Janice Loden Sullivan v. James Wayne Sullivan , 243 So. 3d 240 ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2015-CA-01513-COA
JANICE LODEN SULLIVAN APPELLANT
v.
JAMES WAYNE SULLIVAN APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/31/2015
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JACQUELINE ESTES MASK
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LEE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MICHAEL LEE DULANEY
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: JASON D. HERRING
MICHAEL SPENCER CHAPMAN
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: GRANTED DIVORCE AND DIVIDED
ASSETS
DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 03/21/2017
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE LEE, C.J., ISHEE AND GREENLEE, JJ.
LEE, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. In this appeal, the primary issue is whether the chancellor failed to make specific
findings of facts and conclusions of law as required by Ferguson.1 Because the chancellor
failed to do so, we reverse and remand.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. Janice Loden Sullivan filed a complaint for divorce on March 8, 2014, in the Lee
County Chancery Court against her husband, James Wayne Sullivan. Ultimately, the parties
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Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994).
consented to an irreconcilable-differences divorce and submitted the issues of equitable
distribution, alimony, and attorney’s fees to the chancellor. The chancellor executed a
judgment of divorce on August 31, 2015, which was filed with the chancery clerk on
September 3, 2015. The chancellor granted the divorce and divided the marital assets. The
chancellor also awarded Janice $1,360 per month from Wayne’s retirement account “for up
to twelve years effective September 1, 2015.”
¶3. Janice now appeals, raising several issues which we have condensed as follows: (1)
the chancellor did not make specific findings pursuant to Ferguson, and (2) the chancellor
failed to make specific findings regarding the alimony award.
FACTS
¶4. Janice and Wayne were married in 1998 and separated in 2014. At the time of the
parties’ marriage, Wayne was a dean at Itawamba Community College, earning
approximately $80,000 per year. By the time he retired in 2010, his salary was approximately
$150,000 per year. Wayne drew $8,208.22 per month in state retirement. After retirement,
Wayne continued to do contract work, earning approximately $6,900 per month. During
trial, which was held in July 2015, Wayne testified that he anticipated retiring from his
contract position in June 2016 and that the retirement account associated with this position
totaled $67,767.
¶5. Janice was a registered nurse but quit working in 2012 due to health issues. Janice
received $1,333 per month from a trust established by her deceased mother. There was
testimony that Janice’s father had regularly been giving Janice as much as $29,000 a year,
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sometimes in monthly installments.
¶6. The couple bought their current marital home, located in Tupelo, Mississippi, in 2010,
for $166,000. They purchased the home outright using $130,000 from Janice’s father and
the remainder from Wayne. The home was appraised at $220,000. The couple also had a
savings account containing approximately $341,329.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7. We afford chancellors much discretion in our review of domestic-relations cases.
Steiner v. Steiner, 788 So. 2d 771, 777 (¶18) (Miss. 2001). This Court will not disturb a
chancellor’s findings unless they are manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous, or the chancellor
applied an erroneous legal standard. Mizell v. Mizell, 708 So. 2d 55, 59 (¶13) (Miss. 1998).
DISCUSSION
I. Application of Ferguson
¶8. According to both Janice’s and Wayne’s briefs, the chancellor made an oral ruling via
telephone. The record does not indicate when this occurred, and a court reporter was not
present. As a result, this oral ruling was not included in the record on appeal. The
chancellor’s judgment of divorce does not reference this oral ruling. The judgment simply
awarded the marital home to Janice, divided the savings account, divided the marital assets,
and awarded Janice $1,360 per month from Wayne’s state retirement “for up to twelve years
effective September 1, 2015.” The chancellor never referred to Ferguson or its guidelines.
¶9. In Lee v. Lee, 78 So. 3d 326, 329 (¶11) (Miss. 2012), the chancellor mentioned
Ferguson in his ruling from the bench, but he did not apply the factors or make factual
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findings and conclusions of law. Also, in the final divorce decree, the chancellor failed to
mention Ferguson or apply its guidelines. Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court found this
was reversible error and remanded for the chancellor to make specific findings regarding
Ferguson. Id. at 329-30 (¶14).
¶10. As previously stated, the chancellor here did not mention Ferguson or its guidelines
in her judgment. And neither party contends that she applied the factors during her oral
ruling. We note that “failure to make an explicit factor-by-factor analysis does not
necessarily require reversal where we are satisfied the chancellor considered the relevant
facts.” Seghini v. Seghini, 42 So. 3d 635, 641 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (citation omitted).
However, the record here simply does not show that the chancellor adequately considered or
applied the factors. Thus, we must reverse and remand for a proper application of the
Ferguson factors.
II. Alimony
¶11. Janice also argues that the judgment is unclear as to whether the award of $1,360 per
month from Wayne’s state retirement is alimony. Wayne contends the amount is not
alimony, but an equitable division of the marital assets.
¶12. If the award was in fact alimony, the chancellor failed to make specific findings as
required under Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993). “Failure to
make an on-the-record Armstrong analysis is manifest error.” Lowrey v. Lowrey, 25 So. 3d
274, 280 (¶7) (Miss. 2013). If the award was in fact part of the equitable distribution under
Ferguson, the chancellor’s specific findings on remand should resolve any confusion.
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¶13. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LEE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS
REVERSED, AND THIS CASE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE
ASSESSED TO THE APPELLEE.
IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTON, FAIR, WILSON,
GREENLEE AND WESTBROOKS, JJ., CONCUR.
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