Amy Denise Towles v. State of Mississippi , 2016 Miss. App. LEXIS 382 ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2014-KA-01226-COA
AMY DENISE TOWLES A/K/A AMY DENISE APPELLANT
THOMAS TOWLES A/K/A AMY TOWLES
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/24/2014
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. THOMAS J. GARDNER III
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: ALCORN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JULIE ANN EPPS
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ABBIE EASON KOONCE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: J. TRENT KELLY
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: CONVICTED OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
AND SENTENCED TO TWENTY YEARS,
WITH FIVE YEARS TO BE SERVED IN
THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
FIFTEEN YEARS SUSPENDED, AND FIVE
YEARS OF POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION
DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 06/14/2016
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE LEE, C.J., BARNES AND WILSON, JJ.
BARNES, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. On September 20, 2012, Amy Towles was indicted for aggravated assault on William
Clay Wells. After a jury trial in Alcorn County Circuit Court, she was convicted and
sentenced to twenty years, with five years to be served in the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections (MDOC), fifteen years suspended, and five years of post-release
supervision. After the circuit court denied her posttrial motions, Towles appealed. Finding
the circuit court erred in refusing to give the defendant’s proposed self-defense instruction,
we reverse and remand for a new trial. The State’s acknowledgment of improper “send-a-
message” arguments to the jury further supports reversible error.
SUMMARY OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. Towles and Wells had a tumultuous, off-and-on dating relationship for four years,
until Towles shot and seriously injured Wells with a .22-caliber rifle in the early morning
hours of June17, 2012. Wells had spent the night at Towles’s residence the previous evening
(June 15). Towles lived alone in an upstairs apartment at her mother’s home/farm. Wells
drove Towles’s van to his job the following morning, June 16, but he brought it back to her
midday and went back to work.1 He was later dropped off at Towles’s apartment by a
coworker sometime between 7:00 and 8:30 p.m. that evening.
¶3. There is some discrepancy regarding the events that transpired after Wells arrived at
Towles’s apartment that evening. According to Wells, Towles “wanted to go out dancing”
when he got home, but he was tired from work; so he just drank a couple of beers, planning
to retire early.2 He said Towles kept trying to convince him to go out, and they began
arguing over “petty” things. He claimed Towles struck him “several times” and hit him with
a full beer bottle. He eventually went to bed sometime between 10:30 p.m. and midnight.
Wells said that he awoke around 3:00 a.m. and found Towles sitting on the couch, drinking
1
Towles claimed Wells took the van without her permission.
2
Although Wells claimed he was not a “big drinker,” medical records indicate a
history of substance abuse.
2
alcohol and watching television, which prompted another fight.
¶4. Towles, however, asserts she had planned to stay home that evening and was not
aware Wells was coming over. She claims she was preparing Father’s Day gift baskets, and
a client stopped by at 9:00 p.m. to pick one up.3 She said Wells was “agitated” and wanted
to discuss moving in with her, and he was “angry” because she did not want him to
accompany her to Memphis to visit her family the next day for Father’s Day. Towles did not
want Wells to move in due to his past issues with drug abuse. She admitted “he did push
[her] button one time that night, and [she] threw a lamp in his direction,” but denied hitting
him. Towles stated that after she threw the lamp, she “caught [herself],” not wanting to fight
with him anymore. She wanted to take him home, and Wells went downstairs, presumably
to get his laundry. However, when Wells came back upstairs to the apartment, he “passed
out on the couch”; so Towles went to bed, not wanting to “arouse him from sleep to fight
some more.” Towles awoke in the middle of the night to find Wells angry and awake; he
began throwing and breaking her dishes. She testified that, “in all of [their] fights, [she] had
never seen anything like it, like a tornado. . . . [H]e was just tearing up everything.” She
picked up her son’s .22-caliber rifle that was by the door, “trying to get him to focus on right
then and where [they] were and [trying to get] him to calm down.” But she claimed it had
the “opposite effect”; he broke the windows of the french doors to the apartment.
3
Towles previously worked as a linguist (Persian/Farsi) for the Air Force for several
years, and then worked as a paralegal. Although Towles was characterized as unemployed
at the time of the shooting, and considered disabled due to a medical condition (Crohn’s
disease), she states that she was self-employed, helping to manage and maintain her family’s
farm and selling natural, homemade products from the farm.
3
¶5. Wells admitted that he broke a dish “to release some anger and busted out the wall,
but . . . [he stated he] never laid a hand on [Towles].” He also acknowledges that he walked
outside to the porch area and broke the glass of the apartment’s french doors. But Wells
claims he decided to leave the apartment at that point and walk to the nearby truck stop to
call a friend to pick him up; so he proceeded down the outside stairs to the driveway. He
heard Towles run up behind him, and when he turned, he saw her with the rifle. Wells stated
that Towles shot him in the driveway, and he had to drag himself up the stairs to where she
was sitting and watching television. He contends she refused to help him at first, but
eventually relented and called 911.
¶6. Towles’s version of events leading to the shooting is substantially different. She
maintains that after Wells broke the glass in the french doors, he remained on the deck
outside the doors, angrily pacing and shouting “ugly things” at her. It was at this point Wells
“came straight at [her],” and when she reflexively backed up, the gun went off accidentally.
Initially, she was not certain he was hit. When she realized he was injured, Towles said she
went to get dressed to drive him to the hospital. She said she came back into the room, and
Wells was drinking a soda from the refrigerator. He collapsed, and she could not lift him;
so she called 911.
¶7. The record shows that Towles called 911 at 3:58 a.m., requesting an ambulance; the
911 operator testified that Towles told her there had been “an accidental shooting.” Alcorn
County Sheriff’s Deputy Shane Crowe soon arrived on the scene, noting the broken glass in
the french doors and “several broken dishes in the floor.” He asked Towles where the gun
4
was; she initially replied that she was not sure. However, she quickly produced the rifle and
handed it to the deputy.
¶8. At this point, Wells was awake, but unresponsive. EMS took him to the local hospital
for medical treatment. Although Wells’s injuries were, according to his surgeon, “almost
uniformly fatal,” he survived. Wells, who has an admitted history of substance abuse, had
Lortab, cocaine, and Adderall in his system at the time of the shooting.4 He claimed that the
drugs were taken “a day or two prior” to the incident.
¶9. In the meantime, Investigator Tommy Hopkins arrived and talked to Towles, who
stated that the gun accidentally discharged. The investigator said Towles did not appear to
be intoxicated, and she freely gave her version of the events. She told law enforcement that
she had firearm experience, and she later testified: “I had been shooting guns most of my life
[(hunting)], and I was just a few points short of expert marksmanship.” Deputy Crowe noted
that “her story changed.” Towles initially stated that the gun fell and went off. However,
she later told the deputy that she pointed it at Wells, admitting she had pulled a gun on Wells
“several times in the past” to calm him down when they would fight.
¶10. After a jury trial, Towles was convicted of aggravated assault on July 24, 2014. The
circuit court sentenced her to twenty years, with five years to be served in the custody of the
MDOC, fifteen years suspended, and five years of post-release supervision. She filed a
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the alternative, for a new
trial, arguing that the sufficiency and weight of the evidence did not support the verdict and
4
Towles testified that she had a prescription for Adderall; she had been “on it for
about [fifteen] years.” She said that she “had to start hiding [her] medication from [Wells].”
5
that the inclusion of the term “recklessly” in Jury Instruction S-1, as an element of the
offense, constituted reversible error. She also filed a motion to reconsider her sentence,
claiming it was excessive and noting hardship due to her Crohn’s disease. The circuit court
denied her motions on August 26, 2014, and she now appeals.5
DISCUSSION
I. Whether the circuit court erred in giving Jury Instruction 2
(State’s Jury Instruction S-1), which Towles claims constructively
amended the indictment.
¶11. Towles claims that the State constructively amended the indictment when it submitted
Jury Instruction S-1 at trial, which added the term “recklessly” to the elements of the offense.
The original indictment stated, in part, that Towles
did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an aggravated assault upon
. . . Wells by attempting to cause and by causing, knowingly and purposely,
serious bodily injury to . . . Wells, a human being, in that [s]he did shoot the
said . . . Wells with a .22[-]caliber rifle, striking his abdomen, thereby
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life; in violation of
Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-7 [(Supp. 2011).]
However, Jury Instruction S-1 provided:
Towles is charged with aggravated assault. If you find beyond a reasonable
doubt from the evidence in this case that on or about July 17, 2012[,] in Alcorn
County, Mississippi, . . . Towles knowingly, purposely, or recklessly, under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life and
not as a result of accident or misfortune, caused serious bodily injury to . . .
Wells by shooting the said . . . Wells with a .22[-]caliber rifle striking him in
the abdomen, then you shall find . . . Towles guilty as charged.
The circuit court gave the instruction as Jury Instruction 2.
5
On November 7, 2014, Towles was granted bail in the sum of $50,000 pending her
appeal.
6
¶12. At the time Towles was charged, Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-7(2)
(Supp. 2011) provided in pertinent part:6
A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he (a) attempts to cause serious
bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely, knowingly or
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value
of human life; (b) attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily
injury to another with a deadly weapon or other means likely to produce death
or serious bodily harm[.]
Prior to the verdict, defense counsel argued that the indictment “seemed to be kind of a
hybrid indictment using parts of Section 97-3-7(2)(a) and (b), and . . . that it was both
confusing and misleading . . . and . . . based on that, the reckless part shouldn’t have been in
the instruction.” In her motion for a JNOV, Towles reasserted her claim that the indictment
was erroneously amended, but the circuit court concluded that the “subsections of the
aggravated[-]assault statute are similar and not mutually exclusive,” and the indictment was
sufficient to advise Towles of the charges against her.
¶13. “A constructive amendment of the indictment occurs when the proof and instructions
broaden the grounds upon which the defendant may be found guilty of the offense charged
so that the defendant may be convicted without proof of the elements alleged by the grand
jury in its indictment.” Bell v. State, 725 So. 2d 836, 855 (¶58) (Miss. 1998). An
indictment’s primary purpose “is to give a defendant fair notice of the crime charged.”
Williams v. State, 169 So. 3d 932, 935 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Hines v. State, 126
So. 3d 985, 987 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013)). “Each and every material fact and essential
6
The statute has been amended since 2011, but the text of the relevant language has
not changed other than to change the subsection notations from (a) and (b) to (i) and (ii).
7
ingredient of the offense must be with precision and certainty set forth.” Id. (quoting
Burchfield v. State, 277 So. 2d 623, 625 (Miss. 1973)).
¶14. There is no dispute that the language in Towles’s indictment is a “hybrid” or
“blended” version of both subsections of the statute. In McLarty v. State, 842 So. 2d 590,
593-94 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), this Court concluded that amending an indictment to
“collapse (a) and (b) [of section 97-3-7(2)],” five days prior to trial, “confuse[d] the two
separate subsections” and rendered the indictment “defective and unclear.” Cf. Mason v.
State, 867 So. 2d 1058, 1059 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (“Section 97-3-7(2) delineates two
separate crimes of aggravated assault.”). However, in Johnson v. State, 910 So. 2d 1174,
1179 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005), we subsequently held that the blending of the two
subsections of the aggravated-assault statute in an indictment “should [not] be classified
necessarily as a ‘defect[,]’ [and] even if we were to accept that this blending of the
subsections was a defect, such a defect in this case would be one of form only[.]” Whether
an amendment to an indictment is one of substance rather than form involves a determination
of whether the change “materially alter[s] facts which are the essence of the offense on the
face of the original indictment or . . . . materially alter[s] a defense to the original indictment
so as to prejudice the defendant’s case.” McLarty, 842 So. 2d at 593 (¶11) (quoting
Chandler v. State, 789 So. 2d 109, 111 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001)).
¶15. In Stevens v. State, 808 So. 2d 908, 919 (¶35) (Miss. 2002), the supreme court
considered a defendant’s claim that his indictment should have been dismissed “because it
did not enumerate the elements of aggravated assault.” The Court reasoned:
8
Because [Glynn] Stevens was charged not under a specific single subsection
of [section] 97-3-7(2), it necessarily follows that he was charged under both
subsections comprising that section. Stevens was therefore put on notice that
he was being charged with aggravated assault under both subsections, i.e., by
causing injury under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life and by causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon or
other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm.
Stevens, 808 So. 2d at 920 (¶36) (emphasis added). More recently, the supreme court,
discussing Stevens and Johnson, reaffirmed that the “subsections of aggravated assault are
not mutually exclusive[.]” State v. Hawkins, 145 So. 3d 636, 644 (¶22) (Miss. 2014).
¶16. Towles contends, however, that the addition of the term “recklessly” constituted
reversible error, citing Quick v. State, 569 So. 2d 1197 (Miss. 1990). Unlike Towles, the
defendant in Quick was specifically indicted under section 97-3-7(2)(b). On the morning of
trial, the State moved to amend the indictment to add the following phrase: “[I]ntentionally
or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human
life contrary to [section] 97-3-7(2)(a) and (b) of Mississippi Code of 1972, as amended.”
Quick, 569 So. 2d at 1198. The jury instructions were changed by interlineation to reflect
the amended language. Id. at 1198-99. The Quick court determined there was “no doubt that
the jury acted under the language contained in the proposed amendment because it inquired
of the court, after it had retired, as to the meaning of that language.” Id. at 1200. Thus,
because the “new element” was not in the original indictment, and the jury clearly relied on
the jury instruction’s language in returning its verdict, the supreme court found it was
reversible error. Id. As the State observes, Quick is factually distinguishable from the
present case – the indictment here did not specify a subsection of the statute, and there is no
9
evidence that the jury convicted Towles based on the addition of the term “recklessly.”
¶17. Under these circumstances, we find Towles suffered no prejudice from the State’s
inclusion of the term “recklessly” in the jury instruction. The original indictment clearly
provided that she was being charged under section 97-3-7; thus, she had sufficient notice of
the charges against her. Accordingly, we find no error in the circuit court’s giving of Jury
Instruction 2 (S-1).
II. Whether the circuit court’s failure to instruct the jury on self-
defense was reversible error.
¶18. At trial, Towles submitted Jury Instruction D-4, which read:
The Court instructs the jury that an individual shall be deemed justified in the
use of deadly force when committed by any person in the defense of one’s own
person or any other person, where there shall be reasonable grounds to
apprehend a design to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury, and
there shall be imminent danger of such design being accomplished.
The circuit court refused the instruction without explanation. However, when questioned by
defense counsel as to why the defendant’s jury instruction on the castle doctrine was denied,
the court responded:
So, now, if I understand the defense asserted in this case, it is characterized in
the law as accident and misfortune . . . . And I think that states clearly the
position of the defendant in this case, what her claim is, that she had no
intention to shoot him, but that because of mishandling or otherwise, the gun
discharged.
Towles argues that although the gun accidentally fired and hit Wells, she was also entitled
to a self-defense instruction, as she picked up the gun to defend herself. Therefore, she
claims the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing Jury Instruction D-4.
¶19. Jury instructions “are to be read together as a whole[, and a] defendant is entitled to
10
have jury instructions given which present his theory of the case.” Booker v. State, 64 So.
3d 988, 995 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (citation omitted). “An instruction should not be
given to a jury submitting a theory which is not supported by the evidence.” Wadford v.
State, 385 So. 2d 951, 954 (Miss. 1980).
¶20. The State claims that Towles’s version of events does not support a self-defense
instruction, citing her statements to law enforcement that it was an accident. Neither
Investigator Hopkins nor Deputy Crowe indicated that Towles told them she shot Wells in
self-defense. During the direct examination of Investigator Hopkins, he was asked:
Q. Did she at any point in this conversation say or indicate [in] any way
that Mr. Wells was trying to break into her house and that was the
reason she shot him?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did she indicate at any point during that conversation that she had to
shoot him, he was attacking her, or that she shot him in self-defense?
A. No, sir.
The State also contends “[t]here is an inherent conflict between Towles’[s] claims that the
shooting was both accidental and done in self-defense,” and observes there was no evidence
that Wells attempted to throw anything at Towles or hit her; Towles was merely upset he was
destroying her property.
¶21. We disagree with the State’s position. Towles distinctly testified during direct
examination at trial that she was scared of Wells during the fight, saying, “I didn’t know
what I was dealing with.”
Q. And when he came and turned around at you that night and started
11
toward you, were you afraid of him?
A. Well, yes, that’s why – I mean, in an instant, I backed up. I took a step
back, and that’s when the gun went off.
....
A. Okay. I was very scared. I did not know what I was dealing with. . . .
All this mayhem and rampage and rage, I picked up the gun because I
couldn’t predict what would happen. He was, you know, being very
violent and I was scared.
....
A. For me to have picked up that gun at all, it was because I was scared
of him. . . . But I know I had never seen this level of rage, and yes, I
was scared.
(Emphasis added). During cross-examination, Towles reiterated: “The man was scaring me.
The man was threatening me. He was tearing up my house, and one of us was going to the
hospital that night.”
¶22. Admittedly, “[a] defendant simply saying that he or she shot someone in self-defense
or that the shooting was an accident in and of itself does not provide a defendant with a right
to a jury instruction on self-defense, nor does it obligate a jury to accept such defense.”
Johnson v. State, 52 So. 3d 384, 397-98 (¶41) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). As the supreme court
has held, “[a] defendant is not entitled to use deadly force in self-defense based upon a
subjective fear of great bodily injury unless it is determined by a jury that this fear is
reasonable under the circumstances.” Ellis v. State, 708 So. 2d 884, 887 (¶8) (Miss. 1998).
¶23. But the photographic exhibits show broken dishes scattered on the floor of the
apartment and busted windows in the french doors. Wells admitted he caused this damage
12
and was angry with Towles that night. Wells’s medical records reveal that he had several
drugs in his system that evening – Lortab, cocaine, and Adderall. He also acknowledged he
drank beer that night. Therefore, there is more than just Towles’s testimony to support her
version of events and to support a finding that her fear of Wells was “reasonable under the
circumstances.”
¶24. Regarding whether the self-defense instruction contradicted Towles’s claim that the
shooting was accidental, we find that no conflict exists in these circumstances. Towles stated
she picked up the gun in an attempt to calm Wells down and because he was “being very
violent and [she] was scared.” In McTiller v. State, 113 So. 3d 1284, 1292 (¶26) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2013), we recognized that “a criminal defendant has a right to assert alternative theories
of defense, even inconsistent alternative theories.” (Quoting Reddix v. State, 731 So. 2d 591,
593 (¶9) (Miss. 1999)). The circuit court in that case had denied Mike McTiller’s self-
defense instruction “on the basis that it was contradictory to his accident defense.” Id. at
(¶25). This Court concluded that the refusal of the self-defense instruction was reversible
error, as there was evidence that the defendant thought the victim was pulling a gun and that
the victim rushed the defendant first. Id. at 1293 (¶28).
¶25. Here, the jury was given Jury Instruction 3, which stated in pertinent part: “If you find
from the evidence that . . . Towles shot . . . Wells by accident and misfortune while
performing a lawful act by lawful means, with usual and ordinary caution and without any
unlawful intent, then [you] are to return a verdict in favor of the defendant.” (Emphasis
13
added).7 A self-defense instruction would have allowed the jury to consider whether Towles
possessed the gun in a lawful manner and through lawful means to defend herself. Thus, the
fact the gun may have discharged accidentally, under these circumstances, is not in conflict
with Towles’s claim that she picked up the gun in self-defense.
¶26. Accordingly, we find the circuit court’s refusal of the proposed self-defense jury
instruction was reversible error and remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion.
III. Whether Jury Instruction 3 improperly instructed the jury on
accident and mistake, or alternatively, whether counsel was
ineffective for not objecting to the giving of the instruction.
¶27. Towles argues that the circuit court erred in giving Jury Instruction 3 (State’s Jury
Instruction S-5), which provided:
Accident and misfortune is an affirmative defense to aggravated assault.
The defendant has asserted the defense of accident by claiming the shooting
of . . . Wells occurred as the result of the accidental discharge of a rifle she
was holding and pointing at . . . Wells.
If you find from the evidence that . . . Towles shot . . . Wells by accident and
misfortune while performing a lawful act by lawful means, with usual and
ordinary caution and without any unlawful intent, then [you] are to return a
verdict in favor of the defendant.
If, however, you find from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt
that the State has proven the necessary elements of aggravated assault and that
the shooting of . . . Wells by the defendant was not the result of accident and
misfortune, you should find the defendant guilty as charged.
Towles argues that the instruction was “deficient because it improperly limited the defense
to only one subsection of the applicable statute[.]” The defense of accident and misfortune
7
We will address Jury Instruction 3 in greater detail in Issue III.
14
is defined in Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-17 (Rev. 2014):
The killing of any human being by the act, procurement, or omission of
another shall be excusable:
(a) When committed by accident and misfortune in doing any lawful act by
lawful means, with usual and ordinary caution, and without any unlawful intent;
(b) When committed by accident and misfortune, in the heat of passion, upon
any sudden and sufficient provocation;
(c) When committed upon any sudden combat, without undue advantage being
taken, and without any dangerous weapon being used, and not done in a cruel
or unusual manner.
Here, the jury instruction included language from subsection (a), but not (b) or (c). Towles’s
contention is that the instruction should have also included language from subsection (b),
noting both parties’ agitated states during the argument that preceded the shooting. To
support her claim, Towles cites McTiller, a case in which this Court concluded that “the jury
should have been privy to all three subsections of [section 97-3-17] to determine if any of the
three subsections applied to [the defendant’s] case.” McTiller, 113 So. 3d at 1291 (¶19).8
¶28. As defense counsel did not object to the State’s instruction, we must determine if the
alleged deficiency in the jury instruction’s language constitutes plain error. See Williams v.
State, 134 So. 3d 732, 736 (¶15) (Miss. 2014) (finding that because counsel failed to “object
to any of the jury instructions complained of on appeal[,]” the defendant’s “points of
contention are subject to plain-error review”). “Under our plain-error doctrine, there has to
8
We noted in McTiller that while section 97-3-17 references homicide, “we have held
it a natural extension that these principles ‘should apply to make an assault that does not
result in death excusable under the same circumstances.’” McTiller, 113 So. 3d at 1291
(¶19) (quoting Rogers v. State, 994 So. 2d 792, 802 (¶41) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008)).
15
be a finding of error, and that error must have resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice
for reversal to occur.” Id. (citing Gray v. State, 549 So. 2d 1316, 1321 (Miss. 1989)). Plain
error will be found “only where a fundamental right of the defendant has been violated.”
Fitzpatrick v. State, 175 So. 3d 515, 522 (¶31) (Miss. 2015). “A defendant has a fundamental
right to have his or her lawful defense – even if the evidence is minimal or highly unlikely
– presented as a factual issue before the jury under proper instruction.” Expose v. State, 99
So. 3d 1141, 1146 (¶34) (Miss. 2012) (citing Chinn v. State, 958 So. 2d 1223, 1225 (¶13)
(Miss. 2007)). However, in cases where there is no evidentiary basis for such an instruction,
it is appropriate for the court to refuse such an instruction. Smith v. State, 171 So. 3d 542,
547 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015).
¶29. In Thomas v. State, 818 So. 2d 335, 350 (¶55) (Miss. 2002), the Mississippi Supreme
Court, discussing whether a jury instruction on accident or misfortune under section 97-3-17
should have been given, held that a “necessary component of ‘heat of passion’ is ‘a state of
violent and uncontrollable rage.’” (Quoting Mullins v. State, 493 So. 2d 971, 974 (Miss.
1986)). There is undisputed evidence that Towles and Wells were engaged in a heated
argument prior to the shooting. Wells testified that he broke Towles’s dishes because
“[a]nger would come over [him],” and “[he] don’t hit women.” However, the State argues
there is no testimony to support there was “sudden and sufficient provocation,” although it
acknowledges Towles’s testimony that he “came straight at [her].” It also contends that
subsection (b) required Towles to pick up the gun in response to the provocation. Towles
did testify, however, that she picked up the gun in response to Wells’s “mayhem and rampage
16
and rage[.]” She said, “He was . . . being very violent and I was scared.”
¶30. In Clayton v. State, 106 So. 3d 802 (Miss. 2012), the supreme court considered a
similar scenario that involved Quincy Clayton’s shooting of his wife during a domestic
argument. Coincidentally, the Claytons’ argument also occurred on Father’s Day, after Mrs.
Clayton began swinging a steak knife at her husband during breakfast. Id. at 803 (¶2). After
she cut him a couple of times and threatened him, Clayton grabbed a 12-gauge shotgun from
the hall closet. He claimed he was “trying to bluff her so [he] could get [his] shoes [on] to
go to church,” when she came at him with the knife. The gun went off, killing her. Id. at
803-04 (¶2). Clayton argued the shooting was an accident. At trial, the circuit court gave
the defendant’s jury instruction on accident and misfortune that included only subsection (a),
but refused the defendant’s second proposed instruction that included language from
subsection (b) regarding “heat of passion” and “sudden and sufficient provocation.” Id. at
805 (¶7). Finding reversible error, the supreme court concluded that the refused instruction
“correctly stated the law” and found that evidence of the couple’s “escalating argument,” and
the victim’s use of a knife “to threaten and cut” the defendant moments before the shooting,
“provided a sufficient evidentiary foundation . . . to present a heat-of-passion theory to the
jury.” Id. at 806 (¶¶10-11).
¶31. In Clayton, however, the jury instruction was submitted by counsel and denied by the
circuit court. Here, as no instruction containing subsection (b) was submitted to the court,
we must determine whether this omission rose to plain error. Our supreme court has held
that a defendant has a fundamental right to the jury being instructed on her theory of defense,
17
if supported by the evidence. Expose, 99 So. 3d at 1146 (¶34). While there was evidence
that the parties were angry and fighting prior to the shooting, a circuit court “has no
affirmative duty to offer jury instructions sua sponte or to suggest instructions for the parties
to consider.” McGregory v. State, 979 So. 2d 12, 18 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (citing
Giles v. State, 650 So. 2d 846, 854 (Miss. 1995)). Therefore, we conclude that the circuit
court’s failure to modify Jury Instruction 3 to include the language regarding subsection (b)
did not constitute plain error.
¶32. We further find that we need not address Towles’s alternative claim “that defense
counsel’s failure to object to the defective instruction or to proffer a jury instruction
containing all the subsections of the statute” constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel brought on direct appeal should not be addressed
on the merits unless “the record affirmatively shows ineffectiveness of constitutional
dimensions, or . . . the parties stipulate that the record is adequate and the Court determines
that findings of fact by a trial judge able to consider the demeanor of witnesses, etc. are not
needed.” Read v. State, 430 So. 2d 832, 841 (Miss. 1983). If it cannot be determined from
the record that counsel’s performance was constitutionally ineffective, and the case is
reversed on other grounds, “the ineffectiveness issue . . . become[s] moot.” Id. As we are
reversing on the issue of the court’s refusal of the self-defense instruction, and we cannot
determine on direct appeal why Towles’s trial counsel did not object to Jury Instruction 3 or
proffer an alternative jury instruction, we find this claim by Towles is rendered moot.
IV. Whether the prosecution’s cross-examination of Towles constituted
plain error under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), and whether
18
defense counsel was ineffective by not objecting to the questioning.
¶33. Prior to her oral statement to Investigator Hopkins, Towles was given Miranda9
warnings and signed a waiver of rights. However, when Investigator Hopkins called her two
months later to sign the transcribed statement, Towles told him that she needed to speak with
her attorney “before she signed anything[.]” Towles never signed the statement. During
cross-examination, the State questioned Towles regarding her failure to sign the statement
provided by Investigator Hopkins:10
Q. And, Ms. Towles, you were given the opportunity to review that
statement, to read it and see if it was correct, make any additions,
corrections, subtractions that you wanted to, and you refused to do so,
did you not?
A. No, that’s not how that happened.
Q. Well, you heard the testimony of [Investigator] Hopkins, who said that
he called you and asked you to do that, and you said on advice of an
attorney that you weren’t going to do that and weren’t going to talk to
him.
A. My attorney has never said we weren’t going to do it. [The attorney]
was going to look over the statement and advise me whether or not I
should validate it, ratify it, whichever word you choose . . . . The
document was never submitted to my attorney for us to review it before
it went to the grand jury. So it was not as if he said look at this and
ratify it and I said no. I never laid eyes on that document until after I
had been indicted[.]
9
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10
On March 13, 2014, counsel for Towles filed a motion to suppress her statement
to police, noting that Investigator Hopkins “did not reduce this statement to writing until
August 20, 2012, nearly two (2) months after the oral statement was given to him” and that
Towles “did not review th[e] statement, did not sign it, had no opportunity to make
corrections to it, and did not ratify and accept this as an accurate reflection of her
statement[.]” The circuit court denied the motion.
19
Towles argues that the prosecution’s cross-examination regarding her failure to sign the
statement constituted an improper inference that her testimony was false and was prohibited
under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). Defense counsel did not object to the
questioning, but Towles claims that the comments should warrant reversal under plain error.
¶34. In Doyle, the United States Supreme Court held “it would be fundamentally unfair and
a deprivation of due process to allow [an] arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach an
explanation subsequently offered at trial.” Id. at 618. Thus, “the use for impeachment
purposes of petitioners’ silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings,
violate[s] the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 619.
¶35. The State contends that Doyle is not applicable, citing Towles’s waiver of her
Miranda rights and her voluntary oral statement given to Investigator Hopkins.
[I]f the defendant does not take advantage of his right to remain silent, any
statements he voluntarily makes can and will be used against him in a court of
law. The United States Supreme Court’s holding in Doyle simply reiterates
that the defendant’s silence cannot be used against him during cross-
examination. However, because [the defendant] did not invoke his right to
silence, and made voluntary statements, the Miranda and Doyle provisions do
not apply. To hold otherwise would not only afford the defendant the right not
to incriminate himself by remaining silent but would also afford him the right
not to incriminate himself by making voluntary statements which are
inconsistent with his testimony at trial.
Puckett v. State, 737 So. 2d 322, 350-51 (¶85) (Miss. 1999). In Robinson v. State, 40 So. 3d
570, 575 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009), where the defendant was given his Miranda warnings
and subsequently chose to provide “oral statements to law enforcement,” this Court
concluded that there was “no Doyle violation or violation of post-Miranda silence.”
¶36. Towles’s response is that the issue “is not that the prosecutor used [her] prior
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statements to argue inconsistencies with her trial testimony,” but that “he used her failure to
sign her statement and her invocation of her right to counsel to argue that she was guilty.”
To support her claim, she cites State v. Jones, 575 A.2d 216, 220 (Conn. 1990), a case in
which the prosecution made two references during closing argument to the defendant’s
refusal to sign a transcribed statement of his taped statement from the day of his arrest. The
Connecticut Supreme Court found that the prosecution’s statements constituted error under
Doyle. Id. at 221. However, it concluded that the statements were harmless error, as the
prosecutor did not “focus upon” the defendant’s invocation of his right to remain silent, and
“the jury would have returned a guilty verdict without the impermissible comments by the
prosecutor[.]” Id. at 222.
¶37. We find no merit to Towles’s claim. The questioning regarding Towles’s statement
arose from the preceding testimony about her version of the events of that evening:
Q. Now, you said you told the investigators, including [Investigator]
Hopkins, the same thing this morning after you shot . . . Wells as you’re
telling us in the courtroom today. Could you tell us when you told him
about, first of all, a visitor that night and also about a planned trip with
your father or with your family? When did you tell them that?
A. I told him all of that.
Q. And that would be in the statement that he took from you, then
wouldn’t it?
A. Well, perhaps between the two months that passed from the time I gave
him a statement and the time it was reduced to writing, he didn’t see the
need to put those facts in there. But, yes, I told him both of those
things.
Therefore, the subsequent comments made by the prosecution about her failure to sign the
21
statement were an attempt to point out inconsistencies between her testimony and the
statement given to law enforcement. “[W]here a prosecutor’s questions and comments are
aimed at eliciting an explanation for an arguably prior inconsistent statement, no Doyle
violation occurs.” Robinson, 40 So. 3d at 574 (¶14) (citing Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S.
404, 409 (1980)).
¶38. Furthermore, unlike Jones, Towles was able to respond at trial to the prosecution’s
comments during cross-examination, asserting she was never afforded the opportunity to sign
the statement. She also explained on redirect examination that when she contacted her
attorney regarding signing the statement, he told her that he “would get in touch with
Investigator Hopkins and get [the statement.] I know those two spoke, but for whatever
reason that document never got to me.”
¶39. Accordingly, we conclude that the prosecution’s comments regarding Towles’s failure
to sign the statement did not violate Doyle. Alternatively, even if the State’s comments were
improper, they would constitute harmless error, as nothing indicates the jury relied on the
prosecution’s comments in arriving at its guilty verdict. Furthermore, because we find no
merit in Towles’s claim of error on this issue, she cannot demonstrate prejudice to establish
her alternative claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
V. Whether the prosecution’s “send a message” comments during
closing arguments constituted plain error.
¶40. Towles’s last issue concerns statements made by the prosecution during closing
arguments, which she claims were impermissible and warrant a finding of plain error.
During closing arguments, the prosecuting attorney stated:
22
There is something that can be done about the shootings that we have that are
far too prevalent and the killings that we have, and that something is for jurors
like you, good people like you, a cross-section of this community, to say,
“Wait a minute. We are the conscience of this community. We will not have
this. We will do something about it in Alcorn County.”
....
In a few minutes this case will be yours. As I said earlier, you’re the
conscience of the community.
....
As I said earlier, you’ll decide what kind of community this is. You’ll decide
if we allow things like this to go on, if we allow people to get into arguments
and then go get a gun and shoot them and say, “Oh, but it was an accident.
You can’t convict me because it was an accident.” You will decide that.
Defense counsel made no objection to the comments. While “the failure to object
contemporaneously generally waives a claim of prosecutorial misconduct during closing
argument, we will review such a claim if the prosecutor’s statement was so inflammatory that
the trial judge should have objected on his own motion.” O’Connor v. State, 120 So. 3d 390,
399 (¶26) (Miss. 2013) (citations omitted).
¶41. Our supreme court has firmly stated: “We have repeatedly condemned the ‘send a
message’ argument and warned prosecutors accordingly.” Payton v. State, 785 So. 2d 267,
270 (¶11) (Miss. 1999) (citations omitted). The State concedes the prosecution’s statements
were improper; however, it argues that the comments do not constitute reversible error. In
Forbes v. State, 771 So. 2d 942, 951 (¶27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000), our Court distinctly held
that “it is error to urge jurors to consider that the verdict [they] return is going to be reflective
of the conscience of this community.” (Quotations omitted). However, we found that the
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comments in Forbes were not “so egregious as to prevent the jurors from reaching an
appropriate verdict,” acknowledging that there have been few cases in which this argument
has constituted reversible error. Id. at (¶28).
¶42. Towles, however, contends that it is not apparent whether the jurors would have
convicted her absent the offending comments. As we have already found reversible error in
this case, we need not make that determination. “The cumulative error doctrine holds that
while harmless error in and of itself is not reversible, where more than one harmless error
occurs at the trial level, those errors may have the cumulative effect of depriving a defendant
of a fair trial.” Wilson v. State, 21 So. 3d 572, 591 (¶58) (Miss. 2009). Thus, even if the
prosecution’s statements were harmless error, the cumulative effect of this error, combined
with the other error discussed in Issue II, further warrants a reversal of Towles’s conviction
and a remand for a new trial.
¶43. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALCORN COUNTY IS
REVERSED, AND THIS CASE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE
ASSESSED TO ALCORN COUNTY.
LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., ISHEE, CARLTON, FAIR, JAMES,
WILSON AND GREENLEE, JJ., CONCUR.
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