Sheila Ealey v. State of Mississippi , 2015 Miss. LEXIS 80 ( 2015 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2013-KA-01800-SCT
SHEILA EALEY
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/28/2013
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. WILLIAM E. CHAPMAN, III
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: MICHAEL GUEST
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 02/12/2015
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE RANDOLPH, P.J., KITCHENS AND COLEMAN, JJ.
COLEMAN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Sheila Ealey gave birth to a baby boy in a hotel room, wrapped the baby in a
comforter, put him in a suitcase, and left the suitcase behind her church. A jury found her
guilty of capital murder with the underlying felony of child abuse, and the circuit court
sentenced her to life without parole. On appeal, Ealey asserts that the trial court erred in
refusing an accident-or-misfortune jury instruction and that the evidence was insufficient to
support the guilty verdict. She also urges the Court to abandon and replace the M’Naghten 1
Rule on insanity. Ealey’s issues lack merit. We affirm.
1
M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
Factual Background
¶2. Sheila Ealey claims a man abducted and raped her in September 2009. Ealey did not
tell anyone. Several months later, Ealey discovered that she was pregnant. She did not tell
anyone that she was pregnant; her family and coworkers never realized it. At that time,
Ealey was a forty-one-year-old single mother of five children. Ealey’s oldest daughter was
a nurse, her oldest son was in high school, and her three youngest children were in middle
school. According to her children, Ealey provided for them and was a good mother. Ealey
worked at a church daycare, and her coworkers said she was a good teacher. Ealey attended
Smith Chapel Baptist Church with her family, and she was involved in many church
activities.
¶3. Ealey’s great-uncle, Victor Washington, was the groundskeeper at Smith Chapel. On
July 1, 2010, Washington was mowing grass at the church when he noticed a suitcase
partially hidden in a wooded area behind the church. Although he thought it was strange, he
did not then inspect the suitcase. The suitcase was still there when Washington returned the
following day, and Washington called a church trustee to inspect it. The trustee was Calvin
Ealey, who happened to be Ealey’s father. Carolyn Robinson, Ealey’s aunt, arrived at the
church with her brother Calvin. As the trio approached the suitcase, they saw green flies
swarming around it, and they suspected that something might be dead. They called the
sheriff’s department without ever touching the suitcase.
¶4. Madison County Sheriff Deputy Jimmy Knight responded and retrieved the suitcase.
Inside the suitcase, Deputy Knight found a comforter stuffed into a black trash bag. As he
inspected the contents, he saw blood and a baby’s hand. Deputy Knight called Sheriff’s
2
Investigator Robin Welch, who came to the church with the police chief. Welch
photographed the scene and called the coroner. Later that day, Welch was notified that Ealey
was at the Sheriff’s Department, and she wanted to speak to an investigator. Welch advised
Ealey of her Miranda rights,2 which she said she understood, and she signed a waiver-of-
rights form. Ealey then gave a verbal statement.
¶5. Ealey told Welch that she had been raped in September 2009. In January 2010, she
discovered she was pregnant, and she thought the pregnancy resulted from the rape. Ealey
did not tell anyone about the rape or the pregnancy, and she did not seek prenatal care. On
Saturday, June 26, 2010, Ealey woke up with labor pains. She left home around 1:00 p.m.,
taking a suitcase and a bed comforter. The suitcase was empty except for a trash bag that she
used for laundry when she traveled. Ealey went to the Super-8 Motel in Gluckstadt and
checked in. She spread the comforter on the floor and gave birth to a child on the motel
room floor.
¶6. Ealey said that she fell asleep after giving birth. When she woke up, she wrapped the
baby in the comforter, put the comforter in the suitcase, and put the suitcase in the trunk of
her car. Ealey then drove to Smith Chapel and left the suitcase behind the church. Ealey
went home, took a bath, and washed her clothes. She did not tell anyone what happened.
Ealey attended church at Smith Chapel the following morning, but she said she could not sit
through the entire service. Ealey’s verbal statement was not recorded, but she provided a
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3
written statement as well. In her written statement, Ealey wrote that she intended to go back
to the church and take the child to a hospital.
¶7. Welch conducted three interviews with Ealey and obtained two written statements.
Her story was consistent each time with two exceptions: (1) whether Ealey had heard the
baby cry, and (2) whether anyone other than the attacker could have been the baby’s father.
During the first interview on July 2, Ealey said she heard the baby cry only once in the motel
room before she wrapped the child in the comforter and put him in the suitcase. In her
written statement given the same day, she wrote, “I am not sure if the baby was crying, I did
hear it initially but after that I’m not sure.” During a second interview the following day,
Ealey said the baby cried twice – once at birth and once when she was putting the suitcase
in the trunk. Investigator Todd Wilson was present for the second interview, and he
confirmed that Ealey said the baby cried twice. Ealey later told a psychologist that “she
thought she heard a baby cry, but she wasn’t sure.”
¶8. During the interviews on July 2 and 3, the implication was that the pregnancy resulted
from the rape, and Ealey did not suggest that anyone other than the attacker could have been
the father of the child. In her written statement from July 2, she wrote, “I had been carrying
the incident around with me and to think I had to have a baby with someone who had raped
me. I couldn’t wrap my mind around it.” Several days later, on July 7, Ealey contacted
Welch and told him that Jerry Bolden, her longtime boyfriend and the father of four of her
children, could have been the father. She provided a written statement confirming that
“Bolden could possibly be the father of the child.” DNA testing later confirmed that Bolden
was the father.
4
¶9. A Madison County grand jury indicted Ealey for capital murder with the underlying
felony of child abuse. Ealey entered a plea of not guilty, and she presented an insanity
defense at trial.3 Dr. Feng Li, who had performed the baby’s autopsy, was accepted as an
expert in forensic pathology. Dr. Li testified that he did not determine cause of death when
he did the autopsy.4 However, after reviewing details from the investigation, Dr. Li opined
that the cause of death was “more likely than not asphyxia” and that the manner of death was
homicide.
¶10. Ealey’s son, Jerald Ealey, was called as a witness for the defense. Jerald testified that
Ealey was the sole provider for her children and that she received little support from his
father, Bolden. Jerald said his mother was very protective of her children and that they
confided in her. Jerald testified that he went to church with Ealey the day after the incident.
He said she looked fine, but she did not feel well and did not go to lunch with the family after
church that day.
¶11. The defense also called Dr. Gerald O’Brien, and he was accepted as an expert in
forensic psychology. Dr. O’Brien had evaluated Ealey and performed a full psychological
assessment. He testified that Ealey’s IQ was in the low-average range and that she did not
exhibit signs of malingering. He testified that Ealey was suffering from major depression
3
Ealey was indicted in October 2010, and trial was set initially for July 2011. After
multiple continuances, agreed to by both parties, Ealey’s trial took place in August 2013.
4
Dr. Li testified: “At the time of the autopsy, . . . I didn’t have all of the information
available, and a lot of times we don’t want to delay the signing out or finishing a case for too
long, so I leave that cause and manner of death undetermined for the possibility of future.
If we have more information, new information, then we can always change to other cause
or manner of death.”
5
and anxiety and that she had been for at least one year prior to the incident. Dr. O’Brien
opined that there was “clear evidence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time
of the alleged offense” and, in his opinion, “strongly suggestive evidence” indicated that
Ealey “was unable to know the nature and quality of her acts [and] the difference between
right and wrong” at the time of the incident. However, he could not say “to a reasonable
degree of scientific, psychological, or mental certainty” that Ealey did not know right from
wrong at the time of the incident. And, to the contrary, he admitted that Ealey’s statements
that she would never hurt anyone, especially a child, and the fact that she turned herself in
and wanted to make a confession reflected an understanding that she had done something
wrong. Dr. O’Brien testified that, in his opinion, no one could say with any degree of
certainty whether Ealey was sane at the time of the incident.
¶12. The State presented several lay witnesses and expert witnesses to rebut Ealey’s claim
that she was insane at the time she committed the offense. Three of Ealey’s coworkers were
called to testify. Ealey had worked at the daycare for a year and a half, and she worked with
four-year-old children. The assistant director of the daycare testified that Ealey was a good
teacher, that she got along well with the other teachers, and that the parents and children
liked her. Likewise, another coworker testified that Ealey “did a great job” and that the
parents and children loved her. They each testified that Ealey did not exhibit any odd or
irrational behavior in the week leading up the incident, and they did not have any indication
that Ealey was mentally ill or unstable. Each coworker testified that, in their opinion, Ealey
knew the difference between right and wrong at that time.
6
¶13. The State called Dr. Criss Lott as an expert in forensic psychology. Dr. Lott had
evaluated Ealey, performed personality and psychological testing, reviewed information
about the case, and interviewed Ealey’s family and coworkers. The purpose of Dr. Lott’s
evaluation was to assess Ealey’s mental state at the time of the offense and to determine
whether she was capable of assisting in the preparation of her defense. Dr. Lott interviewed
Ealey’s five children, her brother, and the daycare director. He testified that Ealey’s family
members did not notice any odd behavior before the incident. Dr. Lott said Ealey reported
that she was experiencing depression, which was consistent with his clinical observations.
However, Dr. Lott saw Ealey only after the incident, when she was incarcerated, and he
explained that “it would not be uncommon” for a person in Ealey’s situation to suffer from
situational depression and anxiety. Dr. Lott administered an intellectual capacity and
functioning test, and Ealey scored in the average to low-average range. Dr. Lott did not think
Ealey was malingering regarding her intelligence or exaggerating her depression.
¶14. Dr. Lott opined that Ealey was suffering from major depression when he saw her, but
that her depression could have been ongoing for some time prior to the incident. However,
he did not believe that, prior to the incident, her depression was so severe that she could not
function. Dr. Lott also opined that depression was entirely different from insanity and that
Ealey was not insane. Dr. Lott’s opinion, which he testified was to a “reasonable degree of
psychological certainty,” was that Ealey would have been able to understand what she was
doing and that she would have been able to understand the difference in right and wrong at
the time she gave birth. He testified that, in his opinion, Ealey knew that what she did was
wrong. Dr. Lott explained that Ealey had exhibited remorse after the incident and said that
7
she felt significant guilt, which was evidence that she understood she had done something
wrong. However, in his report, he concluded that, although Ealey did not meet the
M’Naghten criteria for insanity,5 he thought “her depression adversely affected her ability
to respond rationally to her situation and to conform her conduct to the requirements of the
law.”
¶15. Dr. Reb McMichael, who was accepted as an expert in forensic psychiatry, also
evaluated Ealey and testified for the State. Dr. McMichael opined that Ealey had
experienced depression and anxiety off and on for many years. However, in his opinion, at
the time of the offense, Ealey knew the nature and quality of her actions and knew right from
wrong. In talking to Dr. McMichael, Ealey did not mention hearing the baby cry at birth; she
said when she woke up “there was silence.” Ealey told Dr. McMichael that she did not mean
to harm the baby, but she was being selfish and thinking about herself and she just wanted
it to be over. Dr. McMichael testified that, in his opinion, Ealey was not suffering from a
major mental disorder when the incident occurred. Like Dr. Lott, Dr. McMichael opined that
situational depression and anxiety for a person in jail was not unusual and, in fact, it would
have been unusual if Ealey was not depressed or anxious.
¶16. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Ealey guilty of capital murder with the
underlying felony of child abuse. The court sentenced Ealey to life imprisonment without
5
M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). The M’Naghten test for determining
insanity is whether the accused knew right from wrong at the time the act was committed.
See Woodham v. State, 779 So. 2d 158, 163 (¶ 27) (Miss. 2001); Russell v. State, 729 So.
2d 781, 784 (Miss. 1997).
8
parole. Ealey filed a Motion for Acquittal Notwithstanding the Verdict or for New Trial,
which was denied. Ealey appealed.
Analysis
¶17. Ealey was convicted of capital murder with the underlying felony of child abuse under
Mississippi Code Sections 97-5-39(a)(2) and 97-3-19(2)(f). She raises three issues on
appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in refusing her accident-or-misfortune jury
instruction; (2) whether the evidence of capital murder was sufficient and whether the verdict
was contrary to the weight of the evidence; and (3) whether the M’Naghten Rule on insanity
should be abandoned and replaced.
I. Whether the trial court erred in refusing Ealey’s accident-or-
misfortune jury instruction.
¶18. The standard of review for a trial court’s grant or denial of a jury instruction is abuse
of discretion. Newell v. State, 49 So. 3d 66, 73 (¶ 20) (Miss. 2010). Ealey submitted an
accident-or-misfortune jury instruction under Mississippi Code Section 97-3-17(a). That
section provides: “The killing of any human being by the act, procurement, or omission of
another shall be excusable: (a) When committed by accident and misfortune in doing any
lawful act by lawful means, with usual and ordinary caution, and without any unlawful
intent[.]” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-17 (Rev. 2014). If the jury finds that a killing occurred
by accident or misfortune while doing “a lawful act by lawful means with usual and ordinary
caution and without any unlawful intent,” then it is considered “excusable homicide” and is
not punishable. Burge v. State, 472 So. 2d 392, 395 (Miss. 1985) (citing Miss. Code Ann.
§ 97-3-17(a) (1972)).
9
¶19. Ealey’s proposed accident-or-misfortune jury instruction read:
The Court instructs the jury that if you find that the baby Ealey died as the
result of accident or misfortune while Sheila Ealey was engaged in a lawful act
by lawful means, with usual and ordinary caution, and without unlawful intent,
then you shall find the Defendant, Sheila Ealey, not guilty of Capital Murder
as charged in the indictment, and return your verdict as follows: “We, the Jury,
find the Defendant, Sheila Ealey, not guilty of Capital Murder, as charged in
the indictment, by reason of accident or misfortune.”
The trial judge denied the instruction, holding that there was no evidentiary basis to support
an accident-or-misfortune instruction. Ealey claims that the evidence did support the
instruction, because the evidence presented was inconclusive regarding when the baby died
and the manner of death. Part of Ealey’s defense at trial was that, if the baby’s death was
caused by accident or misfortune, then the homicide was excusable. Thus, Ealey claims that,
by refusing the accident-or-misfortune jury instruction, the trial court did not allow her to
present her theory of the case to the jury. While a defendant is entitled to have jury
instructions given that present his theory of the case, that entitlement is not without limits –
“the court may refuse an instruction [that] incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly
elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence.” Newell, 49 So. 3d
at 74 (¶ 20) (quoting Hearn v. State, 3 So. 3d 722, 738 (¶ 45) (Miss. 2008)).
¶20. We have held that “[j]ury instructions should be given only when facts developed in
the case being tried support them.” Simmons v. State, 805 So. 2d 452, 473 (¶ 30) (Miss.
2001). The trial court will not be put in error for denying a jury instruction when the
evidence was insufficient to support the instruction. Id. See also Batiste v. State, 121 So.
3d 808, 845-46 (¶ 75) (Miss. 2013); Robinson v. State, 758 So. 2d 480, 489 (¶ 37) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2000). In Robinson v. State, the defendant requested an accident-or-misfortune
10
instruction for the theory that his gun accidentally went off when he was trying to break up
a fight. Robinson, 758 So. 2d at 489 (¶ 34). No one testified that Robinson drew the gun
in an effort to stop the fight; Robinson himself even “repeatedly denied that the weapon was
fired, either accidentally or otherwise.” Id. at 489 (¶ 37). The Court of Appeals held that the
trial judge did not err in denying the instruction because it was not supported by the
evidence. Id.
¶21. Ealey argues that, even if the child was alive when she put him in the suitcase, his
death could have been an accident. She asserts that she could have been disoriented when
she woke up due to blood loss, resulting in her exercise of poor judgment. While she was
in custody, Ealey was hospitalized and treated for postpartum hemorrhaging and severe
anemia. The State’s experts both testified that blood loss after giving birth could have
affected Ealey adversely and caused her to be delirious. Ealey was treated for postpartum
hemorrhaging after she was in custody, which was at least one week after the baby was born.
Immediately after the child was born, however, Ealey was able to walk to her car, drive to
the church, carry the suitcase to the woods, drive home, bathe, wash her clothes, and attend
church the following morning. She then went to work the following week. No one noticed
any odd behavior during that time. There is no evidence to support that Ealey was delusional
or delirious.
¶22. Ealey also claims that the child could have died when she was asleep, before she put
him in the suitcase, thus, the child’s death could have been an accident and the result of
Ealey’s choice to have an unattended birth. To support that theory, Ealey points to her own
confusion about whether she heard the child cry once or twice and to her own statement that
11
she did not detect movement when she wrapped the baby in the comforter. The trial judge
said, “her saying she doesn’t recall is not a sufficient factual basis for the jury to return a
verdict of accident or mistake” and “her later statement that she didn’t recall is not
tantamount to her saying the baby didn’t cry.” Ealey’s own statements contradicted her
theory that the child died while she was asleep because, at one point, Ealey said the child
cried when she put the suitcase in the trunk.
¶23. Finally, Ealey argues that her failure to seek medical care could have been considered
abusive behavior and, therefore, she was entitled to the accident-or-misfortune instruction
because “omissions” that are considered abusive are not necessarily purposeful. There is no
evidence to support the contention that Ealey’s decision not to seek prenatal care and not to
seek medical care during the birth was anything other than intentional and purposeful. She
readily admitted that she told no one about the pregnancy and did not seek medical care. In
Buffington v. State, the Court held that “failure to feed, nourish, or provide medical care to
a child can be intentional, and such a refusal may cause serious bodily harm” and acts of
omission are included as abusive behavior. Buffington v. State, 824 So. 2d 576, 582 (¶ 24)
(Miss. 2002) (emphasis added).
¶24. The State argues that the trial court correctly denied Ealey’s accident-or-misfortune
instruction because the evidence does not support that Ealey acted with “with usual and
ordinary caution” as required for a homicide to be excusable under Section 97-3-17(a).
Specifically, the State writes that Ealey did not act “with usual and ordinary caution” by
giving birth in a hotel room rather than in a hospital, by wrapping the child in a comforter
and putting the comforter in a garbage bag, by transporting the child in a suitcase in the trunk
12
of her car, and by abandoning the child at a church. We agree. The evidence did not support
the accident-or-misfortune instruction, because the evidence presented did not show that
Ealey acted with “with usual and ordinary caution,” and Ealey’s own statements contradicted
her theory that the child died before she put him in the suitcase. The trial judge’s denial of
the accident-or-misfortune instruction did not amount to an abuse of discretion.
II. Whether the evidence of capital murder was sufficient and whether the
verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence.
¶25. Ealey claims that the evidence did not support the verdict and the verdict was contrary
to the weight of the evidence. She asks the Court to do one of the following: render an
acquittal; reverse and remand for a new trial; reverse and render a manslaughter conviction;
or reverse and remand for resentencing for the crime of manslaughter.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶26. Claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support a capital murder conviction,
Ealey asks the Court to reverse and acquit. When the challenge is to the legal sufficiency of
the evidence, “the critical inquiry is whether the evidence shows ‘beyond a reasonable doubt
that the accused committed the act charged, and that he did so under such circumstances that
every element of the offense existed.’” Beasley v. State, 136 So. 3d 393, 401-402 (¶ 29)
(Miss. 2014) (quoting Ivy v. State, 949 So. 2d 748, 751 (Miss. 2007)). On appeal, we view
all of the evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Beasley, 136 So. 3d at 402
(¶ 29) (citing Bush v. State, 895 So. 2d 836, 843 (Miss. 2005)). The evidence is legally
sufficient to support the jury’s verdict if “reasonable fair-minded men in the exercise of
impartial judgment might reach different conclusions on every element of the offense.”
13
Beasley, 136 So. 3d at 402 (¶ 29) (quoting Edwards v. State, 469 So. 2d 68, 70 (Miss.
1985)).
¶27. Ealey was indicted for capital murder with the underlying felony of child abuse under
Sections 97-5-39(2)(a) and 97-3-19(2)(f). Section 97-3-19 provides that a person is guilty
of capital murder if she kills a human being “without the authority of law by any means or
in any manner” while “engaged in the commission of the crime of felonious child abuse
and/or battery of a child in violation of subsection (2) of Section 97-5-39, or in any attempt
to commit such felony.” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(f) (Rev. 2014). At the time of the
child’s death, Section 97-5-39(2) provided, in pertinent part:
(2)(a) Any person who shall intentionally (i) burn any child, (ii) torture any
child or, (iii) except in self-defense or in order to prevent bodily harm to a
third party, whip, strike or otherwise abuse or mutilate any child in such a
manner as to cause serious bodily harm shall be guilty of felonious abuse of
a child and, upon conviction, shall be sentenced to imprisonment . . . for life
or such lesser term of imprisonment as the court may determine, but not less
than ten (10) years. . . .
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-5-39(2)(a) (2006). The Court has defined “serious bodily harm” under
the child abuse statute to mean “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death, or
permanent or temporary disfigurement, or impairment of any bodily organ or function.”
Buffington, 824 So. 2d at 579 (¶ 13) (citing Wolfe v. State, 743 So. 2d 380, 385 (Miss.
1999)). Further, “acts of omission are adequate to constitute felony child abuse.”
Buffington, 824 So. 2d at 577, 582 (¶¶ 2, 25).
¶28. Ealey admits that she “discarded” her baby, but she asserts that the evidence
established only that the baby had died from neglect, deprivation, or abandonment, which
14
would be a misdemeanor under Section 97-5-39(1),6 not from felonious child abuse under
Section 97-5-39(2). The only support Ealey provides for her claim that the evidence was
insufficient to support the verdict is as follows: “No rational trier of fact could conclude that
Ms. Ealey, the good mother and daycare worker, would intentionally abuse a child; rather,
the evidence was clear that her abandonment of the child resulted from poor judgment which
was symptomatic of clinical depression and physical debilitation or legal insanity.” Ealey’s
conclusory statement is insufficient to rebut the actual evidence presented at trial. The
evidence was sufficient to find that Ealey intentionally tortured or abused her child “in such
a manner as to cause serious bodily harm.” See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-5-39(2)(a) (2006).
The result of Ealey’s conduct was the child’s death, therefore, because the death resulted
6
Ealey claims that the evidence established only neglect, deprivation, or
abandonment, under Section 97-5-39(1)(a) or (b). At the time of the child’s death, that
section provided, in pertinent part:
(1)(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, any parent . . . who
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly commits any act or omits the
performance of any duty, which act or omission contributes to or tends to
contribute to the neglect or delinquency of any child or which act or omission
results in the abuse of any child, as defined in Section 43-21-105(m) of the
Youth Court Law, . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction
shall be punished by a fine not to exceed One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00),
or by imprisonment not to exceed one (1) year in jail, or by both such fine and
imprisonment.
(b) If the child’s deprivation of necessary food, clothing, shelter, health care
or supervision appropriate to the child’s age results in substantial harm to the
child’s physical, mental or emotional health, the person may be sentenced to
imprisonment for not more than five (5) years or to payment of a fine of not
more than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), or both.
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-5-39(1)(a), (b) (2006).
15
from Ealey’s “commission of the crime of felony child abuse,” the evidence supported a
conviction for capital murder. See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(f) (2006).
¶29. After her baby was found dead, Ealey turned herself in to the police. She voluntarily
confessed, telling officers that she gave birth alone in a hotel room, wrapped the newborn
baby in a comforter, put the comforter in a suitcase, and left the suitcase in the woods behind
her church. The investigating officer testified that the suitcase found behind the church
contained a garbage bag, which had a comforter stuffed inside it, and that the baby was
wrapped in the comforter. The above-described facts were undisputed. Dr. Feng Li
performed the autopsy on the baby. Although initially, due to the stage of decomposition,
he was not able to determine whether the child had been born alive, after learning the facts
of the case he concluded that the cause of death was more likely than not asphyxia and the
manner of death was homicide. Part of his conclusion was based on Ealey’s own testimony
that she heard the child cry at least once. The jury heard Dr. Li’s testimony and testimony
from the investigating officers who responded to the crime scene and later took Ealey’s
statements.
¶30. The jury was instructed that, to find Ealey guilty of capital murder, they must find
beyond a reasonable doubt that Ealey killed her newborn son while “engaged in the
commission of the crime of felonious abuse of said infant child by wrapping him in a
bedspread, placing the said bedspread containing the infant son inside a garbage bag, placing
the infant son inside a closed suitcase, and abandoning said infant so enclosed.” Reasonable
jurors could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Ealey committed capital murder
16
as set forth in the jury instruction. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support
the jury’s verdict.
B. Weight of the Evidence
¶31. Ealey also claims that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence, and she
asks the Court to reverse and remand for a new trial, to reverse and render a manslaughter
conviction, or to reverse and remand for resentencing for manslaughter. She claims that the
weight of the evidence did not support a finding that she was sane or that she committed
capital murder. Challenges to the weight of the evidence are granted only if the verdict “is
so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would
sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Beasley, 136 So. 3d at 403 (¶ 35) (quoting Bush, 895
So. 2d at 844 (¶ 18)). Again, we view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the
verdict.” Id. “Factual disputes are properly resolved by a jury and do not mandate a new
trial.” Beasley, 136 So. 3d at 403 (¶ 35) (citing Temple v. State, 498 So. 2d 379, 382 (Miss.
1986)).
1. Sanity
¶32. Ealey claims that the weight of the evidence did not support a finding that she was
sane. The M’Naghten test for determining insanity is whether the accused knew right from
wrong at the time the act was committed. Woodham v. State, 779 So. 2d 158, 163 (¶ 27)
(Miss. 2001) (citing Russell v. State, 729 So. 2d 781, 784 (Miss. 1997)). Specifically, the
Court has held that prove insanity under M’Naghten, it must be proven that, at the time of
the act, the accused “was laboring under such defect of reason from disease of the mind as
(1) not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing or (2) if he did know it, that
17
he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.” Woodham, 779 So. 2d at 163 (¶ 27)
(quoting Roundtree v. State, 568 So. 2d 1173, 1181 (Miss. 1990)).
¶33. The determination of a defendant’s sanity under the M’Naghten Rule is within the
province of the jury, and the jury has discretion to accept or reject expert and lay testimony
on the subject. Woodham, 779 So. 2d at 164 (¶ 29); Russell, 729 So. 2d at 784. A jury’s
finding on a defendant’s sanity “will not be reversed if it is supported by substantial
evidence.” Woodham, 779 So. 2d at 164 (¶ 29) (citing Davis v. State, 551 So. 2d 165, 173
(Miss. 1989)). We have held that, “[i]n insanity defense cases, perhaps more than any other,
a jury’s verdict ought to be given great respect and deference.” Sanders v. State, 63 So. 3d
497, 503 (¶ 18) (Miss. 2011) (citing Laney v. State, 486 So. 2d 1242, 1246 (Miss. 1986)).
¶34. Three experts in forensic psychology or psychiatry – Dr. O’Brien, Dr. Lott, and Dr.
McMichael – testified at trial. They all agreed that Ealey suffered from depression and
anxiety, but no one opined that she was legally insane. Dr. O’Brien testified that substantial
evidence suggested that Ealey may not have been criminally responsible based on
M’Naghten, but he could not make a determination to a reasonable degree of scientific
certainty. Dr. Lott testified that Ealey’s depression may have affected her conduct and may
have resulted in her exercising poor judgment; however, he opined that Ealey would have
been able to understand what she was doing at the time of the offense and that she would
have been able to understand the difference between right and wrong. Dr. McMichael
testified that Ealey was suffering from emotional distress at the time of the offense but, in his
opinion, the evidence did not indicate that Ealey was unable to understand the nature and
quality of actions or the difference between right and wrong.
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¶35. Although none of the doctors testified that Ealey satisfied the M’Naghten test for
insanity, Ealey claims that, because the doctors testified that she was suffering from
depression that could have adversely affected her ability to respond rationally, the weight of
the credible evidence was that she was insane. In her brief, Ealey dismisses Dr. McMichael’s
opinion as “unsound” and concludes that the other two doctors actually considered her to be
insane, even though they did not say so. Ealey’s conclusion regarding the doctors’ testimony
is simply unfounded. The doctors were questioned specifically about the M’Naghten
standard – whether she understood the nature and quality of her actions at the time of the
crime and whether she knew right from wrong – and none of the doctors could say that Ealey
was insane under that standard. Further, Ealey’s coworkers and family members testified
that, in the days immediately preceding the incident, Ealey went on with life as usual, she did
not exhibit any odd behavior, and, in their opinions, she knew right from wrong.
¶36. The jury had ample evidence from which it could determine that Ealey was sane at the
time of the offense. The overwhelming evidence was that Ealey suffered from depression,
but none of the experts testified that she was insane under M’Naghten. Further, none of her
family or coworkers testified that she acted differently at any time before or after the offense.
Again, weighing testimony and determining sanity under M’Naghten is within the province
of the jury, and the jury’s finding will not be disturbed if it is supported by substantial
evidence. Woodham, 779 So. 2d at 164 (¶ 29); Russell, 729 So. 2d at 784. The jury’s
finding that Ealey was sane was supported by substantial evidence, and the jury’s finding
was not so contrary to the evidence that allowing it to stand would sanction an
unconscionable result.
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2. Manslaughter
¶37. Ealey writes that “the weight of credible evidence was that [she] was legally insane
during the conduct constituting the alleged homicide in this case” therefore, “the jury’s
verdict to the contrary resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” She claims that, at most, the
evidence supported a manslaughter conviction. She asks the Court to reverse and render a
manslaughter conviction or to reverse and remand for resentencing for manslaughter. Ealey
did not raise the manslaughter theory before the trial court or request a manslaughter
instruction. Thus, her claim is procedurally barred. See Byrom v. State, 863 So. 2d 836,
865-66 (¶ 96) (Miss. 2003) (citing Evans v. State, 725 So. 2d 613, 632 (Miss. 1997) (Issues
not presented to the trial judge are “procedurally barred and error, if any[,] is waived. This
rule is not diminished in a capital case.”)).
¶38. Further, the claim is without merit because a person who causes death during the
commission of felonious child abuse can be convicted of only capital murder, not
manslaughter. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 97-3-27, 99-3-19(2)(f) (Rev. 2014). Section 97-3-27
provides:
The killing of a human being without malice, by the act, procurement, or
culpable negligence of another, while such other is engaged in the perpetration
of any felony, except those felonies enumerated in Section 97-3-19(2)(e) and
(f), or while such other is attempting to commit any felony besides such as are
above enumerated and excepted, shall be manslaughter.
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-27 (Rev. 2014). Felonious child abuse is identified in Section 97-3-
19(2)(f), thus, it is one of the felonies that cannot be relegated to manslaughter. Therefore,
where the evidence supports a conviction for child abuse, the resulting death cannot be
manslaughter. The crime is capital murder even if the defendant acted “without any design
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to effect death.” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(f) (Rev. 2014). As discussed above, the
evidence supports the jury’s verdict that Ealey caused the death of her newborn child while
engaged in the commission of felonious child abuse, by wrapping him in a comforter, putting
him in a suitcase, and abandoning the suitcase behind her church. Thus, she cannot be
convicted of manslaughter, and the issue is without merit.
III. Whether the M’Naghten Rule on insanity should be abandoned and
replaced with the Model Penal Code definition of insanity.
¶39. Ealey asserts first that the application of the M’Naghten test for determining sanity
resulted in a violation of due process in her case. However, she failed to articulate how the
application of M’Naghten denied her due process rights, therefore, that claim is without
merit. See Byrom, 863 So. 2d at 880 (¶ 161) (“failure to cite relevant authority obviates [our]
obligation to review such issues”) (quoting Simmons v. State, 805 So. 2d 452, 487 (¶ 90)
(Miss. 2001)).
¶40. Ealey then urges the Court to abandon the M’Naghten rule for determining sanity and
to adopt Section 4.01 of the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute. The Court
repeatedly has rejected similar arguments and declined to abandon M’Naghten. See, e.g.,
Burk v. State, 506 So. 2d 993, 993 (Miss. 1987) (appellant urged Court to abandon
M’Naghten Rule and to adopt Model Penal Code Section 4.01 as the legal definition of
insanity; Court held that the proposition had been considered previously and that M’Naghten
remained the law); Laney v. State, 421 So. 2d 1216, 1219 (Miss. 1982) (“[W]e are not
swayed to abandon the use of the M’Naghten test of insanity, and we hold that M’Naghten
remains the law in this state with regard to the insanity defense.”); Hill v. State, 339 So. 2d
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1382, 1385-86 (Miss. 1976) (holding that M’Naghten “better protects society’s needs” than
the Model Penal Code). Pursuant to the rule of stare decisis, we deny Ealey’s request to
abandon M’Naghten.
Conclusion
¶41. The issues raised by Ealey are without merit. We affirm Ealey’s conviction and
sentence.
¶42. CONVICTION OF CAPITAL MURDER AND SENTENCE OF LIFE
IMPRISONMENT IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE, AFFIRMED. COURT
COSTS, FEES, AND ASSESSMENTS IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,098.50 SHALL BE
WAIVED BY THE COURT. ALL TIME SERVED IN PRETRIAL DETAINMENT IN
THIS CAUSE IS CREDITED AGAINST THIS SENTENCE.
DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., LAMAR, KITCHENS, CHANDLER,
PIERCE AND KING, JJ., CONCUR. WALLER, C.J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
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