Kenneth Moore, Jr. v. State of Mississippi ( 2008 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-KA-00946-SCT
KENNETH MOORE, JR.
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/15/2008
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JANNIE M. LEWIS
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HOLMES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: LATRICE WESTBROOKS
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: STEPHANIE BRELAND WOOD .
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: JAMES H. POWELL, III
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 11/04/2010
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE GRAVES, P.J., LAMAR AND KITCHENS, JJ.
GRAVES, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Kenneth Moore, Jr., was convicted of murder in the Circuit Court of Holmes County
and sentenced to life imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of
Corrections (MDOC). The record does not indicate that Moore filed any post-trial motions,
but he subsequently filed this appeal. We find that the issues raised by Moore are without
merit and that his conviction should be affirmed.
FACTS
¶2. On the night of August 19, 2007, Moore, Cordarius McChriston and numerous others
gathered at a nightclub in Holmes County called Club Greasy. During the night, some minor
verbal exchanges occurred between Moore and McChriston. The exchanges later escalated
into a brief, physical fight outside the club, during which McChriston apparently got the best
of Moore. Moore’s brother, Latravis Skinner, broke up the fight and walked Moore a
distance away from the area to try to calm him down. Junior Williams, who was the owner
of Club Greasy, Corey Johnson, and some others accompanied the pair and attempted to calm
Moore. After several minutes, Moore indicated that he was going to retrieve his baseball cap
from the ground near where the fight occurred. Instead, Moore approached McChriston and
started shooting at him. McChriston, who had been struck by a bullet to the chest, ran away
as Moore gave chase and continued firing more shots. McChriston jumped a fence and ran
to a neighboring club called the Safe House, where he collapsed. McChriston died from his
injury.
¶3. After a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Holmes County, Moore was convicted of
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment in the custody of the MDOC. The record in this
matter does not indicate that any post-trial motions were filed. Moore then filed this appeal.
ANALYSIS
I. Whether the trial court erred when it failed to grant defendant’s motion for
continuance.
¶4. Moore asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant the motion
for continuance he requested on the date of trial. The State asserts that Moore is procedurally
2
barred from raising this issue because it was not raised in a motion for new trial.
Alternatively, the State asserts that this issue is without merit. The State is correct.
¶5. In Metcalf v. State, 629 So. 2d 558 (Miss. 1993), this Court said:
On a motion for a new trial, certain errors must be brought to the attention of
the trial judge so that he may have an opportunity to pass upon their validity
before this Court is called upon to review them. Weyen v. Weyen, 165 Miss.
257, 139 So. 608 (1932). For example, the denial of a continuance in the trial
court is not reviewable unless the party whose motion for continuance was
denied makes a motion for a new trial on this ground.
Metcalf, 620 So. 2d at 561-62.
¶6. The record does not indicate that Moore ever filed a motion for new trial. Therefore,
this issue is procedurally barred. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, Moore’s assertion is
without merit. In Conway v. State, 915 So. 2d 521 (Miss. 2005), Conway’s attorney filed
a motion for continuance five days before trial on the grounds that he was unprepared for
trial. This Court has said:
A circuit court judge has wide discretion in deciding whether to grant
a continuance, and the denial of a motion for continuance will not be reversed
absent a showing of substantial prejudice or manifest injustice. Simmons v.
State, 805 So. 2d 452, 484 (¶ 72) (Miss. 2002). The moving party bears the
burden of establishing prejudice. Wilson v. State, 755 So. 2d 2, 5 (¶ 11) (Miss.
Ct. App. 1999). Conway offers no proof that his attorney at trial was
unprepared or that he was prejudiced from his attorney’s lack of preparation.
This issue is without merit.
Conway, 915 So. 2d at 525.
¶7. In the instant case, Moore’s attorney moved for a continuance on the date of trial,
saying that she was not prepared because she had been busy with other cases. The trial court
denied the motion, noting that counsel had known of the trial setting for some four months.
On appeal, Moore’s counsel asserts that the trial court erred in not granting the continuance
3
because the State had not yet propounded discovery. Specifically, counsel is referring to
audiotapes of statements. The record shows that counsel was provided copies of the tapes
and the accompanying transcript, but that the tapes were blank. However, counsel was not
certain that the tapes were blank until she attempted to listen to the tapes enroute to the
courthouse on the date of trial. Further, counsel did not notify the District Attorney’s office
of the problem until the date of trial. Moreover, the trial court recessed the proceeding so
counsel could listen to the tape in question, Moore’s statement, which was approximately
fifteen minutes in length, and compare it to the previously provided transcript. Finally,
counsel was given an opportunity to cross-examine Holmes County Sheriff’s Deputy Chief
Roosevelt March regarding the content of the tape and the accompanying transcript.
¶8. We find that Moore has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the motion for continuance. Further, Moore has failed to establish any showing of
substantial prejudice.
II. Whether the trial court erred when it allowed a prejudicial photograph to be
admitted for identification purposes when the defendant did not contest identification
of the deceased.
¶9. Moore asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing an autopsy
photograph of McChriston to be admitted for identification purposes.
¶10. In Noe v. State, 616 So. 2d 298 (Miss. 1993), this Court said:
It is well settled in this state that the admission of photographs is a
matter left to the sound discretion of the trial judge and that his decision
favoring admissibility will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that judicial
discretion. . . . “A review of our case law indicates that the discretion of the
trial judge runs toward almost unlimited admissibility regardless of the
gruesomeness, repetitiveness, and the extenuation of probative value.” . . .
A photograph, even if gruesome, grisly, unpleasant, or even inflammatory,
4
may still be admissible if it has probative value and its introduction into
evidence serves a meaningful evidentiary purpose.
Id. at 303 (citations omitted). Further, this Court has said that photographs have an
evidentiary purpose “when they: (1) ‘aid in describing the circumstances of the killing; (2)
describe the location of the body and cause of death; (3) supplement or clarify witness
testimony.’” Jordan v. State, 995 So. 2d 94, 110 (Miss. 2008).
¶11. In the instant case, the photograph depicts the head and neck area of McChriston and
is neither gruesome nor inflammatory. Further, the photograph was introduced for
identification purposes during the testimony of Dr. Steven Hayne. Accordingly, we find that
this issue is without merit.
III. Whether a mistrial should have been declared in light of juror misconduct.
¶12. Moore asserts that the trial court should have sua sponte granted a mistrial because
juror Sarah Wade was related to potential witness Dewan McGee and had traveled to the
courthouse with him. Moore asserts that Wade did not acknowledge this during voir dire.
However, Moore’s assertion mischaracterizes what occurred. During voir dire by the State,
the following exchange occurred:
Q. Dewan Magee, who lives on Wade Road? Anybody know Mr. Magee?
Mr. Newman? Okay, Mr. Newman and Ms. Wade. Anything about, Ms.
Wade, anything about your knowledge of Mr. Magee, if he was called as a
witness, you could not be fair and impartial?
A. No.
¶13. Wade was never asked whether she was related to Magee. Further, Moore’s counsel
did not follow up on Wade’s response during the State’s voir dire that she knew Magee.
More importantly, Moore’s counsel did not object to Wade being seated on the jury. During
5
the State’s case-in-chief, Moore’s counsel then provided the trial court information that Wade
and Magee had ridden to court together because Magee did not have transportation. The trial
court then held a conference with Wade in which Wade reiterated that nobody had asked if
she was related to Magee, but that she had informed the State that she knew him. Wade also
explicitly stated that she had never discussed the case with Magee. Moore’s counsel later
informed the trial court that she had heard through a relative of Moore that Wade and another
juror knew McChriston’s family. The trial court ultimately removed Wade because of the
possible appearance of impropriety of her riding with Magee. Moore’s counsel did not move
for a mistrial on this ground.
¶14. In Gladney v. Clarksdale Beverage Co., 625 So. 2d 407, 418-19 (Miss. 1993), this
Court said:
Once an allegation of juror misconduct arises, then the next step is to
consider whether an investigation is warranted. In order for the duty to
investigate to arise, the party contending there is misconduct must make an
adequate showing to overcome the presumption in this state of jury
impartiality. Juror polling shall only be permitted by an attorney, outside the
supervision of the court, upon written request.
At the very minimum, it must be shown that there is sufficient evidence
to conclude that good cause exists to believe that there was in fact an improper
outside influence or extraneous prejudicial information.
Gladney v. Clarksdale Beverage Co., 625 So. 2d 407, 418-19 (Miss. 1993). Further, the
“Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice, Rule 3.12 allows the judge to declare
a mistrial only when the harm done would render the defendant without hope of receiving
a fair trial.” Reed v. State, 764 So. 2d 511, 513 (Miss. 2000) (quoting Roundtree v. State,
568 So. 2d 1173, 1178 (Miss. 1990)).
6
¶15. Moore’s counsel failed to inquire during voir dire into Wade’s relationship with
Magee. Moore’s counsel failed to object to Wade being seated on the jury. Moore’s counsel
failed to inform the trial court of any relationship between Wade and Magee until the trial
had already begun. Moore’s counsel failed to move for a mistrial. The trial court thoroughly
investigated the allegations and found that there had been no inappropriate communication.
The trial court removed Wade prior to any deliberations to avoid the appearance of any
impropriety. Further, Magee indicated he did not know anything about the case, and he did
not testify. Moore has failed to establish that good cause exists to believe that improper
outside influence occurred or prejudicial information was exchanged. Accordingly, we find
that this issue is without merit.
IV. Whether the trial court erred in allowing speculative testimony.
¶16. Moore asserts that, during the testimony of Skinner, Moore’s brother, that speculative
testimony was elicited regarding the body weight of McChriston. Moore cites two cases,
Edmonds v. State, 955 So. 2d 787 (Miss. 2007),1 and Balouch v. State, 938 So. 2d 253
(Miss. 2006). However, Edmonds involved speculative testimony of an expert witness.
Edmonds, 955 So. 2d at 791. In Balouch, the Court found that the assignment of error
involving speculative testimony was without merit and that there was no need for discussion.
Balouch, 938 So. 2d at 260. Further, in the instant case, the testimony complained of was
merely an attempt to find out whether Skinner knew if Moore was larger or smaller in
physical size than McChriston. We find that this issue is without merit.
1
Appellate counsel for Moore provided an incorrect citation for this case. We supply the
correct citation.
7
V. Whether the evidence supports a verdict of manslaughter rather than murder.
¶17. Moore asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support a verdict of murder.
Specifically, Moore asserts that the evidence showed that the killing was done in the heat of
passion, thereby mitigating the killing to manslaughter. The State asserts that Moore is
procedurally barred from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence because he did not
renew his motion for directed verdict at the close of his case in chief. The State also asserts
that Moore did not present a peremptory instruction to the trial court or file a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
¶18. This Court, in Wright v. State, 540 So. 2d 1, 3 (Miss. 1989), said:
In Harris v. State, 413 So. 2d 1016, 1018 (Miss.1982), we held:
It is elemental that after a motion for directed verdict is
overruled at the conclusion of the State's evidence, and the
appellant proceeds to introduce evidence in his own behalf, the
point is waived. In order to preserve it, the appellant must renew
his motion for a directed verdict at the conclusion of all the
evidence. Ross v. State, 234 Miss. 309, 106 So. 2d 56 (1958);
Fields v. State, 293 So. 2d 430 (Miss.1974). Also see State v.
Russell, 358 So. 2d 409, 413 (Miss.1978).
The appellants waived error, if any, in the court's refusal to grant them
a directed verdict at the close of the State's case-in-chief when they proceeded
to present evidence in their behalf. Because they did not renew this motion by
way of a motion for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the evidence or via
a motion for a peremptory instruction, any objection they may have had to the
sufficiency of the evidence is waived. Harris v. State, 413 So. 2d 1016, 1018
(Miss.1982).
Wright v. State, 540 So. 2d 1, 3 (Miss. 1989). See also Turner v. State, 721 So. 2d 642, 647
(Miss. 1998); and Green v. State, 631 So. 2d 167, 171 (Miss. 1994).
8
¶19. Moore did move for a directed verdict at the close of the State’s case-in-chief.
However, Moore did not renew this motion at the conclusion of all of the evidence.
Therefore, any objection Moore has to the sufficiency of the evidence has been waived.
Notwithstanding that Moore is procedurally barred from objecting to the sufficiency of the
evidence, we find that this issue is without merit.
¶20. The jury received a manslaughter instruction. Moore agreed to the use of the State’s
manslaughter instruction, S-2, because the proposed defense instruction did not include the
elements of manslaughter. The State’s instruction said, in relevant part:
Therefore, if you should find the State has failed to prove all of the
essential elements of Murder beyond a reasonable doubt, you will then proceed
with your deliberations to decide whether the State has proved beyond a
reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the lesser crime of
Manslaughter.
If you find from the evidence in this Cause, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the Defendant, KENNETH MOORE, JR., on or about August 19, 2007,
in Holmes County, Mississippi, did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
without authority of law, kill Cordarius McChriston, without malice, in the
heat of passion, by the use of a deadly weapon, then you shall find the
Defendant guilty of Manslaughter.
If the State has failed to prove any essential element of the lesser
included offense of Manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt, you shall find
the Defendant, KENNETH MOORE, JR., not guilty.
¶21. The trial court also granted an amended heat-of-passion instruction offered by the
defense, which said:
The term heat of passion is defined as a state of violent and
uncontrollable rage engendered by a blow or certain other provocation given,
which will reduce a homicide from the grade of murder to that of
manslaughter. Passion or anger suddenly aroused at the time by some
immediate and reasonable provocation, by words or acts of one at the time.
The term includes an emotional state of mind characterized by anger, rage,
hatred, furious resentment or terror.
9
¶22. The jury found the defendant guilty of murder, pursuant to instruction S-1, which said:
Kenneth Moore, Jr., has been charged in the indictment with the offense
of murder. If you find from all the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable
doubt that:
1. Kenneth Moore, Jr. on or about August 19, 2007, in Holmes County
Mississippi;
2. did wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and without authority of law;
3. kill and murder Cordarius McChriston, a human being;
4. with malice aforethought or the deliberate design to kill said Cordarius
McChriston;
5. by shooting him with a gun;
then, you shall find the defendant, Kenneth Moore, Jr., guilty of murder as
charged in the indictment.
If the state has failed to prove any one or more of the above listed
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you shall find the defendant,
Kenneth Moore, Jr., not guilty of murder.
¶23. As summarized by the Court of Appeals:
When presented with a claim that the evidence is insufficient to sustain
a conviction, we review the record in “a light most favorable to the State.”
Robinson v. State, 940 So. 2d 235, 239-40 (¶ 13) (Miss. 2006) (citing
McClain v. State, 625 So. 2d 774, 778 (Miss. 1993)). This Court “must accept
as true all evidence consistent with [the defendant's] guilt, together with all
favorable inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence, and
disregard the evidence favorable to the defendant.” Id. at 240 (¶ 13). If the
evidence is “of such quality and weight that, ‘having in mind the beyond a
reasonable doubt burden of proof standard, reasonable fair-minded [persons]
in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions on
every element of the offense,’ the evidence will be deemed to have been
sufficient.” Bush v. State, 895 So. 2d 836, 843 (¶ 16) (Miss. 2005) (quoting
Edwards v. State, 469 So. 2d 68, 70 (Miss. 1985)).
Fair v. State, 25 So. 3d 380, 382-83 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
¶24. Murder is “(1) The killing of a human being without the authority of law by any
means” or “(a) When done with deliberate design to effect the death of the person killed or
of any human being . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(1)(a) (Rev. 2006). Manslaughter is
“[t]he killing of a human being, without malice, in the heat of passion, but in a cruel or
10
unusual manner, or by the use of a dangerous weapon, without authority of law, and not in
necessary self-defense . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-35 (Rev. 2006).
¶25. Moore asserts that the evidence shows he killed McChriston in the heat of passion,
mitigating the killing to manslaughter. Moore’s assertion is not supported by the record in
this matter. Witnesses for both the State and the prosecution testified consistently as to what
occurred on the night in question. Witnesses testified that the fight lasted only a couple of
minutes. Although there was testimony, as mentioned above, that Moore was losing the
fight, the only evidence of injury sustained by Moore was a scrape on his elbow and a bloody
nose.
¶26. Junior Williams, the owner of Club Greasy, specifically said:
Q. And tell us what you saw when you got outside the club?
A. There was a group of guys standing down there at the end of the
driveway.
Q. What were they doing?
A. They wasn’t doing nothing right then. By the time I got to them, they
went to fighting.
...
Q. And how long did this fight last?
A. Probably about three minutes, if that long.
Williams also testified that Moore previously had been told that he was not to be at the club.
¶27. Moore’s brother, Latravis Skinner, broke up the fight, and McChriston and Moore
separated, with McChriston walking back toward the building and Moore walking toward
the end of the driveway. Williams, Skinner, Corey Johnson, and some others talked to
Moore and attempted to calm him down. Williams testified as follows:
Q. [Prosecutor] Tell me what you said to [Moore].
A. I said, “Man, the police are coming now, and you just go and we’ll
forget all of this.” He was like, “All right. I’m through with it.” He
11
walked down and broke to the right and went back up there and went
to shooting.
Williams further testified:
Q. Okay. Well, let me ask you this: When the fight was broken up, was
there any indication that it would continue at some point?
A. After we talked to them, I thought it was through with.
¶28. Gregory Malone testified that, after the fight, Moore stayed down the road talking to
Skinner and the others for approximately fifteen to twenty minutes before he returned and
shot McChriston. Jennifer Grant testified, in relevant part:
Q. Okay. And while you were at this club, did you have an occasion to see
anything that you thought was unusual?
A. Yes.
Q. Tell us what it was.
A. They had an altercation like a fight was going on between Kenny
Moore and [McChriston], and once the fight and everything was over
with, people tried to talk to Kenny Moore.
Q. Who did you see try to talk to Kenny Moore.
A. Corey Johnson and Jamario Johnson and his brother, Travis Skinner.
Q. And how do you know they were trying to talk to Kenny Moore?
A. Because they had broke them up, and they took him to the side.
Q. Okay. And after they – well, did, in fact, you saw them together?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. Did it appear that they did talk to him?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Without telling us what they said, what happened after that
conversation with him?
A. Well, after they got through talking to him, he walked back. I thought
he was like going back to his car or something to sit down.
Q. Okay, now, who is this “he” you’re talking about?
A. Kenny Moore.
Q. Okay.
A. So he just pulled out a gun and shot.
Grant further testified:
Q. Okay. What happened after that?
12
A. [McChriston] ran and jumped off the fence, and he shot at him again.
He fell, and he shot him again. So [McChriston] ran into the Safe
House, and Kenny Moore ran behind him. But he stayed on the Greasy
side and ran down behind him.
¶29. Marilyn Skinner testified that she walked outside the club and saw Moore and
McChriston fighting. She said:
And they was fighting, so it was by my truck. So I said, “Get off my
GD truck.” But they still fighting. They got back, you know, they moved
back from my truck, and then they were just still fighting, and along, and
Travis [Skinner] came, which is Kenny Moore’s brother, and said, “That’s
enough,” picked him up by the arm, and they walked towards the end of the
road. I don’t know how far they went, but that’s what I saw.
Marilyn Skinner further testified:
Q. Okay. Did you see Kenny come back at some time?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. What happened when he came back?
A. I was standing next to the front door of my car, and Lucious, as they
called him, his nickname, and he was standing right beside me, and he
said, “They usually say Kenny Moore carries a gun.” So when he said
that –
Q. Do you know Lucious’ real name?
A. James Griffin, I think.
Q. Okay.
A. And when he said that, I looked around, I seen Kenny Moore coming
back up with his right arm up like this right here with a gun in his hand,
and I took off running from the front of my truck, and I ran into my
sister, and we hit the ground.
¶30. Jermaine Young testified that he had seen a “little argument” between Moore and
McChriston. Young also testified:
After they started arguing, they started fighting. After they got through
fighting, Kenny Moore’s brother comes out of the club and picked him up and
tell him to leave him alone, that it was over with. It was like three or four
more other guys telling them to leave it alone, so like five or ten minutes later,
he come back up and start shooting [McChriston].
13
Young further testified that, after shooting and chasing McChriston, Moore sat on a car in
the parking lot of the Safe House, as McChriston lay dying at the door of the Safe House.
¶31. Corey Johnson testified that Moore said he was going to retrieve his hat after the fight
and that was when Moore shot McChriston.
¶32. This Court previously has said: “Whether a homicide is classified as a murder or
manslaughter is ordinarily an inquiry to be made by the jury.” Hodge v. State, 823 So. 2d
1162 (Miss. 2002). In the instant case, the jury was instructed on both manslaughter and
murder. The jury considered the evidence and concluded that Moore committed murder.
That conclusion is supported by the record in this case. Therefore, this issue is without merit.
CONCLUSION
¶33. We find that no reversible error was committed by the trial court, and that the
evidence supports the verdict of guilty. Therefore, Moore’s judgment of conviction and
sentence of life imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections
is affirmed.
¶34. CONVICTION OF MURDER AND SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISIONMENT
IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
AFFIRMED.
WALLER, C.J., CARLSON, P.J., DICKINSON, RANDOLPH, LAMAR,
KITCHENS, CHANDLER AND PIERCE, JJ., CONCUR.
14