Anthony Robinson v. Mississippi Department of Employment Security , 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 304 ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2015-CC-00336-COA
ANTHONY ROBINSON APPELLANT
v.
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF APPELLEE
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/06/2015
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ANDREW K. HOWORTH
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MARSHALL COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ANTHONY ROBINSON (PRO SE)
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: ALBERT B. WHITE
ANNA CRAIN CLEMMER
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - STATE BOARDS AND AGENCIES
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT
OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY BOARD OF
REVIEW’S FINDINGS THAT CLAIMANT
ABANDONED HIS JOB AND THEREFORE
WAS NOT ENTITLED TO
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 05/17/2016
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE LEE, C.J., ISHEE AND BARNES, JJ.
ISHEE, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Sedona Staffing fired Anthony Robinson pursuant to Sedona Staffing’s attendance
policy. After Robinson’s termination, he filed for unemployment benefits. A claims
examiner from the Mississippi Department of Employment Security (MDES) investigated
and found that Robinson voluntarily quit without good cause and was, therefore, ineligible
to receive unemployment benefits. Robinson appealed. After a hearing, an administrative
judge (ALJ) agreed with MDES, and held that Robinson violated Sedona Staffing’s
attendance policy. Robinson appealed to MDES’s Board of Review, which adopted the
ALJ’s findings and conclusions. Robinson appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Marshall
County Circuit Court, which also affirmed MDES’s judgment. Still aggrieved, Robinson
now appeals to this Court. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS
¶2. Robinson had been employed as a material handler for Sedona Staffing from
December 27, 2012, until he failed to show up for work without notification for three
consecutive days beginning on August 30, 2013. On September 10, 2014, over a year after
his termination, Robinson filed an initial claim for unemployment benefits. A claims
examiner from MDES investigated. According to the claims examiner’s report, Robinson
was arrested on August 30, 2013, and was incarcerated until September 18, 2014. The claims
examiner found that neither Robinson nor someone on his behalf contacted Sedona Staffing
regarding Robinson’s incarceration status. As a result, the claims examiner found that
Robinson voluntarily quit without good cause because he failed to take steps to protect his
job.
¶3. Robinson appealed. An ALJ conducted a telephonic hearing with Robinson and
Salvadore Balderamma, an office manager testifying on behalf of Sedona Staffing. During
that hearing, Balderamma explained that they had an attendance policy that if there was “no
call/no show after three days,” it was considered self-termination. Balderamma also stated
that they tried to no avail to reach Robinson. Furthermore, Balderamma explained that had
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he been informed of Robinson’s incarceration status, Robinson’s employment status would
have been handled differently. When asked about the attendance policy, Robinson admitted
that he was aware of the policy. Robinson stated that he had been incarcerated for one year
and one week, and was not allowed a telephone call during that time. He did see family
members during that time, but not within his first three days of incarceration. Robinson
stated that he asked the judge involved in his criminal case to notify Robinson’s work about
his status on his behalf. Nonetheless, Balderamma, during the telephonic hearing, stated that
the hearing was the first time that he had heard about Robinson’s incarceration. The ALJ
ultimately found that Robinson had not “shown good cause under the [l]aw for voluntarily
leaving his employment and would not be entitled to receipt of benefits.”
¶4. Robinson appealed this decision to MDES’s Board of Review, which adopted the
findings of facts and opinion, and affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Robinson appealed the
Board’s decision to the circuit court, which affirmed the Board’s decision on the grounds that
it was “supported by substantial evidence and the applicable law.” Aggrieved, Robinson now
appeals the circuit court’s judgment.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
¶5. Mississippi Code Annotated section 71-5-531 (Supp. 2015) provides that the Board's
findings of fact are conclusive if supported by evidence and if no fraud is involved, as is the
case before us. Therefore, on appeal, this Court’s jurisdiction is “confined to questions of
law.” Id. “If substantial evidence supports the [B]oard's fact-finding and the relevant law
was properly applied to the facts, the appellate court must affirm.” Barnett v. Miss. Emp't
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Sec. Comm'n, 583 So. 2d 193, 195 (Miss. 1991). “This Court must not reweigh the facts of
the case or insert its judgment for that of the agency.” Allen v. Miss. Emp’t Sec. Comm’n,
639 So. 2d 904, 906 (Miss. 1994) (citation omitted).
¶6. Robinson points to his incarceration as the reason he was unable to notify Sedona
Staffing. However, Robinson was well aware of the attendance policy, specifically the three-
day “no show/no call” rule, which provided the grounds for Robinson’s status as having
voluntarily left his employment without good cause. The record also reveals that Robinson
admitted that, upon his release, he did not go to Sedona Staffing to explain, nor is there
evidence that Robinson tried to regain employment with Sedona Staffing. Finally, nothing
in the record indicates that Robinson asked his family members who visited him during his
incarceration to relay his status to Sedona Staffing.
¶7. Under Mississippi's unemployment-compensation law, a person is disqualified from
receiving benefits if he left work voluntarily without good cause. Miss. Code Ann. § 71-5-
513(A)(1)(a) (Supp. 2015). The burden of proving good cause for leaving one's employment
voluntarily rests with the employee. Miss. Code Ann. § 71-5-513(A)(1)(c) (Supp. 2015);
see also Hoerner Boxes Inc. v. Miss. Emp’t Sec. Comm'n, 693 So. 2d 1343, 1346 (Miss.
1997). We cannot find that the Board, by adopting the ALJ’s ruling, erred in its findings of
facts or its application of the law. As such, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
¶8. THE JUDGMENT OF THE MARSHALL COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS
AFFIRMED.
LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, CARLTON, FAIR,
JAMES, WILSON AND GREENLEE, JJ., CONCUR.
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