Michael W Crosby v. The Mississippi Bar , 268 So. 3d 520 ( 2018 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2017-BA-00250-SCT
MICHAEL W. CROSBY
v.
THE MISSISSIPPI BAR
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/21/2016
TRIAL JUDGE: HONORABLE JACQUELINE MASK
TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: JAMES RUSSELL CLARK
MICHAEL W. CROSBY (PRO SE)
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: COMPLAINT TRIBUNAL
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MICHAEL W. CROSBY (PRO SE)
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: JAMES RUSSELL CLARK
ADAM BRADLEY KILGORE
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - BAR MATTERS
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 06/21/2018
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
RANDOLPH, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Michael W. Crosby appeals the Complaint Tribunal’s opinion and final judgment
finding him in violation of Rules 1.3, 1.16, 8.1(b), and 8.4(a) and (d) of the Mississippi Rules
of Professional Conduct, and issuing a public reprimand, based on his failure to file an appeal
brief on his client’s behalf, and for his failure to respond to the client’s bar complaint. The
Court finds that the Mississippi Bar proved by clear and convincing evidence that Crosby
violated each Rule. Further, the Court finds that the tribunal’s opinion is accurate and
contains all material facts. The Complaint Tribunal’s opinion and final judgment is affirmed.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. Michael Crosby was retained by Travis Cardell Brown to represent him in a criminal
trial arising from the shooting of three University of Southern Mississippi football players.
Brown was convicted, and Crosby filed a notice of appeal on August 31, 2012. The trial
transcript was filed on April 3, 2013,1 and the appeal brief was to be filed by July 16, 2013.
¶3. Crosby requested additional time to file the appeal brief on July 16, 2013; August 21,
2013; September 10, 2013; September 16, 2013; and September 23, 2013. The first request
for an extension of time cited Crosby’s caseload and the voluminous record in Brown’s case
as the basis for needing additional time. The second and third requests for an extension of
time cited Crosby’s caseload. Crosby testified that, at the time he filed his third request for
an extension of time, a dispute had arisen with Brown regarding the trial’s venue, and
whether Crosby could include this issue in the appeal brief. Crosby did not move for a
change of venue from Forrest County for Brown’s trial. Crosby testified that this was a
strategic decision he made based on his years of experience questioning potential jurors in
voir dire.
¶4. After Brown was convicted, Brown told Crosby that he should have moved for a
change of venue. Crosby testified that this venue dispute created a conflict with Brown, in
1
Crosby raised the length of time it took the court reporter to file the trial transcript
in his Motion to Alter or Amend the Complaint Tribunal’s judgment, but he does not explain
how the delay affected the filing of the appeal brief. He only requested that this fact be
included in order to “fully reflect” the delay in filing the appeal brief.
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which Crosby would have had to include an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in the
appeal brief regarding his own representation of Brown at trial. Crosby testified that the
venue issue prevented Crosby from being able to file the brief, although the appeal brief was
“really close” to completion at the time the third request for additional time was filed.
¶5. Crosby’s fourth request for an extension of time was filed on September 16, citing
Crosby’s caseload, and that the brief was not yet complete. Crosby’s last request for an
extension of time, filed on September 23, cited his own health issues. Crosby testified that
he could have filed a completed appeal brief at this time, and that he had Brown’s permission
to do so. However, Crosby testified that Brown had changed his mind regarding the venue
issue on numerous occasions, which ultimately prevented Crosby from filing the brief.
¶6. On October 4, this Court issued a Show Cause Notice, as Brown’s appeal brief still
had not been filed. Crosby was given fourteen days to file the appeal brief. Crosby testified
that he had obtained Brown’s permission to file the appeal brief. On October 18 at 4:55 p.m.,
Crosby electronically filed a Notice of Compliance with Show Cause Notice and Notice of
Mailing.2 Crosby testified that he physically placed the appeal brief in the mail. After the
brief was placed in the mail, Crosby was informed that Brown was getting another attorney
to represent him. Crosby retrieved the brief from the mail, but did not inform the Court that
2
Crosby was questioned as to why he electronically filed every motion and the Notice
of Compliance with Show Cause Notice and the Notice of Mailing, but chose to mail the
brief. Crosby conceded in his testimony that, in order to comply with this Court’s Show
Cause Notice, the brief needed to be electronically filed by midnight on October 18.
3
Brown had obtained a different attorney, or that the Notice of Mailing was incorrect.3
Crosby took no action on Brown’s case for another six days, and Brown’s appeal was
dismissed for failure to file an appeal brief on October 24, 2013.
¶7. After the appeal was dismissed, Crosby testified that he offered to file a petition for
post-conviction relief (PCR) for Brown to pursue an out-of-time appeal, and Brown gave
Crosby consent to do so. In a letter dated August 26, 2014, Crosby mailed the PCR and
affidavit to Brown for his signature. Brown told Crosby that he did not receive the
documents, and Crosby sent it two more times: once on October 10, 2014, and again on
November 6, 2014. On December 3, 2014, Brown sent Crosby a letter stating that, although
he felt Crosby was an “excellent attorney,” Brown no longer wanted Crosby to represent him
or to file the PCR. Crosby never filed anything with the Court to show that he no longer
represented Brown. Brown later attempted to have his appeal reinstated through another
attorney, but the Court of Appeals issued an order denying Brown’s motion on February 10,
2015.
3
At trial, the Bar raised the issue of Crosby submitting the Notice of Mailing of the
brief without actually mailing the brief. The Bar also questioned Crosby regarding why he
had failed to seek remedial measures by informing the Court that the brief had not been
mailed. However, the Bar did not charge Crosby with a violation of any Rule based on this
failure, and the Complaint Tribunal did not address it. Therefore, the Court declines to
address it.
4
¶8. Crosby testified that, at the end of June 2015, a representative of the Mississippi Bar
forwarded him a letter that Brown had written to the Bar’s Consumer Assistance Program.
Brown’s letter stated the following:
My name is Travis Brown [and] I was supposedly represented by Michael
Crosby out of Gulfport MS. We went to trial [and] lost so Mr. Crosby was
supposed to file an appeal, but I lost my direct appeal because Mr. Crosby
never filed the brief which is clearly inaffective [sic] assistance of councel
[sic]. I can never get in touch with him [and] his office is always giving me
the run around. [I’m] not doubting that Mr. Crosby is a good attorney but I feel
like he has a lot going on in his life personally [that’s] affecting his work as an
attorney, so this is why I am filing the complaint with the Mississippi Bar
[and] ask that this matter be looked into. Further more [sic] I have hired new
counsel [and] no longer wish for Mr. Crosby to be my attorney.
The Mississippi Bar representative informed Crosby that a bar complaint form would be sent
to Brown along with instructions for its filing. On July 10, 2015, Brown filed an informal
bar complaint against Crosby for failing to file his appeal brief. Brown’s complaint
contained the following allegation: “Michael Crosby has been inaffective [sic] as my counsel.
We went to trial [and] lost [and] he never filed an appeal brief on my half [sic]. Therefore
my appeal was dismissed.”
¶9. The Bar forwarded Brown’s complaint to Crosby on July 10, 2015, and demanded that
his response be filed on or before July 27, 2015. Crosby acknowledged that he had received
the bar complaint and requested additional time to respond in an email to the Bar, which was
granted with an extension to August 4. However, Crosby did not file a response to Brown’s
bar complaint. On August 25, 2015, the Bar sent Crosby a second demand letter requesting
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that he respond to Brown’s complaint by September 1, 2015. Crosby did not submit a
response by the date demanded.
¶10. On December 4, 2015, Crosby emailed James Clark, Deputy General Counsel for the
Mississippi Bar, and informed Clark that he needed additional time to respond to Brown’s
complaint due to his current caseload. However, Crosby’s testimony did not reflect that his
caseload prevented him from submitting a response. Instead, Crosby testified that he
deliberately chose not to submit a response to Brown’s bar complaint because he believed
his response would have included a personal issue that occurred in 2009 that he did not want
shared with Brown. Further, Crosby testified that he believed that he was not required under
the Rules of Professional Conduct to submit a response and instead believed that he would
be given an opportunity to participate in an investigation into the conduct that gave rise to
the bar complaint. Crosby never filed a response to Brown’s bar complaint.4
¶11. The Bar filed its formal complaint against Crosby on December 21, 2015, based on
(1) Crosby’s failure to file an appeal brief on Brown’s behalf, and (2) Crosby’s failure or
refusal to respond to the Bar complaint filed by Brown. The Bar alleged that Crosby had
violated the following Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct:
Rule 1.2(a), which provides that a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions
concerning the objectives of representation and shall consult with the client as
to the means by which they are to be pursued;
4
An email dated September 4, 2015, was included in the record on appeal reflecting
that Crosby had submitted a response to a separate bar complaint filed by a different client.
This response was not to Brown’s bar complaint.
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Rule 1.3, which provides that a lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client;
Rule 1.4(a), which provides that a lawyer shall keep a client reasonably
informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable
requests for information;
Rule 1.16 (d), which provides that upon termination of representation, a lawyer
shall take reasonable steps to protect a client’s interests;
Rule 8.1(b), which provides that a lawyer shall not fail to disclose a fact
necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in
the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information by
a disciplinary authority; and
Rules 8.4(a) and (d), which provide that it is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the rules of professional conduct or
engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
¶12. After more than twenty days elapsed with no answer or pleading from Crosby, the Bar
filed an application for the Clerk of Court to enter default pursuant to Rule 55 (a) of the
Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. The Clerk entered default against Crosby the next day.
The Bar then filed a motion for default judgment, alleging that Crosby had been personally
served with process on January 4, 2016, and never filed an answer, motion, or any other
pleading.
¶13. On February 29, 2016, Crosby filed a motion to set aside the Clerk’s entry of default.
Crosby produced an affidavit from the police officer who was responsible for service of
process, who stated that he did not personally see, meet, speak to, or serve Crosby. Crosby
also filed a motion to modify one deadline in the scheduling order. On April 22, 2016, the
Complaint Tribunal granted Crosby’s motion to set aside the clerk’s entry of default, and
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denied the Bar’s motion for default judgment. The Complaint Tribunal also denied Crosby’s
motion to modify the scheduling order as moot.
¶14. On April 29, 2016, Crosby answered the Bar’s formal Complaint, relating the facts
as they are discussed above. Trial was held on October 14, 2016, and Crosby was the only
witness who testified. The Complaint Tribunal issued its Opinion and Final Judgment on
November 14, 2016, finding that Crosby had violated Rules 1.3, 1.16, 8.1(b), 8.4(a), and
8.4(d) based on his failure to file an appeal brief on Brown’s behalf, and his failure to
respond to Brown’s bar complaint. The tribunal then analyzed the nine factors outlined in
Liebling v. Mississippi Bar, 929 So. 2d 911, 918-20 (Miss. 2006), in order to determine the
appropriate level of discipline. The tribunal found that the appropriate disciplinary sanction
should be a public reprimand.
¶15. Crosby filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, or alternatively, a motion to
correct a clear error of law to prevent manifest injustice, or alternatively, a motion for a new
trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Crosby raised the following issues: (1) the
length of time it took the court reporter to file the trial transcript; (2) Brown’s ability to seek
an out-of-time appeal; (3) the venue dispute with Brown; and (4) the personal reasons for not
responding to the bar complaint. The Complaint Tribunal denied Crosby’s motion, and
Crosby appealed.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
¶16. The five issues raised by Crosby on appeal are restated verbatim et literatim:
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Issue I.
If an appeal is dismissed due to the failure of the attorney to file the appellate
brief, does such failure always constitute a violation of Rule 1.3 MRPC (i.e.
failure of a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client, or
does Rule 2-4 of the MRAP and Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-39-
5(i) set forth reasons why the attorney’s failure to file the appeal brief may
constitute good cause.)[?]
Issue II.
Does Mr. Crosby’s actions constitute withdrawal from representation of a
client when he allowed the appeal to be dismissed, and further, did said actions
constitute a violation of Rule 1.16 MRPC which requires a lawyer to withdraw
only when it can be accomplished without harm to the client[?]
Issue III.
Does Mr. Crosby’s failure to file written responses to the demand for the same,
constitute a violation of Rule 8.1(b) MRPC under the unique circumstances of
this case[?]
Issue IV.
Did Mr. Crosby violate Rule 8.4 MRPC which provides that it is misconduct
to violate any rule of professional conduct and engage in conduct that is
detrimental to the administration of justice[?]
Issue V.
Should the opinion and judgment of the bar, which is to be read publicly, state
all the material and relevant facts which impacts [sic] Mr. Crosby, and should
misstated facts be corrected to reflect the truth[?]
¶17. The first four issues can be restated simply as whether the Mississippi Bar proved by
clear and convincing evidence that Crosby had violated each of the four rules. The final
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issue raised on appeal is restated as whether the Complaint Tribunal’s opinion and final
judgment omitted material facts or contains misleading statements.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶18. The appropriate standard of review in Bar discipline matters is as follows:
On appeal, this Court shall review the entire record and the findings and
conclusions of the Tribunal, and shall render such orders as the Court may find
appropriate. When reviewing disciplinary matters[,] this Court reviews the
evidence de novo, on a case-by-case basis, sitting as triers of fact, and no
substantial evidence or manifest error rule shields the Tribunal from scrutiny.
Rogers v. Mississippi Bar, 731 So. 2d 1158, 1163-64 (Miss. 1999) (quoting Asher v.
Mississippi Bar, 661 So. 2d 722, 727 (Miss. 1995)) (internal quotations omitted). While this
Court applies a de novo standard of review when considering evidence, “deference is given
to the Tribunal’s findings ‘due to its exclusive opportunity to observe the demeanor and
attitude of the witnesses, including the attorney, which is vital in weighing the evidence.’”
Id. at 1164. The Mississippi Bar must “prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
respondent’s actions constitute professional misconduct.” Id. (quoting Mississippi Bar v.
Pels, 708 So. 2d 1372, 1374 (Miss. 1998)).
DISCUSSION
¶19. Other than citing the four Rules of Professional Conduct that Crosby was found to
have violated, Crosby’s brief contains two citations of authority. The first citation refers to
Rules 2 through 4 of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the second cites
Mississippi Code Section 99-39-5(i), which provides that any person sentenced by a
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Mississippi court may file a motion for an out-of-time appeal. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-
5(i) (Rev. 2015). Crosby cites not a single case in his brief nor any other relevant authority
to support his arguments on appeal. The Bar asserts in its brief that Crosby’s appeal should
be dismissed.
¶20. Rule 28(a)(7) of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that an
appellant’s brief “shall contain the contentions of the appellant . . . and the reasons for those
contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.” This
Court has held that an appellant’s failure to do so constitutes abandonment of the issue and
makes the issue procedurally barred for appellate review. Matter of Estate of Smith v.
Boolos, 204 So. 3d 291, 313 (Miss. 2016) (quoting McNeil v. Hester, 753 So. 2d 1057, 1075
(Miss. 2000)). Accordingly, the Court may dismiss Crosby’s appeal on this basis alone,
because his brief contains virtually no citations to the record, and the two citations of
authority that he cites do not support his arguments.
¶21. Notwithstanding, this Court has examined whether the Mississippi Bar proved by clear
and convincing evidence that an attorney violated the Rules of Professional Conduct based
on the attorney’s factual arguments alone. See, e.g., Shah v. The Mississippi Bar, 962 So.
2d 514, 522 (Miss. 2007) (citing only the standard of review in discussion of whether the Bar
proved by clear and convincing evidence that an attorney violated the Rules of Professional
Conduct.). This Court has “exclusive jurisdiction of matters pertaining to attorney discipline
and reinstatement, and this Court is the ultimate judge of matter[s] arising under the Rules
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of Discipline for the Mississippi Bar.” Asher, 661 So. 2d at 727. And while the Court “may
delegate the fact-finding process to others, such as the Mississippi Bar, its tribunals, or courts
in other jurisdictions, the final decision on whether particular conduct constitutes a violation
of our rules of professional conduct and of discipline rests with this Court.” Mississippi Bar
v. Labovitz, 226 So. 3d 92, 95 (Miss. 2016). Crosby cites the Rules of Professional Conduct
that he was found to have violated and asserts several factual reasons to support his
arguments. Therefore, the Court may consider the arguments presented by Crosby on appeal.
I. Rule 1.3
¶22. The Court begins with an examination of the record to determine whether, by clear
and convincing evidence, Crosby violated Rule 1.3. Rule 1.3 provides that “[a] lawyer shall
act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” The Complaint
Tribunal found that Crosby’s failure to file an appeal brief constituted a violation of this
Rule. Crosby argues that Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure 2 through 4, and
Mississippi Code Section 99-39-5(i), provide an excuse, or establish “good cause” for his
violation of Rule 1.3.
¶23. Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 provides the penalties for noncompliance
with the rules, e.g., dismissals and other sanctions, and when the rules may be suspended in
a particular case. This Rule does not support Crosby’s argument that he did not violate Rule
1.3. Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 provides how appeals may be taken,
including the filing and notice of appeal, inter alia. This Rule does not support Crosby’s
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argument. Finally, Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 provides the procedure for
when an appeal may be taken. Again, this Rule does not provide any support for Crosby’s
argument that he did not violate Rule 1.3 by failing to file an appeal brief. Likewise,
Mississippi Code Section 99-39-5(i) is irrelevant to this appeal, as this statute deals
exclusively with post-conviction relief.
¶24. Crosby does not dispute that he failed to file an appeal brief for Brown. Crosby filed
the Notice of Appeal on Brown’s behalf, requested numerous extensions of time to submit
the brief, never terminated his representation of Brown even after Brown informed him that
he was seeking another attorney, and never filed the appeal brief. Crosby’s only argument
related to his failure to file the brief is that Brown insisted that the venue issue be included,
which Crosby felt was not appropriate to include. As such, the Mississippi Bar proved by
clear and convincing evidence that Crosby violated Rule 1.3 based on Crosby’s failure to file
Brown’s appeal brief.
II. Rule 1.16
¶25. Rule 1.16 requires a lawyer to withdraw from representation of a client only when the
same can be accomplished without harm to the client. The Complaint Tribunal found that
Crosby effectively withdrew from representing Brown on appeal when he allowed the appeal
to be dismissed, which caused harm to Brown and constituted a violation of this Rule.
Crosby combined his argument regarding Rule 1.3 with Rule 1.16 in his brief; therefore, he
asserts the same arguments under Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure 2 through 4, and
13
Mississippi Code Section 99-39-5(i), which are neither applicable nor supportive of Crosby’s
argument. Further, Crosby argues that, because he offered to file a petition for PCR for an
out-of-time appeal for Brown, he did not withdraw or harm Brown.
¶26. Crosby’s mere offer to file a PCR for Brown does not excuse his failure to file an
appeal brief for Brown. There is no guarantee that Brown would have been entitled to an
out-of-time appeal under the PCR statute. Further, Brown’s second attorney attempted to
reinstate Brown’s appeal, and it was denied. Crosby’s allowing Brown’s direct appeal to be
dismissed amounted to a withdrawal by Crosby and certainly caused harm to Brown. The Bar
proved by clear and convincing evidence that Crosby violated Rule 1.16.
III. Rule 8.1
¶27. Rule 8.1(b) provides that a lawyer in connection with a disciplinary matter shall not
knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from a disciplinary authority,
other than information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6, i.e., confidential information related
to the representation of client. The Complaint Tribunal found that Crosby violated this Rule
because he had knowledge of the Bar complaint and the need to respond (he requested
additional time to respond and acknowledged at trial that he had received the demands), but
failed to respond.
¶28. Crosby argues that Rule 8.1 does not require a response to be in writing. Crosby
argues that, because he spoke with an attorney from the Bar, and because he agreed to
participate in the Bar’s investigation, he complied with Rule 8.1. Crosby further argues that
14
he did not intend to violate Rule 8.1. Crosby does not cite any authority to support his
arguments. Although Rule 8.1 does not specifically state that a response must be in writing,
the Mississippi Bar informed Crosby that his response to Brown’s bar complaint was to be
in writing. On the day the Bar forwarded Brown’s complaint to Crosby, a letter was included
that stated Crosby was required to attach a certificate of service showing that a full and
complete copy of the response had been served upon Brown, or it would not be accepted for
filing. Further, Crosby acknowledged that his response had to be in writing in email
correspondence with the Bar. Crosby’s argument that he did not intend to violate Rule 8.1
also is without merit. Again, Crosby acknowledged that his response was to be in writing
but he failed to submit a response. Thus, he “knowingly” failed to respond to a lawful
demand for information from the Bar. The Bar proved by clear and convincing evidence that
Crosby violated Rule 8.1 by failing or refusing to respond to Brown’s bar complaint.
IV. Rule 8.4
¶29. Although Crosby raises Rule 8.4 (a) and (d) in his statement of the issues, Crosby does
not present any argument in his brief regarding the Tribunal’s finding that he violated Rules
8.4 (a) and (d). Thus, the Court will not address them.
V. WHETHER THE COMPLAINT TRIBUNAL’S OPINION AND
JUDGMENT OMITTED MATERIAL FACTS OR CONTAINS
MISLEADING STATEMENTS.
¶30. Crosby argues that the Complaint Tribunal’s opinion and final judgment omits or
misstates “many material and relevant facts” that he alleges will impact his ability to practice.
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First, Crosby argues that the opinion omits the fact that Brown’s case could have been
reinstated for good cause by either motion or petition, and instead states that Brown received
“the worst possible outcome.” This is not a material fact that must be included in the
tribunal’s opinion and final judgment. Whether or not Brown’s appeal could be reinstated
is irrelevant as to Crosby’s failure to file an appeal brief on Brown’s behalf.
¶31. Second, Crosby alleges that the opinion does not mention that Brown refused to allow
Crosby to reopen Brown’s case by filing a PCR. Again, whether or not Brown’s appeal
could be revived has no relevance to Crosby’s failure to file the appeal brief.
¶32. Crosby next alleges that the opinion does not state anything about “the long delay
which caused communication and cooperation issues with [Brown].” Crosby does not
explain what delay he is referring to. The Court is unable to discern whether this is a relevant
or material fact, because Crosby does not expand on this issue any further.
¶33. Further, Crosby alleges that the opinion does not state the total number of days that
Crosby requested in his motions for extensions of time to file Brown’s appeal brief, which
he states totaled only sixty days, after “thirteen months of delay.” Although Crosby does not
explain what thirteen-month delay to which he is referring, he alleges in his statement of
facts that the court reporter took thirteen months to file the trial transcript.5 Presumably, this
is the thirteen-month “delay” to which Crosby refers. In any event, the amount of time that
5
The record demonstrates that it did not take the court reporter thirteen months to file
the trial transcript. The jury reached its verdict in Brown’s trial on June 28, 2012, and the
record reveals that the trial transcript was filed on April 3, 2013.
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Crosby requested in his motions for extensions of time is immaterial, and the opinion and
final judgment contains nothing misleading about Crosby’s five requests for an extension of
time.
¶34. Last, Crosby alleges that the opinion does not mention the work that Crosby did in
preparing Brown’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and Brown’s motion for
a new trial. The substantive work that Crosby did before, during, and after trial were not
challenged by the Mississippi Bar and therefore are entirely irrelevant to Crosby’s failure to
file the appeal brief, which is the only issue that gave rise to Brown’s bar complaint. This
issue is without merit.
CONCLUSION
¶35. The Mississippi Bar proved by clear and convincing evidence that Michael W. Crosby
violated Rules 1.3, 1.16, 8.1, 8.4(a), and 8.4(d). Further, the Complaint Tribunal’s opinion
and final judgment included all material facts, and did not contain any misleading statements.
The tribunal’s opinion and final judgment are affirmed.
¶36. AFFIRMED.
WALLER, C.J., KITCHENS, P.J., KING, COLEMAN, MAXWELL, BEAM,
CHAMBERLIN AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR.
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