Orlando Newell v. State of Mississippi ( 2020 )


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  •                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
    NO. 2018-KA-01689-SCT
    ORLANDO NEWELL
    v.
    STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                         11/14/2018
    TRIAL JUDGE:                              HON. LISA P. DODSON
    TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS:                    JOEL SMITH
    MARY ELIZABETH McFADYEN
    IAN LAWRENCE BAKER
    CHRISTOPHER ALAN GREEN
    GLENN F. RISHEL, JR.
    COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:                HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:                  OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC
    DEFENDER
    BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES
    MOLLIE MARIE McMILLIN
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:                    OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
    BY: ALLISON ELIZABETH HORNE
    DISTRICT ATTORNEY:                        JOEL SMITH
    NATURE OF THE CASE:                       CRIMINAL - FELONY
    DISPOSITION:                              REVERSED AND REMANDED - 03/19/2020
    MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
    MANDATE ISSUED:
    EN BANC.
    KING, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
    ¶1.    Orlando Newell shot and killed Michael Woods. At trial, he argued self-defense, and
    the jury convicted him of murder. The trial court gave a pre-arming jury instruction, which
    precluded Newell’s self-defense theory. Because this instruction was not supported by the
    evidence and improperly impaired Newell’s self-defense claim, the trial court’s grant of the
    pre-arming instruction was error; this Court consequently reverses Newell’s conviction and
    remand the case for a new trial.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2.    On September 24, 2016, Orlando Newell shot and killed Michael Woods. The
    primary issue of contention at trial was whether Newell shot Woods in self defense.
    ¶3.    On December 4, 2017, Newell was indicted for murder, felony possession of a stolen
    firearm, and felon in possession of a firearm. The indictment was amended on May 10,
    2018, to charge Newell as a habitual offender. Newell pled guilty to the felon in possession
    charge, and trial solely on the murder charge began on May 15, 2017. That trial ended in a
    hung jury and consequent mistrial. Newell’s second trial occurred in November 2017.
    ¶4.    On the evening of September 23, 2016, Newell attended a birthday party for his cousin
    James Newell held at another cousin’s apartment. At the time, Newell was living with his
    sister Sharon Newell in her apartment. Sharon got off work at 2:00 a.m. on September 24,
    2016, had her cousin Latonya pick her up, and the two of them went to James’s party.
    Sharon only stayed at the party for approximately fifteen to twenty minutes, because she had
    to work the next morning. Newell, Sharon, Latonya, and Latonya’s boyfriend, “Steez,” left
    in Newell’s car with Steez driving to take Sharon home. Sharon and Newell began arguing
    and Newell asked Steez to pull the car over. Newell got Sharon out of the car and began to
    hit her with his belt. Sharon got in Newell’s car and drove home, leaving Newell, Latonya,
    and Steez on the side of the road. When Sharon returned to her apartment, she removed
    2
    Newell’s key to her apartment from his keychain and began throwing his personal belongings
    off her balcony into the parking lot below. When she threw his set of weights off the
    balcony, the weights landed on the windshield of Newell’s car and shattered the windshield.
    ¶5.    Newell arrived at the apartment complex and, with Newell in the parking lot and
    Sharon on the balcony above, they began arguing. Sharon testified that Newell began
    throwing cologne bottles at her. She then went into her kitchen, retrieved several kitchen
    knives, and threw four or five of them at Newell. Sharon alleged that Newell then told her
    multiple times that he was going to kill her. Newell eventually gathered his belongings,
    placed them in his car, and left in his car.
    ¶6.    In the meantime, Sharon, upset, called several people, including Michael Woods, who,
    according to Sharon, was her friend, ex-boyfriend, and boyfriend. A little after 3:00 a.m.,
    Woods arrived at Sharon’s apartment and asked Sharon and her children to spend the night
    with him. Sharon declined, as she had to work the next morning. Close to 6:00 a.m., Woods
    called and texted Sharon several times and returned to her apartment. Sharon testified that
    at around 6:15 a.m., she let Woods into her apartment and Woods walked in to check on her
    and the kids. He walked to the bedroom, saw the children asleep, and left.1
    ¶7.    During this 3:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. time frame, Newell drove his car to Latonya’s
    house. Because the windshield was shattered, he had to drive with his head outside the
    driver’s side window. He left his clothes at Latonya’s house, and stated that he needed to
    1
    Newell attempted to introduce text messages between Sharon and Woods that
    indicated that they had been fighting about Sharon’s new boyfriend that evening, and that
    Woods believed the boyfriend to be at Sharon’s apartment during this 6:15 a.m. visit. The
    court excluded these text messages from evidence.
    3
    park his car somewhere because he couldn’t see out of it to drive it safely. He then parked
    his car at another relative’s house. Newell retrieved his gun from the console of the car and
    got in Latonya’s car with Steez. Newell testified that he removed his gun from his car and
    placed it on his person because he did not want to leave it at a relative’s house. At that point,
    Newell returned to the birthday party. James saw Newell at his birthday party with a gun in
    his waist around 3:50 a.m. James testified that Newell stated that he was going to “get”
    Sharon and that James called Sharon to inform her of this. Newell then went to Latonya’s
    house and looked through his possessions. He testified that he had money missing that he
    had hidden in a sock in a closet at Sharon’s apartment.
    ¶8.    A little after 6:00 a.m., Steez drove Newell back to Sharon’s apartment. Newell
    testified that he wanted to retrieve his money. When they arrived, Newell saw Woods
    walking down the stairs. Newell got out of the car, and he testified that he was going to ask
    Woods to retrieve his money for him. He saw Woods by the hood of the car picking up
    something off the ground. Newell was standing next to the back of a pickup truck parked
    next to the car. Newell testified that he asked Woods to retrieve the money for him and that
    Woods responded angrily. Newell saw a knife in Woods’s hand, and Woods began
    advancing towards Newell angrily. Newell testified that he pulled the gun out of his pocket
    and Woods began speeding up. Newell was scared. Newell then shot several times in quick
    succession.
    ¶9.    Sharon testified that she heard gunshots, ran to her kitchen window, and saw Newell
    standing between a car and a truck, aiming with his arm pointed down. She did not see a
    4
    gun. She testified that she then opened the door, ran to the balcony, heard Woods, and ran
    down to him. She then ran back upstairs to get her phone, called 911, and ran back down to
    be with Woods while they awaited help.
    ¶10.   When the police arrived, they did not observe a knife near Woods’s body. Four knives
    were recovered from the scene. The closest knife to Woods was located in the pickup truck
    bed, approximately ten feet away from Woods. The knife had dew on top of it and no dew
    underneath it. A cell phone and keys were located near Woods. Two projectiles were
    recovered from the scene, one projectile was recovered at the hospital between Woods’s shirt
    and body, and two projectiles were recovered from inside Woods’s body. Five shell casings
    were recovered from the scene. For the three shell casings located by Investigator Garner,
    a length of approximately twenty-five feet existed between the casing closest to Woods to
    the casing farthest away from Woods. Officer Wallace testified that the same distance with
    regard to all five shell casings located was approximately thirty to thirty-five feet. Woods’s
    autopsy indicated that he received five bullet wounds. Two of those bullet wounds entered
    Woods’s back, one entered the lateral side of his right hip, one entered the lateral side of his
    left chest, and one entered the right side of his chest. Four of the bullets moved from the
    back to front direction in his body. A gun was located in the trash can in a different
    apartment complex, and Newell was arrested at that same complex. His DNA was on the
    gun, and the gun matched several of the projectiles found on the scene.
    ¶11.   At the scene of the crime, Sharon attempted to remove a set of keys from the
    perimeter established by the police. Investigator Garner saw her and demanded she return
    5
    the keys to their location in the crime scene.
    ¶12.   The jury was given instructions on murder, manslaughter, self-defense, stand your
    ground, and it was also given a pre-arming instruction. Newell’s counsel refused to agree
    to the pre-arming instruction, but did not state a legal issue with its use. The jury found
    Newell guilty of murder. Newell appeals the trial court’s grant of the pre-arming instruction.
    ANALYSIS
    1.     Standard of Review
    ¶13.   Jury instructions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Boston v. State, 
    234 So. 3d 1231
    , 1233 (Miss. 2017). They must fairly announce the law of the case and not create an
    injustice to the defendant. 
    Id. The defendant
    has a right to have the jury instructed as to his
    theories of defense that are supported by the evidence, no matter how meager or unlikely.
    
    Id. Refusing to
    allow the defendant to present his theories of defense compromises the right
    to a fair and impartial trial. Miss. Valley Silica Co., Inc. v. Eastman, 
    92 So. 3d 666
    , 669
    (Miss. 2012). “[T]he ultimate responsibility to instruct the jury properly falls squarely upon
    the trial judge[.]” 
    Id. at 670.
    2.     Pre-arming Instruction
    ¶14.   The trial court gave the State’s pre-arming instruction, which stated “The Court
    instructs the Jury if a person provokes a difficulty, arming himself in advance, and intending,
    if necessary, to use his weapon and overcome his adversary, he becomes the aggressor, and
    deprives himself of the right of self-defense.” While Newell’s appeal was pending, this
    6
    Court abolished pre-arming instructions, which had previously been heavily disfavored in
    Mississippi. Taylor v. State, 
    287 So. 3d 202
    (Miss. 2020). In doing so, we found pre-arming
    instructions to be “long-condemned, heavily criticized, disfavored, and exceedingly unwise.”
    
    Id. at 209.
    The Court recognized that “[i]f a defendant’s self-defense claim has an
    evidentiary basis but is indeed laughable, Mississippi’s able prosecutors are no doubt skilled
    enough to point this out to juries. In fact, they do so quite often.” 
    Id. at 208.
    The Court
    discussed how problematic the estoppel of a self-defense theory is, and that defendants have
    the right to assert such a theory when an evidentiary basis for it exists. 
    Id. It also
    discussed
    the rights in this State of concealed carry, the right to defend oneself, and the problematic
    effect pre-arming instructions have on those rights. 
    Id. We ultimately
    found that “[t]he
    bottom line is that one should not necessarily risk estoppel or forfeiture of his privilege of
    self-defense because he has previously armed himself in anticipation of an attack or a
    perceived dangerous situation.” 
    Id. at 209.
    Accordingly, we reverse Newell’s conviction
    and remand this case for a new trial in which a pre-arming instruction will not be available.2
    ¶15.   Additionally, the pre-arming instruction given in Newell’s case would be error even
    under the previous caselaw as it stood prior to the abolishment of pre-arming instructions.
    Even prior to their abolishment, pre-arming instructions were heavily disfavored in
    Mississippi. This Court has repeatedly cautioned the State that it requests such an instruction
    2
    The State claims that Newell waived this argument for the lack of a specific
    objection at trial and the failure to raise the issue in his motion for judgment notwithstanding
    the verdict. However, Newell’s counsel did voice his objection to the instruction. And this
    Court has noted that the trial judge has “the ultimate duty to instruct the jury properly.”
    
    Eastman, 92 So. 3d at 669
    . Further, even if this Court analyzed this issue under a plain error
    standard, the pre-arming instruction would be error.
    7
    at its own peril. Taylor, 
    287 So. 3d 202
    ; 
    Boston, 234 So. 3d at 1234
    ; Johnson v. State, 
    908 So. 2d 758
    , 763 (Miss. 2005); Keys v. State, 
    635 So. 2d 845
    , 849 (Miss. 1994) (listing
    numerous cases in which this Court “denounced” this type of instruction). Every defendant
    has a right to present his theory of the case, and an instruction that cuts off a self-defense
    claim and prohibits the defendant from asserting his theory of the case is highly problematic.
    
    Boston, 234 So. 3d at 1234
    . “Even if the great weight of the evidence against [the
    defendant] supports a contrary view, [the defendant] is still entitled to present his defense to
    the jury unimpaired by instructions similar to [the pre-arming instruction] which preclude his
    right to self-defense.” 
    Keys, 635 So. 2d at 849
    ; Dew v. State, 
    748 So. 2d 751
    , 754 (Miss.
    1999); 
    Boston, 234 So. 3d at 1234
    . This Court has held that pre-arming instructions are only
    appropriate in “exceedingly rare circumstances” and noted that they have only been affirmed
    in three cases. 
    Boston, 234 So. 3d at 1235
    . “In each case, the record was uncontradicted that
    the defendants armed themselves with the intent to initiate a confrontation.” 
    Id. In two
    of
    those cases, the defendant, while not in physical danger from the victim, armed himself and
    went to the victim’s house. Hart v. State, 
    637 So. 2d 1329
    (Miss. 1994), abrogated by
    Taylor v. State, 
    287 So. 3d 202
    (Miss. 2020); Hall v. State, 
    420 So. 2d 1381
    (Miss. 1982),
    abrogated by Taylor v. State, 
    287 So. 3d 202
    (Miss. 2020). In the third case, the defendant,
    knowing the victim to be present at a trailer, armed himself, went inside the trailer, and
    challenged the victim. Reid v. State, 
    301 So. 2d 561
    (Miss. 1974), abrogated by Taylor v.
    State, 
    287 So. 3d 202
    (Miss. 2020).
    ¶16.   It is undisputed that Newell armed himself several hours before the encounter between
    8
    him and Woods. And it is undisputed that this was a chance encounter; Newell had no
    knowledge of Woods being present at Sharon’s apartment. The record is in conflict
    regarding who initiated the fight. In Boston, the confrontation was likewise by chance, and
    “[n]o evidence exists that Boston placed the knife in his pocket with the intent to provoke
    an altercation with Dean,” and thus this Court found reversible error in the grant of the pre-
    arming instruction. 
    Boston, 234 So. 3d at 1235
    . Similarly, no evidence exists that Newell
    armed himself with the gun with the intent to provoke an altercation with Woods, especially
    given that it is undisputed that Newell had no knowledge of Woods being present at Sharon’s
    apartment. The grant of the pre-arming instruction in this case was error, as the instruction
    was not supported by the evidence, and it improperly precluded Newell’s self-defense claim.3
    CONCLUSION
    ¶17.   Because this Court has abolished pre-arming instructions, and because, in the
    alternative, the pre-arming instruction given in this case was in error and impaired Newell’s
    right to bring his theory of the case to the jury, this Court reverses Newell’s conviction and
    remands the case to the trial court for a new trial.
    ¶18. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    KITCHENS, P.J., COLEMAN, MAXWELL, BEAM, CHAMBERLIN AND
    3
    Even under a plain error standard, the trial court clearly deviated from the legal rule
    regarding pre-arming instructions, and the error resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.
    In homicide cases, the defendant has a right to have the jury instructed on his theory of the
    case, “[e]ven though based on meager evidence and highly unlikely[.]” Hester v. State, 
    602 So. 2d 869
    , 872 (Miss. 1992). Precluding such a right is reversible error. 
    Id. Newell’s first
    trial, that also included the pre-arming instruction, resulted in a hung jury. Without this
    improper instruction, the jury would be able to fully consider his self-defense claim, and
    determine what credit to give Newell’s testimony regarding his self-defense claim.
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    ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR. RANDOLPH, C.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN
    OPINION JOINED BY GRIFFIS, J.
    RANDOLPH, CHIEF JUSTICE, DISSENTING:
    ¶19.   The evidence presented at trial supports a pre-arming instruction. For the reasons
    outlined in my dissent in Taylor v. State, 
    287 So. 3d 202
    (Miss. 2020) (Randolph, C.J.,
    dissenting), I reject my colleagues’ abandonment of our longstanding precedent that pre-
    arming instructions are appropriate when supported by the facts.
    GRIFFIS, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.
    10