Juarez Keyes v. State of Mississippi ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2017-CP-00712-COA
JUAREZ KEYES A/K/A JUAREZ KEYS A/K/A APPELLANT
JUAREZ L. KEYES
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/08/2017
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JEFF WEILL SR.
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JUAREZ KEYES (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ABBIE EASON KOONCE
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED: 01/08/2019
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
GRIFFIS, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Juarez Keyes appeals the circuit court’s denial of his motion for post-conviction
collateral relief (PCCR). We find no error and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. On September 30, 1983, Keyes pleaded guilty to multiple charges, including rape.
During the plea hearing, Keyes admitted that he was guilty of each charge. On the rape
charge, Keyes was sentenced as a habitual offender pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated
section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2015) to serve thirty-seven years in the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections.
¶3. On April 25, 2016, Keyes filed a motion for PCCR. The circuit court subsequently
denied the motion. In its order denying the motion for PCCR, the circuit court noted that
Keyes had previously filed three motions for PCCR, all of which were denied, and found that
his current motion for PCCR was procedurally barred and without merit. Keyes now appeals
and argues: (1) he was denied his right to confront his accuser, (2) no DNA evidence was
ever produced, and (3) the circuit court is withholding records from him.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶4. We review a circuit court’s denial or dismissal of a PCCR motion for abuse of
discretion. Wallace v. State, 180 So. 3d 767, 769 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). “However,
questions of law are reviewed de novo.” Id.ANALYSIS
¶5. Before we may address the merits of Keyes’s motion for PCCR, we must first
determine whether his motion is procedurally barred.
¶6. Pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2015), in case of
a guilty plea, a motion for PCCR must be filed “within three (3) years after entry of the
judgment of conviction.” Keyes’s judgment of conviction was entered September 30, 1983.
Keyes’s motion for PCCR was filed April 25, 2016, well beyond the three year deadline.
Thus, his motion for PCCR is time-barred.
¶7. Additionally, under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-23(6) (Rev. 2015), an
order denying a motion for PCCR is considered a final judgment and “a bar to a second or
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successive motion.” As the record reflects, Keyes has previously filed multiple motions for
PCCR, all of which were denied. Keyes v. State, 549 So. 2d 949 (Miss. 1989); Keyes v.
State, 918 So. 2d 76 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005); Order, Keyes v. State, Hinds County Circuit
Court Civil Action No. 25CI1:13-cv-00796 (October 9, 2013). Thus, Keyes’s present
motion for PCCR is barred as a successive writ.
¶8. Pursuant to Sections 99-39-5(2)(a)-(b) and 99-39-23(6), there are several statutory
exceptions to the time and successive-writ bars. To be exempt from the time or successive-
writ bar, Keyes must show that he has met at least one of the statutory exceptions. See
Campbell v. State, 233 So. 3d 904, 906 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (“When a time-barred
PC[C]R motion is filed, the burden falls on the movant to show he has met a statutory
exception.”); see also Dobbs v. State, 18 So. 3d 295, 298 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (“[The
movant] bears the burden of proving that he satisfied at least one of the exceptions to the
successive-writ bar.”). Additionally, the time-bar may be waived when a fundamental
constitutional right is implicated. Dobbs, 18 So. 3d at 299 (¶13).
¶9. Here, Keyes does not assert or claim to meet any of the statutory exceptions, nor does
he show that a fundamental constitutional right was violated. As a result, Keyes’s motion
for PCCR is procedurally barred. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, we find Keyes’s
motion for PCCR is without merit.
¶10. Keyes first argues he “was denied his right to confront his accuser.” Yet, Keyes’s
constitutional right to confront his accuser was waived by his valid guilty plea. Myers v.
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State, 767 So. 2d 1058, 1060 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). Indeed, the plea-hearing transcript
shows that Keyes was advised of and understood the consequences of his guilty plea,
including the waiver of certain constitutional rights. Thus, this issue is without merit.
¶11. Keyes next argues no “rape-kit or DNA evidence linking him to [the] alleged rape . . .
was ever produced.” Importantly, Keyes does not assert that biological or DNA evidence
exists that would demonstrate by reasonable probability that he would not have been
convicted. Instead, he simply asserts such evidence was never produced by the State.
“While DNA evidence certainly supports a conviction, it is not absolutely necessary . . . .”
Fountain v. State, 85 So. 3d 913, 925 (¶43) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012).
¶12. The plea-hearing transcript shows that Keyes admitted to the rape charge.
Specifically, the transcript shows that Keyes, armed with what appeared to be a pistol, “told
[the female victim] to take her clothes off” and “lay on the ground.” According to Keyes,
he then “penetrated her twice” after taking her ring and money. The record reflects that
sufficient facts and evidence were presented to support Keyes’s guilty plea, despite the lack
of DNA evidence. Accordingly, this issue lacks merit.
¶13. Keyes last argues the circuit court “is attempting to coverup [its] illegal acts by
intentionally withholding records and other documents pertaining to th[e] cause of rape.”
Keyes fails to identify what records and/or documents he believes were intentionally
withheld by the circuit court. Instead, in support of his argument, Keyes cites Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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¶14. In Brady, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.” Id. at 87. Thus, pursuant to Brady, suppression of material evidence by the
prosecution, not the circuit court, violates due process.
¶15. Here, there is no evidence of a Brady violation by the State. Because Keyes fails to
show that the State suppressed material evidence, his claim regarding an alleged Brady
violation fails.
CONCLUSION
¶16. We find Keyes’s motion for PCCR is procedurally barred and without merit. As a
result, the circuit court properly denied the motion. We therefore affirm.
¶17. AFFIRMED.
BARNES AND CARLTON, P.JJ., WILSON, GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS
AND TINDELL, JJ., CONCUR. McDONALD, LAWRENCE AND McCARTY, JJ.,
NOT PARTICIPATING.
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