Timothy Rice v. State of Mississippi , 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 224 ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2015-CP-00446-COA
TIMOTHY RICE A/K/A TIMOTHY L. RICE APPELLANT
v.
APPELLEE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/29/2015
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. WAYMAN DAL WILLIAMSON
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: JONES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: TIMOTHY RICE (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ALICIA MARIE AINSWORTH
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: AMENDED APPELLANT’S SENTENCE TO
THIRTY YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF
THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, LESS TIME SERVED, AND
A FINE OF $10,000
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 04/19/2016
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., CARLTON AND JAMES, JJ.
CARLTON, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. After a Jones County jury convicted Timothy Rice for the crime of selling cocaine,
Rice appealed to this Court, which affirmed Rice’s conviction and sentence. Rice v. State,
172 So. 3d 768, 769-71 (¶¶6, 13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013). Rice then sought leave from the
Mississippi Supreme Court to proceed with a motion for postconviction collateral relief
(PCR) on the following issues: (1) whether he was subjected to double jeopardy; (2) whether
he lacked notice of the State’s intent to charge him as a recidivist; and (3) whether the circuit
court violated his right to be sentenced outside the jury’s presence. The supreme court,
however, granted Rice leave to proceed with his PCR motion on the sole issue of whether
his sentence enhancement as a subsequent drug offender was in error in light of the supreme
court’s decision in Williams v. State, 131 So. 3d 1174 (Miss. 2014).
¶2. After finding the subsequent-drug-offender enhancement of Rice’s sentence was in
error, the Jones County Circuit Court entered an order amending Rice’s sentence. On appeal
from the circuit court’s order on his PCR motion, Rice raises the following issues: (1)
whether the State’s amendment to his indictment to charge him as a habitual offender caused
unfair surprise and prevented him from presenting a defense; (2) whether the circuit court
erred by sentencing him in front of the jury; (3) whether he was denied effective assistance
of counsel; and (4) whether the circuit court erred by denying his request for an evidentiary
hearing prior to disposing of his PCR motion.
¶3. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶4. In a previous opinion, this Court acknowledged the following relevant facts and
procedural history underlying Rice’s direct appeal from his conviction for the sale of cocaine:
On March 3, 2009, the Jones County grand jury indicted Rice for the
sale of cocaine, a Schedule II substance, in violation of Mississippi Code
Annotated section 41-29-139 (Rev. 2009). On October 9, 2009, the State filed
a motion to amend the indictment to charge Rice as a habitual offender
pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2009). Rice
had been convicted previously of burglary, grand larceny, escape, and simple
assault. On October 13, 2009, the same day the trial began, the trial judge
entered an order amending the indictment to charge Rice as a habitual
offender.
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The trial occurred from October 13, 2009, until October 14, 2009. On
the last day of the trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict. The trial judge then
sentenced Rice as a habitual offender to forty years of imprisonment, with ten
years suspended and thirty years to serve, all in the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections. On October 23, 2009, Rice filed a motion for a
new trial or, in the alternative, a [judgment notwithstanding the verdict]. His
motion was denied by the trial court on May 31, 2011. Rice now appeals. In
his sole issue on appeal, Rice argues the trial court erred by amending the
indictment to reflect his status as a habitual offender after the voir dire of the
jury had taken place and the trial had begun.
Rice, 172 So. 3d at 769-70 (¶¶5-6). Finding no merit to Rice’s arguments, this Court
affirmed Rice’s conviction and sentence on appeal. Id. at 771 (¶13).
¶5. After this Court affirmed his conviction and sentence, Rice filed a petition with the
supreme court seeking permission to file a PCR motion with the circuit court. Rice alleged
the following assignments of error: (1) he was subjected to double jeopardy; (2) he failed
to receive notice of the State’s intent to charge him as a recidivist; and (3) the circuit court
violated his right to be sentenced outside the jury’s presence. The supreme court ordered the
State to file a response to Rice’s petition. After the State’s response, the supreme court
entered a second order requiring the State to file an additional response “to address Rice’s
sentence as a subsequent drug offender in light of [Williams].”
¶6. On November 25, 2014, the supreme court entered an order granting Rice leave to
proceed in circuit court on his PCR motion. With regard to the issues Rice raised, the
supreme court stated the following in its order:
Regarding Rice’s claims of double jeopardy and lack of a separate
sentencing hearing, [this] panel finds that Rice fails to present a substantial
showing of the denial of a state or federal right. See Rowland v. State, 98 So.
3d 1032, 1036 [(¶6)] (Miss. 2012). Rice, citing Williams . . . , challenges his
sentence as a recidivist for lack of notice. The habitual-offender enhancement
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was addressed on direct appeal and, thus, is barred from review. Miss. Code
Ann. § 99-39-21(3) [(Rev. 2009)]. After due consideration, we find that Rice
should be allowed leave to proceed in the trial court to address the subsequent-
drug-offender enhancement in light of [our] decision in Williams.
¶7. Following the supreme court’s order granting him leave to proceed on the sole issue
of his subsequent-drug-offender enhancement, Rice filed his PCR motion in circuit court on
December 23, 2014. Despite the supreme court’s order, Rice asserted in his PCR motion that
the circuit court erred by allowing the State, on the first day of his trial, to amend his
indictment to charge him as a habitual offender. Rice argued that the State’s filing on the
first day of his trial unfairly surprised him and denied him a fair opportunity to present a
defense. As the procedural history of this case shows, however, the supreme court found in
its November 25, 2014 order that the issue of Rice’s habitual-offender enhancement was
addressed on direct appeal and was therefore barred from review.
¶8. On January 29, 2015, the circuit court entered its order addressing Rice’s PCR motion.
Even though the supreme court granted Rice permission to proceed with his PCR motion on
the sole issue of whether error resulted from his subsequent-drug-offender enhancement, the
circuit court nevertheless reviewed Rice’s habitual-offender enhancement and found no error.
The circuit court noted that, in Williams, the State filed its motion to amend Williams’s
indictment to charge him as a recidivist a mere three days before trial. See Williams, 131 So.
3d at 1176 (¶2). In addressing the amendment to Williams’s indictment, the Williams court
stated:
Through formal pleadings filed three days in advance of trial, the State
informed Williams of its intent to seek enhanced punishment under one of
Mississippi’s recidivist statutes, [s]ection 99-19-81. The State’s motion
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specifically provided the details of the prior convictions which would be
presented to the trial judge for sentence enhancement (subject to a conviction
for the crime charged in the indictment), including the cause numbers, dates,
and courts in which they were obtained. Absent an argument as to why
Williams’s notice was inadequate, we cannot say, based on the record, that the
State failed to provide adequate notice of its intent to seek enhanced
punishment for Williams as a recidivist under [s]ection 99-19-81.
Williams, 131 So. 3d at 1177-78 (¶9).
¶9. In the present case, the circuit court found that the State filed its motion to amend
Rice’s indictment to reflect his habitual-offender status four days before the start of Rice’s
trial. As previously noted, in Williams the defendant only received three days of advance
notice. Id. The circuit court here also stated that, like in Williams, the State’s motion to
amend Rice’s indictment provided details as to Rice’s prior convictions, including the cause
numbers, dates of convictions, and courts in which the prior convictions were obtained.
Thus, after reviewing the record in Rice’s case and the supreme court’s holding in Williams,
the circuit court concluded that it was “unable to say that the State failed to provide adequate
notice of its intent to seek enhanced punishment for Rice since four days would have
afforded ample time for [Rice] and his attorney to confirm the previous felony sentences
pertaining to [Rice] in other Jones County cases.”
¶10. Despite finding no error from the amendment of Rice’s indictment to reflect his
habitual-offender status, the circuit court found an error regarding the portion of Rice’s
sentence that enhanced his punishment as a subsequent drug offender under Mississippi Code
Annotated section 41-29-147 (Rev. 2009). The circuit court found that the State never
actually filed a motion to enhance Rice’s sentence based on section 41-29-147. Because
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none of Rice’s prior felony convictions pertained to violations of the controlled-substance
laws, the circuit court found that the previous court’s reference to section 41-29-147 in
sentencing Rice resulted in error. After finding that Rice’s previous sentencing order failed
to comply with section 41-29-139 as it stood when Rice committed the crime, the circuit
court amended Rice’s sentence to order that he serve a term of thirty years in MDOC’s
custody, less time served, and pay a fine of $10,000. See Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-139 (Rev.
2009).
¶11. Aggrieved by the circuit court’s order amending his sentence, Rice appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Whether the State’s amendment to Rice’s indictment to charge him
as a habitual offender caused unfair surprise and prevented him
from presenting a defense.
II. Whether the circuit court erred by sentencing Rice in front of the
jury.
III. Whether Rice was denied effective assistance of counsel.
¶12. “Where a PCR movant’s direct appeal has been affirmed by the [supreme court] or
this court, he must be granted leave from the supreme court before filing a PCR motion.”
McKenzie v. State, 66 So. 3d 1274, 1275 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Miss. Code Ann.
§ 99-39-7 (Supp. 2010)). The “[f]ailure to obtain permission from the supreme court
deprives the trial court and this Court of jurisdiction.” Lacey v. State, 29 So. 3d 786, 788
(¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted). Furthermore, “the dismissal or denial by the
supreme court of an application for leave to proceed in the trial court is a final judgment and
bars successive applications under the statute.” Bradford v. State, 158 So. 3d 1202, 1204
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(¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-27(9) (Supp. 2014)).
¶13. In the present case, the supreme court granted Rice leave to proceed on the sole issue
of whether, in light of Williams, the circuit court erred by enhancing Rice’s sentence as a
subsequent drug offender. In addressing this issue, the circuit court concluded that error
occurred because none of Rice’s prior felony convictions dealt with controlled-substance
violations and because the State filed no motion seeking to enhance Rice’s sentence on a
subsequent-drug-offender basis. As a result, the circuit court eliminated the subsequent-
drug-offender portion of Rice’s sentence and amended the sentence to comply with section
41-29-139 as it stood when the State indicted Rice for the crime of selling cocaine.
Accordingly, Rice’s amended sentence ordered that he serve a term of thirty years in
MDOC’s custody, less time served, and pay a fine of $10,000.
¶14. In appealing the circuit court’s order amending his sentence, Rice raises additional
assignments of error unrelated to his subsequent-drug-offender enhancement. As the State
asserts, these alleged additional assignments of error “claim [no] error in the [circuit] court’s
order at issue.” Because the supreme court failed to grant Rice leave to proceed on these
additional issues, we find these issues were not properly before the circuit court. See Lacey,
29 So. 3d at 787-88 (¶7). As a result, both the circuit court and this Court lack jurisdiction
to consider these issues. See id.
IV. Whether the circuit court erred by denying Rice’s request for an
evidentiary hearing prior to disposing of his PCR motion.
¶15. Rice also argues that the circuit court erred by denying his request for an evidentiary
hearing prior to disposing of his PCR motion. Rice asserts that he asked the circuit court for
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an evidentiary hearing to present evidence on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
As already discussed, however, the supreme court failed to grant Rice leave to proceed on
his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Therefore, the issue was not properly before the
circuit court to consider, and the circuit court possessed no jurisdiction to hold an evidentiary
hearing to allow Rice to present evidence on this claim. As a result, we find this argument
lacks merit.
¶16. THE JUDGMENT OF THE JONES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO JONES
COUNTY.
LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, ISHEE, FAIR, JAMES,
WILSON AND GREENLEE, JJ., CONCUR.
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