Justin Crockett v. State of Mississippi ( 2017 )


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  •                     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
    NO. 2015-KM-00828-SCT
    JUSTIN CROCKETT a/k/a JUSTIN RANDLE
    CROCKETT a/k/a JUSTIN R. CROCKETT
    v.
    STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                          04/17/2015
    TRIAL JUDGE:                               HON. GERALD W. CHATHAM, SR.
    COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:                 CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL
    DISTRICT OF PANOLA COUNTY
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                    B. BRENNAN HORAN
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:                     OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
    BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS
    DISTRICT ATTORNEY:                         JOHN W. CHAMPION
    NATURE OF THE CASE:                        CRIMINAL - MISDEMEANOR
    DISPOSITION:                               AFFIRMED - 01/12/2017
    MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
    MANDATE ISSUED:
    BEFORE DICKINSON, P.J., KITCHENS AND KING, JJ.
    KITCHENS, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
    ¶1.    Justin Crockett pled guilty in Panola County Justice Court to headlighting a deer in
    violation of Mississippi Code Section 49-7-95 (Rev. 2012). Crockett appealed1 his conviction
    to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Panola County. After a bench trial de
    novo, that court found Crockett guilty. Crockett timely appealed to this Court, arguing solely
    1
    “[A]ny defendant who has been convicted of a criminal offense in a justice court
    may appeal even though he or she pleaded guilty.” Jones v. State, 
    972 So. 2d 579
    , 580
    (Miss. 2008) (citing Neblett v. State, 
    75 Miss. 105
    , 
    21 So. 799
    (1897)).
    that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. We find sufficient evidence
    in the record to sustain Crockett’s conviction. Accordingly, we affirm.
    FACTS
    ¶2.    On January 30, 2014, at approximately 8:45 p.m., Lieutenant Marion Pearson received
    a call about a truck that had been stopped by authorities in Panola County. Pearson, a warden
    with the Mississippi Department of Wildlife, Fisheries, and Parks, was told that the truck was
    carrying three deer (a mature doe, a small doe, and a spike buck) in its bed and that the deer
    appeared to have been “freshly killed.” Pearson arrived at the scene and questioned the three
    individuals who were in the truck: John Kyle Gordon, Michael Chad Lanier, and Seth Allen
    Wooten.
    ¶3.    All three men admitted that they had been headlighting deer and informed Pearson
    that they had been doing so with Crockett. The three individuals further stated that Crockett
    had shot two of the deer and that they all had put them in the bed of the truck. One of them,
    Gordon, was working six weeks on and ten days off in North Dakota at the time of trial, and
    the State was not successful in securing his presence. Crockett raised no hearsay objection
    to Pearson’s testimony about what Gordon, Lanier, and Wooten had told him. According to
    Pearson’s testimony, Crockett later admitted having shot the spike deer, though Crockett
    claimed to have shot the deer during legal hunting hours.
    ¶4.    The State responded with forensic evidence showing that the spike was shot well after
    legal hunting hours. The trial court accepted Pearson as an expert witness in the field of
    “forensic investigation of the death of a deer.” Pearson testified that at approximately 3:00
    2
    a.m. on January 31, 2014, he returned to his house with the deer and performed standard
    procedures to determine the time of death. Crockett did not object to the trial court’s
    acceptance of Pearson as an expert witness. Following the standard procedures, Pearson took
    the spike’s temperature in various parts of its anatomy. Pearson then plugged the temperature
    readings into a computer program along with the ambient air temperature for the night of
    January 30, 2014. In addition, Pearson checked for rigor mortis in various parts of the deer’s
    body. Finally, Pearson measured the diameter of the deer’s pupils. After factoring in all of
    the above, Pearson and his supervisor Bruce Jenkins concluded—rightly or wrongly, and
    without objection—that the spike buck (the only deer for which Crockett was charged) had
    been killed between approximately 8 p.m. and 10 p.m. on January 30, 2014.
    ¶5.      The trial court, acting as both the judge and trier of fact, found Crockett guilty of
    killing a deer at night by headlighting in violation of Mississippi Code Section 49-7-95 (Rev.
    2012).
    ANALYSIS
    ¶6.      Crockett’s only argument on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence to support
    a conviction under Mississippi Code Section 49-7-95 (Rev. 2012).
    ¶7.      Section 49-7-95 provides:
    Any person who hunts or takes or kills any deer at night by headlighting, by
    any lighting device or light amplifying device shall, upon conviction thereof,
    be guilty of a Class I violation and shall be punished as provided in Section
    49-7-141.
    For any person to be charged with a violation of this subsection, that person
    must have been observed committing an overt act consistent with the hunting
    of deer at night with the aid of a light, lighting device or light amplifying
    3
    device. Such observation of an overt act may include, but shall not be limited
    to, witnessing the discharge of a weapon capable of killing a deer, hearing the
    report of a firearm being fired, seeing the person in possession of a recently
    killed deer which could not have been killed during legal hunting hours, or
    witnessing the person committing any acts consistent with headlighting deer
    in violation of this subsection.
    Miss. Code Ann. § 49-7-95(1)(a), (b) (Rev. 2012) (emphasis added).
    ¶8.    This Court has affirmed a conviction under this statute when the State relied upon
    circumstantial evidence to prove its case. See Pharr v. State, 
    465 So. 2d 294
    (Miss. 1984).
    The Pharr court noted that “spotting and killing a deer [at night] would have been next to
    impossible without the aid of power lighting.” 
    Id. at 300.
    In Pharr, an officer observed a
    truck from which a spotlight was shining in a field. 
    Id. at 296.
    The officer pursued the truck
    and ultimately forced it off the road. 
    Id. The officer
    found the following in the truck: “(1)
    four men, including Milton V. Pharr, the Defendant below and Appellant here; (2) two dead
    deer, both still warm and with blood running from their bodies; (3) a Q-beam spotlight; (4)
    a seven millimeter Magnum rifle, three spent shell casings and other ammunition; and (5) one
    hand flashlight.” 
    Id. at 297.
    This Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction for headlighting
    the two deer even though the officer had not actually observed the defendant killing either
    deer. 
    Id. at 304.
    ¶9.    Crockett’s only argument on appeal is that the State presented insufficient evidence
    to prove that he committed an “overt act” within the meaning of Mississippi Code Section
    49-7-95(1)(b) (Rev. 2012).
    ¶10.   “[W]hen a trial judge sits without a jury, this Court will not disturb his factual
    determinations where there is substantial evidence in the record to support those findings.”
    4
    Transocean Enter., Inc. v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 
    33 So. 3d 459
    , 462 (Miss. 2010)
    (citing Ezell v. Williams, 
    724 So. 2d 396
    , 397 (Miss. 1998)). This standard of review
    “affords deferential treatment to the trial judge’s findings.” 
    Id. (citing City
    of Greenville v.
    Jones, 
    925 So. 2d 106
    , 109 (Miss. 2006)). “[T]his Court ought and generally will affirm a
    trial court sitting without a jury on a question of fact unless, based upon substantial evidence,
    the court must be manifestly wrong.” 
    Id. (citing Yarbrough
    v. Camphor, 
    645 So. 2d 867
    , 869
    (Miss. 1994)).
    ¶11.   Here, the trial judge heard testimony from Pearson and Jenkins to the effect that three
    individuals were found at night with three recently killed deer in their possession. These three
    men admitted that they had been headlighting deer. They further stated that they had been
    acting in concert with Crockett and that Crockett had shot two of the deer, including the
    spike. In addition, Crockett admitted to Lieutenant Pearson that Crockett had shot the spike,
    though Crockett claimed he had shot it during legal hunting hours.
    ¶12.   Legal hunting hours end thirty minutes after sunset. Miss. Code Ann. § 49-7-59(1)
    (Rev. 2012). Pearson testified that sunset on January 30, 2014, occurred at 5:27 p.m., so legal
    hunting hours ended at 5:57 p.m. The State presented unchallenged forensic evidence
    through the testimony of Pearson and Jenkins showing that the spike could not have been
    killed during legal hunting hours. The time of death was calculated to have been between
    8:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m., well after legal hunting hours.
    ¶13.   Applying the deferential standard of review, we cannot say that the trial court was
    manifestly wrong. It is true, as Crockett urges, that the statute requires that the defendant
    5
    must be “observed committing an overt act consistent with the hunting of deer at night with
    the aid of a light.” Miss. Code Ann. § 49-7-95(1)(b). However, the statute further provides
    that “[s]uch observation may include, but shall not be limited to . . . seeing the person in
    possession of a recently killed deer which could not have been killed during legal hunting
    hours.” Miss. Code Ann. § 49-7-95(1)(b) (emphasis added). The State presented evidence
    tending to show: (1) possession of a recently killed deer; (2) the deer could not have been
    killed during legal hunting hours; and (3) Crockett shot the deer. Furthermore, as the Pharr
    court noted, “spotting and killing a deer would have been next to impossible without the aid
    of power lighting.” 
    Pharr, 465 So. 2d at 300
    . Finally, the men admitted that they had been
    headlighting deer.
    ¶14.   While Pearson’s testimony regarding the statements of Gordon, Lanier, and Wooten
    is hearsay, Crockett did not object to its admission at trial. “The law is well settled in
    Mississippi that appellate courts will not put trial courts in error for issues not first presented
    to the trial court for resolution, and that issues not presented in the trial court cannot be first
    argued on appeal.” Purvis v. Barnes, 
    791 So. 2d 199
    , 202 (Miss. 2001) (internal citations
    omitted). In failing to object to hearsay at trial, the party waives the right to present the issue
    on appeal. Cross v. State, 
    759 So. 2d 354
    , 357 (Miss. 1999). “‘It is elementary that a party
    seeking reversal of the judgment of a trial court must present this Court with a record
    adequate to show that an error of reversible proportions has been committed and that the
    point has been procedurally preserved.’” 
    Id. (quoting Hansen
    v. State, 
    592 So. 2d 114
    , 127
    (Miss. 1991)).
    6
    ¶15.   The trial judge was not manifestly in error in finding Crockett guilty of violating
    Mississippi Code Section 49-7-95.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶16.   We affirm Crockett’s conviction of headlighting a deer in violation of Mississippi
    Code Section 49-7-95.
    ¶17. CONVICTION OF HEADLIGHTING DEER AND SENTENCE OF FIVE (5)
    DAYS IN THE PANOLA COUNTY JAIL, WITH FIVE (5) DAYS SUSPENDED,
    AFFIRMED. APPELLANT’S HUNTING, FISHING, AND TRAPPING PRIVILEGES
    ARE REVOKED FOR A PERIOD OF THREE (3) YEARS. IN ADDITION, A FEE
    OF $500 SHALL BE PAID PRIOR TO REINSTATEMENT OF PRIVILEGES.
    APPELLANT SHALL PAY A FINE IN THE AMOUNT OF $2,120, PAYABLE TO
    THE CIRCUIT CLERK OF PANOLA COUNTY.
    WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, P.JJ., KING, COLEMAN,
    MAXWELL AND BEAM, JJ., CONCUR.         CHAMBERLIN, J., NOT
    PARTICIPATING.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: NO. 2015-KM-00828-SCT

Judges: Dickinson, Kitchens, King, Waller, Randolph, Coleman, Maxwell, Beam, Chamberlin

Filed Date: 1/12/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024