Jeffrey Keefe Seale, Sr. v. Cherie Nanez Seale , 2014 Miss. App. LEXIS 647 ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2013-CA-01464-COA
JEFFREY KEEFE SEALE, SR. APPELLANT
v.
CHERIE NANEZ SEALE APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/31/2013
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LAWRENCE PRIMEAUX
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LAUDERDALE COUNTY CHANCERY
COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MARTY CRAIG ROBERTSON
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: ROBERT D. JONES
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: GRANTED DIVORCE, DIVIDED MARITAL
PROPERTY, AND AWARDED ALIMONY
TO THE APPELLEE
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 11/18/2014
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE LEE, C.J., ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ.
CARLTON, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Jeffrey Seale Sr. appeals the judgment of the Lauderdale County Chancery Court
awarding alimony to Cherie Seale and distributing the couple’s marital property. On appeal,
Jeffrey raises the following issues: (1) whether the chancellor erred in his classification of
certain debts; (2) whether the chancellor erred in his distribution of the couple’s marital
property; and (3) whether the chancellor erred by awarding permanent alimony to Cherie.
Upon review, we find no abuse of discretion by the chancellor and therefore affirm.
FACTS
¶2. After seventeen years of marriage, Jeffrey and Cherie obtained a final judgment of
divorce. The parties had two children during the course of their marriage, both of whom
were minors at the time of the divorce. At the start of the parties’ marriage, Jeffrey worked
as a stockbroker, and Cherie worked as an office administrator for a securities firm. Jeffrey
later attended and graduated from medical school, completed a residency program, and began
working as a physician in Meridian, Mississippi. Although Cherie continued to work while
Jeffrey attended medical school, she opted to stay at home and raise the couple’s children
after the family moved to Meridian.
¶3. In the proceedings below, the chancellor granted Cherie a divorce on the ground of
adultery and awarded her custody of the parties’ children. After conducting an analysis of
the Ferguson 1 factors, the chancellor divided the couple’s marital property as follows: (1)
Cherie received $77,107 in marital assets and $38,334 in marital debt; and (2) Jeffrey
received $31,513 in marital assets and $292,127.12 in marital debt.
¶4. Based on the parties’ respective incomes and the amount of their debt in comparison
with their total assets, the chancellor found that the division of the marital estate left Cherie
with a “definite deficit.” The chancellor therefore conducted an analysis of the Armstrong 2
factors to determine whether an award of alimony was appropriate. He concluded that Cherie
“should have rehabilitative periodic alimony during a transition period . . . and . . . permanent
1
Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928-29 (Miss. 1994).
2
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993).
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periodic alimony in a nominal amount.” Based on his findings, the chancellor ordered
Jeffrey to pay Cherie $1,500 in “rehabilitative periodic alimony” for forty-eight months. The
chancellor also ordered Jeffrey to pay Cherie $100 in nominal permanent alimony until
Cherie’s remarriage or either party’s death. Aggrieved by the chancellor’s rulings on the
issues of distribution of the marital property and permanent alimony, Jeffrey appeals to this
Court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5. “This Court’s standard of review in domestic[-]relations matters is extremely limited.”
Phillips v. Phillips, 45 So. 3d 684, 692 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010). On appeal, we “will not
disturb a chancellor’s award of alimony and division of marital assets unless the [chancellor]
was manifestly wrong, abused [his] discretion[,] or applied an erroneous legal standard.”
Watson v. Watson, 882 So. 2d 95, 98 (¶14) (Miss. 2004) (citing Sandlin v. Sandlin, 699 So.
2d 1198, 1203 (Miss. 1997)). Furthermore, though we only interfere with a chancellor’s
findings of fact where the chancellor applied an erroneous legal standard or his factual
findings were manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous, we review de novo the chancellor’s
interpretation and application of the law. Singley v. Singley, 846 So. 2d 1004, 1006 (¶5)
(Miss. 2002).
DISCUSSION
I. Whether the chancellor erred in his classification of certain debts.
¶6. In his first assignment of error, Jeffrey challenges the chancellor’s classification of
certain debts as either marital or nonmarital. Jeffrey asserts that the chancellor erred by
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classifying a debt owed to Tony Nanez, Cherie’s father, as marital since Cherie used the
money to pay for her attorney’s fees. Jeffrey also appears to argue that the chancellor
improperly classified the unpaid portion of Jeffrey’s medical-school debt as nonmarital
property.
a. The Debt Owed to Cherie’s Father
¶7. Our caselaw holds that debts acquired during the course of the marriage are subject
to equitable distribution. McLaurin v. McLaurin, 853 So. 2d 1279, 1285-86 (¶24) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2003). “The courts in this state have consistently held that expenses incurred for the
family, or due to the actions of a family member, are marital debt and should be treated as
such upon dissolution of the marriage.” Shoffner v. Shoffner, 909 So. 2d 1245, 1251 (¶17)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
¶8. The record reflects that, due to Jeffrey’s adultery, Cherie incurred the debt at issue to
pay for legal representation during her divorce proceedings. Because Cherie incurred the
debt during the course of the parties’ marriage and as a direct result of Jeffrey’s actions, we
find no error in the chancellor’s classification of the debt as marital. As a result, this
argument lacks merit.
b. The Unpaid Portion of Jeffrey’s Medical-School Debt
¶9. On appeal, Jeffrey appears to argue that the chancellor erroneously classified his
medical-school debt as nonmarital because the chancellor assigned Jeffrey sole responsibility
for the repayment of the debt. In his brief, Jeffrey argues that “the loans for his education
should not solely be assigned to him as the funds most certainly were commingled with other
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income to pay for living and marital/family expense[s].” Despite Jeffrey’s assertions, the
record fails to indicate that the chancellor classified Jeffrey’s medical-school debt as
nonmarital.
¶10. Although the chancellor assigned Jeffrey full responsibility for the remainder of the
medical-school loans, this fact alone fails to establish that the chancellor erroneously
classified the debt as nonmarital. The chancellor clearly acknowledged in his opinion that
Jeffrey acquired the debt during the course of the parties’ marriage. The chancellor further
noted that the proceeds of the loans, along with Cherie’s income and other revenue sources,
paid for the parties’ living expenses while Jeffrey attended medical school. Based on the
facts in the record, we find no support for Jeffrey’s argument that the chancellor erroneously
classified his medical-school debt as nonmarital. As a result, this argument also lacks merit.
II. Whether the chancellor erred in his distribution of the couple’s
marital property.
¶11. Jeffrey next argues that the chancellor inequitably distributed the parties’ marital
property. Jeffrey contends that the chancellor committed clear error by assigning him most
of the marital debt and awarding him almost none of the marital assets.
¶12. Our caselaw provides that “an equitable division of property does not necessarily
mean an equal division of property.” Chamblee v. Chamblee, 637 So. 2d 850, 863-64 (Miss.
1994). “Our task is to review the chancellor’s findings on the Ferguson factors—we do not
conduct a Ferguson analysis anew.” Carter v. Carter, 98 So. 3d 1109, 1112 (¶9) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As previously discussed, the
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“chancellor’s factual findings will not be disturbed unless manifestly wrong, clearly
erroneous, or the chancellor applied an improper legal standard.” Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
¶13. In Carter, this Court stated:
As long as Ferguson is properly applied, equitable divisions may indeed
be lopsided. And “when the facts and circumstances warrant an equitable
division of the marital estate of one-half or greater and such a division
complies with the Ferguson principles, then we are duty bound to let such a
distribution stand.” Phillips v. Phillips, 904 So. 2d 999, 1003 (¶13) (Miss.
2004). This [C]ourt performed that duty in Seymour v. Seymour, 960 So. 2d
513, 519 (¶¶13-15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). In that case, we affirmed the
chancellor’s award of ninety-seven percent of the marital property, including
the marital home, to the wife and order that the husband pay the outstanding
debt on the marital home, because the facts and circumstances—including the
husband’s much larger income and separate assets—supported such a division.
Id.Carter, 98 So. 3d at 1113 (¶12).
¶14. In the present case, we find that the record contains substantial evidence to support
the chancellor’s findings of fact and distribution of the marital estate. The chancellor wrote
in his opinion that “the answer to the parties’ financial security does not lie in the division
of the marital estate, due to its lack of liquidity and size. Moreover, the value of the marital
estate is almost equal to the marital debt, compounding the difficulty of effecting an equitable
division.”
¶15. In analyzing the Ferguson factors, the chancellor found that clear and substantial
proof existed that Jeffrey’s actions destabilized his marriage and damaged his relationship
with his children. Although Jeffrey served as the primary wage earner during the parties’
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marriage, the chancellor found Cherie’s indirect contributions to the acquisition of marital
assets to be as valuable as Jeffrey’s direct contributions. In addition, while Jeffrey’s medical
degree improved his own earning capacity, the chancellor noted that the pursuit of Jeffrey’s
career negatively impacted Cherie’s earning capacity since she left a more lucrative position
for lower-paying employment when the couple moved.
¶16. Concluding his analysis of the Ferguson factors, the chancellor stated:
The disparity in income between the parties is striking and must be
taken into account. Cherie earns around $1,500 a month when she works
every available day. Jeffrey earns that much in a single shift of emergency
room duty. His monthly income is more than ten times greater than Cherie’s.
As a result, Jeffrey is in a better position [than Cherie] to be able to pay down
debt and accumulate wealth . . . .
The most valuable single marital asset is the equity in the former marital
residence. Any division of that equity between the parties will require that it
be sold, because neither party has the cash to buy out the other’s interest. In
his testimony, Jeffrey stated that he wanted his children to continue to live in
the residence . . . . The court has taken into account Jeffrey’s wish in this
regard.
¶17. The chancellor found that Cherie should receive a greater share of the marital estate
since “the assets she is receiving are not liquid in any real sense.” The chancellor noted that
the equity in the former marital home was “locked into the property so long as [Cherie] uses
it as shelter for the minor children and herself[.]” The chancellor also noted that, if Cherie
later sold the home, she would need the funds to provide a replacement shelter for herself and
the children. Based on his application of the Ferguson factors, the chancellor distributed the
parties’ marital estate in the following manner: (1) Cherie received $77,107 in marital assets
and $38,334 in marital debt; and (2) Jeffrey received $31,513 in marital assets and
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$292,127.12 in marital debt.
¶18. After reviewing the record and applicable caselaw, we find no manifest error in the
chancellor’s distribution of the marital estate. See Watson, 882 So. 2d at 98 (¶14). The
chancellor based his distribution of the marital property on a proper application of the
Ferguson factors, and the record contains substantial evidence to support his findings.
Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.
III. Whether the chancellor erred by awarding permanent alimony to
Cherie.
¶19. Jeffrey also argues that the chancellor erred by awarding Cherie permanent alimony.
“Alimony awards are within the discretion of the chancellor, and his discretion will not be
reversed on appeal unless the chancellor was manifestly in error in his finding of fact and
abused his discretion.” Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993)
(citations omitted). “Alimony should only be considered if the property division leaves one
spouse in a deficit.” Jones v. Jones, 2011-CA-01440-COA, 2013 WL 1800051, at *8 (¶35)
(Miss. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2013) (citation omitted). “If there are sufficient assets to provide
for both parties, then there is no more to be done.” Id. (citation omitted).
¶20. In Jones, this Court found manifest error in the chancellor’s award of nominal
permanent alimony because the chancellor applied the Armstrong factors “after
acknowledging he had made sufficient provision for [the wife] through the equitable division
of the property so that permanent alimony was not needed.” Id. In reversing the chancellor’s
award of alimony, this Court stated:
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By referring to the award as “nominal” alimony, it does not appear that
the chancellor was trying to address an actual deficit in the property award.
Rather, he admits he was simply leaving the door open in case future events
prove [the wife] has a need and [the husband] has an ability to pay. Such a
contingency plan, while well-meaning, simply is not supported by our law.
Alimony is to be considered as a remedy to an actual insufficiency in the
marital assets, not as a contingency for a possible insufficiency in the future.
Because the chancellor found the division of marital property left no need for
alimony, we find it was error for the chancellor to nonetheless award
“nominal” alimony.
Id. at (¶36).
¶21. On appeal, Jeffrey argues that the chancellor erroneously based the award of
permanent alimony on Cherie’s possible future needs and his possible future income. The
record reflects, however, that the chancellor found the division of Jeffrey and Cherie’s
marital estate left Cherie with a “definite deficit” and failed to provide her with any lasting
financial security. The chancellor’s finding that Cherie still suffered a deficit after the
equitable distribution of the couple’s marital estate distinguished this case from Jones and
provided the evidentiary basis required by precedent to consider an award of alimony. See
id. at (¶35). The chancellor therefore proceeded with an analysis and application of the
Armstrong factors.
¶22. In determining alimony to be proper, the chancellor stated:
With several years of financial support, which will afford her a transition
period between this marriage and a more financially fruitful life, [Cherie] will
hopefully be in a position to achieve a financial recovery. This consideration
. . . weigh[s] in favor of a period of rehabilitative alimony[, which] . . . . is
intended to prevent the recipient from being destitute.
On the other hand, it seems inequitable to allow Jeffrey the possibility
to rebuild his life financially and enjoy the accumulation of wealth that Cherie
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would have participated in but for the breakup of the marriage. In his present
financial state, at least according to the picture he presented to the court, it
would seem unlikely that he could do so. Yet, if he has not been entirely
forthcoming about his finances, he could rebound quickly. In the latter
circumstance, it would be inequitable for Cherie to be precluded from enjoying
her former standard of living. This consideration weighs in favor of permanent
periodic alimony, since the purpose of permanent periodic alimony is to
preserve the marital standard of living following a lengthy marriage.
The court finds that, in order to effect a financial remedy for this
situation, Cherie should have rehabilitative periodic alimony during a
transition period . . . and . . . should have permanent periodic alimony in a
nominal amount.
¶23. As acknowledged, the chancellor determined after equitable distribution of the marital
estate that Cherie suffered a deficit. As further recognized, our precedent allows the award
of alimony upon the finding of such a deficit. See Jones, 2013 WL 1800051, at *8 (¶35).
After finding that a deficit existed, the chancellor awarded Cherie transitional rehabilitative
alimony for forty-eight months and $100 in permanent alimony thereafter.3 We review the
amount of an alimony award by a chancellor for manifest error. See Armstrong, 618 So. 2d
at 1280. In so doing, we find no abuse of discretion in the present case since the evidence
in the record supports the chancellor’s determination regarding the amount and type of
alimony awarded to Cherie. See id.
¶24. In accordance with our caselaw, the chancellor considered alimony only after
3
We acknowledge that the chancellor used the term “nominal amount” in referring
to the award of permanent alimony. The use of the term “nominal” could be misleading
since the term could imply that the alimony was not warranted. However, we acknowledge
in this case the chancellor’s finding that an evidentiary basis existed to establish that Cherie
suffered a deficit following the distribution of the marital estate.
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determining that the division of property left Cherie with a deficit. See Jones, 2013 WL
1800051, at *8 (¶35). The chancellor then applied the Armstrong factors to the present case.
Unlike in Jones, the record reflects that the chancellor awarded Cherie rehabilitative alimony
for a transitional period and then awarded her permanent alimony in a nominal amount “as
a remedy to an actual insufficiency in the marital assets,” rather than “as a contingency for
a possible insufficiency in the future.” Id. at (¶36). As a result, we find this argument lacks
merit.
¶25. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LAUDERDALE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS,
MAXWELL, FAIR AND JAMES, JJ., CONCUR.
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