Will Realty, LLC v. Mark Isaacs and Sally Isaacs ( 2020 )


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  •                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
    NO. 2019-CA-01440-SCT
    WILL REALTY, LLC
    v.
    MARK ISAACS AND SALLY ISAACS
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                         08/16/2019
    TRIAL JUDGE:                              HON. LAWRENCE PAUL BOURGEOIS, JR.
    TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS:                    ANDREW R. NORWOOD
    JOHN B. HOWELL, III
    WILLIAM P. WESSLER
    WYNN E. CLARK
    NATHAN L. PRESCOTT
    PAUL J. DELCAMBRE, JR.
    COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:                HANCOCK COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:                  ANDREW R. NORWOOD
    JOHN B. HOWELL, III
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:                  WYNN E. CLARK
    WILLIAM P. WESSLER
    W. GERRY WESSLER
    NATURE OF THE CASE:                       CIVIL - OTHER
    DISPOSITION:                              AFFIRMED - 05/14/2020
    MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
    MANDATE ISSUED:
    BEFORE RANDOLPH, C.J., COLEMAN AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ.
    RANDOLPH, CHIEF JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
    ¶1.    Will Realty, LLC, appeals the Hancock County Circuit Court’s grant of a motion for
    relief from judgment in favor of Mark and Sally Isaacs. Will sought to execute on a foreign
    judgment and garnish assets belonging to the Isaacses. The resolution of this case is
    controlled by a plain reading of Mississippi Code Section 15-1-45 (Rev. 2019) regarding the
    statute of limitations for judgments from foreign jurisdictions. Accordingly, we affirm the
    judgment of the Hancock County Circuit Court that the statute of limitations extinguished
    Will’s right.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2.    On October 30, 2009, Mainsource Bank, Inc., obtained a judgment against the
    Isaacses for the sum of $3,911,681.92 and interest in Kentucky. This judgment was assigned
    to Will on January 6, 2010. In 2019, Will enrolled the October 30, 2009 judgment in the
    judgment rolls of Hancock County, Mississippi.
    ¶3.    Will then filed writs of garnishment directed to multiple banks and the employer of
    Sally Isaacs. After the writs were issued, the Isaacses sought relief under our Rule of Civil
    Procedure 60(b), claiming the judgment was void. Will responded, arguing that the
    judgments had been renewed and that the statute of limitations had reset. After receiving
    argument, the court granted the Isaacses’ requested relief. Will appeals.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶4.    This Court reviews dispositions of motions for relief from judgment under an abuse
    of discretion standard. Mabus v. St. James Episcopal Church, 
    13 So. 3d 260
    , 265 (Miss.
    2009) (citing Davis v. Nationwide Recovery Serv., 
    797 So. 2d 929
    , 930 (Miss. 2001)).
    Appellate courts analyze the trial court’s factual findings and applicable law, and if the
    court’s factual findings are not supported by evidence or are manifestly wrong, they will not
    be affirmed. Ashmore v. Miss. Auth. on Educ. Television, 
    148 So. 3d 977
    , 981 (Miss. 2014)
    2
    (citing Pierce v. Heritage Props., Inc., 
    688 So. 2d 1385
    , 1388 (Miss. 1997)). Reversal is
    likewise merited if the trial court relies on an incorrect statement of law. 
    Id.
     (citing Pierce,
    688 So. 2d at 1388). Because no facts are disputed in this case, our analysis is focused on
    whether the circuit court abused its discretion in determining questions of law, which we
    review de novo. See ABC Mfg. Corp. v. Doyle, 
    749 So. 2d 43
    , 45 (Miss. 1999) (citing Ellis
    v. Anderson Tully Co., 
    727 So. 2d 716
    , 718 (Miss. 1998)).
    ISSUES ON APPEAL
    ¶5.    The issues we consider, restated, are
    I.     Whether renewal of a judgment in a foreign jurisdiction changes how
    we apply Mississippi’s statutes of limitations.
    II.    Was Will’s judgment renewed under Kentucky law?
    ANALYSIS
    I.     Whether renewal of a judgment in a foreign jurisdiction changes
    how we apply Mississippi’s statutes of limitation.
    ¶6.    Will argues that renewal of a foreign judgment “resets the running of Mississippi
    limitations period.” For this proposition, Will relies on two cases, Mabie v. Shannon, 
    120 So. 3d 415
     (Miss. Ct. App. 2012), and White v. Taylor, 
    281 So. 3d 1188
     (Miss. Ct. App.
    2019). Both of these cases articulate how a renewal of a judgment in a foreign jurisdiction
    affects the application of Mississippi’s seven-year statute of limitations. In this case, there
    was no renewal in the foreign jurisdiction.
    ¶7.    We are mindful that the dispute here is not whether Mississippi’s statute of limitations
    or Kentucky’s statue of limitations applies. It has long been established that the statute of
    3
    limitations of a forum state may be applied by the forum state. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 
    486 U.S. 717
    , 722, 
    108 S. Ct. 2117
    , 
    100 L. Ed. 2d 743
     (1988). Mississippi applies its statute of
    limitations to these type of cases. 
    Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-303
     (Rev. 2019).
    ¶8.    The argument Will offers is that Mississippi’s statute of limitations is reset once a
    judgment is renewed. The Mabie court considered “[t]he question of whether a renewed or
    revived judgment may be enrolled and enforced in Mississippi after the statute of limitations
    for enrollment has expired as to the original judgment . . . .” 
    120 So. 3d at
    418 (citing Smith
    v. RJH of Fla., Inc., 
    520 F. Supp. 2d 838
    , 841 (S.D. Miss. 2007)). Noting that Florida case
    law distinguished between a “renewed judgment” and “post-judgment proceedings,” the
    Court of Appeals found that Florida law treats a renewed judgment as a “new and separate
    action that is entitled to full faith and credit.” 
    Id.
     Because Florida treated the renewed
    judgment as separate from the original judgment, the Court of Appeals held that the relevant
    date from which to calculate the running of our statute of limitations was the date of the
    renewed judgment, not that of the original judgment. 
    Id.
     In White, the Court of Appeals
    similarly considered a Florida judgment and whether the judgment was a separate, renewed
    judgment under Florida law or “a post-judgment proceeding.” 281 So. 3d at 1190.
    ¶9.    The plain text of our statute establishing the statute of limitations applicable to actions
    on foreign judgments reads,
    All actions founded on any judgment or decree rendered by any court of record
    without this state shall be brought within seven years after the rendition of
    such judgment or decree, and not after. However, if the person against whom
    such judgment or decree was or shall be rendered, was, or shall be at the time
    of the institution of the action, a resident of this state, such action, founded on
    such judgment or decree, shall be commenced within three years next after the
    4
    rendition thereof, and not after.
    
    Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-45
     (Rev. 2019). Section 15-1-45 requires that all actions based upon
    foreign judgments must be commenced within seven years of the “rendition of such judgment
    or decree, and not after.” 
    Id.
     The Court of Appeals has correctly applied this statute. To the
    extent that a judgment is separate from a prior judgment under the laws of a foreign
    jurisdiction such that a new, separate ruling is issued, our statute of limitations would be
    calculated from the date of entry of that renewed judgment.
    II.       Was Will’s judgment renewed under Kentucky law?
    ¶10.   In its order, the circuit court wrote,
    [t]he 2009 judgment is a foreign judgment. 
    Miss. Code Ann. §11-7-301
     (Rev.
    2004). Under Mississippi law, an action to enforce a foreign judgment ‘. .
    .shall be brought within seven years after the rendition of [the] judgment, and
    not after.’ 
    Miss. Code Ann. §15-1-45
     (Rev. 2012); Miss. Const., Art. 4, § 97
    (1890).
    The circuit court held that because the Kentucky judgment was entered in Hancock County,
    Mississippi, more than seven years after rendition of the judgment in Kentucky, any actions
    taken on it Mississippi were void ab initio.
    ¶11.   Will argues that the enrollment and issuances of the writs in Mississippi renews the
    Kentucky judgment. Will’s argument on this point is strained. Will claims that Kentucky
    jurisprudence establishes that there is a mechanism for renewal of judgment. Will presents
    Wade v. Poma Glass & Speciality Windows, Inc., 
    394 S.W.3d 886
     (Ky. 2012), to advance
    this position.
    ¶12.   In Wade, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that for purposes of computing the statute
    5
    of limitations in Kentucky, Kentucky courts should look to “the last act enforcing, carrying
    out, or putting the judgment into effect, including garnishment proceedings and judgment
    liens.” 394 S.W.3d at 887. Wade, while providing guidance to Kentucky courts on the
    determination of the Kentucky statute of limitations, says nothing regarding renewal or
    revival of its judgments in foreign states such as Mississippi. Will’s argument that its
    enrolling a foreign judgment in Mississippi after the judgment had expired according to
    Mississippi’s statute of limitations, and then its attempting to execute a writ of garnishment
    through Mississippi courts, is unavailing.
    ¶13.   Enrolling a foreign judgment in the state of Mississippi subjects that judgment to the
    “same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating or staying as a judgment
    of a circuit court of any county in this state . . . subject to the provisions of Section 15-1-45.”
    
    Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-303
    . The seven-year statute of limitations of Section 15-1-45 bars
    any foreign judgments enrolled outside that time frame. 
    Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-45
    . Without
    renewing the judgment in Kentucky, Will enrolled a judgment ten years after its rendition and
    three years after the statute of limitations in Mississippi had expired. Thus, the judgment is
    unenforceable. 
    Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-3
    (1) (Rev. 2019) (“The completion of the period of
    limitation prescribed to bar any action, shall defeat and extinguish the right as well as the
    remedy.”). Relief was appropriately granted by the circuit court under our Rule of Civil
    Procedure 60(b).
    CONCLUSION
    ¶14.   Because the statute of limitations has prescribed regarding Will’s judgment, the circuit
    6
    court appropriately granted relief to the Isaacses. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
    learned trial judge.
    ¶15.   AFFIRMED.
    KITCHENS AND KING, P.JJ., COLEMAN,                              MAXWELL,         BEAM,
    CHAMBERLIN, ISHEE AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 2019-CA-01440-SCT

Filed Date: 5/14/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/14/2020