Mississippi State Tax Commission v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. ( 2003 )


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  •                              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
    NO. 2003-CA-00325-SCT
    MISSISSIPPI STATE TAX COMMISSION
    v.
    MURPHY OIL USA, INC.
    ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                            01/21/2003
    TRIAL JUDGE:                                 HON. J. LARRY BUFFINGTON
    COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:                   SIMPSON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:                     SAMUEL T. POLK
    GARY WOOD STRINGER
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:                      JAMIE G. HOUSTON
    W. TERRELL STUBBS
    NATURE OF THE CASE:                          CIVIL - STATE BOARDS AND AGENCIES
    DISPOSITION:                                 REVERSED AND RENDERED -10/13/2005
    MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:                  06/23/2005
    MANDATE ISSUED:
    EN BANC.
    SMITH, CHIEF JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
    ¶1.     The motion for rehearing is granted. The prior opinions are withdrawn, and this opinion
    is substituted therefor.
    ¶2.     In 1999,       the   Mississippi State Tax Commission   (“Commission”)    examined the
    Mississippi Combined Income and Franchise tax returns of Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc. (“Murphy”)
    for the following tax years: 1995, 1996, and 1997.      As a result of this examination, on
    September 30, 1999, the Commission assessed additional franchise taxes and interest against
    Murphy in the amount of $87,952.00.            After two internal agency appeals, Murphy sought
    judicial review in the Chancery Court of Simpson County pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 27-
    13-45 (Rev. 2003). On January 17, 2003, the chancellor ordered that the additional franchise
    tax assessment made by the Commission “shall not be allowed.”                The Commission filed a
    timely appeal to this Court.
    ¶3.     This Court has specifically rejected the Destination Sales Theory and instead looks to
    the volume of business actually conducted in this state. Miss. State Tax Comm’n v. Chevron
    U.S.A., Inc., 
    650 So. 2d 1353
    (Miss. 1995). We also find that the franchise tax imposed does
    not violate the commerce or due process clauses of the United States Constitution. Thus, we
    reverse and render.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶4.     Murphy is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business located in El
    Dorado, Arkansas, and is authorized to do business in the State of Mississippi. Murphy is in
    the business of refining and marketing petroleum products for wholesale and retail purposes.
    As part of its operations, Murphy owned and operated a refinery in Meraux, Louisiana, and
    refined products produced at this refinery were shipped through tank trunks, by barge or
    through a pipeline known as the Collins Pipeline located in Collins, Mississippi.             In addition
    to refining and selling products at wholesale, Murphy also owned and operated service stations
    in Mississippi to sell products at retail.
    ¶5.     The Collins Pipeline starts at Meraux, Louisiana, and terminates at the T&M terminal
    located in Collins, Mississippi.        From 1995 to the present, a corporation by the name of
    Collins Pipeline Company owns Collins Pipeline.            During the tax years in issue, Collins
    2
    Pipeline Company was owned by Murphy and Chalmette Refining, Inc.          The facility at which
    this pipeline terminates, T&M Terminal, is owned by T&M Terminal Company. T&M Terminal
    Company, during the years in question, was also owned by Murphy and Chalmette.
    ¶6.     The T&M terminal at which the Collins Pipeline terminates consists of ten tanks,
    referred to as “breakout tankage” where products shipped on the pipeline can be stored.
    Additionally, at the T&M terminal, there are pipes, valves and other equipment that connect that
    facility to both Colonial Pipeline and Plantation Pipeline to allow for the injection of product
    from the T&M terminal into either of these pipelines.     Colonial Pipeline begins at Pasadena,
    Texas, and terminates in New Jersey, with numerous terminals and facilities along its pipeline
    system in Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Tennessee, Georgia, South Carolina, North
    Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, and New Jersey.      Plantation Pipeline begins in Baton
    Rouge, Louisiana, and terminates in Washington, D.C., with numerous terminals and facilities
    along its pipelines in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Tennessee, Georgia, South Carolina,
    North Carolina, Virginia, and the District of Columbia.
    ¶7.     The sales by Murphy, which the auditor reclassified as Mississippi sales resulting in the
    assessment of additional franchise taxes, were sales made by Murphy where title and control
    of the property sold was transferred to the purchaser at Collins, Mississippi.   The amount of
    these sales for each of the tax years in issue is as follows: (1) tax year 1995 =
    $156,826,131.00; (2) tax year 1996 = $199,285,823.00; and (3) tax year 1997 =
    $155,652,973.00.     The negotiations of these sales began with traders in El Dorado, Arkansas,
    determining what product being manufactured in Meraux is available for sale.      Based upon a
    review of the market conditions, a trader would determine which pipeline would give Murphy
    3
    the greatest return on its sale. After this was determined, the trader would attempt to market
    the product to potential buyers who were willing to purchase the product using the pipeline
    selected.
    ¶8.     The product to be sold belonged to Murphy while it was being shipped from Meraux to
    Collins on the Collins Pipeline and while it was in the breakout tankage at the T&M terminal.
    The product would remain in the breakout tankage at T&M terminal for a few hours up to
    several days. The length of this time the product is stored in Collins, Mississippi depends on
    quantity and product cycle requirements of the pipelines.    Many times, Murphy would already
    have a buyer for the product before it left the refinery in Meraux, Louisiana.   At other times,
    Murphy would not have a buyer for the product until after the product had left the refinery and
    at times, even after it had been placed in the breakout tankage at the T&M terminal. Under the
    terms of the sales at issue, title, possession and control of the product passed from Murphy
    to the purchaser when the product was injected from the T&M terminal into either the Colonial
    Pipeline or the Plantation Pipeline in Collins, Mississippi. Title actually passed as the product
    was being metered when it was injected into the pipelines.      This metering of the injection of
    the product into Colonial or Plantation Pipeline was used by Murphy to bill its purchaser for
    payment.    Upon receipt of the report of this metering that took place in Collins, Mississippi,
    Murphy would bill its customers who would then pay Murphy by wire transfer.
    ¶9.     Upon injection into Colonial or Plantation Pipelines, Murphy had no knowledge of the
    whereabouts of the product or where the product is ultimately offloaded.      Murphy contends
    that these sales are not Mississippi sales for determining its Mississippi sales factor.
    4
    Furthermore, Murphy had not included these sales as sales in any other state in determining
    the sales factors.
    ¶10.     The Commission examined the Mississippi Combined Income and Franchise Tax
    Returns of Murphy for tax years 1995, 1996 and 1997.           As a result of this examination, an
    assessment of additional Mississippi franchise tax and interest was issued against Murphy on
    September 30, 1999.        Murphy, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 27-13-43, appealed this
    assessment to the Board of Review of the Commission for a hearing on this matter.             After
    proper notice and a hearing before the Board of Review on March 9, 2000, the Board entered
    its order affirming the assessment in the original amount of $87,952.00.            Following this
    decision by the Board of Review, Murphy appealed to the full Mississippi State Tax
    Commission for a hearing on the decision of the Board of Review to affirm the tax in question.
    A hearing before the full Commission was held on June 21, 2000. On December 6, 2000, the
    full Commission affirmed the assessment in issue.           Murphy was ordered to pay to the
    Commission the entire assessment of $87,952.00 plus up to date interest.
    ¶11.     Following the decision of the full Commission, Murphy timely filed a petition for
    judicial review in the Chancery Court of Simpson County.             After discovery and trial, the
    chancellor signed a final judgment wherein he ordered “that the additional assessments made
    by the Mississippi State Tax Commission shall not be allowed and that the sales for the years
    in question shall be those that were, in fact, downloaded in the state of Mississippi for final
    destination in the state of Mississippi.”     The Commission timely filed its appeal with this
    Court.
    ISSUES
    5
    I.       Whether the Destination Sales Theory Should Be Applied for
    Franchise Tax Purposes.
    II.      Whether the Franchise Tax Violates of the Commerce or Due
    Process Clauses of the United States Constitution.
    ANALYSIS
    I.
    ¶12.    The chancery court reviewed this matter in a full evidentiary hearing, complete with a
    full record. In Tenneco, Inc. v. Barr, 
    224 So. 2d 208
    , 211 (Miss. 1969), this Court held that
    “[i]t is manifest, from the express provisions of [Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated] § 9220-
    31, that the Legislature has made it the public policy of this state to provide a full evidentiary
    judicial hearing in cases of the character now under consideration.”          Section 9220-31 is the
    predecessor to the applicable current Miss. Code Ann. §§                 27-7-73 (income tax–judicial
    review) and 27-13-45 (franchise tax–judicial review).           In Tenneco, as well as in the present
    matter, “the chancellor heard evidence and determined the cause as in ‘other cases’ as provided
    by the 
    statute.” 224 So. 2d at 210
    . Thus, in accordance with Tenneco the chancellor in this
    case reviewed evidence and determined the cause under the authority of §§ 27-7-73 and 27-13-
    45. Therefore, this Court must now ascertain whether or not the chancery court arrived at the
    proper determination.
    ¶13.    Murphy argues that the chancellor’s ruling should be affirmed because § 27-7-23 (c)(3)
    (Rev. 1991) provides for the application of the Destination Sales Theory to determine those
    “sales” assignable to Mississippi for purposes of any formula in which a sales factor is
    included regardless of ownership, title, control or risk of loss.
    6
    ¶14.    This Court has rejected the Destination Sales Theory as a way to account for
    Mississippi receipts for franchise tax purposes.         However, Murphy indicates that § 27-7-
    23(c)(3) (Rev. 1991) provides for application of the Destination Sales Theory to determine
    whether sales are assignable to Mississippi for franchise tax purposes.       This conclusion is
    inconsistent with Mississippi State Tax Comm’n v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 
    650 So. 2d 1353
    (Miss. 1995).
    ¶15.    In Chevron, this Court noted that the destination theory was specifically rejected by this
    Court as a way to account for Mississippi receipts for franchise tax purposes.       
    Id. at 1357.
    This Court specifically stated that “franchise tax is imposed on a corporation based on what is
    actually being done in Mississippi, regardless of the ultimate destination of the product.”    
    Id. (citing Southern
    Package Corp v. State Tax Comm’n, 
    195 Miss. 864
    , 
    15 So. 2d 436
    , 437-38
    (1944)). In Chevron, Chevron claimed that its records were maintained on a destination and
    origin basis and that it only attributed a sale as being in Mississippi when the customer
    physically came to the state or the product was consumed in the state. 
    Id. at 1359.
    However,
    this Court specifically stated that “this does not reflect the volume of business that Chevron
    conducts within this State, the basis on which franchise tax liability is now determined.” 
    Id. (emphasis added).
    The same version of § 27-7-23 was in effect when Chevron was decided.
    Moreover, in accordance with Chevron, a franchise tax is measured by the volume of business
    conducted in Mississippi and not the ultimate destination.
    II.
    7
    ¶16.    Furthermore, Murphy contends that Mississippi’s claiming these sales on the basis that
    the sales are not being claimed by another state violates the commerce clause.         On the other
    hand, the Commission argues that these sales should be treated as Mississippi sales unless
    Murphy can show the sales are being reported or assigned to another state. Murphy provides
    that Mississippi cannot assign these sales unless the taxing statute so provides and such
    assignment does not offend the due process and the commerce clauses.                   First of all,
    Mississippi can assign these sales because the franchise tax statute does allow Mississippi to
    tax these activities.    Furthermore, the taxing statute also provides that Mississippi can assign
    these sales if “the taxpayer is not taxable in the state of the purchaser.” Miss. Code Ann. § 27-
    7-23 (c)(3)(ii)(b) (Rev. 1991). Murphy had no knowledge of the whereabouts of the product
    or its ultimate destination and was not taxed by the state of the purchaser.             Therefore,
    Mississippi can tax these sales unless such a tax would violate the commerce clause.
    ¶17.    Murphy concludes that treating the sales as Mississippi sales under the facts of this
    case would violate the commerce clause and due process clauses under the four-part Complete
    Auto test as provided for in Marx v. Truck Renting & Leasing Ass’n, Inc., 
    520 So. 2d 1333
    ,
    1342-43 (Miss. 1987) (citing Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady, 
    430 U.S. 274
    , 
    97 S. Ct. 1076
    , 51 L. Ed. 2d (1977)). This test requires that “(1) [t]he tax must be applied to an activity
    with a substantial nexus with the taxing state; (2) the tax must be fairly apportioned; (3) the tax
    must not discriminate against interstate commerce; (4) the tax must be fairly related to
    services provided by the taxing state. 
    Marx, 520 So. 2d at 1342-43
    . However, Murphy only
    argues that the first and fourth prongs of the test are violated.
    1. Nexus with the Taxing State
    8
    ¶18.    Murphy contends that the tax does not have a substantial nexus with Mississippi. As this
    Court has stated, the mere fact that income is generated outside this state will not prevent
    taxation of that income, for purposes of the commerce clause challenge, so long as there is
    a nexus between the tax and the transaction within the taxing state. Id at 1343.
    ¶19.    In order to satisfy the minimal connection prong of the four-prong test, the corporation
    being taxed must avail itself of “the substantial privilege of carrying on business within the
    state.” Miss. State Tax Comm'n v. Bates, 
    567 So. 2d 190
    , 193 (Miss. 1990) (citing Marx
    v. Truck Renting & Leasing Ass’n, Inc., 
    520 So. 2d 1333
    , 1342 (Miss. 1987)). The taxing
    power exerted by the state must bear a fiscal relation to protections, opportunities, and
    benefits given by the state so that the state may properly ask return for what it has given the
    taxpayer.      
    Id. In determining
    whether the first prong is met, the inquiry must focus on the
    underlying activities conducted within the state and in order for the taxpayer to avoid such
    taxation it must show the income was derived from activities unrelated to activities conducted
    within the taxing state. 
    Id. ¶20. Again,
    franchise taxation is based on what is actually being done or carried on in
    Mississippi.     In addition to being merely stored in Mississippi for periods not exceeding five
    days, the product was metered when it was stored in Collins, Mississippi, which was the basis
    for Murphy to bill its purchasers for the sale.         In addition to being metered and billed in
    Mississippi, the transfer of title, ownership and control of the product also occurred in
    Collins, Mississippi.     Once metered and billed in Mississippi, the purchasers took absolute
    control of the product, and Murphy had no knowledge of the whereabouts of the product or its
    ultimate destination. Therefore, Murphy did not merely store the fuel in Mississippi, and there
    9
    is a substantial nexus to warrant franchise taxation.        A franchise tax is measured by what is
    actually being done or carried on in Mississippi, which is exactly what occurred when Murphy
    stored, metered, billed and transferred title and ownership of the petroleum products.
    Therefore, there is a substantial nexus between the tax and the transaction within Mississippi.
    2. Tax Fairly Apportioned
    ¶21.    The party opposing the tax must show by clear and cogent evidence that the tax is out
    of proportion to the activity which takes place in Mississippi.           Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v.
    Marx, 
    594 So. 2d 615
    , 618 (Miss. 1992); Marx v. Truck Renting & Leasing Ass’n, 
    Inc., 520 So. 2d at 1344
    .         Murphy does not specifically address the second prong of the test;
    nevertheless, we will address this issue. Murphy merely asserts that an inclusion of the sales
    at issue into the franchise tax apportionment formula results in an inconsistent tax assessment
    by the Commission.        Murphy      suggests that the Commission’s determination of the sales at
    issue as “Mississippi Receipts” leads to a less than equitable tax level after calculation of the
    franchise tax apportionment formula.       Murphy infers that due to the Commission’s designation
    of these sales as “Mississippi Receipts”, and the subsequent inclusion of these sales in the
    numerator of the franchise tax formula, results in an improper tax franchise.
    ¶22.    As previously determined under the first prong a franchise tax is measured by what is
    actually being done or carried on in Mississippi, which is exactly what occurred when Murphy
    stored, metered, billed and transferred title and ownership of the petroleum products.
    Therefore, it is proper to include these sales in the franchise tax apportionment formula
    because the franchise tax statute does allow Mississippi to tax these activities.           Further,
    10
    Murphy does not present any clear and cogent evidence to the contrary. Thus, the Commission
    fairly apportioned the franchise tax under the apportionment formula.
    3. No Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce
    ¶23.    Murphy does not address the third prong of the test, nevertheless we must consider this
    element. In Marx, this Court decreed that “[i]f the tax causes so called ‘double taxation’ so
    that an interstate taxpayer is subjected to two taxes on the same income that an intrastate
    taxpayer would pay one tax on, then the tax is said to be discriminatory.” Marx v. Truck
    Renting & Leasing Ass'n 
    Inc., 520 So. 2d at 1345
    , citing Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 
    467 U.S. 638
    , 
    104 S. Ct. 2620
    , 
    81 L. Ed. 2d 540
    (1984). Further, “[a] state tax that favors an in-state
    business over an out-of-state business for the sole reason of location is prohibited by the
    commerce clause.” Tenn. Gas 
    Pipeline, 594 So. 2d at 618
    . Murphy is not subject to double
    taxation as a result of the franchise tax in this case, nor does the franchise tax imposed
    discriminate against interstate commerce in favor of intrastate commerce.                     Therefore, the
    franchise tax is not discriminatory, and this prong of the test is satisfied.
    4. Tax is Fairly Related to Services of the State
    ¶24.    The final prong of the test determines whether the activity which generated the income
    is related to the activities conducted in Mississippi.            Additionally, “the fourth prong of the
    Complete Auto test thus focuses on the wide range of benefits provided to the taxpayer, not
    just the precise activity connected to the interstate activity at issue.”           Goldberg v. Sweet, 
    488 U.S. 252
    , 267, 
    109 S. Ct. 582
    , 592, 
    102 L. Ed. 2d 607
    (1989).                   In the present case, all of the
    activities mentioned above occurred in Mississippi and relate to the particular sales in
    question.    Moreover, Murphy receives police and fire protection, use of transit in Mississippi
    11
    and other advantages of civilized society. D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 
    486 U.S. 24
    , 32,
    
    108 S. Ct. 1619
    , 1624, 
    100 L. Ed. 2d 21
    (1988). “Furthermore, [Murphy] is currently availing
    itself of the use of our court system.”   Tenn. Gas 
    Pipeline, 594 So. 2d at 619
    . “It follows that
    [Murphy] should pay its share of the tax burden in Mississippi although it is involved in
    interstate commerce.” Tenn. Gas 
    Pipeline, 594 So. 2d at 619
    , citing American Trucking
    Ass’ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 
    483 U.S. 266
    , 296, 
    107 S. Ct. 2829
    , 2846, 
    97 L. Ed. 2d 226
    , 251
    (1987).
    ¶25.      Consequently, there is a fair relationship between the services provided by Mississippi
    in allowing the sales to occur and the value of those sales. Hence the fourth and final prong of
    the test is satisfied.
    ¶26.      The franchise tax imposed by the Commission has a sufficient nexus with Mississippi,
    is fairly apportioned under the apportionment formula, does not discriminate against interstate
    commerce in favor of intrastate commerce, and is fairly related to services provided by
    Mississippi.     Therefore, contrary to Murphy’s contention, the franchise tax imposed by the
    Commission does not violate of the commerce or due process clauses of the United States
    Constitution.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶27.      For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the chancery court, and we render
    judgment reinstating and affirming the order of the Mississippi State Tax Commission.
    ¶28.      REVERSED AND RENDERED.
    WALLER AND COBB, P.JJ., EASLEY, CARLSON, DICKINSON AND
    RANDOLPH, JJ., CONCUR. GRAVES, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN
    OPINION. DIAZ, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
    12