Danny Satchfield v. R.R. Morrison & Son, Inc. ( 2002 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2002-CA-01563-SCT
DANNY SATCHFIELD
v.
R.R. MORRISON & SON, INC., PREMIUM TANK
LINES, INC. AND BRUCE JORDAN, AS AGENT OF
PREMIUM TANK LINES, INC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 8/15/2002
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. STEPHEN B. SIMPSON
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JOHN RANDALL SANTA CRUZ
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: WALTER WILLIAM DUKES
TRACE D. McRANEY
RONALD G. PERESICH
EMILIE FISCHER WHITEHEAD
MICHAEL E. WHITEHEAD
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL
INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 05/06/2004
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
COBB, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. At issue in this case is whether a witness to a service station gasoline explosion which killed six
people unrelated to him is a foreseeable plaintiff to whom the defendants owed a duty of care. Under the
precedent of this Court, no such duty was owed. Therefore we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment for the defendants.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. On August 9, 1998, an underground gasoline tank at a Texaco Fast Lane service station in Biloxi,
Mississippi was being filled from a fuel truck owned by Premium Tank Lines, Inc. (Premium) and operated
by Bruce Jordan (Jordan). During the fueling procedure the tank overflowed, and a large quantity of
gasoline spilled into a nearby intersection where it ignited. The ensuing fire resulted in property damage and
personal injuries, including several fatalities.
¶3. Danny Satchfield, the plaintiff in the trial court below, was at the Texaco station purchasing gasoline
for his automobile and witnessed the explosion and the painful death of the victims. Accompanying him
were his son, Kurt Satchfield, and a good friend, David Rogers. Satchfield alleges that his vehicle was
approximately five feet away from the explosion and that witnessing the explosion and the violent, painful
deaths of his fellow citizens caused him to suffer from emotional shock and trauma. He also alleges that
he was in immediate fear of imminent death or injury to himself, his son and his close friend, and he was left
with permanent psychological injury requiring ongoing medical treatment.1 Satchfield sought recovery for
his injuries from R.R. Morrison & Sons, Inc. (Morrison), the owner of the Texaco station in question, as
well as Premium and Jordan. Following Satchfield’s complaint, Morrison propounded requests for
admissions seeking only to establish that Satchfield was not related to the victims.
¶4. Based upon Satchfield’s affirmative response to these inquiries, Morrison filed a motion for
summary judgment. Morrison claimed that, as a matter of law, Satchfield could not recover because he
is not related to any of the victims. Premium and Jordan subsequently filed similar motions. Concluding
that Satchfield’s claims were those of a bystander, and since it was undisputed that he was not physically
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Specifically, Satchfield alleges that he suffers from mental anguish, mental shock, survivor’s guilt,
flashbacks, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, psychological trauma and other psychological
damages which resulted in continuous psychiatric treatment and care for him.
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injured as a result of the fire and explosion and that he was not related to any of the victims, the trial court
granted summary judgment for the defendants. From that judgment Satchfield appeals.
ANALYSIS
¶5. This Court applies a de novo standard of review of a trial court's grant or denial of summary
judgment. Hudson v. Courtesy Motors, Inc., 794 So. 2d 999, 1002 (Miss. 2001); Jenkins v. Ohio
Cas. Ins. Co., 794 So. 2d 228, 232 (Miss. 2001); Heigle v. Heigle, 771 So. 2d 341, 345 (Miss. 2000).
Our appellate standard for reviewing the granting or denial of summary judgment is the same standard as
that of the trial court under Rule 56(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure: summary judgment shall
be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact...." Hudson, 794 So. 2d at
1002; Jenkins, 794 So. 2d at 232; Heigle, 771 So. 2d at 345. The burden of demonstrating that no
genuine issue of fact exists is on the moving party. Id. "The presence of fact issues in the record does not
per se entitle a party to avoid summary judgment. The court must be convinced that the factual issue is a
material one, one that matters in an outcome determinative sense ... [T]he existence of a hundred contested
issues of fact will not thwart summary judgment where there is no genuine dispute regarding the material
issues of fact." Hudson, 794 So. 2d at 1002 (quoting Simmons v. Thompson Mach. of Miss., Inc.,
631 So. 2d 798, 801 (Miss. 1994)).
I. No close relationship between Satchfield and victims.
¶6. Morrison, Premium and Jordan assert that summary judgment was proper because Satchfield,
unrelated to any of the victims, cannot satisfy the elements necessary to support his claim. The trial court
agreed.
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¶7. In Entex, Inc. v. McGuire, 414 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 1982), this Court set the standard for
determining whether a defendant has a duty of care to a bystander plaintiff:
In determining, . . . whether defendant should reasonably foresee the injury to plaintiff, or,
. . . whether defendant owes plaintiff a duty of care, the courts will take into account such
factors as the following: (1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident
as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted
from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous
observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after
its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and victim were closely related, as
contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distance
relationship.
Id. at 444 (quoting Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968)) (emphasis added). In O’Cain v.
Harvey Freeman & Sons, Inc., 603 So. 2d 824 (Miss. 1991), this Court held that, in Entex, the
“Court set out the criteria which one must meet on a claim of emotional trauma by a bystander[.]” Id.
at 829 (emphasis added).
¶8. Satchfield argues that Entex does not foreclose his claim. He argues that case is only one in a long
line of cases related to recovery for emotional harm or injury and that Entex has been substantially
expanded. He argues that the factors laid out in Entex are not mandatory elements of foreseeability, but
rather only guidelines for that determination. For support, Satchfield points out that Dillon v. Legg, 441
P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968), the California case which laid out the factors this Court adopted in Entex,
expressly required that foreseeability be adjudicated on a case-by-case basis. See id. at 920.
¶9. While Satchfield’s analysis of Dillon is correct, it is not persuasive authority. Numerous
Mississippi cases have reaffirmed the applicability of the factors set forth in the Entex decision as they
relate to bystander recovery for emotional distress in Mississippi. As mentioned previously, O’Cain held
that, in Entex, the “Court set out the criteria which one must meet on a claim of emotional trauma by
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a bystander[.]” Id. at 829 (emphasis added). In Summers ex rel. Dawson v. St. Andrew’s
Episcopal School, Inc., 759 So. 2d 1203 (Miss. 2000), this Court quoted the Entex factors as the
standard to determine whether the parents of a child could recover damages for emotional distress for
injuries the child sustained at school. Id. at 1210. Although in Summers recovery was barred by the
failure of the plaintiffs to satisfy the contemporaneous observation requirement, the Court clearly reaffirmed
the applicability of all the Entex factors by stating that the plaintiffs “fail[ed] the criteria as a bystander as
enumerated in Entex.” Id. See also Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Hawkins, 830 So. 2d 1162, 1174-75 (Miss.
2002) (holding that there are three criteria required to qualify as a bystander who is owed a duty of care,
one of which is relatedness); Thomas v. Global Boat Builders & Repairmen, Inc., 482 So. 2d
1112, 1117 (Miss. 1986) (affirming dismissal of emotional distress claim where, inter alia, the plaintiff was
not related to the victim).
¶10. The Mississippi federal courts have also addressed bystander recovery for emotional distress, citing
Entex. See Moore v. Kroger Co., 800 F. Supp. 429, 433 (N.D. Miss. 1992) (denied emotional
distress claims of family members of victim of motor vehicle accident when family members did not witness
accident), aff’d mem. 18 F.3d 936 (5th Cir. 1994); Campbell v. Beverly Enterprises, 724 F. Supp.
439, 441 (S.D. Miss. 1989) (denied emotional distress claim of family members of an allegedly mistreated
nursing home patient because the family members did not observe the alleged mistreatment).
¶11. Satchfield cites Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc., 937 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1991), where a Fifth
Circuit panel recognized claims for purely emotional injuries under the Jones Act. However, on rehearing
en banc, the en banc Fifth Circuit concluded that it was not required to decide whether or under what
circumstances it might permit recovery of damages for purely emotional injuries. Plaisance v. Texaco,
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Inc., 966 F.2d 166, 169 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc). Since it involved the Jones Act and federal maritime
law and given the decision by the en banc Fifth Circuit, Plaisance is neither controlling nor persuasive on
the Mississippi law issue before us today.
¶12. The Supreme Court of Connecticut has discussed why the three-prong test set forth in Entex must
be adhered to strictly:
We are aware that the application of pure rules of foreseeability could lead to unlimited
liability. "[T]here are ample policy concerns for setting limits or administrative boundaries
establishing the permissible instances of recovery. There are fears of flooding the courts
with 'spurious and fraudulent claims'; problems of proof of the damage suffered; exposing
the defendant to an endless number of claims; and economic burdens on industry."
Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital, 556 So. 2d 559, 566 (La. 1990). For example,
"[i]t would be an entirely unreasonable burden on all human activity if the defendant who
has endangered one person were to be compelled to pay for the lacerated feelings of every
other person disturbed by reason of it, including every bystander shocked at an
accident, and every distant relative of the person injured, as well as all his friends." W.
Prosser & P. Keeton, Torts (5th Ed. 1984) §§ 54, p. 366; Thing v. La Chusa, supra,
48 Cal.3d at 666-67, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865. . . .
With these considerations in mind, and borrowing from the experience of other
jurisdictions, we agree that specific limitations must be imposed upon the reasonable
foreseeability rule. We recognize that those limitations, albeit somewhat arbitrary, are
"necessary in order not to leave the liability of a negligent defendant open to undue
extension by the verdict of sympathetic juries, who under our system must define and apply
any general rule to the facts of the case before them.... Prosser, Torts (4th Ed.) §§ 54, p.
335."
Clohessy v. Bachelor, 675 A.2d 852, 862-63 (Conn. 1996) (emphasis added). The standard ultimately
adopted by Connecticut is virtually identical to the Entex standard. Id. The Connecticut high court’s
explanation establishes why there must be specific limitations upon the standard for bystander recovery for
emotional distress damages.
¶13. Allowing Satchfield’s claim would expose the defendants to unlimited liability. Every person who
witnessed this horrible accident could bring suit. There must be some limit to foreseeability. This limit has
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been set by Entex, and since Satchfield, unrelated to any of the victims of this unfortunate accident, cannot
satisfy Entex, this assignment is without merit.
¶14. In an attempt to avoid summary judgment, Satchfield submitted his affidavit wherein he alleges that,
while accompanied by a friend and his son, he was “in [his] vehicle preparing to leave the service station
when a huge explosion ensued. [Satchfield’s] vehicle was approximately 5 feet away from the explosion.
[He] was in immediate fear of immanent [sic] death or injury to [himself] and [his] son and friend.”
Satchfield then goes on to restate the allegations of his complaint related to the horror he witnessed during
and after the explosion, and concludes by stating that the incident caused him to “suffer from emotional
shock and trauma”, leaving him with “permanent psychological injury” for which he has received
psychological treatment.”
¶15. The trial court determined that Satchfield could not recover based upon fear of injury to his son
because he “failed to establish that his son was a ‘victim’ of the fire and explosion, i.e., his son did not
sustain any physical harm.” Entex, 414 So. 2d at 444. See also Campbell v. Beverly Enterprises,
724 F. Supp. at 442 (no recovery for third-party mental distress without specific and serious physical injury
to another with whom plaintiff shares a close relationship).” We find no fault with the trial judge’s ruling
on this point.
¶16. Regarding Satchfield’s allegations that he was in immediate fear of imminent death or injury, his
complaint makes no such allegations, nor does his appellate brief. Satchfield alleges nothing more than a
bystander claim for emotional distress. His entire claim is centered on his witnessing the horror experienced
by the victims of the explosion. Thus, based on Entex, the trial court did not err in dismissing his claim.
This assignment is without merit.
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II. Allegations of gross negligence and punitive damages awarded to
others.2
¶17. Satchfield argues that the standard for bystander recovery for emotional distress, as set forth in
Entex, is not applicable because the defendants are “charged with willful, wanton and grossly negligent
conduct.3 A similar argument was dismissed by the federal district court in Moore v. Kroger Co.:
Plaintiff insists that Campbell expands Entex by allowing family members to recover for
emotional distress even if they are outside the zone of danger and outside the range of
immediate sensory perception where the negligence is gross or wanton, as is arguably the
case herein. In other words, as the severity of the negligence increases so should the
scope of foreseeable plaintiffs.
Moore, 800 F. Supp. at 433. The district court then held that the plaintiff’s argument was “an inaccurate
characterization of Mississippi law.” Id. The court flatly rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the scope
of foreseeability should be expanded as the severity of the negligence increases. Id. at 433-34.
¶18. This Court cited Moore with approval in Summers, 759 So. 2d at 1210. In Summers we did
not distinguish the district court’s holding in Moore.
¶19. Satchfield cites a host of cases dealing with emotional distress and grossly negligent conduct;
however, none of them are bystander cases. Because Satchfield cites no pertinent or persuasive authority
which stands for the proposition he asks us to accept, and because there is applicable law to the contrary,
we must conclude that the trial court properly dismissed his claims. This assignment is without merit.
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Satchfield argues that because punitive damages were awarded to victims of the explosion and
their survivors, he should be entitled to the same. Such damages were not awarded, however, based on
any bystander emotional distress claims. Additionally, the facts and circumstances regarding the entry of
the judgment are not set forth in the record. These facts are, therefore, improper for our consideration.
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Although Satchfield argues that this issue was not proper for the trial judge’s consideration since
it was not raised by the defense in its motion for summary judgment, the issue was clearly raised in the
defense’s rebuttal to the plaintiff’s response to defense motion for summary judgment.
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CONCLUSION
¶20. There is no doubt that the explosion was a traumatic and life changing experience for Satchfield.
His damages are well-documented and not put into question by the defendants. However, based on the
law of this State, he has no means of recovery. Foreseeability must end somewhere. Entex says that, with
bystander claims, it ends with injury to a close relative. None of Satchfield’s relatives were injured in this
tragedy. Thus, the trial court’s grant of the defendants’ motions for summary judgment is affirmed in all
respects.
¶21. AFFIRMED.
SMITH, C.J., WALLER, P.J., EASLEY, CARLSON AND DICKINSON, JJ.,
CONCUR. GRAVES, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. DIAZ AND RANDOLPH, JJ.,
NOT PARTICIPATING.
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