Thelma R. Koestler v. Mississippi Baptist Medical Center ( 2009 )


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  •                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
    NO. 2009-CA-00603-SCT
    THELMA R. KOESTLER AND LEO C. (MICKEY)
    KOESTLER, DECEASED, BY AND THROUGH
    THELMA R. KOESTLER
    v.
    MISSISSIPPI BAPTIST HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC.;
    BAPTIST MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC.;
    BAPTIST BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES;
    WILLIAM S. COOK, JR., M.D., P.A.; WILLIAM S.
    COOK, JR., M.D., INDIVIDUALLY AND/OR IN HIS
    CAPACITY AS AN EMPLOYEE OF MISSISSIPPI
    BAPTIST MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC., AND/OR IN
    HIS CAPACITY AS AN EMPLOYEE OF
    MISSISSIPPI BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER, INC.,
    AND/OR IN HIS CAPACITY AS MEDICAL
    DIRECTOR OF BAPTIST SENIOR BEHAVIORAL
    HEALTH SERVICES; KHARI A. OMOLARA, P.C.;
    KHARI A. OMOLARA, M.D., INDIVIDUALLY
    AND/OR IN HIS CAPACITY AS AN EMPLOYEE
    OF MISSISSIPPI BAPTIST HEALTH SYSTEMS,
    INC., AND/OR IN HIS CAPACITY AS AN
    EMPLOYEE OF MISSISSIPPI BAPTIST MEDICAL
    CENTER, INC., AND/OR IN HIS CAPACITY AS
    CONTRACTOR OF BAPTIST BEHAVIORAL
    HEALTH SERVICES; GRACE SCOTT, R.N.,
    INDIVIDUALLY AND/OR IN HER CAPACITY AS
    AN EMPLOYEE OF MISSISSIPPI BAPTIST
    HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC., AND/OR IN HER
    CAPACITY AS AN EMPLOYEE OF MISSISSIPPI
    BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER, INC., AND/OR IN
    HER CAPACITY AS EMPLOYEE OF BAPTIST
    BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES; TIFFANY
    PARKER, L.S.W., INDIVIDUALLY AND/OR IN
    HER CAPACITY AS AN EMPLOYEE OF
    MISSISSIPPI BAPTIST HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC.,
    AND/OR IN HER CAPACITY AS AN EMPLOYEE
    OF MISSISSIPPI BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER,
    INC., AND/OR IN HER CAPACITY AS EMPLOYEE
    OF BAPTIST BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES;
    BECKY IVEY, O.T., INDIVIDUALLY AND/OR IN
    HER CAPACITY AS AN EMPLOYEE OF
    MISSISSIPPI BAPTIST HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC.,
    AND/OR IN HER CAPACITY AS AN EMPLOYEE
    OF MISSISSIPPI BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER,
    INC., AND/OR IN HER CAPACITY AS EMPLOYEE
    OF BAPTIST BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES;
    S. INMAN, R.N., INDIVIDUALLY AND/OR IN HER
    CAPACITY AS AN EMPLOYEE OF MISSISSIPPI
    BAPTIST HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC., AND/OR IN
    HER CAPACITY AS AN EMPLOYEE OF
    MISSISSIPPI BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER, INC.,
    AND/OR IN HER CAPACITY AS AN EMPLOYEE
    OF BAPTIST BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES;
    AND STACEY ASHLEY, INDIVIDUALLY
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                         03/18/2009
    TRIAL JUDGE:                              HON. W. SWAN YERGER
    COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:                HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS:                 MARCIE T. SOUTHERLAND
    BRANAN P. SOUTHERLAND
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:                  EUGENE R. NAYLOR
    REX M. SHANNON, III
    ANASTASIA G. JONES
    CLIFFORD B. AMMONS
    LORRAINE W. BOYKIN
    WHITMAN B. JOHNSON, III
    FRANK F. FARMER
    NATURE OF THE CASE:                       CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY
    DISPOSITION:                              AFFIRMED - 10/07/2010
    MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
    MANDATE ISSUED:
    GRAVES, P.J., DICKINSON AND CHANDLER, JJ.
    DICKINSON, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
    ¶1.   After voluntarily seeking treatment at a mental-health facility, Thelma Koestler claims
    she changed her mind and demanded that she be released. Because the facility refused to
    2
    release her, she filed suit against numerous defendants, alleging several causes of action,
    including false imprisonment. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based
    in part on the running of the statute of limitations. We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2.    On October 2, 2006, at the urging of her children, Thelma Koestler voluntarily
    admitted herself to Mississippi Baptist Medical Center (“Baptist”) for treatment of what
    Thelma called “mild depression” caused by the imminent death of her husband of more than
    fifty years. She claims she changed her mind on the same day she was admitted, and
    demanded to be released, but her doctor refused her request, ordering instead that she be held
    in a locked ward.
    ¶3.    On October 11, 2006, Thelma’s daughter filed an affidavit for civil commitment with
    the Hinds County Chancery Clerk. On October 16, 2006, a special master conducted a
    hearing which resulted in an order of civil commitment.1 Thelma was then transferred to the
    Mississippi State Hospital on October 24, 2006, and was released on November 3, 2006.
    ¶4.    On October 1, 2007, Thelma filed suit against her doctors, Baptist, and Baptist’s staff,
    alleging false imprisonment, assault and battery, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction
    of emotional distress, and loss of consortium. On January 29, 2008, pursuant to Mississippi
    Rule of Civil Procedure 41,2 Thelma voluntarily dismissed her complaint and refiled on
    January 30, 2008.
    1
    Thelma successfully appealed her civil commitment in Koestler v. Koestler, 
    976 So. 2d 372
    (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
    2
    Miss. R. Civ. P. 41.
    3
    ¶5.       Dr. Khari A. Omolara filed a motion for summary judgment, which was joined by all
    defendants. On March 19, 2009, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
    defendants, finding, among other things, that Thelma’s claims were barred by the statute of
    limitations. From that order, Thelma appeals and raises several issues, including her
    argument that the trial judge erred in holding that the statute of limitations bars her suit.
    Because we find the statute-of-limitations issue dispositive, we decline to address the other
    issues.
    ANALYSIS
    ¶6.       We apply a de novo standard of review to the trial court’s grant or denial of a motion
    for summary judgment.3 A motion for summary judgment “shall” be granted by a court “if
    the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with
    the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
    moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 4
    ¶7.       We also review statute-of-limitations issues under a de novo standard.5 Thelma
    admits that all her claims are governed by Mississippi Code Section 15-1-35, which provides
    a one-year statute of limitations, and that absent some tolling provision, the statute of
    3
    Moss v. Batesville Casket Co., 
    935 So. 2d 393
    , 398 (Miss. 2006) (citations omitted).
    4
    M.R.C.P. 56(c).
    5
    Marshall v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 
    7 So. 3d 210
    , 213 (Miss. 2009) (citing Champluvier
    v. Beck, 
    909 So. 2d 1061
    , 1063 (Miss. 2004)).
    4
    limitations would have expired on October 2, 2007 – one year from the date of the beginning
    of Thelma’s alleged false imprisonment.6
    ¶8.    Although Thelma filed her original complaint on October 1, 2007, she did not serve
    Dr. Omolara or the other defendants. Instead, on January 29, 2008, she voluntarily dismissed
    the complaint pursuant to Rule 41 7 and, on January 30, 2008, filed a second complaint based
    on identical facts.
    ¶9.    Ordinarily, the filing of a complaint tolls the statute of limitations.8 But we have held
    that
    a voluntary dismissal without prejudice does not deprive the defendant of any
    defense he may be entitled to make to the new suit, nor confer any new right
    or advantage on the complainant (plaintiff), and hence it will not have the
    effect of excepting from the period prescribed by the statute of limitations, the
    time during which that suit was pending.9
    ¶10.   Thelma argues her claim is timely because when she filed the original complaint, one
    day remained before the statute of limitations expired. She says filing the complaint tolled
    the statute for 120 days until January 29, 2008, and she filed suit the following day, January
    30, 2008.
    6
    Because Thelma stipulated that all her claims were subject to a one-year statute of
    limitations, the question of whether Section 15-1-35 of the Mississippi Code does in fact cover each
    of those claims is not before this Court. Therefore, today we do not address which torts are subject
    to the provisions of that code section and which are not.
    7
    M.R.C.P. 41(a)(1)(i).
    8
    Erby v. Cox, 
    654 So. 2d 503
    , 504-05 (Miss. 1995).
    9
    Marshall, 7 So. 3d at 213 (Miss. 2009) (emphasis added) (quoting Smith v. Copiah
    County, 
    232 Miss. 838
    , 
    100 So. 2d 614
    , 616 (1958)).
    5
    ¶11.   But Thelma provides no argument as to why the rule in Marshall should not apply.
    Her voluntary dismissal of the first complaint deprived her of the tolling normally provided
    by filing a complaint. So the statute of limitations ran long before the second suit was filed.
    ¶12.   Thelma next argues that “retroactively” applying this rule would be fundamentally
    unfair. However, our decision is not based on new law,10 and her argument has no merit.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶13.   The filing of a complaint does not toll the statute of limitations when the plaintiff
    voluntarily dismisses the suit. Thelma voluntarily dismissed her first complaint, so the
    statute of limitations was not tolled, and it ran approximately four months before she filed
    her second complaint. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    ¶14.   AFFIRMED.
    WALLER, C.J., CARLSON AND GRAVES, P.JJ., RANDOLPH, LAMAR,
    KITCHENS, CHANDLER AND PIERCE, JJ., CONCUR.
    10
    Smith, 100 So. 2d at 616; W.T. Raleigh Co. v. Barnes, 
    143 Miss. 597
    , 
    109 So. 8
    , 9( 1926);
    Nevitt v. Bacon, 
    32 Miss. 212
    , 
    1856 WL 4011
    , *10 (Miss. Err. & App. 1856).
    6