determine Danielle’s best interests. Or, if he failed to find immorality, unfitness,
or abandonment, he would have to grant custody to Vaughn without regard to Danielle’s best
interests. The chancellor found abandonment through Vaughn’s agreement to temporary
custody. Following this finding, the chancellor determined that Danielle’s best interests were
served by continuing to live in Connie’s home, the only home Danielle had ever known.
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¶12. We find that the chancellor was not required to make such a stark choice under these
facts. Our custody statute, as cited in Leverock, offers another option, a finding of desertion,
as follows:
Upon a finding by the court that both of the parents of the child have
abandoned or deserted such child or that both such parents are mentally,
morally or otherwise unfit to rear and train the child the court may award
physical and legal custody to . . . [t]he person in whose home the child has
been living in a wholesome and stable environment. . . .
Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-24(1)(e)(i) (Rev. 2004) (emphasis added); see Leverock, 23 So. 3d
at 430. Thus, the chancellor could have treated Vaughn’s inaction prior to the agreed order
as desertion of Danielle. If so, Vaughn would have forfeited the presumption he had as her
natural father, even though his actions/inactions do not compare to the behavior our courts
have found to constitute abandonment or constructive abandonment. Governale v. Haley,
228 Miss. 271, 275-78, 87 So. 2d 686, 687-89 (Miss. 1956) (abandonment, leaving child with
a relative for ten years); Loomis v. Bugg, 872 So. 2d 694, 695-96 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004)
(unfitness); Hill v. Mitchell, 818 So. 2d 1221, 1222-23 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (constructive
abandonment, child allowed to stay in court-ordered temporary physical custody of
grandparents for eleven years). However, desertion, if found, would apply.
¶13. This Court in Leverock distinguished abandonment and desertion as follows:
Abandonment is “any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled
purpose to forego all duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.”
[Ainsworth v. Natural Father, 414 So. 2d 417, 419 (Miss.1982).] In defining
the term “desert,” this Court in Ainsworth noted the following definitions: “2.
To forsake (a person, institution, cause, etc., having moral or legal claims upon
one). 3. To forsake one's duty, one's post or one's party.” Id. at 420. This
Court explained that “abandonment has to do with the relinquishment of a
right or claim, whereas desertion involves an avoidance of a duty or
obligation.”
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Leverock, 23 So. 3d at 430 n.2. The Ainsworth Court cited Webster’s and the Oxford
English Dictionary for the definitions of both words, finding that the “definition of
abandonment in Wright v. Fitzgibbons, [198 Miss. 471, 477-78, 21 So. 2d 709, 710-11
(1945)], seems to include both avoidance of duty and relinquishment of right.” Ainsworth
v. Natural Father, 414 So. 2d 417, 419-20 (Miss. 1982).
¶14. In Leverock, this Court found 3 that a father had deserted his son by “completely
avoid[ing] both his moral and legal duties and obligations as a father for more than two years.
During this period of time, he showed a complete disregard for the welfare of his young son.”
Leverock, 23 So. 3d at 431. The Leverock Court continued that the father had chosen “‘to
take an extended holiday from the responsibilities of parenthood’ and we find that he should
not now be able to claim the benefit of his status as a natural parent . . . .” Id. at 431-32
(citation omitted). The Court stated that, once “abandonment, desertion, or other acts
demonstrating unfitness to raise a child” are found “by clear and convincing evidence,” the
natural-parent “presumption vanishes, and the court must go further to determine custody
based on the best interests of the child through an on-the-record analysis of the Albright
factors.” Id. at 431. In this Albright analysis, even though the natural parent has lost the
presumption, a court may still consider “society's interest in preserving the natural parent and
child relationship whenever possible,” but a chancellor should consider it as “only one factor,
3
Six justices were in the majority, which reversed and rendered the desertion issue.
Leverock, 23 So. 3d at 434. Two justices would have reversed and remanded. See id. at
435-38 (Pierce, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Carlson, P.J., joined
in part by Waller, C.J.). Thus, the Court was eight-to-one on the question of reversing the
chancellor’s grant of custody to the father.
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among many, to be considered. ” Id. The Court instructed the chancellor to consider “the
present circumstances of the parties” in the custody determination, as two years had passed
since the hearing. Id. at 432.
¶15. It was error here to find that Grant controls. In Grant, a mother relinquished custody
of her three children to their paternal grandparents. See Grant, 757 So. 2d at 264. The
grandparents were appointed as guardians via a chancellor’s order. Two years later, when
the parents divorced, a settlement agreement granting custody of the children to the
grandparents was incorporated into the final judgment of divorce. See id. at 265. More than
two years later, after the mother had remarried, she petitioned for a modification, which was
denied. See id. The Court of Appeals, finding no unfitness or abandonment, reversed and
rendered in the mother’s favor. See id. at 266. This Court reversed the judgment of the
Court of Appeals, setting a new standard “that a natural parent who voluntarily relinquishes
custody of a minor child, through a court of competent jurisdiction, has forfeited the right to
rely on the existing natural parent presumption.” Id. (emphasis added). The Court stated
that, in setting the new standard, it did not “want to encourage an irresponsible parent to
relinquish . . . custody to another for convenience sake, and then be able to come back into
the child's life years later and simply claim the natural parents' presumption . . . .” Id. The
Grant Court also reaffirmed the principles that (1) “stability in the lives of children is of such
great importance,” and (2) “the polestar consideration in all child custody cases is the best
interest of the child . . . .” 4 Id.
4
Webster’s defines “polestar”as “1. Polaris, a star that is vertical or nearly so, to the
pole of the earth, also called North Star. 2. That which serves as a guide or director.”
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¶16. The mother in Grant gave up custody of her children through a court of competent
jurisdiction on two different occasions, i.e., the guardianship and the divorce decree. Id. at
264-65. When she gave up custody the first time, she actually was relinquishing physical
custody of the children. Unlike in Grant, Vaughn never had physical custody of Danielle,
thus, he had nothing to relinquish. He merely allowed Connie to retain custody, which was
a proper temporary arrangement, until a hearing could be held. Vaughn could not have
known at that time that three years would elapse before the hearing was held, and that five
years (and counting) would go by before a decision would be made on Danielle’s long-term
custody. Vaughn’s signing this agreement does not equate to abandonment. A comparison
of the temporary nature of this agreement with the guardianship in Grant is flawed. In
Grant, there was a divorce decree, as well as a guardianship order. Id. Here, there was only
a temporary agreement awaiting a hearing.
¶17. We affirm the chancellor’s finding that Connie stood in loco parentis to Danielle.
“We have defined a person acting in loco parentis as one who has assumed the status and
obligations of a parent without a formal adoption.” Leverock, 23 So. 3d at 430 (quoting
Logan v. Logan, 730 So. 2d 1124, 1126 (Miss. 1998). The record shows that Connie took
Danielle into her home and provided parental supervision and support as though she were her
own child. See Farve v. Medders, 241 Miss. 75, 81-82, 128 So. 2d 877, 879-80 (1961).”
CONCLUSION
Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 1391 (2d ed. 1983).
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¶18. Thus, we reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the trial court, and we
remand the matter to the Chancery Court of Rankin County for proceedings consistent with
this opinion. Specifically, the court is to determine if Vaughn relinquished the natural-parent
presumption for reasons other than forfeiture by agreeing to a temporary custody order.
Three years have elapsed since the last hearing. Thus, the chancellor should consider
Danielle’s circumstances at the time of the remand hearing, if he determines that desertion
has been proven. As always in custody matters, the best interests of the child should guide
the analysis as a polestar. As the chancellor’s judgments on joint legal custody, visitation,
et cetera, were not part of this appeal, the chancellor retains his discretion in crafting the best
arrangements, considering present circumstances.
¶19. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
WALLER, C.J., CARLSON AND GRAVES, P.JJ., DICKINSON, LAMAR,
KITCHENS, AND CHANDLER, JJ., CONCUR. PIERCE, J., SPECIALLY
CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY WALLER, C.J.,
AND CARLSON, P.J.
PIERCE, JUSTICE, SPECIALLY CONCURRING:
¶20. While I concur with the majority’s holding and analysis, I cannot join the majority
opinion where it adopts the analysis found in In re: Dissolution of Marriage of Leverock
and Hamby, 23 So. 3d 424 (Miss. 2009). Specifically, the majority discusses this Court’s
finding that the father in Leverock “deserted his son by ‘completely avoid[ing] both his
moral and legal duties and obligations as a father for more than two years.’” (Maj. Op. ¶ 14)
(quoting Leverock, 23 So. 3d at 431).
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¶21. As I stated in Leverock, as an appellate court, this Court is responsible “to review the
decision of the chancellor, not to make an original determination.” Id. at 434-435 (Pierce,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The chancellor in Leverock did not make
adequate findings on the record to support this Court’s sua sponte determination that the
father had deserted his child. Because I am of the opinion Leverock was wrongly decided,
I cannot join the majority opinion in which it adopts this Court’s analysis in that case.
Otherwise, I fully concur.
WALLER, C.J., AND CARLSON, P.J., JOIN THIS OPINION.
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