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, 164 L .Ed. 2d 415
(2006), in support of its contention that actual notice is required in order to comply with due-
process requirements. In Jones, the State of Arkansas took Jones’s home for property tax
delinquency and sold it to a private buyer. The State attempted to notify Jones of the tax
delinquency and his right of redemption by mailing a certified letter to him.

Id. at 223-24

,
7

. Because Jones no longer occupied the home, the certified letter went
unclaimed and was returned to the State as undeliverable.

 Even though the State knew
Jones did not receive the notice, it arranged for the private sale.

 Jones then filed suit
alleging the State’s attempted notice was insufficient under the Due Process Clause.

Id. at 224

. The Supreme Court held that “when mailed notice of a tax sale is
returned unclaimed, the State must take additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide
notice to the property owner before selling his property, if it is practicable to do so.”

Id. at 225

126 S. Ct. 1708

.
¶16.    Pearson’s also cites Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope,

485 U.S. 478

108 S. Ct. 1340

99 L. Ed. 2d 565

 (1998), for the proposition that the annexation
procedure under Sections 21-1-13 to -41 is unconstitutional. In Pope, the United States
Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of an Oklahoma statute which required the
probate court to appoint an executor or executrix after admitting a will to probate.

Id. at 481

. After appointment, the executor or executrix was required to publish notice
advising creditors to present claims within two months after the date of first publication.

If the decedent died intestate, creditors were given one month to present claims.

 In Pope,
a hospital failed to file its claim within the time period specified. Id. at 482,

.
The hospital then claimed that the statute did not provide proper notice to known creditors
and, as such, violated the hospital’s due-process rights. Id. at 483,

. The
Supreme Court agreed and held: “due process is directly implicated and actual notice [to
known or reasonably ascertainable creditors] generally is required.” Id. at 487,

108 S. Ct. 1340

.
8
¶17.   Pearson’s points out that, shortly after Pope, the Mississippi Legislature amended its
statute governing the identification of claims against an estate to provide for notice by mail
to known creditors. See

Miss. Code Ann. § 91-7-145

 (Rev. 2013); see also Estate of Petrick
v. Miss. Neurosurgery, P.A.,

635 So. 2d 1389

, 1393 (Miss. 1994) (“The Mississippi statute,
enacted shortly after Pope, clearly requires an administratrix to give creditors who can be
discovered through reasonably diligent efforts notice by mail and notice by publication.”).
The statute also requires the executor or administrator to “make reasonably diligent efforts
to identify persons having claims against the estate.”

Id. ¶18

.   Pearson’s claims that “[b]y analogy the same principle should apply to Mississippi’s
annexation procedures. All persons whose businesses may be affected by annexation of
property ought to be given actual notice of the pendency of annexation proceedings. Mere
publication is not constitutionally sufficient.”
¶19.   In today’s case, the owner of the land (the party typically concerned with notice of an
annexation) contacted the City and requested the annexation. Even though this annexation
was considered a “friendly annexation,” the City followed the notice procedures prescribed
in Section 21-1-15. Put simply, the landowner had notice of the annexation, and any due-
process concerns were resolved through the City’s compliance with the statutory procedures.
Further, Pearson’s contention leads to a far-reaching, and seemingly impossible, application.
If all persons who have a business interest – or in essence, an economic interest – that may
be affected by annexation proceedings are due actual notice of the proceedings, how does the
municipality determine the scope of persons who have may an interest?
9
¶20.    Because the cases Pearson’s cites in its brief are limited to individuals or definable
groups requiring notice – rather than imprecise groups – the cases are distinguishable from
today’s case. Jones involved the sale of a known individual’s real property to satisfy a tax
lien.   Jones,

547 U.S. at 223-24

.        The state sold Jones’s home despite
knowing that Jones did not receive the mailed notice.

 The Supreme Court focused on
the State not taking further actions to effect notice when the mailed notices were returned and
held that, under these facts, the state should have taken further action to notify Jones.

Id. at 225

. Pope also limited its application to known or reasonably ascertainable
creditors. Pope,

485 U.S. at 487

. Further, in addition to their narrow
holdings, Jones and Pope have not been applied to annexation cases such as this one.
¶21.    Although this Court has not directly addressed whether Section 21-1-15 is
unconstitutional for failure to give actual notice to persons whose economic interests are
affected by an annexation, this Court has held that personal service under the annexation
statutes is not required. In Myrick v. Stringer,

336 So. 2d 209

, 210 (Miss. 1976), this Court
held that the notice provision in Section 21-1-15 “is in lieu of personal service” and must be
strictly complied with. See also City of Tupelo, 94 So. 3d at 262 (“The notice required by
Section 21-1-15 is in lieu of personal service and must be strictly complied with.”).
¶22. Because requiring actual notice to all persons who have some economic interest in
annexation proceedings is almost limitless in its application, and because this Court has held
that the notice provisions contained in the statutes at issue are in lieu of personal service, this
issue is without merit.
10
III. Whether the grandfathering provision in the City’s zoning code and/or the pre-
existing-use doctrine overrides the City’s fireworks ordinance.
¶23. Next, Pearson’s contends that the grandfathering provision in the City’s zoning code
and/or the pre-existing-use doctrine override the City’s zoning provision prohibiting the sale
of fireworks.
¶24. The City’s zoning code contains the following provision: “12.03. The lawful use of
land existing at the time of the passage of this Code, although such does not conform to the
provisions herein, may be continued . . . .” Because selling fireworks was lawful on the
subject land prior to the annexation, Pearson’s claims that, under the grandfathering
provision, fireworks sales may lawfully continue after the annexation. Likewise, Pearson’s
claims that the pre-existing-use doctrine allows for the continuation of fireworks sales after
the annexation. Under this doctrine “[n]on-conforming uses may be permitted to continue
where the uses were lawfully established at the adoption of the ordinance.” Barrett v. Hinds
County,

545 So. 2d 734

, 737 (Miss. 1989). Further, “the right to continue a non-conforming
use, once established and not abandoned, runs with the land. It has been held by some courts
that any ordinance which takes away that right in any unreasonable manner, or in a reason
not grounded in public welfare is invalid.”

Id.

 (citations omitted).
¶25.   In Davidson v. City of Clinton,

826 F. 2d 1430

, 1434 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying
Mississippi law), the Fifth Circuit found that the doctrine of nonconforming (or pre-existing)
use did not apply when the City of Clinton – which prohibited alcohol sales in certain areas
– annexed land on which the plaintiff operated a nightclub that sold beer. After the
annexation, the plaintiff filed suit against the City of Clinton, claiming, in part, that he should
11
be able to sell beer lawfully at the nightclub under the pre-existing-use doctrine.