Bruce Benson v. State of Mississippi ( 2000 )


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  •                             IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
    NO. 2000-CA-00704-SCT
    BRUCE BENSON
    v.
    STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                                   3/31/2000
    TRIAL JUDGE:                                        HON. KEITH STARRETT
    COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:                          LINCOLN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                             CHOKWE LUMUMBA
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:                              OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
    BY: W. GLENN WATTS
    DISTRICT ATTORNEY:                                  DUNNICA O. LAMPTON
    NATURE OF THE CASE:                                 CIVIL - POST CONVICTION RELIEF
    DISPOSITION:                                        AFFIRMED - 7/18/2002
    MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
    MANDATE ISSUED:                                     8/8/2002
    BEFORE SMITH, P.J., DIAZ AND EASLEY, JJ.
    DIAZ, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
    ¶1. On September 24, 1993, Bruce Benson was tried and convicted by a jury, in the Circuit Court of
    Lincoln County, the Honorable Keith Starrett presiding, for the sale of cocaine. Benson was given a fifteen-
    year sentence in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. The conviction was appealed to
    the Mississippi Court of Appeals and affirmed on November 25, 1995. Benson v. State, No. 93-KA-
    01262-COA (opinion not designated for publication). On November 24, 1998, this Court granted
    Benson's Application for Leave to File Post Conviction Motion, and on December 15, 1998, Benson filed
    for post-conviction relief. Hearings were held in the trial court on the petition for post-conviction relief on
    May 24, 1999, November 22, 1999, and December 20, 1999. Benson's motion for post-conviction relief
    was denied by order dated March 31, 2000. On appeal, Benson now asks that this Court consider the
    following issues:
    I. WHETHER BENSON RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
    HIS TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO REQUEST A COMPETENCY HEARING.
    II. WHETHER BENSON RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
    HIS TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO CHALLENGE THE USE OF THE AUDIO TAPE
    RECORDING.
    III. WHETHER BENSON RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
    HIS TRIAL COUNSEL'S LACK OF PREPARATION.
    FACTS
    ¶2. On May 17, 1993, Anthony Lloyd, a confidential informant, met with two officers with the Brookhaven
    Police Department, Craig Oster and Clint Earls. Lloyd agreed to bait Benson into selling him drugs. Lloyd
    wore a microphone and went to Benson's house where he was able to buy cocaine from Benson under the
    audio surveillance of Oster and Earls. The drug transaction was recorded on audio tape. At trial, Officer
    Oster, Officer Earls, the informant, and Charles Terry of the Mississippi Crime Laboratory testified for the
    State. The audio tape was played before the jury. Benson's voice was identified on tape, and Benson, who
    testified on his own behalf, stated that it was possible that the audio recording was his voice. Benson was
    found guilty.
    ¶3. On direct appeal, Benson raised two issues before the Mississippi Court of Appeals. First, he argued
    that Oster's testimony about what he heard on the audio tape was hearsay. Second, he argued that the trial
    court erred in restricting the cross examination of Lloyd as to Lloyd's prior convictions. Benson's conviction
    and sentence were affirmed.
    ¶4. Benson was granted a hearing on his motion for post-conviction relief. In a hearing on May 24, 1999,
    Benson argued about the legality of the audio surveillance under Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-525 (2001).
    The trial court found that the statute relied upon by Benson was not applicable to the facts of this case. On
    November 22, 1999, a hearing was held on Benson's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial
    court heard testimony from a psychiatrist, Dr. Richard Roden, Benson's mother, Mae Benson, and
    Benson's trial attorney, Durwood Breeland. The trial court found that there was no ineffective assistance of
    counsel.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶5. To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel the defendant must prove that under the totality
    of the circumstances (1) the counsel's performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance
    deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Hiter v. State, 
    660 So. 2d 961
    , 965 (Miss.1995) (citing Strickland
    v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 
    104 S. Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L. Ed. 2d 674
    (1984)).
    I. WHETHER BENSON RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
    HIS TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO REQUEST A COMPETENCY HEARING.
    ¶6. Benson argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a competency hearing. It is
    undisputed that Benson has suffered significant mental problems for several years. His primary diagnosis is
    paranoid schizophrenia. Benson was able to establish these medical conditions at the hearing on his petition
    for post-conviction relief. Furthermore, Breeland, Benson's trial counsel, testified that he had known
    Benson for a number of years and was familiar with his mental problems. However, the trial court found that
    Benson failed to meet his burden of proof in establishing that he did not know "right from wrong" at the time
    of the alleged offense. The trial court concluded that Benson had not met his burden of proof for
    establishing that he was criminally insane or that he was not competent to stand trial.
    ¶7. At the hearing Dr. Roden testified that schizophrenia was a treatable illness and that with proper
    medication, a person with this illness could function properly at work and at home. Dr. Roden testified that
    merely having the condition did not mean one could not distinguish right from wrong. In addition, Breeland
    testified at the hearing that he was Benson's trial counsel and that based upon his communications with
    Benson, he had no reason to think Benson would be incompetent to stand trial.
    ¶8. Breeland testified that he advised Benson not to testify because the jury would have the opportunity to
    recognize Benson's voice. Nevertheless, Benson refused Breeland's advice. Breeland also testified that
    Benson told him that he did not remember what happened on May 17, 1993, the day he sold cocaine to
    Lloyd.
    ¶9. The issue of whether a trial court erred by failing to order a competency hearing sua sponte has been
    considered by this Court in Richardson v. State, 
    722 So. 2d 481
    (Miss. 1998). In that case, Richardson's
    attorney told the trial court that he was able to effectively communicate with his client. There was no
    evidence "that Richardson suffered from irrational behavior or incompetence to a degree that would affect
    his right to a fair and just trial." 
    Id. at 487. The
    failure to hold a competency hearing in that case was not
    error.
    ¶10. In Conner v. State, 
    632 So. 2d 1239
    (Miss. 1993), overruled on other grounds, Weatherspoon
    v. State, 
    732 So. 2d 158
    (Miss. 1999), this Court found that Conner suffered from schizophrenia, had a
    low intellectual capacity, and recalled no facts about the charges against him. Nevertheless, he was
    competent to stand 
    trial. 632 So. 2d at 1251
    . This was due to Conner's apparent ability to understand the
    proceedings of the case, to appreciate the significance of the proceedings, and to aid his attorney in his
    defense. 
    Id. ¶11. In the
    instant case, there is no evidence in the record indicating that Benson had no understanding of
    the nature and significance of the proceedings against him and that he could not rationally assist his trial
    counsel in his defense. The only arguments used to support this claim is that the trial counsel knew of
    Benson's psychological problems and let him stand trial and testify as to the audio tape. Benson merely
    states that, based on those arguments, the trial counsel should have requested a competency hearing. There
    is simply no showing that Benson's trial counsel's failure to raise the issue of Benson's competency
    constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
    II. WHETHER BENSON RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
    HIS TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO CHALLENGE THE USE OF THE ENTIRE
    AUDIO TAPE RECORDING.
    ¶12. Breeland testified at the hearing that he did not pursue an illegal search and seizure challenge during the
    trial because the State had testimony from two eyewitnesses and a confidential informant, as well as a tape
    recording of a voice identified as Benson's during the cocaine sale. Furthermore, Breeland testified that
    Benson stated he did not remember anything that day, so there was no means to pursue a search and
    seizure challenge.
    ¶13. Benson argues that Breeland should have objected to the use of the audio recording as a violation of
    Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-503 (2001) and as a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Benson contends that
    he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his conversation with Lloyd. Furthermore, Benson argues that
    the officers were not Bureau of Narcotics agents and were not permitted to electronically intercept
    conversations, although Officer Oster was a contract agent of the Bureau of Narcotics. At the hearing on
    this issue, the trial judge found that under these facts the conversation was not one in which Benson had an
    expectation of privacy. Benson was monitored electronically while Benson sold cocaine to an informant.
    ¶14. We conclude that Benson has not shown how Breeland's failure to challenge the use of the audio tape
    recording constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Furthermore, this issue was capable of being raised
    during the trial or on appeal. This issue is without merit.
    III. WHETHER BENSON RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
    HIS TRIAL COUNSEL'S LACK OF PREPARATION.
    ¶15. Benson argues that his trial counsel had only 14 days to prepare for trial and that in a motion for
    continuance his trial counsel had argued that he had ten other criminal cases at the time. Benson also argues
    that his appellate counsel was ineffective by not raising the issue of his trial counsel's ineffective assistance of
    counsel and by only raising two issues and not filing a rebuttal brief. Benson's trial counsel testified at the
    hearing that he did have adequate time to prepare for Benson's case because there were only a few
    witnesses. Specifically, Benson's trial counsel stated that there were three witnesses for the State "and
    against my wishes, my client, were the four witnesses, It wasn't particularly complex. No. I wouldn't say
    that 14 days is long enough to - hopefully, you would have long enough to prepare for any trial."
    ¶16. An allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to properly prepare must state whether any
    additional investigation, such as interviewing witnesses or investigating facts, would have significantly aided
    or altered the outcome of the defendant's case at trial. Brown v. State,798 So. 2d 481, 494, 496. (Miss.
    2001); Mohr v. State, 
    584 So. 2d 426
    , 430 (Miss.1991). Based on a review of the record and of the facts
    of this case, there is no support for Benson's claim that his trial counsel was not adequately prepared and
    that any additional investigation would have altered the outcome of the case. This issue is without merit.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶17. Benson's allegations that his trial counsel was deficient in performance at Benson's trial are not
    supported by the record. There is no evidence that Benson's trial counsel was deficient, and there is
    certainly no evidence that any deficiency by Benson's trial counsel would have altered the outcome of the
    trial. Therefore, the trial court's judgment denying post-conviction relief is affirmed.
    ¶18. AFFIRMED.
    PITTMAN, C.J., McRAE AND SMITH, P.JJ., WALLER, COBB, EASLEY, CARLSON
    AND GRAVES, JJ., CONCUR.