Jamie Cartell Payne v. State of Mississippi ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2015-KA-00641-COA
JAMIE CARTELL PAYNE A/K/A JAMIE PAYNE APPELLANT
A/K/A JAMIE C. PAYNE
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/25/2015
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ANTHONY ALAN MOZINGO
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LAMAR COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: JUSTIN TAYLOR COOK
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: LAURA HOGAN TEDDER
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: HALDON J. KITTRELL
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: CONVICTED OF ROBBERY AND
SENTENCED TO FIFTEEN YEARS IN THE
CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 08/02/2016
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., ISHEE AND WILSON, JJ.
ISHEE, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. In March 2015, Jamie Payne was convicted by a jury in the Lamar County Circuit
Court of robbery. He was sentenced to fifteen years in the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections (MDOC). On appeal, Payne asserts that the trial court erred in
denying his Batson1 challenge against the State’s peremptory strike of a member of the venire
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Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
absent a legal race-neutral reason stated during voir dire. Payne also asserts that the trial
court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based on the State’s comment during closing
arguments. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶2. On June 15, 2010, the Hattiesburg Police Department was dispatched to Ross clothing
store for a report of a robbery. The robbery victim was Merlene Breazeale, who had been
walking to her car in Ross’s parking lot when her purse was stolen off her arm. She was
unable to identify who took her purse. Amanda Roberts witnessed the event. She testified
that she saw a black male take Breazeale’s purse and escape in a Ford Taurus. There were
three other individuals in the car.
¶3. While on the phone with police, Roberts followed the vehicle to an apartment that the
suspects entered. The suspects, Nanette Hathorn, Rodrique Watson, Chadwick Watson, and
Payne, were all apprehended and placed in separate patrol units. During a live lineup, Roberts
identified Payne as the individual who stole Breazeale’s purse. At a later date, Roberts was
shown a photo lineup, and she again identified Payne.
¶4. While testifying, subsequent to a plea deal, Hathorn confirmed that Payne was the
purse thief. She also stated that Rodrique was driving the escape vehicle, she was in the front
passenger seat, and Chadwick and Payne were in the backseat. At trial, she explained that
they pulled over at Ross, where Payne got out of the vehicle and walked toward the entrance
of the store as though he was going to enter it. Hathorn stated that Rodrique parked the car
in Ross’s parking lot. Rodrique, Chadwick, and Hathorn sat in the car. An older woman was
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leaving the store as Payne was approaching the entrance. Hathorn testified that Payne
waited for the older woman to walk to her car. When she was almost to her car, he ran up
and stole her purse off her arm. The woman fell down, and Payne started running. Hathorn
stated that Payne tossed the purse under a parked car and ran toward a nearby store.
Rodrique drove toward Payne and let him into the car. At trial, several other witnesses
identified Payne as the perpetrator.
¶5. Police also obtained a surveillance video from Ross that showed the entrance to the
store. The video depicted Payne snatching the purse off Breazeale’s arm and fleeing.
¶6. Payne was convicted of robbery and was sentenced to fifteen years in the custody of
the MDOC. The trial court denied his posttrial motions. This appeal ensued.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
I. Batson Challenge
¶7. On appeal, Payne contends that the trial court erred in denying his Batson challenge
regarding the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory strike on prospective juror twenty.
Mississippi Code Annotated section 13-5-2 (Rev. 2012) provides:
It is the policy of this state that all persons selected for jury service be selected
at random from a fair cross section of the population of the area served by the
court, and that all qualified citizens have the opportunity in accordance with
this chapter to be considered for jury service in this state and an obligation to
serve as jurors when summoned for that purpose. A citizen shall not be
excluded from jury service in this state on account of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, or economic status.
¶8. In Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, the United States Supreme Court held that parties could not
exercise peremptory strikes based solely on a potential juror’s race. “The Batson decision
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provides procedural directives for the trial court to follow in detecting and disallowing the
practice of using peremptory challenges to remove members of an identified racial group
from jury service based upon nothing more than their racial identification.” Forrest v. State,
876 So. 2d 400, 403 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
¶9. The Batson analysis has three prongs. Lynch v. State, 877 So. 2d 1254, 1270 (¶48)
(Miss. 2004). First, the party objecting to the opposing party’s exercise of the peremptory
strike “must . . . make a prima facie showing that race was the criteria for the exercise of a
peremptory strike.” Id. at 1270-71 (¶48). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination,
the objecting party must demonstrate: (1) “that he is a member of a cognizable racial group;
(2) that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire
members of the defendant’s race; [and] (3) . . . the facts and circumstances raised an
inference that the prosecutor used his peremptory strikes for the purpose of striking
minorities.” Id. at 1271 (¶48).
However, where the trial court does not explicitly rule on whether the
defendant established a prima facie case under Batson but nevertheless
requires the [State] to provide [gender/]race-neutral reasons for its challenges
and the [State] provides reasons for its challenges, the issue of whether the
[challenging party] established a prima facie case is moot.
Id.
¶10. Second, the burden shifts to the party exercising the challenge to provide a
race-neutral reason for doing so. Id. at (¶49). “[A]ny reason [that] is not facially violative
of equal protection will suffice.” Id. In other words, an explanation does not have to be
persuasive, or even plausible. Id. Unless discriminatory intent is inherent in the proffered
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explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race-neutral. Id.
¶11. Our supreme court has set out a non-exhaustive list of valid race-neutral reasons for
the exercise of peremptory challenges, which includes “living in a ‘high crime’ area, body
language, demeanor, [distrust of a juror by the party exercising the strike], inconsistency
between oral responses and [the] juror’s card, criminal history of [the] juror or [a] relative,
social work and other types of employment, and religious beliefs.” Walker v. State, 815 So.
2d 1209, 1215 (¶13) (Miss. 2002) (citing Lockett v. State, 517 So. 2d 1346, 1356-57 (Miss.
1987)).
¶12. The third prong of a Batson analysis requires the trial court to “determine whether the
objecting party has met its burden to prove that there has been purposeful discrimination in
the exercise of the peremptory [challenge].” McFarland v. State, 707 So. 2d 166, 171 (¶14)
(Miss. 1997). The trial court must determine whether the proffered gender/race-neutral
reasons were pretexts for intentional gender/race discrimination. Berry v. State, 802 So. 2d
1033, 1038 (¶14) (Miss. 2001).
¶13. “In reviewing the trial judge’s decision on the gender/race-neutral reasons offered by
the party exercising the peremptory strike, this Court will give the decision great deference.”
Perry v. State, 949 So. 2d 764, 767 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Lynch, 877 So. 2d at
1271 (¶50)). “We give such deference to the trial court’s findings because the trial judge is
in the best position to evaluate the demeanor and credibility of the attorney offering a
race-neutral explanation.” Id.
¶14. In the instant case, during jury selection, defense counsel made a Batson challenge
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based on the State’s use of three of its peremptory challenges against minorities. The trial
judge held that the pattern of three strikes in a row against people of color created “the issue
of a pattern” of striking potential black jurors based on their race. The trial court then looked
to the State to provide race-neutral reasons for its three peremptory strikes. The first of the
three peremptory strikes exercised by the State and challenged by the defense was against
prospective juror nineteen, whom the State listed as a “Pacific Islander.” The State’s
reasoning for striking juror nineteen was that the juror did not answer any questions, had a
ponytail and an earring, had no work history, had no wife, and had only lived in the area for
a year and a half. The trial court ruled that long hair, an earring, his lack of education, and
his employment were not sufficiently race-neutral reasons. Therefore, the trial court upheld
the Batson challenge.
¶15. On appeal, Payne takes issue with the prosecution’s use of a peremptory strike
exercised by the State against prospective juror twenty, an African American woman. When
the trial court asked the State to present a race-neutral reason for striking prospective juror
twenty, the State responded as follows:
Your Honor, on [prospective juror twenty,] she lives in Lumberton . . . . We’ve
prosecuted several people for drugs in that area. We’ve prosecuted several
[people with her last name] in the past and the present. There’s [sic] several on
the docket now.
[When asked s]he’s said absolutely nothing about being related to anybody that
was being prosecuted. I was told by law enforcement [that she] was not a
good person to be on the jury that knew her from the drug agents, not to – that
she would not be a good juror . . . . It’s got everything to do with her relatives
and where she lives, her prior history.
¶16. After the State and Payne argued their positions, the trial court stated:
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The [c]ourt notes for the record the responsibility of the [c]ourt to provide the
defendant with a fair, unbiased jury. The heightened scrutiny of a Batson
challenge ruling by this [c]ourt arises from the fact that defendant is African
American and the alleged victim is white or Caucasian. Nevertheless, a
straightforward race-neutral reason that has been provided the Court is
satisfied with based on the history of the prosecutors and consultations with
law enforcement and because it’s race neutral, the challenge is denied.
¶17. The third peremptory strike exercised by the State and challenged by the defense was
against prospective juror twenty-two, also an African American woman. The trial court
rejected the State’s race-neutral reason as unsatisfactory because it was the third strike of an
African American in a row, and the State’s response did not overcome the hurdle of
providing a race-neutral reason. Therefore, the Batson challenge was upheld.
¶18. The trial court made a factual finding with respect to the Batson ruling for juror
twenty. As stated, the trial judge is in the best position to evaluate the demeanor and
credibility of an attorney’s race-neutral explanation. Perry, 949 So. 2d at 767 (¶7). Payne
argues that living in a high-crime area is a pretext for racial reasons. However, living in a
high-crime area is a valid race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory strike. See Lockett
v. State, 517 So. 2d 1346, 1356 (Miss. 1987). Furthermore, the State’s explanation does not
have to be persuasive, or even plausible. Randall v. State, 716 So. 2d 584, 588 (¶16) (Miss.
1998) (citation omitted). As such, we cannot find that the trial court’s ruling was clearly
erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. We find this issue without
merit.
II. Mistrial
¶19. Payne also argues that the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial after the State
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made comments during closing arguments alluding to Payne’s constitutional right to stand
trial. The State commented: “We asked you in the beginning of this case to make Jamie
Payne take responsibility for what he did. He has not done that. He has put you in the
position of having to make me do that. That’s what we are here for.” Payne did not object
when the comment was made; however, Payne requested a mistrial. The State argued that
it did not misstate the facts in that Payne did not “take responsibility,” and that Payne’s
codefendants had pleaded guilty. Payne argued that it was an inappropriate comment on his
right to a trial by jury.
¶20. “It is the duty of a trial counsel, if he deems opposing counsel overstepping the wide
range of authorized argument, to promptly make objections and insist upon a ruling by the
trial court.” Evans v. State, 725 So. 2d 613, 670 (¶271) (Miss. 1997) (citation omitted).
Although, if a comment is “so inflammatory that the trial court should have objected on [its]
own motion, the point may be considered.” Gray v. State, 487 So. 2d 1304, 1312 (Miss.
1986) (citation omitted). This Court reviews alleged misconduct by counsel during closing
arguments to see if “the natural and probable effect of the improper argument . . . create[s]
unjust prejudice against the accused so as to result in a decision influenced by the prejudice
so created.” Baker v. State, 991 So. 2d 185, 188 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting
Sheppard v. State, 777 So. 2d 659, 661 (¶7) (Miss. 2000)).
¶21. In an analogous case, Moore v. State, 932 So. 2d 833, 839 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App.
2005), the State commented during closing argument: “Y’all didn’t want to be here. That
[defendant] put you here.” The defendant argued the comment implied he did not have a
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right to argue that he acted in self-defense. This Court agreed that “there [was] no valid
reason” for the statement. Id. at 840 (¶21). But this Court found no reversible error in the
trial court’s decision to overrule the defendant’s objection because “[t]he jury was well
instructed as to [the defendant]’s theory of self-defense, and without more, we cannot find
that the [State’s] statements negated the effectiveness of the instructions given the jury.” Id.
¶22. Here, similarly, we find the remarks made were improper. Nevertheless, the jury was
instructed prior to closing arguments that “remarks from counsel are intended to help you
understand the evidence and apply the law, but they are not evidence. If any remark of
counsel has no basis in evidence, then you must disregard it.” Jurors are presumed to follow
the instructions of the trial court. See Chase v. State, 645 So. 2d 829, 853 (Miss. 1994).
When applying the appropriate standard of review, because of the overwhelming evidence
against Payne, the State’s comments did not result in any unjust prejudice, nor were the
statements so inflammatory that the trial court should have objected on its own motion. This
argument is without merit.
¶23. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LAMAR COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF
CONVICTION OF ROBBERY AND SENTENCE OF FIFTEEN YEARS IN THE
CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO LAMAR
COUNTY.
LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., CARLTON, FAIR, JAMES AND GREENLEE, JJ.,
CONCUR. BARNES AND WILSON, JJ., CONCUR IN PART AND IN THE RESULT
WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. IRVING, P.J., DISSENTS WITHOUT
SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
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