Cornelius Lorenzo Callahan v. State of Mississippi , 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 310 ( 2016 )


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  •         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
    NO. 2014-CP-00516-COA
    CORNELIUS LORENZO CALLAHAN A/K/A                                       APPELLANT
    CORNELIUS CALLAHAN A/K/A CORNELIUS
    L. CALLAHAN
    v.
    STATE OF MISSISSIPPI                                                    APPELLEE
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                        03/26/2014
    TRIAL JUDGE:                             HON. ROGER T. CLARK
    COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:               HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
    FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                  CORNELIUS LORENZO CALLAHAN (PRO
    SE)
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:                   OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
    BY: LISA L. BLOUNT
    NATURE OF THE CASE:                      CIVIL - POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
    TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:                 PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
    DISMISSED
    DISPOSITION:                             AFFIRMED - 05/17/2016
    MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
    MANDATE ISSUED:
    BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., CARLTON AND JAMES, JJ.
    JAMES, J., FOR THE COURT:
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶1.   On September 22, 2012, Cornelius Callahan, along with his codefendant, robbed the
    Dollar General in Long Beach, Mississippi. On December 26, 2012, Callahan was indicted
    and charged with armed robbery pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-79
    (Rev. 2014). On September 9, 2013, Callahan entered an open plea to the armed-robbery
    charge and was sentenced to twenty-two years to serve day-for-day.
    ¶2.    On March 3, 2014, Callahan, pro se, filed a motion for postconviction relief (PCR).
    Callahan contended that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and he asked the trial
    court to vacate his guilty plea and/or reduce his sentence. The trial court found that the
    motion was without merit and denied it. Callahan now appeals claiming: (1) his plea was
    involuntary, and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶3.    A trial court’s decision to deny a PCR motion will not be reversed absent a finding
    that the trial court’s decision was clearly erroneous. Kirksey v. State, 
    728 So. 2d 565
    , 567
    (¶8) (Miss. 1999). We, however, review questions of law under a de novo standard of
    review. Wilson v. State, 
    76 So. 3d 733
    , 735 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).
    ¶4.    Callahan for the first time argues that he did not know he was pleading as a habitual
    offender. Callahan specifically claims that: (1) the State amended his indictment to
    improperly charge him as a habitual offender, (2) the trial court improperly sentenced him
    as a habitual offender under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2015), and
    (3) he did not know he was pleading guilty as a habitual offender.1 In Fluker v. State, 
    17 So. 3d 181
    , 183 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009), this Court found that a defendant may not raise an
    issue on appeal that he failed to raise in his PCR motion before the trial court. Thus, this
    1
    We note that Callahan’s claim seems to arise out of the trial court’s order denying
    the PCR motion. The order states: “[T]he State successfully moved to amend the indictment
    and charged Callahan as a habitual offender pursuant to section 99-19-81[.]” The trial
    court’s statement is incorrect. Callahan’s indictment and sentencing order make clear that
    Callahan was neither charged nor sentenced as a habitual offender, although the sentencing
    order provided that Callahan was ineligible for parole under Mississippi Code Annotated
    section 47-7-3(1)(d)(ii) (Rev. 2011).
    2
    issue is procedurally barred because Callahan raised it for the first time on appeal.
    ¶5.    Callahan also claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. He contends
    that his counsel failed to object to and inform the judge of the vindictive remarks the assistant
    district attorney (ADA) made to him during plea negotiations. He also claims that his
    attorney pressured him into taking the plea by telling him he would receive a life sentence
    if he did not accept the ADA’s offer.
    ¶6.    Ineffective-assistance claims are governed by Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    ,
    687 (1984). In order to make an ineffective-assistance claim, Callahan first “must show that
    counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Hannah v.
    State, 
    943 So. 2d 20
    , 24 (¶6) (Miss. 2006) (citing Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 687-88, 694
    ).
    Callahan then must show that “there is reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
    unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Callahan
    must allege both prongs with specific detail. McCray v. State, 
    107 So. 3d 1042
    , 1045 (¶9)
    (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). Callahan, however, only offers his own affidavit to support his claim.
    Our law is clear that, “[w]here a party offers only his affidavit, then his ineffective assistance
    of counsel claim is without merit.” Bass v. State, 
    174 So. 3d 883
    , 885 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App.
    2015) (quoting Vielee v. State, 
    653 So. 2d 920
    , 922 (Miss. 1995)). Callahan made assertions
    of ineffective assistance of counsel without supplying this Court with any supporting
    documents. Therefore, this issue is without merit.
    ¶7.  THE JUDGMENT OF THE HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIRST
    JUDICIAL DISTRICT, DISMISSING THE MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION
    RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO
    HARRISON COUNTY.
    3
    LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTON, FAIR,
    WILSON AND GREENLEE, JJ., CONCUR.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2014-CP-00516-COA

Citation Numbers: 192 So. 3d 380, 2016 WL 2860754, 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 310

Judges: Griffis, Carlton, James, Lee, Irving, Barnes, Ishee, Fair, Wilson, Greenlee

Filed Date: 5/17/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024