Benjamin Shelton v. State of Mississippi , 2014 Miss. App. LEXIS 607 ( 2014 )


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  •         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
    NO. 2012-KA-01556-COA
    BENJAMIN SHELTON A/K/A BENJAMIN LEE                                    APPELLANT
    SHELTON A/K/A BENNY A/K/A BENJAMIN L.
    SHELTON
    v.
    STATE OF MISSISSIPPI                                                     APPELLEE
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                       08/24/2012
    TRIAL JUDGE:                            HON. LEE J. HOWARD
    COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:              LOWNDES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                 RODNEY A. RAY
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:                  OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
    BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS
    DISTRICT ATTORNEY:                      FORREST ALLGOOD
    NATURE OF THE CASE:                     CRIMINAL - FELONY
    TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:                CONVICTED OF SEXUAL BATTERY AND
    SENTENCED TO TWELVE YEARS IN THE
    CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI
    DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WITH
    SEVEN YEARS TO SERVE AND FIVE
    YEARS SUSPENDED CONDITIONED ON
    POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION, AND TO
    PAY A $1,000 FINE
    DISPOSITION:                            AFFIRMED - 10/28/2014
    MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
    MANDATE ISSUED:
    BEFORE IRVING, P.J., ISHEE, MAXWELL AND JAMES, JJ.
    ISHEE, J., FOR THE COURT:
    ¶1.   Benjamin Shelton was convicted of sexual battery by a jury in the Lowndes County
    Circuit Court on August 24, 2012. He was sentenced to twelve years, with five years
    suspended conditioned on post-release supervision, and seven years to serve, all in the
    custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). On August 30, 2012,
    Shelton filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the
    alternative, a new trial. The motion was denied. Aggrieved, Shelton appeals.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2.    On April 29, 2009, Shelton was indicted by a grand jury in Lowndes County for two
    counts of sexual battery and one count of solicitation. At the beginning of the trial, the State
    moved to amend the indictment as to the date in the charge of solicitation. The circuit court
    sustained the motion, severed the third count from the indictment, and set it for a separate
    trial. As such, a jury trial was then held on August 21-23, 2012, on the two-count indictment,
    both counts of sexual battery.
    ¶3.    At trial, F.N.L.1 testified that he met Shelton in the summer of 2008 when he began
    attending Eastview Baptist Church in Columbus, Mississippi. F.N.L., who was seventeen
    years old at the time, lived near the church with his mother and younger brother. He stated
    that he attended church every Sunday morning and Wednesday evening. On Sunday
    mornings, Shelton would sometimes teach F.N.L.’s Sunday school class. F.N.L. stated that
    Shelton helped with the church’s youth group and took members of the youth group,
    including F.N.L., out to eat and, in May 2008, to the Market Street Festival.
    ¶4.    In July 2008, F.N.L. attended a two-night youth retreat that the church, conducted at
    Lake Lowndes in Lowndes County, Mississippi.                According to him, there were
    approximately fifteen to twenty children and four to five chaperones present on the retreat.
    1
    The initials are used to conceal the actual name of the minor victim.
    2
    The group stayed in a duplex-like cabin, with all the boys on the right side and all the girls
    on the left side.
    ¶5.    F.N.L. described the cabin as having a large living room between the rooms for the
    boys and girls. From the living room, and in addition to the separate sides for the boys and
    the girls, there was access to a separate bedroom, a kitchen, and a sliding glass door that led
    to the outside. F.N.L. claimed that the separate bedroom was where Shelton slept that
    weekend.
    ¶6.    On the first night, at roughly 2 a.m., a water-balloon fight broke out inside the cabin.
    F.N.L. testified that he had been asleep on the couch in the living room when he was hit by
    a water balloon. F.N.L. left the living room, went to the separate bedroom, and climbed in
    the bed. F.N.L. stated that Shelton was not in the room because he was participating in the
    water-balloon fight. Shortly after, F.N.L. fell back to sleep.
    ¶7.    At approximately 6 a.m., F.N.L. awoke to Shelton’s hands in his underwear and
    Shelton’s penis in his mouth. F.N.L. testified that he pushed Shelton away, went outside to
    the dock, and stayed out there until everyone else woke up. F.N.L. stated that, later that
    morning, he told his friend, Jessica Andrews, that he had woken up to Shelton’s hands in his
    underwear. According to F.N.L., Shelton did not say anything until the next morning when
    he apologized via text message.
    ¶8.    Following the retreat, F.N.L. stopped going to church for about three to four weeks.
    He stated that, when he returned, Shelton apologized, asked him not to tell anyone about their
    sexual interaction, and offered to make it up to F.N.L. F.N.L. then began to allow Shelton
    to give him and his friends rides and take them out to eat.
    3
    ¶9.    F.N.L. turned eighteen years old on December 27, 2008. He testified that, on January
    8, 2009, he contacted Shelton about getting a ride to Wal-Mart to buy a phone card, and
    Shelton agreed to give him the ride. F.N.L. testified that, after they left Wal-Mart, Shelton
    drove to a self-storage building, parked, locked the doors, and forced F.N.L. to perform oral
    sex. Afterwards, Shelton dropped F.N.L. back off at his grandmother’s house.
    ¶10.   F.N.L. testified that, after the incident, he was scared and decided to confide in his ex-
    girlfriend, Heather Richardson. Richardson then called F.N.L.’s grandmother, who later
    informed his mother. On January 9, 2009, F.N.L. filed a report with the Lowndes County
    Sheriff’s Office claiming that he had been sexually assaulted by Shelton. F.N.L. testified that
    his statement with the sheriff’s office inaccurately stated that Shelton’s mouth was on his
    penis. However, he corrected this statement during his testimony.
    ¶11.   At trial, Tony Cooper, a detective with the sheriff’s office, testified that he was
    present when F.N.L. gave his statement to Detective Tony Perkins. Subsequently, Detective
    Cooper obtained statements from Shelton regarding both the 2008 and 2009 incidents
    reported by F.N.L. In these statements, which were admitted into evidence at trial, Shelton
    admitted that he had consensual oral sex with F.N.L. on January 8, 2009. Shelton also stated
    that he and F.N.L. engaged in sexually explicit text messaging for months prior to January
    8, 2009. However, Shelton denied any sexual allegations regarding the incident in July 2008.
    ¶12.   James Eads Jr. also testified on behalf of the State. Eads stated that he was pastor of
    Eastview Baptist in 2008 and had attended the youth retreat that summer. During the retreat,
    Eads was told by his niece, Andrews, that Shelton had done something to F.N.L. He testified
    that he approached F.N.L., who admitted that he had woken up to Shelton’s hand in his
    4
    underwear. Eads confronted Shelton about the incident, but testified that Shelton denied any
    involvement and later told him that he worked out the issue with F.N.L. on his own.
    ¶13.   After the State rested its case, the defense moved for a directed verdict. The motion
    was denied, and subsequently, the defense rested. Following the jury deliberations, Shelton
    was convicted of one count of sexual battery. He was sentenced to twelve years, with five
    years suspended conditioned on post-release supervision, and seven years to serve, all in the
    custody of the MDOC. Shelton then filed a motion for a JNOV or, in the alternative, a new
    trial, which was denied.
    ¶14.   Shelton now appeals, arguing: (1) the circuit erred by denying his motion for a JNOV
    or, in the alternative, a new trial; and (2) the jury instructions did not adequately inform the
    jury of the charge of sexual battery. Finding no error, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
    DISCUSSION
    I.     Sufficiency of the Evidence
    ¶15.   On appeal, Shelton challenges the circuit court’s denial of his motion for a JNOV or,
    in the alternative, a new trial. A motion for a JNOV challenges the sufficiency of the
    evidence. Bush v. State, 
    895 So. 2d 836
    , 843 (¶16) (Miss. 2005) (citing Carr v. State, 
    208 So. 2d 886
    , 889 (Miss. 1968)). In contrast to a motion for a JNOV, a motion for a new trial
    challenges the weight of the evidence. 
    Id. at 844
    (¶18) (citing Herring v. State, 
    691 So. 2d 948
    , 957 (Miss. 1997)). Shelton argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
    conviction of sexual battery. Since Shelton does not assign error to the weight of the
    evidence, we decline to address the denial of his motion for a new trial.
    ¶16.   In order for the evidence to be found sufficient to sustain a conviction, the evidence
    5
    must show “beyond a reasonable doubt that [the] accused committed the act charged, and that
    he did so under such circumstances that every element of the offense existed[.]” 
    Id. at 843
    (¶16) (citing 
    Carr, 208 So. 2d at 889
    ). This Court will reverse a conviction only if the
    evidence “point[s] in favor of the defendant on any element of the offense with sufficient
    force that reasonable [jurors] could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the
    defendant was guilty.” 
    Id. (quoting Edwards
    v. State, 
    469 So. 2d 68
    , 70 (Miss. 1985)).
    ¶17.   Shelton was convicted under Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-95(2) (Rev.
    2006), which provides:
    A person is guilty of sexual battery if he or she engages in sexual penetration
    with a child under the age of eighteen (18) years if the person is in a position
    of trust or authority over the child including without limitation the child's
    teacher, counselor, physician, psychiatrist, psychologist, minister, priest,
    physical therapist, chiropractor, legal guardian, parent, stepparent, aunt, uncle,
    scout leader or coach.
    On appeal, Shelton argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
    element of sexual penetration. Specifically, Shelton argues that F.N.L.’s testimony at trial
    regarding the 2008 incident conflicted with his statements prior to trial. Shelton maintains
    that, at all times prior to trial, F.N.L. never stated that Shelton forced him to perform oral sex
    in July 2008. Shelton asserts that the prosecution only proved that Shelton touched the
    genitals of F.N.L., and not sexual penetration.
    ¶18.   Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-97(a) (Rev. 2006) defines sexual penetration
    as, “cunnilingus, fellatio, buggery or pederasty, any penetration of the genital or anal
    openings of another person's body by any part of a person's body, and insertion of any object
    into the genital or anal openings of another person's body.” F.N.L. testified that his statement
    6
    with the sheriff’s office inaccurately stated that Shelton’s mouth was on his penis. However,
    he corrected this statement during his testimony. He stated that he was seventeen years old
    in July 2008 when Shelton forced him to perform oral sex. This conduct clearly falls within
    the conduct provided by the statute.
    ¶19.   This Court has held “that the unsupported testimony of a sex-crime victim is sufficient
    to support a guilty verdict where that testimony is not discredited or contradicted by other
    credible evidence, especially if the conduct of the victim is consistent with the conduct of one
    who has been victimized by a sex crime.” Faulkner v. State, 
    109 So. 3d 142
    , 149 (¶31)
    (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Riley v. State, 
    797 So. 2d 285
    , 288 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App.
    2001)). After a review of the record, we cannot find that F.N.L.’s unsupported testimony
    regarding the explicit details of his sexual encounter with Shelton was discredited or
    contradicted.
    ¶20.   In his reply brief, Shelton raises a new argument regarding the sufficiency of the
    evidence as it pertains to the element of position of trust or authority. This issue, however,
    was not addressed in his initial brief. “We will not consider issues raised for the first time
    in an appellant’s reply brief.” Nelson v. State, 
    69 So. 3d 50
    , 52 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011)
    (citing Sanders v. State, 
    678 So. 2d 663
    , 669-70 (Miss. 1996)). We find that the State
    presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict and Shelton’s conviction of sexual
    battery. As such, this issue is without merit.
    II.      Jury Instruction
    ¶21.   Shelton also challenges the definition of sexual battery while in a position of trust or
    authority, as provided by Jury Instruction S-3. Jury Instruction S-3 provided:
    7
    The Court instructs the Jury that if you find from the evidence in this case
    beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant, Benjamin Shelton[,] did on or
    about July 19, 2008, unlawfully, willfully, [and] feloniously[ ] engage in
    sexual penetration with [F.N.L.], a child under the age of 18, the said
    Benjamin Shelton being in a position of trust or authority over [F.N.L.], the[n]
    you shall find the Defendant guilty as charged in Count 2. If the State has
    failed to prove any of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
    shall find the Defendant not guilty.
    ¶22.   Specifically, Shelton argues that this instruction failed to adequately define sexual
    penetration and position of trust or authority. However, during the conference on jury
    instructions, Shelton’s attorney declined to object to Jury Instruction S-3 and agreed that it
    was a correct statement of law. “In order to preserve a jury[-]instruction issue on appeal, a
    party must make a specific objection to the proposed instruction in order to allow the lower
    court to consider the issue.” Crawford v. State, 
    787 So. 2d 1236
    , 1244-45 (¶35) (Miss.
    2001). Therefore, this instruction may not be challenged on appeal, and this issue is also
    without merit. As such, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
    ¶23. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWNDES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF
    CONVICTION OF SEXUAL BATTERY AND SENTENCE OF TWELVE YEARS IN
    THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
    WITH SEVEN YEARS TO SERVE AND FIVE YEARS SUSPENDED
    CONDITIONED ON POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION, AND TO PAY A $1,000 FINE,
    IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
    APPELLANT.
    LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, ROBERTS, CARLTON,
    MAXWELL AND FAIR, JJ., CONCUR. JAMES, J., CONCURS IN PART
    WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2012-KA-01556-COA

Citation Numbers: 172 So. 3d 216, 2014 Miss. App. LEXIS 607

Judges: Irving, Ishee, Maxwell, James, Lee, Griffis, Barnes, Roberts, Carlton, Fair

Filed Date: 10/28/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024