Lewis Jenkins v. State of Mississippi , 2015 Miss. App. LEXIS 85 ( 2015 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2013-CP-01828-COA
LEWIS JENKINS APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/03/2013
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. BILLY JOE LANDRUM
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: JONES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: LEWIS JENKINS (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BILLY L. GORE
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: DISMISSED MOTION FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 02/24/2015
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES AND ISHEE, JJ.
ISHEE, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Lewis Jenkins was indicted for the crime of depraved-heart murder. The charge was
subsequently reduced, and on July 29, 2004, Jenkins pled guilty to manslaughter. He was
sentenced to twenty years – fifteen years to serve with five years suspended conditioned on
post-release supervision – all in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections
(MDOC). On August 19, 2013, Jenkins filed a motion that was treated as a motion for post-
conviction relief (PCR) and dismissed as time-barred. Aggrieved, Jenkins filed this appeal.
Finding no error, we affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
¶2. Jenkins confessed two times to killing Teressa Gillum and disposing of her body in
a shallow grave. He was indicted for the crime of depraved-heart murder, but the charge was
later reduced to manslaughter. On July 29, 2004, Jenkins entered a guilty plea in the Jones
County Circuit Court. The trial judge sentenced Jenkins to twenty years, with fifteen years
to serve and five years suspended for post-release supervision, all in the custody of MDOC.
On August 19, 2013, Jenkins filed a “Petition for Order to Show Cause or in the Alternative
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.” The trial court deemed his motion to be a PCR motion
and found it had been filed outside of the three-year statute of limitations and failed to meet
any of the exceptions that would allow it to be filed outside of that time frame. As such, the
trial court ruled that Jenkins’s PCR motion was time-barred.
¶3. In addition to being time-barred, this is actually Jenkins’s second PCR motion. This
Court previously affirmed the denial of Jenkins’s first PCR motion in which Jenkins asserted
the following errors: (1) involuntary plea, (2) involuntary confession and denial of a speedy
trial, (3) newly discovered evidence, (4) constructive denial of counsel and ineffective
assistance of counsel, (5) failure to grant an evidentiary hearing, and (6) cumulative error.
See Jenkins v. State, 986 So. 2d 1031, 1034-36 (¶¶11-20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶4. This Court will not reverse a trial court's dismissal of a PCR motion unless the trial
court's decision was clearly erroneous. Pace v. State, 770 So. 2d 1052, 1053 (¶4) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2000).
DISCUSSION
¶5. Jenkins's motion was labeled as a motion for a writ of habeas corpus; however, the
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Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA) “repealed
post-conviction use of habeas corpus and implemented a motion framework specifically for
post-conviction collateral review of challenges to convictions or sentences, as opposed to
pre-conviction challenges.” Edmond v. Miss. Dep’t of Corr., 783 So. 2d 675, 677 (¶8) (Miss.
2001) (citations omitted). The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that a post-trial motion
seeking habeas corpus relief is to be evaluated under the UPCCRA. Id. Therefore, the
circuit court properly treated Jenkins’s motion as a PCR motion.
¶6 Under the UPCCRA, an order denying or dismissing a PCR motion is a bar to a
successive PCR motion. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6) (Supp. 2014). Because this Court
denied Jenkins’s first PCR motion in 2008, he is procedurally barred from filing this PCR
motion as well as any future PCR motions.
¶7. In addition to being barred as a successive writ, pursuant to Mississippi Code
Annotated section 99-39-5(2) (Supp. 2014), motions for post- conviction relief must be filed
within three years of the entry of the judgment of conviction. Davis v. State, 958 So. 2d 252,
254 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). Any motion not filed within that time period is procedurally
barred. Id. While the three-year statute of limitations may be waived when a fundamental
constitutional right is implicated, id., the supreme court has consistently held that the time-
bar is applicable to PCR claims based on involuntary guilty pleas. Kirk v. State, 798 So. 2d
345, 346 (¶6) (Miss. 2000).
¶8. Jenkins pled guilty to manslaughter on July 29, 2004, and he filed this motion on
August 19, 2013, over nine years later. Jenkins filed his motion for the purpose of proving
that “[he] is actually innocent, and that his guilty plea was the product of inducement by the
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[p]rosecutor and the [d]efense counsel.” Because this motion was filed outside the three-year
statute of limitations and involves a claim that his guilty plea was involuntary, we find that
the trial court properly dismissed the PCR motion as time-barred.
¶9. THE JUDGMENT OF THE JONES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
DISMISSING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED.
ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO JONES COUNTY.
LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, ROBERTS, CARLTON,
MAXWELL, FAIR AND JAMES, JJ., CONCUR.
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