Joe Howard v. State of Mississippi ( 2016 )


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  •            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
    NO. 2015-CP-01206-COA
    JOE HOWARD A/K/A JOE MARTIN HOWARD                                         APPELLANT
    v.
    STATE OF MISSISSIPPI                                                         APPELLEE
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                         07/13/2015
    TRIAL JUDGE:                              HON. JOSEPH H. LOPER JR.
    COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:                WEBSTER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                   JOE HOWARD (PRO SE)
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:                    OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
    BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD
    NATURE OF THE CASE:                       CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
    TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:                  MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
    DENIED
    DISPOSITION:                              AFFIRMED - 08/09/2016
    MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
    MANDATE ISSUED:
    BEFORE IRVING, P.J., BARNES AND GREENLEE, JJ.
    BARNES, J., FOR THE COURT:
    ¶1.    Joe Howard, appearing pro se, appeals the Webster County Circuit Court’s denial of
    his motion for post-conviction relief requesting DNA testing. Finding no error, we affirm.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2.    In May 1998, Howard was indicted for sexual battery of a male child under the age
    of fourteen years old.1 The next month, Howard pleaded guilty to the charges and was
    sentenced to twenty years for each count, to be served concurrently. Since pleading guilty,
    1
    Howard was also indicted for two additional incidents of sexual battery of a second
    child, a male over fourteen years old.
    Howard has filed numerous motions for post-conviction relief (PCR), which have all been
    denied or dismissed.
    ¶3.    On May 3, 2010, Howard filed a motion requesting DNA testing on certain evidence,
    which was dismissed. The trial court found the motion premature, as the law under which
    Howard sought relief would not be in effect until July 2010. Howard appealed. This Court
    found that the trial court dismissed Howard’s motion for the wrong reason, but affirmed the
    dismissal on alternate grounds. Howard v. State, 
    62 So. 3d 995
     (Miss. Ct. App. 2011). In
    that PCR motion, Howard claimed there was specific biological evidence secured during the
    investigation that had not been previously tested. However, he attached to his motion
    supporting documentation – the “State’s Response to Request for Discovery” – which
    showed there was no existing evidence. The State declared there were no crime-lab reports
    or tests, and no physical evidence available. Further, Howard stated in his motion “[t]here
    was no sexual assault kit test [done] on me or the victims.” 
    Id. at 998
     (¶17). This Court
    affirmed the motion’s dismissal not because the motion was premature, but because there
    plainly appeared to be no existing biological evidence for testing, and Howard had not shown
    there was any biological evidence. 
    Id.
     at (¶18).
    ¶4.    On July 2, 2015, Howard again filed a PCR motion for DNA testing on certain items
    of evidence. This motion was nearly identical to his May 2010 motion. He claimed his
    motion was excepted from the three-year statute of limitations under Mississippi Code
    Annotated section 99-39-5(2)(a)(ii) (Rev. 2015) because his motion deals with DNA testing.2
    2
    Section 99-39-5(2)(a)(ii) allows PCR motions to be excepted from the statute of
    limitations if the movant can prove:
    2
    In his motion, he argued: (1) he is innocent of the crimes to which he pleaded guilty; (2) there
    “exists specifically identified biological evidence secured” that has not been previously
    tested; and (3) DNA testing will show “by a reasonable probability that [he] would not have
    been convicted.” On July 15, 2015, the trial court denied Howard’s PCR motion under
    Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-23(6) (Rev. 2015), finding it barred as a
    successive motion and under the doctrine of res judicata, as the issue had already been
    presented and decided by the trial court and this Court.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶5.    This Court will not disturb the trial court’s denial of a PCR motion unless the trial
    court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous. Matters of law are reviewed de novo. Lambert
    v. State, 
    941 So. 2d 804
    , 807 (¶14) (Miss. 2006) (citations omitted).
    ANALYSIS
    ¶6.    On appeal, Howard raises the same arguments he made in his PCR motion. We agree
    with the trial court that Howard’s PCR motion is successive and barred under res judicata.
    ¶7.    Under the Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA), any order
    denying or dismissing a PCR motion bars a second or successive motion. 
    Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23
    (6). Howard has filed approximately nine motions since his guilty plea in June
    That, even if the petitioner pled guilty or nolo contendere, or confessed or
    admitted to a crime, there exists biological evidence not tested, or, if
    previously tested, that can be subjected to additional DNA testing that would
    provide a reasonable likelihood of more probative results, and that testing
    would demonstrate by reasonable probability that the petitioner would not
    have been convicted or would have received a lesser sentence if favorable
    results had been obtained through such forensic DNA testing at the time of the
    original prosecution.
    3
    1998 seeking post-conviction relief of various types.
    ¶8.    Additionally, while PCR motions requesting DNA testing are excepted from the bar
    against subsequent motions, it is only if the movant asserts a new or different grounds for
    relief related to DNA testing not previously presented or available. 
    Miss. Code Ann. § 99
    -
    39-23(6). Here, Howard has filed at least one previous motion for DNA testing, in May
    2010, raising the exact same issues. Res judicata bars “all issues that might have been (or
    could have been) raised and decided in the initial suit, plus all issues that were actually
    decided in the first cause of action.” Mohead v. State, 
    158 So. 3d 358
    , 360 (¶8) (Miss. Ct.
    App. 2014) (quoting Bosarge v. State, 
    141 So. 3d 24
    , 26 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014)).3
    ¶9.    As in the prior decision of this Court, we note there is no DNA to be tested. The
    State’s response to Howard’s discovery request showed there were no crime-lab reports or
    tests related to this case, or any physical evidence. At the plea hearing, the State testified it
    would prove its case by the testimony of the victim, a witness to the event, and confessions
    Howard made to parents of the victim. Howard presents nothing to show any changes in the
    evidence from his last motion, which supplied no support for his claim that biological
    evidence exists or ever existed. Howard’s motion is thus barred by res judicata; it is also
    without merit.
    ¶10.   Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Howard’s PCR motion.
    ¶11.   THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WEBSTER COUNTY
    3
    While res judicata does not apply to post-conviction claims of constitutional
    dimensions, a request for DNA testing is a statutory rather than constitutional matter. Fluker
    v. State, 
    170 So. 3d 471
    , 475 (¶9) (Miss. 2015) (citing Smith v. State, 
    149 So. 3d 1027
    , 1032
    (¶11) (Miss. 2014)).
    4
    DENYING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL
    COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO WEBSTER COUNTY.
    LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., ISHEE, CARLTON, FAIR, JAMES,
    WILSON AND GREENLEE, JJ., CONCUR.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2015-CP-01206-COA

Judges: Irving, Barnes, Greenlee, Lee, Griffis, Ishee, Carlton, Fair, James, Wilson

Filed Date: 8/9/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024